Xuyang Xia
Ph.D. Candidate in Economics, Duke University
I study IO and market design, with a primary focus on the health industry. I am on the 2026–2027 economics job market.
Many designed markets rely on intermediaries to allocate scarce resources. I study how transplant centers' incentives and private information shape deceased-donor liver allocation. Donor livers are offered to patients according to centralized priority lists, but transplant centers screen candidates and accept offers on their behalf. Using nationwide administrative data, I document that center competition affects both patient screening and offer acceptance decisions, and I estimate a game of incomplete information among centers. My estimates show that in 10% of transplants, centers bypass the highest-ranked patient who would benefit in favor of another patient. Centers possess valuable private information about transplant suitability, but rigid allocation rules limit its use. Allowing the nearest center to choose the recipient of each organ would increase the value of transplants by 8.3% and reduce one-year graft failure or death by 26.8% (from a baseline of 8.25%), partly by directing organs to less urgent patients. Other flexible designs can improve transplant value while preserving priority for urgent patients.
R&R at the Journal of Health Economics
Latest draft (First draft Feb 2026)
Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory 2026
Latest draft (First draft Nov 2025)
ASHEcon 2025, BFI Health Econ Initiative 2026, NBER Geography and Health 2026
2025 ASHEcon Program Chair Award: Competition in Health Care Markets
Coverage: CBS News (article, TV, a message my coauthor's mom got from her friend), Managed Healthcare Executive, Healio, Physician's Weekly
Policy: Sen. Richard Blumenthal's letter to FTC, Kidney Care National Plan (HHS)
Coverage: Chicago Booth Review
Draft coming soon