Kurzgesagt – In a Nutshell
Kurzgesagt – In a Nutshell
Embedded Files
Sources – Germany Is Over
Sources – Germany Is Over
We are thankful to the following experts for their critical reading and input:
Dr. Stefan Seuffert
WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management,
Center für Intergenerative Finanzwissenschaft an der WHU
Sebastian Stramka
WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management,
Center für Intergenerative Finanzwissenschaft an der WHU
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg
Dr. Johannes Rausch
Max-Planck-Institut für Sozialrecht und Sozialpolitik
Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) und Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE)
Dr. Romp
Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Amsterdam
– Germany was among the first countries to industrialize and so its fertility rate dropped early in the 20th century. But for 55 years, they have been below replacement, at 1.4 children per woman in 2025.
#OWID. Fertility rate: children per woman, 1950 to 2023. (Data from UN, World Population Prospects 2024).
https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?hideControls=false&indicator=Fertility+rate&Sex=Both+sexes&Age=Total&Projection+scenario=None&country=~DEU
#DESTATIS. Total fertility rate (per woman): Germany, years, age groups of the women.
Starting in the late 1700s, death rates began to fall due to advances in agriculture, technology, health, and sanitation. More people survived into adulthood, increasing life expectancy and driving population growth. This shift changed the long-standing balance between birth and death rates and reshaped population patterns worldwide. Over time, these changes were studied and organized into the Demographic Transition Model (DTM), which explains how population growth evolves as countries develop.
The DTM tracks changes in birth and death rates across five stages of economic development, showing how their relationship affects overall population growth. As social and economic conditions change, countries move through these stages. While all countries fit within the model, not every stage is currently represented—there are no countries in Stage 1 or Stage 5 today, though future shifts remain possible.
#Population Education Blog. Demographic Transition Model (DTM) 2022
https://populationeducation.org/what-demographic-transition-model/
Quote: “What are the stages of the Demographic Transition Model?
In Stage 1, which applied to most of the world before the Industrial Revolution, both birth rates and death rates are high. As a result, population size remains fairly constant but can have major swings with events such as wars or pandemics.
In Stage 2, the introduction of modern medicine lowers death rates, especially among children, while birth rates remain high; the result is rapid population growth. Many of the least developed countries today are in Stage 2.
In Stage 3, birth rates gradually decrease, usually as a result of improved economic conditions, an increase in women’s status, and access to contraception. Population growth continues, but at a lower rate. Most developing countries are in Stage 3.
In Stage 4, birth and death rates are both low, stabilizing the population. These countries tend to have stronger economies, higher levels of education, better healthcare, a higher proportion of working women, and a fertility rate hovering around two children per woman. Most developed countries are in Stage 4.
A possible Stage 5 would include countries in which fertility rates have fallen significantly below replacement level (2 children) and the elderly population is greater than the youthful population.”
#Max Roser (2023) - “Demographic transition: Why is rapid population growth a temporary phenomenon?” Published online at OurWorldinData.org. Retrieved from:
https://ourworldindata.org/demographic-transition
Quote: “Rapid population growth is a temporary phenomenon
If fertility fell in lockstep with mortality, we would not have seen an increase in the population at all. The demographic transition works through the asynchronous timing of the two fundamental demographic changes: The decline in the death rate is followed by the decrease in birth rates.
This decline in the death rate, followed by a decline in the birth rate, is something we observe with great regularity and is largely independent of the culture or religion of the population.
The chart presents the empirical evidence for the demographic transition for five very different countries in Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. In all countries, we observed the pattern described by the demographic transit20ion: first, a decline in mortality that starts the population boom, and then a decline in fertility that brings the population boom to an end. The population boom is a temporary event.
In the past, the size of the population was stagnant because of high mortality. Now, country after country is moving into a world where the population is stagnant because of low fertility.”
https://ourworldindata.org/demographic-transition
#Population Education Blog. Limitations of the Demographic Transition Model (DTM) 2022
https://populationeducation.org/limitations-of-the-demographic-transition-model-dtm/
Quote: “Emigration and Immigration: A Closer Look At Germany’s Population
The original 4-stage DTM also does not take into account migration. Look at Germany, for example. Since the early 1970s, the death rate exceeds the birth rate. We would expect to see Germany’s population decline after several decades. Yet we continue to see an increase in the total population. The population increase is due primarily to immigration into Germany rather than from folks being born inside the country.
In the chart below, the purple columns represent the impact of net migration, or immigration minus emigration, on the total population. The orange columns show the impact of natural increase, or the birth rate minus the death rate, on the total population. Since the 1970s, natural increase has been negative with more deaths than births (the orange bars are below the y-axis). Notice that in recent decades, the total population increases during times of high immigration (like 1983-1992 when the purple bars reach high above the y-axis) and stagnates or decreases during times of lower immigration (early 2000s).
If we categorize Germany’s place in the DTM based solely on birth and death rates, we might place Germany in stage 5. But with an increasing overall population, it could be argued that Germany should be stage 4 of the DTM instead.”
– Compared to South Korea this sounds almost amazing but it still means population collapse.
#South Korea's birthrate, the world's lowest, rises again amid signs of easing demographic crisis. Reuters. February 2026.
https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/south-koreas-birthrate-worlds-lowest-rises-again-amid-signs-easing-demographic-2026-02-25/
Quote: “South Korea birthrate at 0.80 in 2025, up from 0.75 in 2024
Asian country has recorded world's lowest national birthrate
Marriages continue to rise, but statistical effects also behind the rebound
Pace faster than projections as govt plans five-year policy roadmap”
South Korea has the lowest fertility rate in the world in the last few years. We talked about the reasons and potential consequences in a previous video:
SOUTH KOREA IS OVER
South Korea Is Over
– If fertility stays at 1.4 then 100 Germans will have 70 kids. When those grow up, they will have 49 kids, who will then have 34 kids, who will have 24. A 76% drop within four generations.
This is based on a simple back of the envelope calculation, assuming everything else stays the same, it’s not coming from a population projection. We basically propagated the fertility rate of 1.4 for four generations to keep it simple as a demonstrative example.
100/2x 1.4 = 70
70/2x1.4 = 49
49/2x1.4 = 34
34/2x1.4 = 24
There are population projections estimating the population until the end of the century depending on different parameters.
