wittgensteins lectures

Huangshan Area

Wittgensteins Lectures Cambridge, 1930-1933 from the Notes of G.E. Moore edited by D.G. Stern, Brian Rogers, Gabriel Citron

BY BETTINA MUELLER

Recurring to the introduction of the book it is mentioned that this phase is known as the middle Wittgenstein. The Wittgenstein between his early work which is known or associated with the Tractatus logico philosophicus and his later work with the Philosophical Investigations.

These notes are from G.E. Moore who attended Wittgensteins class and his notes are well done and described as „Moore´s notes as they appear in this volume are the fullest and most reliable record of what Wittgenstein said in those classes of the early 1930s.“[1]

Notes of this lecture have been published also by Desmond Lee and Alice Ambrose. The students attending his class are also named as Julian Bell, S.K. Bose, Karl Britton, Maurice O´Connor (Con) Drury, A.C. Ewing, Reuben Goodstein, David Guest, John Inman, D.G. James, John King, Desmond Lee, Margret Masterman, J.B. Nansen, A.J. Shillinglaw, Francis Skinner, C.L. Stevenson, Raymond Townsend, Harold Ursell W.H. Watson, and L.C. Young.

G.E. Moore published his summarized lecture notes in a series of articles entitled „Wittgenstein´s Lectures in 1930-33 in „Mind“ between 1954 and 1955[2]

But this weren´t direct quotation and more a summery of what Wittgenstein said and Moores critical evaluations of his view. Also the published notes from Lee and Ambrose involved enormous editorial reconstruction...[3] He himself describes in the preface of „Wittgenstein Vorlesungen 1930 – 1932“[4] that King tries to write more literally while he himself tries to catch the idea behind. Ambrose also thanks others for their notes they were used for the book. An he puts his notes and the other notes together. So the original notes are nearby away with this methode.

Wittgenstein is described as an interesting lecturer. G.H. von Wright recalled him not having a manuscript or notes and that he thought before the class.[5] Moores role was to help to move the discussion forward.[6]

Karl Britton:

„At all events we had the impression that a kind of dialogue was going on between Moore and Wittgenstein, even when Moore was least obviously being ´brought in´.[7]

Wittgenstein and Moore showed also a deep friendship. Ambrose described this as follows:

Wittgenstein „used Moore as a touchstone to test his own clarity of thought and exposition... he respected Moore greatly and had discussions with him 86 Chesterton Road (Moore´s home) once a week during term, on a day Moore specially set aside for him.“[8]

1933 after the May term Moore stopped attending Wittgensteins lectures and Wittgenstein started to join small students classes to whom he dictated his ideas. That was the way the Blue Book arises. In that context might also be seen Wittgensteins lecture about Ethics which is named in the book „Wittgenstein Vorlesungen 1930 – 1932“ which is dated on the 17. Nov. 1929 at the Heretics Society in Cambridge.[9]

So in this essay one point should be considered more detailed which is the „definition“ in Michaelmas Term 1932.[10]

Wittgenstein introduces his ideas in telling on the one hand that the use of the word „meaning“ is as follows. And on the other hand that the big idea is to avoid confusions. This short statement is now explained with two possibilities and examples.

(1) using names for a process accompanying use of a word

(2) meaning as defined by a grammatical rule which applies to the word

So one example is H2O and water. You might define water with the expression H2O or vice versa.

„You might write „water = H2O“, meaning I shall from now on use „water“ where I have used H2O.“[11]

Another definiton for water would be incorrect or „private“ : H3O. If someone uses H3O for water it would be misleading and it won´t be a definition,

This remembers us to or introduces the theme of rulefollowing which is broadly discussed in the Philosophical Investigations.

What is the relationship between a person and it´s name? So this should be considered: different persons might have the same name while a thing like water, a chair or a table is always named or defined normally in a not confusing way.

So Wittgenstein points out if someone says, „A“ is ill so it is meant the person but not the name.

„That person may be ill; but the meaning of A can´t be ill. The person is bearer of the name.“[12]

How to use a color? Is the use of a red patch a synonym for „red“? A defintion might be used in that way, but that definition is not the explanation for a word.

Wittgenstein states that you might explain things by giving rules in that way, also like chess.

Going back to someone who is the bearer of a name.

Napoleon might be defined in this way that he is the person who won the battle of Austerlitz.

Or Moses: Moses is the man found by Pharaoh´s daughter in a basket. Moses ist he person who led Israelities across Red Sea.

Saul Kripke wrote in his book naming and necessity about this problem, too. He explains that the persons defined in these ways might be these persons also without doing some special things. So Moses and how he is described might be different. He brings there a great idea for history. History might be different, there is no causality.

So a number e.g. might be explained by a rule or a game. If someone says, there is only one door in the room we know the meaning of the proposition „1“.

„Let´s give several games, which we can compare with people´s actual use.

Suppose one wanted to ask : What properties has 1? One answer would be „There is only one window in this room.“[13]

Wittgenstein also describes arbitrary rules you can´t follow, e.g. come into the room and don´t come into the room.

And he points out that we might have a feeling of a word, like „no“.

And summarising these considerations Wittgenstein explains that rules are defining and constituing rules which is close to the PI, the § 201 and § 202.

„I will distinguish between these 2 meanings of „meaning“: I´m going to talk of the sense of meaning, in which the rules define or constitute the meaning.“[14]

In the PI is this characterised as paradox.

So maybe it is possible to talk about a distinguish middle Wittgenstein, because on the one hand considerations of the PI find here their roots on the other hand the idea of defining words are new. All of this is also in a relationship with the difficult source situation That parts of his work are mixed by his students and published in this way.

Literature:

Wittgensteins Lectures Cambridge, 1930-1933 from the Notes of G.E. Moore edited by D.G. Stern, Brian Rogers, Gabriel Citron

Wittgenstein Vorlesungen, 1930 – 1935, Frankfurt 1989,

Kripke, Saul Naming and Necessity

[1] Wittgensteins Lectures Cambridge, 1930-1933 from the Notes of G.E. Moore edited by D.G. Stern, Brian Rogers, Gabriel Citron, Pos. 138

[2] ebd, Pos. 141

[3] ebd, Pos. 152

[4] Wittgenstein Vorlesungen, 1930 – 1935, Frankfurt 1989, S. 12

[5] Wittgensteins Lectures Cambridge, 1930-1933 from the Notes of G.E. Moore, Pos 345

[6] ebd, Pos 354

[7] ebd. Pos. 358

[8] ebd. Pos. 410

[9] Wittgenstein Vorlesungen, 1930 – 1935, Frankfurt 1989, S.17

[10] Wittgensteins Lectures Cambridge, 1930-1933 from the Notes of G.E. Moore, Pos. 7597

[11] ebd Pos. 7609

[12] ebd. Pos. 7633

[13] ebd. Pos 7694

[14] ebd. Pos 7694