Rupert Lowe’s suspension from Reform UK in March 2025 marked a turning point in the relationship between Farage and Lowe. Had events unfolded differently, Restore Britain might never have emerged as a separate political party. Its subsequent arrival has raised questions about the potential impact of a divided right on the next General Election.
Since Restore Britain’s formation, Reform UK’s polling position has weakened. Reform’s vote share has fallen from 25.9% to 21.9%, while Restore Britain has established itself as a separate political force, polling at around 4.3%. Although several factors could explain Reform’s decline, the emergence of a party competing for some of the same voters presents a potential challenge to Nigel Farage’s electoral ambitions.
The implications extend beyond national polling. Recent council by-elections have provided examples of contests in which the presence of Restore Britain may have influenced the outcome. In two such cases, the results suggest that Reform could have won had Restore Britain not stood. These examples highlight how even a relatively small share of the vote can prove significant in closely contested elections.
The potential consequences become more apparent when examining constituency-level projections. Under a hypothetical scenario in which Restore Britain does not contest the next General Election, the following figures illustrate how the parliamentary landscape could look based off the 15 October 2026 Nowcast.
Hypothetical General Election projection without Restore Britain
🔴 Labour: 244 seats (-57)
➡️ Reform UK: 170 seats (+91)
🔵 Conservatives: 86 seats (-29)
🟠 Liberal Democrats: 72 seats (+0)
🟡 SNP: 38 seats (+0)
🌼 Plaid Cymru: 7 seats (-2)
🟢 Greens: 6 seats (+0)
👤 Others: 9 seats (-2)
These figures suggest that Reform could be a major beneficiary if Restore Britain were absent from the electoral contest. In this scenario, Reform would gain 91 seats compared with the 15/10/26 Nowcast projection, while Labour would remain the largest party on 244 seats. The Conservatives would also be projected to lose 29 seats.
However, this is a hypothetical projection rather than a prediction of what would necessarily happen. It assumes that the absence of Restore Britain would translate into a different distribution of votes and seats. In reality, former Restore supporters might not all switch to Reform, and changes in turnout, tactical voting and support for other parties could alter the outcome.
Nevertheless, the figures raise an important question about the future of the British right. With Reform, the Conservatives and Restore Britain competing for support, divisions between parties may have consequences that extend beyond their individual polling figures. In first-past-the-post elections, the distribution of votes between competing parties can be just as important as their overall national support.
For Nigel Farage, the challenge is therefore not simply to improve Reform’s headline polling numbers. It is also to understand why some voters have chosen to support Restore Britain instead, and whether those voters could be persuaded to return.
Whether Restore Britain ultimately proves to be a significant obstacle to Reform’s electoral ambitions will depend on how the parties perform as the next General Election approaches. What is clear from this scenario is that the relationship between the two parties could play an important role in determining how votes translate into parliamentary seats.