UN projections can be found in the following visualizations:
https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?hideControls=false&indicator=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age=Total&Projection+scenario=Low&country=~DEU
Federal Statistical Office of Germany also offers interactive charts and population pyramids:
https://service.destatis.de/bevoelkerungspyramide/index.html#!y=2070&v=12&l=en
– Well at the same time people started living much, much longer.
In the 50s, life expectancy in Germany was nearing 70, today it is about 80 and it is estimated to increase to 90 by the end of the century.
#OWID. Life Expectancy. (Data from UN, World Population Prospects 2024).
– In 2026, Germany is already one of the oldest countries in the world with a median age of over 45. Almost two in five Germans are over 50, almost one in four is older than 65. Only one in 8 is a child under 14.
#OWID. Median Age. (Data from UN, World Population Prospects 2024).
https://ourworldindata.org/population-growth#explore-data-on-population-growth
Young Germans Are Screwed. Old Ones too.
– By 2036, 13 million German Baby boomers will retire – this big bulge here:
In the next decade, the cohort born between 1960 and 1969 will hit their retirement age. In most economic reports in Germany referred to as baby-boomers but some sources define it more strictly or more inclusive, which makes cross comparing a bit difficult. 13 million is a commonly circulating estimate for the number of economically active baby-boomers who will retire by 2036. It's not merely the sum of all who exceed retirement age each year, since not everyone who hits retirement age will necessarily stop working, some retire early and not everyone is economically active already and not everyone has the same life expectancy. So it's not straightforward to come up with an estimate looking only at the current population of age groups but various reports hover around a little over a million retirees per year for the next decade. The total number of people aged over 67 is otherwise expected to be around 20 million in 2036.
#Statistisches Bundesamt. 13,4 Millionen Erwerbspersonen erreichen in den nächsten 15 Jahren das gesetzliche Rentenalter. September 2025
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2025/08/PD25_N048_13.html
Quote: “WIESBADEN – Die Generation der Babyboomer spielt im Zusammenhang mit der Entwicklung des Arbeitskräfteangebots in Deutschland eine wichtige Rolle. Innerhalb von 15 Jahren werden die zahlenmäßig stärksten Jahrgänge in den Ruhestand gegangen sein. Wie das Statistische Bundesamt (Destatis) auf Basis des Mikrozensus 2024 mitteilt, werden bis 2039 rund 13,4 Millionen Erwerbspersonen das gesetzliche Renteneintrittsalter von 67 Jahren überschritten haben. Das entspricht knapp einem Drittel (31 %) aller Erwerbspersonen, die dem Arbeitsmarkt im vergangenen Jahr zur Verfügung standen.
Jüngere Altersgruppen werden die Babyboomer zahlenmäßig nicht ersetzen können. Obwohl die 60- bis 64-Jährigen bereits im Übergang zum Ruhestand waren, stellten sie im Jahr 2024 noch 4,4 Millionen Erwerbspersonen. Das entsprach einer Erwerbsquote von 68 % in dieser Altersgruppe. Von den jüngeren Babyboomern im Alter von 55 bis 59 Jahren war ein deutlich höherer Anteil (85 %) noch am Arbeitsmarkt aktiv. Mit 5,6 Millionen stellten sie über alle Altersgruppen hinweg die meisten Erwerbspersonen. Beide Altersgruppen umfassten zusammen 10,0 Millionen Erwerbspersonen und damit mehr als die jüngeren Altersgruppen bis 54 Jahre. Zwar hatten sowohl die 45- bis 54-Jährigen als auch die 35- bis 44-Jährigen mit 90 % beziehungsweise 89 % die höchsten Erwerbsquoten, allerdings reichte die Zahl der Erwerbspersonen mit 9,3 beziehungsweise 9,8 Millionen nicht ganz an die der Babyboomer heran. Auch die 25- bis 34-Jährigen lagen mit 9,0 Millionen Erwerbspersonen deutlich unter der Zahl der Babyboomer. Gleiches galt für die beiden jüngsten Altersgruppen unter 25 Jahren, die sich teilweise noch in ihrer Ausbildungsphase befanden und erst nach Abschluss ihrer Ausbildung vollumfänglich für den Arbeitsmarkt aktiviert werden könnten.”
#Statistisches Bundesamt. 12.9 million economically active people will reach statutory retirement age in the next 15 years. Press release No. 330 of 4 August 2022.
Quote: “WIESBADEN – The baby boomer generation plays a major role as regards the development of labour supply in Germany. The largest cohorts, born between 1957 and 1969, will retire within the next 15 years. Based on the 2021 microcensus, the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) reports that 12.9 million economically active people will have surpassed retirement age by 2036. This is just under 30% of the economically active population available to the labour market in reference year 2021.”
#Statistisches Bundesamt. By 2035, one quarter of Germany's population will be aged 67 or over. Press release No. 446 of 11 December 2025
https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2025/12/PE25_446_12.html?templateQueryString=retirement
Quote: “WIESBADEN/BERLIN – In Germany, one person in four will be aged 67 or older in 2035. This is the conclusion reached by all variants of the 16th coordinated population projection, which the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) presented at a press conference in Berlin (only in German) on 11 December 2025. By way of comparison, just one person in five was 67 years or older, and therefore of retirement age, in 2024. "The baby boomer generation is currently in the middle of transitioning from working life to retirement. Much smaller birth cohorts will follow", says Karsten Lummer, head of the "Population" department at the Federal Statistical Office. "All calculation variants indicate that the number of people aged 67 and over will increase steadily up to 2038. Depending on how life expectancy increases, there will then be 20.5 to 21.3 million people of pensionable age in Germany. Compared with today, that represents an increase of 3.8 to 4.5 million", explains Elke Loichinger, head of the "Demographic analyses and model calculations, natural population change" section at the Federal Statistical Office. Depending on the calculation variant, the share of people aged 67 and over will increase from 20% in 2024 to between 25% and 27% in 2038.”
