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Tvlogic Firmware Download
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Anyone know where to get the latest firmware? Or what it is even. The website says it's upgradable via USB, but I can't find a link to the firmware download anywhere. I can't even sign up to the on site forum thing because it gives me some garbled message about "up characters" or something, slightly random.
Because there is no way to check the process of the firmware upgrade (you only have a black screen), It said that's better to use a memory stick that has led so you can check that the machine is reading the memory stick.
You should go to the "System" page, then select "firmware upgrade" after having put the memory stick into the USB port. If it recognizes the memory stick and the two files it should ask you if you want to process with the upgrade.
When the upgrade start, at first you have the black screen with a white frame and "NO VIDEO" on the bottom left, then few minutes later a full black screen, then few minutes later the screen with the white frame with "NO VIDEO". I think at that moment you can remove the memory stick and restart the monitor.
Also, when I scrolled the zoom function it zoomed in, but not back out again. Even after doing a system default the zoom wouldn't reset itself. I had to reinstall the firmware to reset the zoom. MAJOR BUG. I'll be rolling back if this is actually true, I use the zoom all the time and if it's broken I can't really use the monitor.
here is a download link for the latest firmware from a german reseller.
The link is at the bottom of the page.
Click on 'Download Software'.
The download is provided by the german TVLogic distributor 'Videor' - it's genuine.
Despite this, there is relatively little known about the internals of most smart TVs. While an open-source firmware for Samsung TVs exists ( ), compatibility is extremely limited, supporting only pre-2011 TVs. Because of these reasons, we chose to analyse the Samsung Q60R smart TV in depth.
At the same time, a separate F-Secure team were analyzing the same device, their intention being to find the quickest route to 0day to win the competition (a task they ultimately succeeded in, using a Javascript bug for device compromise).
In this blog post, we aim to document how we went about performing our analysis, in enough detail that it can be replicated, and expanded upon, by the community at large. Our intention is to lower the barrier to entry for analysis of the smart TV. We will not touch on the success of the team that ultimately entered pwn2own or their methodology.
Since UPnP exposes such rich information, including version strings, we wrote a Python script that scans for UPnP services on the network and fetches all related CVEs from In its current iteration, the script simply checks version strings and does not attempt exploitation to confirm that the potential CVE is applicable to the target, and so manual verification is still required. It is available here.
We ran this against the Samsung Q60R, and were initially excited by the large amount of matches. However, it seems that Samsung backported fixes for these bugs without updating version strings, as we were unable to exploit any of them.
Returning to our initial nmap scan, we can see that a HTTP server is present on port 8080. Scanning it with dirbuster did not reveal much useful information, and so we turned to the TV emulator image to see if we could find anything about it.
The next aspect of the TV which we were interested in was the availability of debug facilities, intended for Samsung engineers, which we could abuse to get more information about the running environment. We had initially hoped that it would be easy to get a shell by connecting to debug traces on the board, but this proved unexpectedly difficult. However, our analysis revealed many other interesting details about the system.
We can see a comparison with the integer value 5, and then a comparison with 6. If neither check succeeds, an error path is taken (the large block in the middle).
If we analyse this function further, however, we can determine the significance of the two other blocks, which load R6 with either 0x20 (for VDFS version 5) or 0x28 (for VDFS version 6). This is the size of a structure used to describe the inode in question. We can tweak the Sourceforge driver, adding this code:
One of the steps in analyzing devices such as TVs - the more sophisticated, "consumer-ready" systems - is diving into the update process. As new functionalities, security fixes etc. need to be deployed onto production appliances, having such a process in place is a must-have.
For Samsung TVs, two options worth mentioning are available. Firstly, the online update: packages are downloaded from servers managed by Samsung and (fortunately for customers) cannot be easily intercepted for inspection. Any attempts to do so will result in the TV rejecting the connection.
Fortunately for anyone performing the analysis, however - and customers without an Internet connection - another option is available as well. The package can be downloaded from an official Samsung website and moved onto a flash drive. This flash drive - assuming it contains a valid FAT/exFAT filesystem - can then be used to perform the update process.
The most interesting function - as we want to decrypt the firmware - would be `getEncryptedItemsAESPassphrase`. That function does not seem to contain any logic worth mentioning, though. We can, however, check the functions around the place where `getEncryptedItemsAESPassphrase` is called, as they are likely to be related. In there we can see the following:
As we can see, the AES passphrase used is decrypted using a secure enclave (TrustZone). Unless device access is gained - enabling us to use the shell - the firmware passphrase (and thus the firmware itself) cannot be easily decrypted.
This was, of course, a team effort, intended mostly to facilitate knowledge transfer and have a bit of fun with the "research time" that F-Secure employees have allocated. The team comprised of the following people, who all contributed in one way or another: 152ee80cbc
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