Downward, Substance, Structural Causation (M. Paolini Paoletti)

Abstract

Downward causation is causation of lower-level effects by higher-level entities. For example, if I am a higher-level entity with respect to my neurons, I can downwardly cause something involving my neurons. Downward causation is associated with emergence. Within an emergentist framework, downward causation is fundamental, irreducible causation of lower-level effects (at the emergence bases) by emergent entities.

In this talk, I shall describe and defend a model of downward causation that is based on substance-structural causation: the Downward, Substance, Structural Causation (D.S.S.C.) model. Firstly, I shall make some ontological assumptions about substance causation, powers and external relations – since structures are external relations, at least within my perspective. Secondly, I shall define emergent powers using the distinction between the possession and the activation of a power. Finally, taking mental causation as an example of downward causation, I shall introduce my D.S.S.C. model and I shall defend three theses that characterize it.