#Ruth Maria Schüler and Stefanie Seele. IW-Kurzbericht 52/2025. 13.06.2025
Quote: “Die demografische Welle – siehe Abbildung – aus den geburtenstarken Babyboomer-Jahrgängen 1954 bis 1969 mit durchgängig mehr als 1,1 Millionen Lebendgeborenen pro Jahrgang erreicht nach und nach das gesetzliche Renteneintrittsalter. Das Statistische Bundesamt fasst die Abgrenzung der Babyboomer mit den Jahrgängen 1957 bis 1968 enger (Pötzsch/Nieden, 2024). Nach IW-Definition haben im Jahr 2023 vier von 16 Geburtsjahrgängen die Regelaltersgrenze erreicht.
[...]
Stand 2023 haben es diese beiden Regelungen 0,9 Millionen Babyboomern ermöglicht, vor Erreichen des gesetzlichen Renteneintrittsalters eine Altersrente zu beziehen. Aus den Geburtsjahrgängen, welche ihre Regelaltersgrenze bis einschließlich 2023 (1954 bis 1957) erreicht haben, gingen 1,8 Millionen Babyboomer vorzeitig in Rente – rund 44 Prozent des jeweiligen Geburtsjahrgangs. Wenn nachkommende Geburtsjahrgänge im gleichen Ausmaß die Voraussetzungen für einen vorzeitigen Renteneintritt erfüllen und ein vergleichbares Renteneintrittsverhalten an den Tag legen, ist zu erwarten, dass ab dem Jahr 2025 jährlich mindestens eine Million Babyboomer gesetzliche Altersrente beziehen, bevor sie die Regelaltersgrenze überschritten haben.”
[Translation: The demographic wave – see figure – from the large baby boomer cohorts of 1954 to 1969, with consistently more than 1.1 million live births per year, is gradually reaching the statutory retirement age. The Federal Statistical Office defines the baby boomer cohort more narrowly, as those born between 1957 and 1968 (Pötzsch/Nieden, 2024). According to the IW definition, four out of the 16 birth cohorts will have reached the standard retirement age by 2023.
[...]
As of 2023, these two regulations enabled 0.9 million baby boomers to draw an old-age pension before reaching the statutory retirement age. Of the birth cohorts that reached their standard retirement age up to and including 2023 (1954 to 1957), 1.8 million baby boomers retired early – around 44 percent of their respective birth cohorts. If subsequent birth cohorts meet the requirements for early retirement to the same extent and exhibit comparable retirement patterns, it is expected that from 2025 onwards, at least one million baby boomers will draw a statutory old-age pension annually before reaching the standard retirement age.]
Summation through 1960 to 1969 in the chart above gives around 13 million people.
Also, according to the 2024 report below, 16 million boomers were estimated to reach retirement age from 2023 to 2036. Assuming an annual rate of a million retirees, 13 million can be estimated between 2026 and 2036.
#Philipp Deschermeier / Holger Schäfer. IW-Kurzbericht 78/2024. 14.10.2024
https://www.iwkoeln.de/studien/philipp-deschermeier-holger-schaefer-die-babyboomer-gehen-in-rente.html
Quote: “Die Alterung der Gesellschaft bleibt die zentrale Herausforderung. So verdeutlicht die Abbildung, dass Deutschland nicht vor dem demografischen Wandel steht, sondern sich bereits mittendrin befindet. Denn 2022 hatten die Geburtenjahrgänge der Jahre 1954 bis 1956 bereits das gesetzliche Renteneintrittsalter erreicht. Für den Jahrgang 1957, dessen gesetzliches Renteneintrittsalter bei 65 Jahren und 11 Monaten lag, trifft dies 2022 mehrheitlich ebenfalls zu. In Summe haben Ende 2022 also bereits etwa 3,1 Millionen Babyboomer das Renteneintrittsalter erreicht. Über den Prognosehorizont bis 2040 beschleunigt sich die Entwicklung insbesondere in der zweiten Hälfte der 2020er Jahre. 2036 werden dann alle verbliebenen etwa 16,5 Millionen Babyboomer das gesetzliche Renteneintrittsalter erreicht haben. Im Jahr 2040 wird die Babyboomer-Generation auf Basis der IW-Prognose auf etwa 15 Millionen Personen geschrumpft sein. Die ersten Jahrgänge der Babyboomer werden dann bereits über 85 Jahre alt sein. Den 19,5 Millionen Babyboomern aus dem Jahr 2022, die bis 2036 vollständig das Renteneintrittsalter erreicht haben oder verstorben sein werden, steht ein Zugang junger Personen zum Arbeitskräftepotenzial im gleichen Zeitraum in Höhe von etwa 12,5 Millionen gegenüber.”
#Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund. Annual Report 2024. From the number of people entering retirement and average pension payout rates to the number of insured persons - this site provides an overview of key statistics on the German Pension Insurance.
https://jahresbericht.deutsche-rentenversicherung.de/en/artikel/in-figures/
Quote: “More people entering retirement
The number of people entering retirement in 2024 was 937,000, which is around 15,500 less than in 2023. The reason for this slight decline is related to the number of people entering retirement in the previous year being particularly high due to pension start postponements and the increase of the statutory retirement age. This effect particularly impacted standard pensions and pensions for persons with exceptionally long contribution histories (“pension at 63”). 28.7 per cent of all people entering retirement in 2024 receive pensions for persons with exceptionally long contribution histories, and this continues to be the most frequently claimed type of early old-age pension. It can be drawn early without deductions as soon as an insurance contribution history of 45 years is reached. As a result of the statutory retirement age being raised for people born in 1960, the earliest pensionable age is 64 years and four months. An increasing number of baby boomers are currently reaching retirement age. This will push up the number of pensions for people with a severe disability and for people with long contribution histories in 2024 compared to 2023.”
Further details can also be found in the Pension Insurance Report 2025 from the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.
#Rentenversicherungsbericht 2025. Bericht der Bundesregierung.
https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/21/030/2103080.pdf
For the population pyramids, we used the data from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany, DESTATIS. In the interactive interface, one can run simulations of population projections with pre-set parameters, like fertility rate, life expectancy and immigration. The most recent data is of the year 2024, so we stick to that to generate pyramids in the video, instead of using a projection.
https://service.destatis.de/bevoelkerungspyramide/index.html#!y=2024&l=en
The same dataset, and more data tables, can be reached through Genesis from DESTATIS. Various population projections are available there and one can visualize the data by variables like age and sex. One can filter the data by retirement ages (65 and 67) for the next ten years to reach the number of people who will pass retirement age.
https://www-genesis.destatis.de/datenbank/online/table/12421-0002/chart/line/table-toolbar
In the scene in the video, we show the same data but in 5 year age gaps:
– But because they didn’t have nearly enough kids, fewer younger people will replace them - in 2030 alone there might be millions of jobs that will be impossible to fill.
