“Knowledge Sharing: The Spillover Effects of Process versus Outcome Accountability”
Main finding: Imposing different types of accountability on employees’ task performance incrementally influences their knowledge-sharing behavior. Such influences differ between employees with high versus low task output.
Method: Online experiment
"Work for Money: The Behavioral Effects of Feedback Format on Employees’ Performance" (with Lulu Di, Wei Jiang, and Jason Kuang)
Presented at the 2021 MAS Midyear Meeting
Funded by the 2020 Georgia Tech CIBER Doctoral Research Award
Main finding: Holding economic incentives constant, the presence of monetary cues in performance feedback leads to significantly better performance than when monetary cues are absent.
Methods: Field experiment; online experiment
2. "Are pro-social managers more honest? The effects of CSR attitude and task type on budget reporting behavior" (with Jason Kuang and Ziyang Li)
To be presented at the 25th Annual Ethics Research Symposium and 2021 AAA Annual Meeting
Main finding: In CSR-related tasks, the level of honesty is significantly higher for CSR-supportive individuals than for non-supportive individuals, but this effect is muted in business tasks unrelated to CSR.
Methods: Lab experiment; survey (with professional participants)
3. "The Effects of Financial versus Nonfinancial Targets on Managers’ CSR Performance" (with Jason Kuang and Ziyang Li)
Presented at the 2019 GRACE Conference, 2019 Georgia Tech Accounting Workshops, and 2020 AAA Annual Meeting
Funded by the 2019 IMA Doctoral Summer Research Scholarship
Developed from the second-year paper
Main finding: CSR performance is higher under financial targets than under nonfinancial targets, but only when managers strongly support CSR.
Methods: Lab experiment; survey (with professional participants)
Employee Incentives and Performance (with Stephanie Cheng, Jason Kuang, and Brian Vansant)
Conducting pilot studies
The Effect of Work Environment on Honesty (with Ziyang Li)
Experimental instruments completed
On Employee Selection
Designing experimental instruments