Any Times are MST
Koray Akcaguner, What Counts as Proof?
Mathematical proofs are often classified into different kinds, such as diagrammatic, algebraic, combinatorial, formal, constructive... Different kinds of proof are favored by different mathematicians and in different periods of time. There are theorems for which we have a large number of different proofs, and there are proofs that establish seemingly contradictory theorems, mostly found in constructive mathematics. It is natural to ask: Within this vast variety of proofs, are some less adequate than others, or more deserving of being called a "proof"? We argue that this question cannot be resolved solely within mathematical methodology but instead constitutes a metamethodological issue. Mathematicians rely on specific criteria to evaluate whether a given argument qualifies as a proof. These criteria, however, are open to interpretation, and their relative importance can vary between individuals. While mathematical findings influence the assessment of proofs, the process of interpreting and prioritizing these criteria involves judgments that extend beyond mathematics. In this talk, I will propose a list of criteria used to evaluate proofs and briefly discuss each. I will illustrate their application through a few examples, showing how they shape the acceptance and evaluation of proofs.
Sophia Kimiagari, Is Feminist Logic A Posteriori?
Is logic suitable for feminist purposes a priori? In this talk, I examine a defining characteristic of feminist logic and argue that it aligns more closely with an anti-exceptionalist view of logic, which interprets logic as a posteriori rather than a priori. While the exceptionalist perspective assumes logic to be independent of experience, the anti-exceptionalist approach contends that logic incorporates facts from the empirical world and can be revised using empirical evidence I will illustrate this by engaging with Andrea Nye’s and Caroll Guen Hart’s critiques of logic and apriority of logic.
Kent Peacock, John Doe Meets the King of France
In this talk I will present an informal account of how I symbolize denoting phrases such as "a Siamese cat" or "the present King of France." My notation could be called "an epsilon calculus without the epsilon". It allows us to broaden the usual conception of a term in first order predicate logic and provides a natural way to define "John Doe" generic names that can be used in Existential Instantiation. It also gives us another way to symbolize definite descriptions and streamline the usual textbook proofs using them. As time permits I'll discuss the application of this notation (which is really Hilbert's notation) to the universal quantifier.