#Skilled professionals for Germany. Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy.
https://www.bundeswirtschaftsministerium.de/Redaktion/EN/Dossier/skilled-professionals.html
Quote: “Demographic change is having an impact
A major factor which will impact decisively on the prevailing skills shortage in future is Germany’s ageing society. An aspect of demographic change, the ageing of society is exacerbating the skills shortage. According to current forecasts, the working-age population, i.e. people aged between 20 and 64, will drop by 3.9 million to 45.9 million by 2030. In 2060, there will be 10.2 million fewer people of working age.”
#ifo Business Survey. Economic Slowdown Eases Shortage of Skilled Workers in Germany. 17 February 2025
https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2025-02-17/economic-slowdown-eases-shortage-skilled-workers-germany
Quote: “Companies in Germany are currently feeling the shortage of skilled workers somewhat less. 28.3% of companies are getting too few qualified workers, down from 31.9% in October. “The weak economy is currently dampening demand for qualified workers, which means that the shortage of skilled workers is being felt somewhat less acutely,” says ifo researcher Klaus Wohlrabe, but at the same time warns: “Demographic change remains a major challenge. In the long term, the shortage of skilled workers will increase again.””
#DESTATIS. 13,4 Millionen Erwerbspersonen erreichen in den nächsten 15 Jahren das gesetzliche Rentenalter. Pressemitteilung Nr. N048 vom 3. September 2025
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2025/08/PD25_N048_13.html
Quote: “Jüngere Altersgruppen werden die Babyboomer zahlenmäßig nicht ersetzen können. Obwohl die 60- bis 64-Jährigen bereits im Übergang zum Ruhestand waren, stellten sie im Jahr 2024 noch 4,4 Millionen Erwerbspersonen. Das entsprach einer Erwerbsquote von 68 % in dieser Altersgruppe. Von den jüngeren Babyboomern im Alter von 55 bis 59 Jahren war ein deutlich höherer Anteil (85 %) noch am Arbeitsmarkt aktiv. Mit 5,6 Millionen stellten sie über alle Altersgruppen hinweg die meisten Erwerbspersonen. Beide Altersgruppen umfassten zusammen 10,0 Millionen Erwerbspersonen und damit mehr als die jüngeren Altersgruppen bis 54 Jahre. Zwar hatten sowohl die 45- bis 54-Jährigen als auch die 35- bis 44-Jährigen mit 90 % beziehungsweise 89 % die höchsten Erwerbsquoten, allerdings reichte die Zahl der Erwerbspersonen mit 9,3 beziehungsweise 9,8 Millionen nicht ganz an die der Babyboomer heran. Auch die 25- bis 34-Jährigen lagen mit 9,0 Millionen Erwerbspersonen deutlich unter der Zahl der Babyboomer. Gleiches galt für die beiden jüngsten Altersgruppen unter 25 Jahren, die sich teilweise noch in ihrer Ausbildungsphase befanden und erst nach Abschluss ihrer Ausbildung vollumfänglich für den Arbeitsmarkt aktiviert werden könnten.”
[transl. Younger age groups will not be able to replace the baby boomers in terms of numbers. Although those aged 60 to 64 were already transitioning into retirement, they still constituted 4.4 million people in the labor force in 2024. This corresponded to an employment rate of 68% in this age group. A significantly higher proportion (85%) of the younger baby boomers, aged 55 to 59, were still active in the labor market. At 5.6 million, they represented the largest group in the labor force across all age groups. Together, these two age groups comprised 10.0 million people in the labor force, more than the younger age groups up to age 54. While both the 45- to 54-year-olds and the 35- to 44-year-olds had the highest employment rates at 90% and 89% respectively, their total number of people in the labor force, at 9.3 million and 9.8 million respectively, did not quite reach that of the baby boomers. The number of people aged 25 to 34, at 9.0 million, was also significantly lower than the number of baby boomers. The same was true for the two youngest age groups under 25, some of whom were still in education or training and could only be fully integrated into the labor market after completing their education or training.]
– But the much more urgent issue is retirees. Germany has a “pay as you go” pension system, which means that about 20% of today’s salaries is directly paid out to pensioners.
#Old-age security in Germany. The Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. 2023.
Quote: “Funding pension insurance
The statutory pension insurance scheme is a pay-as-you-go system (intergenerational contract). This means, all benefits over a period of time are directly financed through contributions as well as federal subsidies for the same period of time. The mandatory contribution rate to the statutory pension scheme for employees is currently 18.6 percent of gross income (but only up to a certain assessment limit). Half of the contributions on the insurable earnings are paid by employees and half by employers in principle.”
#Robert Fenge, François Peglow. Decomposition of Demographic Effects on the German Pension System. 2017.
https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp6834.pdf
Quote: “2 History of the German Statutory Pension System in a Nutshell
The German Statutory Pension System has a long history of over 120 years. In 1889 chancellor Bismarck laid the foundation of social security with the ‘law concerning disability and old-age security’ (“Gesetz, betreffend die Invalidit¨ats- und Alterssicherung”, IAVG).2 The IAVG introduced a disability and an old-age pension for blue collar workers and lower civil servants. Also medical rehabilitation was provided.3 The main focus of the system was put on disability (Eichenhofer et al., 2012, Rn. 27-28, p. 12.). The pension benefits had been low and provided rather a ‘subsidy’ to old age income than an old age income (Eichenhofer et al., 2012, Rn. 42-43, p. 19.). The system was organized as a funded social security system. In the following years the system emerged and provided medical rehabilitation, old-age, disability and survivor benefits.
