The investigations of coordination issues between individual and social interests have become increasingly vital in the analysis of multiagent systems within forthcoming smart societies. To delve into coordination issues, game theory has emerged as one of the disciplines exploring the intricate relations between human decision-making and resulting phenomena on a broader scale. With self-interested nature, each agent strives to enhance its own profits by adopting rational strategies. This pursuit culminates in the establishment of a Nash equilibrium concept in the sense of static games. For the noncooperative systems with dynamic agents, several dynamics are considered in the literature for capturing agents’ selfish decision behaviors. For example, the pseudo-gradient dynamics and best-response dynamics model agents’ continuous decision behaviors and have been applied to solve engineering problems. 

To handle the issue of social utility degradation (e.g., the tragedy of the commons), several incentive mechanisms have been imposed to noncooperative systems as external rules in order to change agents’ decision-making tendencies and hence enlarge the social welfare. For instance, the effectiveness of taxes and subsidies was investigated for congestion games to understand the influence of incentives to the performance of the game. Fabiani and Simonetto proposed a light-touch policy to incentivize or penalize the service providers to steer a networked system towards a targeted outcome, whereas Riehl et al. considered coordination games to study how a binary decision network can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium state by offering payoff incentives or rewards for using a particular strategy.