Yishai Cohen

I am an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Southern Maine. I received my undergraduate degree in philosophy and religious studies from Southern Methodist University and my PhD in philosophy from Syracuse University. My areas of interest include free will, ethics, metaphysics, and the philosophy of religion. Here's a link to my CV.

Papers

Forthcoming. "Probabilism: An Open Future Solution to the Actualism/Possibilism Debate", Journal of the American Philosophical Association. (with Travis Timmerman)

Forthcoming. “Freedom and the Open Future”, Analytic Philosophy.

2020. “The Limits of Virtue Ethics”, Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 10: 255–282. (with Travis Timmerman)

2020. “Actualism, Possibilism, and the Nature of Consequentialism”, in the Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism, Douglas W. Portmore (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 139–161. (with Travis Timmerman)

2019. “Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/actualism-possibilism-ethics/>. (with Travis Timmerman)

2018. “An Analysis of Recent Empirical Data on ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’”, Philosophia 46 (1): 57–67.

2018. “Deliberating in the Presence of Manipulation”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1): 85–105.

2017. “Atonement’s Axiological Boundaries”, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (3): 177–195.

2017. “Fischer’s Deterministic Frankfurt-Style Argument”, Erkenntnis 82 (1): 121–140.

2016. “Actualism Has Control Issues”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (3): 1–18. (with Travis Timmerman)

2016. “Moral Obligations: Actualist, Possibilist, or Hybridist?”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4): 672–686. (with Travis Timmerman)

2016. “Leeway Compatibilism and Frankfurt-Style Cases”, Thought 5 (2): 89–98.

2016. “Counterfactuals of Divine Freedom”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 (3): 185–205.

2015. “Endless Future: A Persistent Thorn in the Kalām Cosmological Argument”, Philosophical Papers 44 (2): 165–187.

·   Reprinted in The Kalam Cosmological Argument, Volume 1: Philosophical Arguments for the Finitude of the Past, eds. Paul Copan and William Lane Craig (Bloomsbury Press, 2017).

2015. “The Manipulation, at the Very Least, Undermines Classical Compatibilism”, Philosophia 43 (2): 291–307.

2015. “Molinists (Still) Cannot Endorse the Consequence Argument”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (3): 231–246.

2015. “Reasons-Responsiveness and Time Travel”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy: 1–7.

2015. “Agential-Settling Requires a Conscious Intention”, Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (1): 140–155.

2014. “Don’t Count on Taurek: Vindicating the Case for the Numbers Counting”, Res Publica 20 (3): 245–261.

2013. “Skeptical Theism and the Threshold Problem”, Forum Philosophicum 18 (1): 73–92.