In 1957 – after several shocks due to World War I, a hyperinflation in the beginning 1920’s and World War II – a major pension reform established the principles of the actual German Statutory Pension System.4 The funding of the GRV was gradually converted to a PAYG scheme and the remaining capital stock of the former funded system was spent by 1967 (B¨orsch-Supan, 2000, p. F25.). The amount of already existing pensions had been raised and the development of future pensions was indexed to gross wages (Eichenhofer et al., 2012, Rn. 22-25, pp. 32.). The reform of the GRV was “designed to extend the standard of living that was achieved during work life also to the time after retirement” (B¨orsch-Supan, 2000, p. F25.). Especially in the 1970s the pension benefits had been increased and flexible rules for early retirement were introduced with a reform in 1972.” GRV: “Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung”
– This sort of worked in the 1960s when there were five working Germans for every retiree. But in 2024 this ratio is down to about 2.5. In the 2030s it will get closer to 2 workers for one pensioner.
This is commonly measured as Old-age Dependency Ratio, which is the number of retirees per 100 workers. In the 60s, this ratio was around 20%, corresponding to 5 workers per pensioner. Slightly different numbers are reported due to different population projections, age limits on working populations and consideration of caveats such as not everyone in the working age range paying contributions or being economically active. Therefore the calculations based solely on the number of people in the given age groups might not reflect the effective ratio. However, we chose to use UN data for comparability with other countries and also applied the same age range on the destatis population data.
#OWID. Median Age. (Data from UN, World Population Prospects 2024).
https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?time=1963..2100&hideControls=false&indicator=Dependency+ratio&Sex=Both+sexes&Age=Old-age+dependency+ratio&Projection+scenario=Medium&country=~DEU
2024: 36.85% ~ 40 -> 100/40=2.5
One can also calculate the old age dependency ratios under different scenarios through the interactive interface on Destatis website. https://service.destatis.de/bevoelkerungspyramide/index.html#!y=2024&a=20,65&l=en&g
DESTATIS reports the values with an upper age limit of 67. The statistical result for 2024 is then resulting in 3 workers per retiree.
#Young-age, old-age and total dependency ratios with age limits of 20 and 67 years. 2026
https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/Graphics/Population/2025/_Interactive/20251211-16te-kbv-19-jugend-alten-gesamtquotient-en.html
#Economic Policy Committee - Ageing Working Group 2024 Ageing Report. Germany - Country Fiche. December 2023.
#EUROSTAT. Population structure and ageing. 2 February 2026
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Population_structure_and_ageing
#Sabine Kinkartz. DW. Was the German pension system built to bust? September 6, 2025
https://www.dw.com/en/was-the-german-pension-system-built-to-bust/a-73892898
Quote: “The intergenerational contract established by Adenauer has been growing less functional for years. In 1962, six employees financed one pensioner. In 2020, the figure was 1.8 employees, and the trend is declining.
Although politicians have long recognized that the current pension system has reached its limits, little has been done about it. On the one hand, this is because politicians do not want to upset older voters and impose cuts on them. On the other hand, Germany has had high levels of immigration over the past ten years, which has temporarily softened the effects of the demographic change.”
Contribution rates were also lower in the 60s than their values today. The second column (Rentenversicherung) of the table below shows the contribution rates into the pension system, which was 14% in 1960 and the last column of the table below shows the total contribution rate.
#Rentenversicherung in Zahlen 2025. Statistik der Deutschen Rentenversicherung.
– And about ten years after retirement people tend to get really sick and cause the vast majority of health care costs.
#Cost of illness, cost of illness per inhabitant: Germany, years, sex, age groups
https://www-genesis.destatis.de/datenbank/online/url/89b07463
– The math ain’t mathing and it actually never really did. Already in the 1970s governments began to subsidize the pension funds with tax revenue – pushing the problem into the future. As has more or less every single government since then.
#Sabine Kinkartz. DW. Was the German pension system built to bust? 2025
https://www.dw.com/en/was-the-german-pension-system-built-to-bust/a-73892898
Quote: “Is Germany doing something wrong?
Could Germany follow the example of its European neighbors? In the Netherlands and Austria, the pension systems are considered stable — and in fact, there are significant differences between them and the German system.
In Germany, only employees are required to pay part of their income into the pension fund. The rate is 18.6%, half of which is paid by employers. Civil servants, the self-employed, and some other professional groups are exempt from this obligation. As a result, only 79% of all employed people pay into the pension fund. In Germany, you are entitled to a pension after just five years of contributions.
In other countries, more money flows into the pension system. In Austria, there is a uniform mandatory system for almost everyone in employment, who pay 22% of their salary, significantly more than employees in Germany. Of this, employers pay 12% and employees 10%. The minimum insurance period to receive a pension is 15 years, and pensions are taxed.
In the Netherlands, every resident is entitled to a basic pension, depending on how long they have lived in the country. To qualify, workers must contribute 17.9% of their income to the pension fund. In addition to the basic pension, 90% of all employees finance a company pension together with their employers. An additional private pension provision is subsidized by the state, but is voluntary.
In Germany, only one in two employees has additional coverage in the form of a company pension. The federal government wants to change this. Tax incentives for company pensions are set to increase, and employees will have to opt out if they do not want part of their salary to be automatically allocated to a company pension.”
#Robert Fenge, François Peglow. Decomposition of Demographic Effects on the German Pension System. 2017.
https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp6834.pdf
Quote: “The predicted acceleration of costs and increasing contributions lead to a further important reform in 1992. The legal age of retirement was gradually raised and a deduction factor for early retirement was introduced, so that early retirement led to lower future pensions. Furthermore, pension benefit indexation was changed to net wages (Rurup ¨ , 2002, pp. 143.).5
In 2001 a major reform gradually changed the paradigm of the GRV. An additional state-subsidized private old age pension was introduced to compensate for declining replacement rates in the public pension. In contrast to the pay-as-you-go system of the first pension pillar, private pensions are financed now by a funded scheme. Also the pension benefit indexation was changed to ‘modified gross wages’ – considering the development of gross wages, contribution rates to the public pension and the evolving burden of private pension saving. As a further response to demographic ageing, in 2004 a ‘sustainability factor’ was added in the pension indexation formula that additionally links the adjustment of pension benefits to the ratio of pensioners to contributors. A further reform in 2007 enacted the gradual raise of the legal retirement age to 67.
