I am a Ph.D. candidate in Financial Economics at Northwestern University's Kellogg School of Management.
My research studies household finance, financial intermediation, and real estate. Previously, I worked at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, where my research focused on unconventional monetary policy.
I am on the 2026-27 academic job market. My CV is here.
WORKING PAPERS
This paper studies how lender-borrower relationships impact loan performance, pricing, and competition in U.S. mortgage markets. I establish that lenders learn private information about borrowers during the lending relationship, creating adverse selection among borrowers who switch lenders. Switching borrowers are 44% more likely to miss payments than borrowers who stay with their original lender, and lenders respond by charging switchers higher interest rates of up to 11 basis points. To identify the role of lender private information in generating this adverse selection, I use lender market exits as a quasi-experiment and show that borrowers forced to switch lenders perform better than other borrowers who switch lenders. I then estimate a model of relationship lending with endogenous adverse selection to quantify how policies which eliminate incumbent lenders' information advantage would reduce their incentives to offer lower initial rates, increasing mortgage rates by 5 basis points.
Pro-Natalist Housing Policy and Fertility
with Győző Gyöngyösi & Ágnes Szabó-Morvai
[Draft coming soon]
This paper studies the effect of housing affordability on fertility using a large pro-natalist housing policy. In 2019, the Hungarian government expanded housing subsidies and mortgage support for families purchasing homes in small municipalities, with eligibility determined by a population cutoff of 5,000 residents. A distinctive feature of the policy is that households could access housing support not only based on existing children, but also by committing ex-ante to having children in the future. Exploiting the population threshold, we implement a difference-in-differences design using linked census and administrative birth records covering the universe of women of reproductive age. We find that eligibility for the program increased fertility by 3.0 percent in the five years after implementation. Dynamic estimates show no differential pre-trends and suggest that the effects persist beyond short-term timing shifts. The results provide causal evidence that relaxing housing finance constraints prior to childbearing increases fertility.
Crowding Out Lending With Liquidity: The Case of the U.S. National Banking System
with Junko Oguri
[Draft available upon request]
Analyzing the costs and benefits of liquidity regulation in the modern context is challenging due to the presence of other interventions whose effects commingle with the impact of liquidity regulation. This paper investigates the impact of liquidity regulation in a historical context in which liquidity regulation's effects can be more effectively isolated from those of other policy interventions: the National Banking Era in the late 19th century United States. Our quasi-experimental design uses population-based cutoffs that determined the stringency of reserve requirements to identify the causal impact of liquidity regulation on bank lending. We present evidence that tighter liquidity requirements crowd out bank lending, illustrating a cost of liquidity regulation.
Open-Ended Treasury Purchases: From Market Functioning to Financial Easing
PUBLICATIONS
Unexpected Supply Effects of Quantitative Easing and Tightening
with Stefania D’Amico
SELECTED WORKS IN PROGRESS
Prepayment Risk and MBS Pricing: Evidence from Mortgage Servicing
This paper studies how mortgage market structure impacts prepayment risk. I find that prepayment probabilities vary significantly across mortgage servicers: a one-standard deviation increase in servicer-level prepayment likelihood is associated with an increase of 14 percentage points in a loan’s probability of prepayment within four years of origination. Prepayment varies with servicer business model: loans serviced by non-banks prepay faster than loans serviced by banks, and prepayment is even faster for non-bank servicers with vertically integrated origination arms. Lastly, I connect these firm-level differences to MBS prices: using servicing transfers as a quasi-experiment, I show that MBS prices incorporate servicer-specific prepayment profiles. My results highlight how the industrial organization of mortgage markets drives the quantity and pricing of prepayment risk in capital markets.
Time-Varying Dispersion of Mortgage Rates
with Naomi Cohen
An Extension of the Credit Channel: Bank Lending to Shadow Banks
with Brian Livingston