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Ninety-nine police officers, not identified in previous research as belonging to groups that are superior in lie detection, attempted to detect truths and lies told by suspects during their videotaped police interviews. Accuracy rates were higher than those typically found in deception research and reached levels similar to those obtained by specialized lie detectors in previous research. Accuracy was positively correlated with perceived experience in interviewing suspects and with mentioning cues to detecting deceit that relate to a suspect's story. Accuracy was negatively correlated with popular stereotypical cues such as gaze aversion and fidgeting. As in previous research, accuracy and confidence were not significantly correlated, but the level of confidence was dependent on whether officers judged actual truths or actual lies and on the method by which confidence was measured.

But it\u2019s the action that\u2019s really the star here. Every action scene is a banger. The opening snow sequence in Switzerland. The extended chase through the streets leading into the Marriott hotel. Everything involving the Florida Keys. The final sequence in which Arnold Schwarzenegger flies a Harrier jet through downtown.

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According to the subjective view of lying, speakers can lie by asserting a true proposition, as long as they believe this proposition to be false. This view contrasts with the objective view, according to which lying requires the actual falsity of the proposition asserted. The aim of this paper is to draw attention to pairs of assertions that differ only in intuitively redundant content and to show that such pairs of assertions are a reason to favour the subjective view of lying over the objective one.

In this section, we will introduce cases of failed lies and the notion of Moorean redundancy, in order to characterise the relevant class of pairs assertions for which subjective and objective views of lying make differing predictions.

Now let us apply Moorean redundancy to cases of failed lies in order to create cases of redundant failed lies. First, the redundancy derived from the omissive version of MP. In such a case, the speaker not only asserts p, but additionally asserts that she believes p. In our example:

We now have all the ingredients required to specify the relevant class of pairs of assertions that serves as the basis for our argument for the subjective view of lying. Each pair in this class features two assertions: the first is a failed lie, an assertion the speaker believes to be false but that is actually true; the second differs from the first only through the addition of Moorean redundant content, which is either derived from the omissive or the commissive version of the corresponding Moorean assertion. We can return to our concrete example once more to illustrate the assertions in each pair of the class. One pair consists of an assertion of (1) as a failed lie is and an assertion of (2) as its redundant counterpart (derived from the omissive version of the corresponding Moorean assertion):

In considering pairs of assertions of this kind (i.e. the pair of (1) and (2) or the pair of (1) and (3)), we have the strong intuition that the first assertion of each pair is a lie if and only if the second assertion of the pair is a lie. Intuitively, the two assertions in each pair do not seem to differ in a way that matters for the question of whether or not they are lies.Footnote 9

In such cases, adding the second sentence to the assertion need not lead to infelicity: for example, if the speaker uses the second sentence to reinforce (insist on) what is asserted with the first sentence, it might be completely fine as a contribution to a conversation. However, even if we consider pairs of assertions and corresponding two-sentence assertions (involving a redundant reinforcement), it seems intuitively wrong to classify the first as non-lies and the second as lies.Footnote 13 Moreover, a similar problem then seems to arise within redundant assertions involving two sentences. If both parts of the assertion are evaluated separately, then the objective view classifies the first as a non-lie and the second as a lie, which again seems to go against intuitions on the matter.

According to a second objection, the objective view is right to treat the first and second assertion in each pair differently, as there is a difference in what is said that matters for whether or not an utterance is a lie.Footnote 14 A natural starting point of this objection is the view that the contents of lies have to be said, where the notion of what is said is construed in a narrow manner so as to exclude conversational implicatures. This view has been defended e.g. by Fallis (2009), Saul (2012) and Stokke (2018), who thereby aim to hold apart cases of lying and cases of mere misleading. The idea is that the distinction between lying and mere misleading aligns with the distinction between saying and conversationally implicating: liars say something they believe to be false, while misleaders put forward a believed-false implicature. Given this view of lying, the objective view might be defended as follows: While the first assertion of each pair somehow conveys the content that the speaker believes p, this content is a conversational implicature; what is said by the assertion is merely p, and this content is believed to be false, but not in fact false. By contrast, the second assertion of each pair is used to say that the speaker believes p, which is in fact false. Recalcitrant intuitions notwithstanding, the objective view thus correctly captures a difference within in each pair: the first assertion is merely misleading, while the second is a lie.