The latest major pension reform in 2014 introduced an early retirement option without penalties at the age of 63 for people with a long working career with 45 and more years of contributions. Starting in 2015, this earliest age increases by two months each year up to the age of 65. The same reform introduced an additional credited earning point for having raised children born before 1992 and included an improvement for disability pensions.”GRV: “Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung”
#Axel Börsch-Supan. (2000). A Model Under Siege: A Case Study of the German Retirement Insurance System.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0297.00506
Quote: ”The increase in the contribution rate has precipitated a vivid discussion about the competitiveness of German labour. Total labour compensation in Germany is among the highest in the world, and about 50% is social insurance contributions (including retirement, health and long term care insurance). Fig. 1 conceals an actually even larger increase in the effective contribution rate since the fraction of general taxes that finances the government subsidy to the retirement insurance is not contained in Fig. 1. In 1960, 4.1% of the budget was subsidised by general revenue, in 1998, it is more than 25%. Most tellingly, at the end of 1997 a projected increase of the contribution rate beyond 20.3% was only avoided by increasing the value added tax by one percentage point.”
#Axel Börsch-Supan, Christina B. Wilke. The German Public Pension System: How It Was, How It Will Be. Working Paper 10525. 2004.
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w10525/w10525.pdf
The future is today.
– In 2025, the German federal government spent roughly a quarter of its annual tax revenues to fix holes in the pension system — on top of the working population’s payments. Let’s say that again: One in four German tax euros is used to pay out pensions today. More than on education, research, infrastructure and defense combined! The wealth of the nation is redistributed from the young and the working to the old and retired. And as the boomers retire this will only get worse.
#Jens Thurau. DW. Could the German government collapse over pensions dispute? Nov 2025.
https://www.dw.com/en/could-the-german-government-collapse-over-pensions-dispute/a-74791858
Quote: “The majority of Germans, excluding civil servants and the self-employed, pay into the state retirement fund. Both they and their employers pay 9.3% of gross income, for a total of 18.6%. The specific amount of an individual's pension is determined by factors like their contributions over their working life, as tracked by pension points, which are then converted into a monthly payment.
But this calculation no longer works because there are fewer and fewer contributors paying into the system to support an ever-growing number of pensioners. As a result, the pension system is being supported by billions of euros from the federal budget. In 2026, this will amount to €128 billion ($148 bn), or just under a quarter of the total budget of around €524 billion.”
There are however monthly press releases in English on the planned and expected budget items. Below is the table from the most recent one (Nov, 20205). The values are similar enough for our purposes.
We had to abbreviate Housing, urban development, regional planning, and local community services items in the text.
#Statistik der Deutschen Rentenversicherung. Aktuelle Daten 2026. 22. Dec 2025.
#DRV. Jahresbericht 2024.Employment high brings high contribution revenue
https://jahresbericht.deutsche-rentenversicherung.de/en/artikel/employment-high-brings-high-contribution-revenue/
Quote: “Growth in contribution revenue despite a challenging economic framework
Compulsory contributions from individuals in gainful employment increased significantly in 2024. A total of 305.9 billion euros in contribution revenue was generated, which is 16.2 billion euros more than in the previous year. This corresponds to a 5.6 per cent increase versus 2023. The positive wage and salary trend was instrumental to this development, as was the robust labour market in a challenging economic environment. According to the final financial result, the total revenue of the German Pension Insurance was 402.0 billion euros. Despite this positive trend, growth in expenditure exceeded growth in revenue. Pension expenditure rose by 5.8 per cent year over year in 2024. Overall, the German Pension Insurance’s expenditure has risen by 6.1 per cent to 402.8 billion euros since 2023.”
A detailed breakdown of the federal budget can be found in the interactive chart from the German Ministry of Finance. It is unfortunately not available in English. The following screenshot is just an example.
#Bundeshaushalt Digital.
https://www.bundeshaushalt.de/DE/Bundeshaushalt-digital/bundeshaushalt-digital.html
#Emilie Höslinger. Bundeshaushalt 2026 Investieren oder konsumieren? November 2025.
https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/sd-digital-2025-20-hoeslinger-bundeshaushalt-2026.pdf
Quote: “Beim BMAS ist die Bewegung ambivalent: + 18,48 Mrd. Euro an Mehrausgaben werden durch – 15,35 Mrd. Euro an Kürzungen zu einem Netto von + 3,13 Mrd. Euro. Diese
gegenläufige Bewegung ergibt sich zu einem Großteil dadurch, dass der Zuschuss an die Rentenversicherung im Beitrittsgebiet in Zukunft innerhalb des Postens des allgemeinen Rentenzuschusses veranschlagt wird (vgl. Abb. A.1 und A.2 im Anhang). Abzüglich dieser Umschichtung ergibt sich dennoch eine Erhöhung des regulären Bundeszuschusses zur Rente in Höhe von 2 Mrd. Euro (+ 3,32 Mrd. Euro nominal). Auch der zusätzliche Zuschuss zur Rentenversicherung soll 2026 um 0,9 Mrd. Euro erhöht werden (+ 1,58 Mrd. Euro nominal). Insgesamt sollen 2026 24,6 % des Bundeshaushalts und 33,3 % der Steuereinnahmen des Bundeshaushalts für die gesetzliche Rentenversicherung aufgewendet werden (ohne Zahlungen für Grundsicherung im Alter).”
Translated: [“At the BMAS (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs), the movement is ambivalent: +€18.48 billion in additional spending is offset by –€15.35 billion in cuts, resulting in a net increase of +€3.13 billion. This opposing movement is largely due to the fact that, in the future, the subsidy to the pension insurance scheme in the accession area will be budgeted within the item of the general federal pension subsidy (see Figures A.1 and A.2 in the appendix). Even after deducting this reallocation, there is still an increase in the regular federal pension subsidy of €2 billion (€3.32 billion nominal). The additional subsidy to the pension insurance scheme is also set to increase by €0.9 billion in 2026 (€1.58 billion nominal). Overall, in 2026, 24.6% of the federal budget and 33.3% of the federal budget’s tax revenues are to be allocated to the statutory pension insurance scheme (excluding payments for basic income support in old age).”]
