How Beliefs Affect Color Perception

This opinion piece, by Mariano Frare-Finnerty, was published on 11/12/24.

Cognitive penetration is the idea that beliefs, desires, and emotions directly shape the content of human perceptual experiences in a semantically coherent way. Contrary to instances where cognitive states influence perception indirectly, such as shifts in attention, cognitive penetration demands that cognitive states directly shape and alter the perceptual content itself. Cognitive penetration is significant as it challenges the traditional idea that perception processes the world independently of our beliefs or ideas. Although some argue that color vision is not cognitively penetrable, I contend it is penetrable when considering Fiona Macpherson's argument based on Delk and Fillenbaum's 1965 case study. Fiona Macpherson's argument compellingly demonstrates how Delk and Fillenbaum's study showcases how what humans believe, expect, and think can influence how humans perceive color, offering the most convincing instance where color vision is cognitively penetrable.

In 1965, Delk and Fillenbaum examined how cognitive factors affect subjects' visual perception. They cut out different object shapes on an orange paper sheet for their experiment. The cutout shapes included shapes that were usually seen as red, such as shapes of a heart, a pair of lips, and an apple. They also cut out shapes of objects that were not generally seen as red, such as an oval, a horse's head, and a bell. Delk and Fillenbaum then placed the different cutout shapes on a background that could have its color changed by turning a knob. The subjects were then told to alter the background colors so the cutout shapes would blend with the background until the shape was the same color as the cutout shape in front of it, to the point that the cutout shape was indistinguishable from the background. When the cutout shape of an object that had a typically red color, such as a heart, was placed in front of the background, the subjects selected a background color that was redder than the color they selected the background to be when the cutout shape was of an object that did not have a typical red color.

Macpherson argues that under some circumstances, such as in Delk and Fillenbaum's 1965 case study, human beliefs can influence perceptual inferences in a semantically coherent way. She asserts, "The subjects' beliefs… penetrated their perceptual experience of those cutout shapes, thereby altering the content and phenomenal character of those experiences (Macpherson 39). This statement is compelling as it takes beliefs from a mere correlation with visual processing by establishing a causal relationship between cognitive beliefs and perceptual processing. This is significant because the cognitive states of the subjects appear to be directly influencing their visual experience, suggesting that what humans see contains our beliefs about the world, challenging the idea of traditional perception theories that suggest otherwise. Macpherson strengthens her argument by mentioning that the subjects had experiences of the cutout shapes that represented the cutout shapes as being more red than they were. Thus, in this manner, Macpherson's argument underscores the idea that the subjects' beliefs did not accompany their perceptual experiences of the color but actively shaped their perceptual experiences. This argument highlights how, in this circumstance, the subjects' prior beliefs directly affected their perceptual experience and caused them to have their perceptual experience altered. In this manner, Macpherson's argument provides a compelling case where cognitive penetration appears to occur. 

Some may argue that the subjects accurately perceive the correct shade of orange but misjudge it as redder than it is, as their prior beliefs cause them to think otherwise. For example, one might contend that the subjects are looking at the background and the heart shape and are unsure what color it is, so they judge the background as redder. However, this counterexample fails to deconstruct Macpherson's argument effectively. Macpherson says, "…What we are to imagine is that the subject's experiences of the colors are different, yet the subject judges the colors to be the same...they involve attributing a gross form of misjudgment to the subject" (Macpherson 41). Therefore, rejecting the claim about cognitive penetration creates challenges by assuming judgment errors on the part of the subjects, although the subjects are directly attending to the shape and background. This is not plausible in this situation, as the critical point of this experiment is that the subjects are looking at the screen and heart, matching the color and trying to make it the same color. Thus, it is hard to see the effects of this experiment, which are attention or memory affecting what they see. In this manner, the simplest explanation for this instance is that it is an effect of perpetual experience on the basis that cognitive penetration is occurring. In that case, the subject's vision is impacted by their beliefs regarding how they typically believe the color of the shape to be, which does not require judgment errors. Thus, cognitive influence offers a more straightforward and consistent argument, making perceptual misrepresentation more plausible than some misjudgment by the subjects that seem out of place within the context of this experiment. 

In sum, cognitive penetration remains a highly contested concept that is still debated within the philosophy of perception, continuing to challenge traditional theories on perception. With this in mind, Macpherson's argument concerning Delk and Fillenbaum's 1965 case study remains one of the most compelling instances where cognitive penetration appears to be occurring. Nevertheless, this argument does not settle the debate entirely on cognitive penetration but instead provides an excellent foundation for further inquiry and experimentation. Additional questions remain, such as what role cognitive penetration plays in other aspects of visual perception and the extent to which cognitive penetration influences what we see. 

Works Cited

MACPHERSON, FIONA. “Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 84, no. 1, 17 Feb. 2011, pp. 24–62, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00481.x.

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