Figure from slack.com
We are a group of researchers from University of Wisconsin-Madison and University of California San Diego. In this project, we studied the security and privacy risks posed by third-party apps in business collaboration platforms such as Slack and Microsoft Teams.
We conducted an experimental security analysis of the third-party app model in two widely-used Business Collaboration Platforms (BCPs) — Microsoft Teams and Slack. Specifically, we examined various types of interactions between BCP apps and users and discovered that the access control systems in BCPs cannot adequately confine a third-party app's behaviors. Therefore, such design flaws allow malicious apps to escalate their privilege and violate the confidentiality and integrity of different resources in BCP workspaces.
Business Collaboration Platforms (BCPs), like Slack and Microsoft Teams, are indispensable collaboration and productivity tools. Beyond multi-user chat features, BCPs allow users to install third-party apps. For example, users can initiate video calls with Zoom or store files on DropBox inside their own BCP workspace. The widespread usage of BCPs in remote work environments implies that a lot of sensitive information passes through them. With the potential ability to access such information, BCP apps can lead to serious security and privacy concerns.
We find that there are inherent design flaws in the access control model of BCPs, causing it to violate security principles such as least privilege and complete mediation. This allows malicious apps to escalate their privilege and violate the confidentiality and integrity of private chat messages and third-party resources connected to BCPs.
Suppose you are installing an app (which is secretly under an attacker's control) into your BCP workspace. Even if you have carefully checked the permissions requested by the app and ensured that no sensitive data are granted to it, the attacker can still exploit these design flaws to bypass the expected access control enforced by BCP. For example, the attacker can:
Abuse other benign apps to send emails on your behalf.
Abuse other benign apps to retweet any content using your account.
Hijack your interaction with the official Zoom app and create attacker-controlled Zoom meetings.
Leak private messages that it does not have permission to read.
You can find the video demos of these attacks below.
A malicious app can appear in your trusted workspace in many different ways:
An attacker tricks one of the users to install a malicious app.
A user of the workspace is curious of other's private data and turns into an attacker.
A previously installed benign app is compromised or becomes malicious.
Attack Demos
BCP apps can interactively chat with users through text messages. Such interactions can be abused by a malicious app via delegated actions and lead to security-critical consequences.
Attacker can exploit benign apps to merge their PRs.
Attacker can exploit benign apps to send emails as you.
BCPs provide features such as slash command and link unfurling to serve as entry points for users to interact with apps. A malicious app can hijack other app’s registered entry points and deceive users.
Attacker creates the meeting, not you.
Attacker hijacks the ability to unfurl links registered by other apps.
We analyzed the different ways in which BCP apps interact with user messages and found that a malicious app can leak messages from private channels without having the proper permission.
Extract messages from private channels by sending message links to users and reading Slack's automatically unfurled results.
Yunang Chen, Yue Gao, Nick Ceccio, Rahul Chatterjee, Kassem Fawaz, and Earlence Fernandes
Experimental Security Analysis of the App Model in Business Collaboration Platforms
In 31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 22), August 2022
@inproceedings{bcpapp22,
author = {Yunang Chen and Yue Gao and Nick Ceccio and Rahul Chatterjee and Kassem Fawaz and Earlence Fernandes},
title = {Experimental Security Analysis of the App Model in Business Collaboration Platforms},
booktitle = {31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 22)},
year = {2022},
isbn = {978-1-939133-31-1},
address = {Boston, MA},
pages = {2011--2028},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity22/presentation/chen-yunang-experimental},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = aug,
}
Yunang Chen, Ph.D. Student, University of Wisconsin–Madison
Yue Gao, Ph.D. Student, University of Wisconsin–Madison
Nick Ceccio, Ph.D. Student, University of Wisconsin–Madison
Rahul Chatterjee, Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin–Madison
Kassem Fawaz, Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin–Madison
Earlence Fernandes, Assistant Professor, University of California, San Diego
Have more questions? Contact us at https://twitter.com/madison_sp