Research
Publications
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures, with Dongsoo Shin and Roland Strausz, Journal of Industrial Economics 71/1 (2023), pages 256-290. Working paper version
Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider, with Dongsoo Shin and Roland Strausz, The RAND Journal of Economics: 52-2 (2021), pages 314-333. Working paper version
Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation, with Okan Yilankaya, International Journal of Industrial Organization: 54 (2017), pages 148-174. Working paper version
Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design, with Michael Peters, Canadian Journal of Economics, 49-1 (2016), pages 374-411. Working paper version
Implementation by Gradual Revelation, The RAND Journal of Economics: 46-2 (2015), pages 271–296. Working paper version
Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism, with Michael Peters, Games and Economic Behavior: 73-2 (2011), pages 375-387. Working paper version
Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation, with Okan Yilankaya, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Advances): Vol. 9: Iss. 1 (2009), Article 24. Working paper version
Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision, Journal of Economic Theory, 144-1 (2009), pages 69-95. Working paper version
On the Optimality of Nonmaximal Fines in the Presence of Corruptible Law Enforcers, with Serdar Sayan, Review of Economic Design, 12-3 (2008), pages 209-227. Working paper version
Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Contributions): Vol. 8: Iss. 1 (2008), Article 3. Working paper version
Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints, Games and Economic Behavior: 56-1 (2006), pages 37-44. Working paper version
Working Papers
Resolving Child Custody Disputes Efficiently, with Nejat Anbarci (2023). Revision requested by International Economic Review, Non-technical outline
Communication in Binary Decisions, with Françoise Forges and Sergei Severinov.
Equilibrium Uniqueness in Committees, with Sergei Severinov
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