Secondly, the intuitions we discuss do not concern individual cases or pairs of cases, but rather a class of pairs of assertions, as we note above. This is another contrast with the existing discussions on the matter, which are based on individual cases. So while it is true that certain recalcitrant intuitions troubling the objective view have been discussed before, these are not the kinds of intuitions discussed here. Moorean redundancy leads to an additional problem for the objective view, and not merely to a different version of a problem that was already known.

To sum up, we have argued for the subjective view of lying and against the objective view of lying by considering pairs of assertions, where a speaker (who incorrectly believes p to be false) either asserts only p or redundantly adds to this assertion that he believes p/does not believe not-p. While the redundant addition might make a difference for some aspects of the overall assertion (in particular for its felicity), it is intuitively irrelevant for the question whether the speaker has lied. The subjective view of lying accords with this judgement, classifying both assertions as lies. For the objective view, however, the redundant addition is important: it can turn a non-lie into a lie. In our view, this is a reason to reject the objective view of lying and to accept the subjective view.

The anonymous reviewer argued that different versions of the objection are possible, according to which the first assertion in each pair is not used to conversationally implicate that the speaker believes p, but rather carries a conventional implicature with this content or conveys it in yet another way. We are doubtful that conventional implicatures are of help to the objectivist here: those theorists who have discussed conventional implicatures in the context of the lying-misleading distinction (such as Stokke, 2017) hold that conventional implicatures do belong to what is said and can be used to lie; in that case, however, the objectivist would have to classify failed lies as lies, which goes against the spirit of the view. (We discuss this option below). It may be possible to argue that the proposition that the speaker believes p is conveyed in yet some other way that does not turn the first assertion into a lie (on the objective view of lying), but (as far as we can tell) none of the existing accounts of lying makes room for this possibility, and thus we will move on for now.

True Lies is the strange case of a film that\u2019s alternately retrograde, forward-looking, and thoroughly of its time. For better or worse, it\u2019s a marker of how the Hollywood action blockbuster had advanced in 1994, as well as a commentary (intended or not) on the troubled state of American masculinity, marital relationships, and lingering racial attitudes. Cameron probably has reason to feel hesitant about approving a proper reissue of True Lies, since its ugliest elements will land even worse in 2022 than they did 28 years ago. But it feels like a piece of Hollywood history is missing, as conspicuous as that gap in the bridge.

Families can talk about the challenges that come with adapting a movie or movie concept for television. Does a story that first appeared in a film have to be changed for it work in a TV format? Why? Are there movies or movie concepts that simply would not work as a TV series?

Recent news regarding the refugee crisis and the travel ban being implemented by the Trump administration has led me to seriously consider the ways in which a whole culture has been represented by mass media. I used to think that the negative attitude towards Middle Eastern people, or more specifically Muslims, began after 9/11. However, after much research I have come to understand that in fact, these attitudes have been perpetuated for a much longer time than I initially thought. There are many factors behind this fear and it is evident that films are partially responsible for this perception. Films have been and continue to be one of the most influential mediums in our culture and I believe Hollywood has played a major role in shaping the ways in which people view a particular region. The circulation of stereotypes found in films has been harmful and has contributed to a xenophobia that applies exclusively to Muslims. I have thus attempted to illustrate the irrationality of the misrepresentation of Middle Eastern people in film, by creating a mosaic comprised of photos of actual citizens located in that region, some photos of refugees, as well as a few photos of Muslims located in other countries. These photos make up a larger portrait, that of the terrorist in the film True Lies (1994). My aim has been to convey to an audience how a prevailing image of the Middle East has rendered a more accurate image of the Middle East invisible. ff782bc1db