PhD Abstract:

Ecological Theory of Concepts: Towards a New Ontology of Concepts 

Abstract

The debate on the nature of concepts has been always critical to philosophy. Contemporary empirical theories specifically demand that regularities in cognition, whether causally described or not, be the main explanandum for concepts. Since the 1980’s, we have vested hopes into various programs, from inferentialism to Fodor’s atomism, but each has fallen short. Confronted with these setbacks, recent advancements seek solutions by expanding conceptual frameworks by integrating cognized real-world context. This project expands on this idea and broadens the factors that constitute concepts to the whole environment. This presents an ecological theory of concepts. Simultaneously, this challenges a commonly held assumption: individuals, as cognitive agents, are not sufficient for concepts nor concept creation. This proposes a fundamental change in the ontology of concepts.

This is evidently reminiscent of the Gibsonian project in perception. Yet, one of the main tenets of the subsequently emerged ecological psychology is anti-representationalism. I argue that this does not imply that ecological concepts are hopelessly contradictory. Firstly, concepts are a peculiar kind of representation. The relation between them and representations, e.g., in perception, has been sketched in a variety of ways, where it is not so sure why they even need to belong to the same kind. Secondly, minimal versions of representationalism’s have recently emerged within ecological psychology. Therefore, the foundations for my project are already laid. A final step remains: reversing the roles. Now, the cognitive systems is inside an ecosystem of concepts.