#Economic Policy Committee - Ageing Working Group. 2024 Ageing Report Germany - Country Fiche. December 2023. Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/e8f41d38-6d27-45b4-8919-c9348720fcfc_en?filename=2024-ageing-report-country-fiche-Germany.pdf
Quote: “Statutory Pension System
The statutory pension insurance scheme - as a point system - comprises pensions for old-age, survivors and disability, provides rehabilitation benefits, but no minimum pensions.
The annual budget volume of the statutory pension system is based on two major sources: the contributions by insured persons and the government subsidies. The latter contribute an amount of about 23% of total receipts. In 2022, insured employees and their employers each contributed 9.3% of the employees’ gross wages to the statutory pension system. In 2022, total revenues amounted to 357.5 billion EUR while total expenditures to 353.9 billion EUR.”
– Well many sure would like to but taxes and contributions are about 40% of salaries for the average worker and almost 50% in the highest tax brackets. One of the highest in the world.
#OECD. Taxing Wages 2025 - Decomposition of Personal Income Taxes and the Role of Tax Reliefs
#Anja Hardenberg and Isabell Pohlmann. Einkommenssteuer. Steuerprogression – einfach erklärt. 03.01.2026
https://www.test.de/steuerprogression-einfach-erklaert-5813257-0/
#PWC. Germany Individual - Taxes on personal income. 19 January 2026
https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/germany/individual/taxes-on-personal-income
– Together with the rising cost of living and sluggish wage growth, this makes it especially hard for young and middle aged Germans to generate savings for their own retirements.
#DESTATIS. Reallöhne und Nominallöhne.
https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Labour/Earnings/Real-Earnings-Net-Earnings/_node.html
Quote: “Reallohnentwicklung 2024 in Deutschland
Der Reallohn ist der Verdienst, über den Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer tatsächlich verfügen können, nachdem die Inflation berücksichtigt wurde. Im Gegensatz zum Nominallohn berücksichtigt der Reallohn die tatsächliche Kaufkraft des Verdienstes. Bei einer positiven Veränderung der Reallöhne - gemessen am Reallohnindex - sind die Verdienste stärker gestiegen als die Verbraucherpreise, bei einer negativen Veränderungsrate ist es entsprechend umgekehrt.
Die Nominallöhne in Deutschland waren im Jahr 2024 um 5,4 % höher als im Vorjahr. Die Verbraucherpreise stiegen im selben Zeitraum um 2,2 %. Damit lagen die Reallöhne im Jahr 2024 um 3,1 % über dem Vorjahr. Diese Entwicklung stellt den stärksten Reallohnanstieg seit 2008 dar. Während in den Jahren zuvor noch insbesondere die hohe Inflation den Nominallohnanstieg aufgezehrt hat, ist das starke Wachstum des Reallohns im vergangenen Jahr auf die vergleichsweise schwächere Inflationsentwicklung zurückzuführen.”
– One of the best investments, wealth generators and places of comfort and security is owning your own place. But due to a mix of NIMBYS preventing new development, increasing mountains of new regulations making building more expensive, and millions of people immigrating to Germany in the last few decades, the housing supply is deeply behind demand. Renting and buying real estate in metropolitan areas, where young people actually want to live, is so expensive today, that even couples with a dual income and good jobs have a really hard time affording it.
#Germany: The end of the single-family home? 2024
Quote: “Urbanization is a long-term driver of the structural decline in the construction of single-family homes. Both historically and today, labour markets in cities and metropolitan regions are in many ways more attractive than in rural areas. They offer short distances of travel, very good medical care, a wide range of cultural activities and much more. Accordingly, migration is towards metropolitan regions. The demand for housing is concentrated in small spaces. Land and housing are becoming scarce and expensive. Prices and rents are rising. As a result, small apartments are preferred over large houses. In addition, high energy and material prices, the shortage of skilled labour and a sharp increase in building costs overall make homes unaffordable for many households. We expect this to remain the case in the future. In particular, the shortage of skilled labour is likely to worsen significantly. Hence, the trend towards the building of large multi-family houses and small apartments is likely to continue.”
#DESTATIS. Construction prices and real property prices. 2026.
https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Economy/Prices/Construction-Prices-And-Real-Property-Prices/_node.html#sprg266586
#Deutsche Bundesbank. German Residential Property Market. 2026.
https://www.bundesbank.de/en/statistics/sets-of-indicators/system-of-indicators-for-the-german-residential-property-market
#Germany's Growing Wealth Gap: Older Generations Far Outpace the Young
IFCCI Research· Economic Analysis. 10 July 2025
https://www.ifcci.org.my/germanys-growing-wealth-gap-older-generations-far-outpace-the-young
Quote: “Assets, Not Income, Are the Key to Wealth
The survey, which included responses from approximately 4,000 private households, measured net wealth—defined as total assets (including real estate, investments, vehicles, and business holdings) minus liabilities. One critical insight: homeownership is central to wealth accumulation. Fewer than 10% of Germans under 35 own property, compared to over 50% of those aged 55–64. This gap highlights both the financial barriers young people face and the compounding advantages of owning property over time.
Co-author Maximilian Stockhausen pointed out that if Germany aims to support private wealth-building, it should consider lowering taxes on earned income. Giving workers greater control over their disposable income would increase their capacity to save and invest.”
#Wealth and finances of private households in Germany: Results of the 2023 wealth survey
Monthly Report – April 2025
– And when seniors are the largest group of voters, politicians make politics for them.
#2025 Bundestag election: at least 59.2 million people eligible to vote. Press release No. 460 of 4 December 2024
– A retirement age of 70 or higher is already being discussed.
#Teresa Knoll. Merz-Regierung diskutiert über Rente mit 70 – Tabelle zeigt: Diese Jahrgänge wären betroffen. 27.02.2026.
Quote: “Rente mit 70 – dieser Plan könnte schon bald Realität werden. Die Rentenkommission soll bald darüber diskutieren. Welcher Jahrgang zuerst betroffen wäre.
Frankfurt – Das deutsche Rentensystem steht vor seiner größten Herausforderung: Die geburtenstarken Babyboomer gehen in Rente, während immer weniger junge Menschen in die Rentenkasse einzahlen. Gleichzeitig steigt die Lebenserwartung kontinuierlich. Aktuell finanzieren laut Tagesschau etwa 2,1 Beschäftigte einen Rentner – dieses Verhältnis wird sich weiter verschlechtern. Ohne Reformen drohen drastisch steigende Beitragssätze oder sinkende Renten.
