Workshop in Logics for Multi-Agent Systems

Michael Thielscher (University of New South Wales)

Title: Acting in continuous time: Normal-form games with timing

Date and time: September 2nd at 10:40 am

Abstract:

In many applications of multi-agent systems, agents can act in continuous time. Game-theoretic models with continuous time possess unique features such as the possibility for agents to move sequentially yet at the same time. A basic model for 2-player games in continuous time are the so-called Wars of Attrition by Hendricks, Weiss and Wilson [1988], in which the payoff is determined solely by the timing of the players, i.e., they only decide when to act but cannot choose among different actions. In this talk, I will take the first step towards generalising this model by investigating general 2x2 matrix games extended by continuous time and discounting, where agents do not only choose when to act but also which of two actions to take. I will present general criteria under which these extended games can be reduced to the basic model by Hendricks, Weiss and Wilson for the purpose of determining the sub-game perfect equilibria. Specifically I will show that games with only a mixed Nash equilibrium typically lead to Wars of Attrition while matrix games with a pure Nash equilibrium never do.

The Workshop invited talks and coffee break will take place in room MF105 at the Manufacture des Tabacs of the University Toulouse 1 Capitole.

See the detailed building map here (look for Building F).