Secure and Attack-Resilient Navigation with Chimera GPS

Despite the critical importance of GPS, its civilian signals currently are open and unencrypted, meaning that an attacker can generate counterfeit GPS signals and spoof a user’s position or timing solution. In fact, recently, indisputable cases of spoofing have been reported in numerous real-world scenarios, with one 2019 report from the Center forAdvanced Defense Studies (C4ADS) documenting nearly 10,000 separate GPS spoofing incidents in Russia and its occupied territories.

In 2024, the NTS-3 satellite will be launched to test a new digital watermark called Chimera to periodically authenticate one’s received GPS signal. However, this potential authentication service is not continuously available, with up to 3-minute delays between consecutive authentications. We develop strategies to utilize Chimera and additional self-contained sensors onboard a vehicle, such as an inertial measurement unit or wheel encoder, in order to perform continuous spoofing detection and secure, attack-resilient navigation. For our continuous spoofing detector, we use formal verification techniques in order to provably satisfy a user-defined false alarm guarantee. To perform continuous, attack-resilient navigation, we further determine the extent to rely on GPS for state estimation, in order to strategically improve real-time navigation performance while mitigating any induced errors during an experienced attack.

Related Publications:

• T. Mina, A. Kanhere, A. Shetty, and G. Gao, “GPS spoofing-resilient filtering using self-contained sensors and the Chimera signal enhancement,” NAVIGATION, Journal of the Institute of Navigation, in review. [paper]

• T. Mina, A. Kanhere, S. Kousik, and G. Gao, “Stochastic reachability-based GPS spoofing detection with the Chimera signal enhancement,” NAVIGATION, Journal of the Institute of Navigation, accepted. [paper]

• A. Dai, T. Mina, A. Kanhere, and G. Gao, “Spoofing-resilient LiDAR-GPS factor graph localization with Chimera signal enhancement,” in IEEE/ION Position, Location and Navigation Symposium (PLANS) Conference, Monterey, CA, Apr. 2023, pp. 470–480. [paper] [slides] [code]

• T. Mina, A. Kanhere, A. Shetty, and G. Gao, “GPS spoofing-resilient filtering with Chimera and self-contained odometry,” in Institute of Navigation (ION) GNSS+ Conference, Denver, CO, Sep. 2022, pp. 3768–3782. [paper] [slides] [video]

• A. Kanhere, T. Mina, A. Shetty, and G. Gao, “Factor graph-based spoofing mitigation using the Chimera signal enhancement,” in Institute of Navigation (ION) GNSS+ Conference, Denver, CO, Sep. 2022, pp. 958–968. [paper] [slides] [video]

• T. Mina, A. Kanhere, S. Kousik, and G. Gao, “Continuous GPS authentication with Chimera using stochastic reachability analysis,” in Institute of Navigation (ION) GNSS+ Conference, St. Louis, MO, Sep. 2021, pp. 4234–4248. [paper] [slides] [video]