Eine dieser Reformen könnte das Arbeitsleben für Millionen Bürgerinnen und Bürger deutlich verlängern: Die Rente mit 70, gegen die sich viele wehren, ist keine ferne Zukunftsmusik mehr, sondern steht auf der Agenda der Rentenkommission. Am 23. Februar will das 13-köpfige Expertengremium unter der Leitung von Sozialrechtsprofessorin Constanze Janda von der Universität Speyer über eine Anhebung des Renteneintrittsalters auf 70 Jahre beraten. Das will die Bild aus Kommissionskreisen erfahren haben.”
[trnsl. Retirement at 70 – this plan could soon become reality. The pension commission is set to discuss it soon. Which birth year would be affected first?
Frankfurt – The German pension system is facing its biggest challenge yet: The large baby boomer generation is retiring, while fewer and fewer young people are paying into the pension system. At the same time, life expectancy is steadily increasing. According to Tagesschau, currently about 2.1 workers finance one retiree – this ratio will worsen. Without reforms, drastically rising contribution rates or declining pensions are imminent.
One of these reforms could significantly extend the working lives of millions of citizens: Retirement at 70, which many oppose, is no longer a distant prospect, but is on the agenda of the pension commission. On February 23, the 13-member expert panel, chaired by social law professor Constanze Janda from the University of Speyer, will discuss raising the retirement age to 70. This information was obtained by Bild from commission sources.]
#Jens Kiffmeier. Reiche plant Renten-Revolution: Deutsche sollen automatisch länger arbeiten. 10.04.2026.
https://www.merkur.de/politik/rente-mit-70-reiche-will-rentenalter-an-lebenserwartung-koppeln-zr-94256249.html
Quote: “Rente automatisch mit 70: Merz-Ministerin Reiche will das Rentenalter an die Lebenserwartung koppeln – doch das Dänemark-Modell hat einen Haken.
Berlin – Rente erst ab 70 – oder noch später? Mit einem Gastbeitrag im Handelsblatt hat Bundeswirtschaftsministerin Katherina Reiche (CDU) die Rentendebatte jetzt neu entfacht: Die Ministerin im Kabinett von Bundeskanzler Friedrich Merz (CDU) fordert, das Renteneintrittsalter „behutsam, aber verbindlich“ an die steigende Lebenserwartung zu koppeln – ähnlich wie in Dänemark. Damit greift Reiche einen der umstrittensten Punkte der laufenden Reformdiskussion auf – und bekommt dafür zumindest grundsätzliche Unterstützung vom Koalitionspartner SPD. Allerdings hat das Reformprojekt einen Haken: Denn Geringverdiener haben statistisch eine deutlich kürzere Lebenserwartung als Besserverdiener.”
[trnsl. Automatic retirement at 70: Merz's Minister Reiche wants to link the retirement age to life expectancy – but the Danish model has a catch.
Berlin – Retirement only from age 70 – or even later? With a guest article in the Handelsblatt newspaper, Federal Minister of Economics Katherina Reiche (CDU) has reignited the pension debate: The minister in Chancellor Friedrich Merz's (CDU) cabinet is calling for the retirement age to be linked "carefully, but bindingly" to rising life expectancy – similar to the system in Denmark. Reiche is thus addressing one of the most controversial points in the ongoing reform discussion – and is receiving at least basic support from her coalition partner, the SPD. However, the reform project has a catch: Statistically, low-income earners have a significantly shorter life expectancy than high-income earners.]
This suggestion has been voiced in the past as well but it quickly got a lot of reactions and became unpopular.
#Deborah Cole. Pension age debate threatens to splinter Germany’s fragile coalition. Aug 2025
Quote: ““The chancellor, Friedrich Merz, has largely sidestepped the ticking timebomb of the greying population since taking office in May, preferring instead to announce sweeteners such as tax breaks for older Germans to continue working past the retirement age.
However his economy minister, Katherina Reiche of the Christian Democrats (CDU), a former energy executive who grew up in the communist east, has stepped into the breach with repeated calls this summer to get real about old-age benefits.Demographic change and ever-increasing life expectancy make it unavoidable: the lifetime labour period must increase,” she told the daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung late last month. “We have got to work more and longer.”
She said a major economic thinktank, the DIW, had argued two decades ago that the minimum pension age should be 70 by 2025 but that instead most Germans were on track to spend “only” two-thirds of their lives employed – a ratio she described as untenable.
A displeased Merz reportedly told her, quietly, to stay in her lane and show consideration for the concerns of the twitchy Social Democrats (SPD), junior partners in the ruling coalition who are polling at a meagre 15%.”
– Today about 20% of German pensioners live in poverty and that rate is all but guaranteed to increase significantly in the 2030s.
#EUROSTAT. At-risk-of-poverty rate of older people by sex and selected age groups - EU-SILC and ECHP surveys. (last update: 10/04/2026)
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/ilc_pnp1__custom_19697362/default/bar?lang=en
#Helen Whittle. Germany struggles to fix its pension system. May 12, 2025
https://www.dw.com/en/how-to-avert-the-pension-fund-crisis-in-germany/a-68566053
Quote: “Current figures from German Pension Insurance show that 61% of pensioners receive less than €1,200 net per month from their statutory state pension. One in three pensioners receive less than €750 net.
Many women in Germany receive much lower pensions, or none at all. That's because they worked in low-paid jobs, and many also spent years at home as a stay-at-home wife, often not returning to work long after having children.
Reentering the labor market after many years isn't easy, and for many a pension isn't enough to make ends meet. They either work to supplement their pensions or receive state welfare benefits.”
#DW. Germany: One in five older women faces poverty. 2024.
https://www.dw.com/en/germany-one-in-five-older-women-faces-poverty/a-68905569
Quote: “The so-called "gender pension gap," the difference in retirement income between men and women, is 27.1% in Germany, the Federal Statistical Office reported on Wednesday.
About every fifth woman (20.8%) aged 65 or older was at risk of poverty last year. The risk level for men in the same age group was 15.9%.”
#Poverty in Germany - statistics & facts. Statista Research Department, Dec 17, 2025.
Quote: “Although Germany has a strong economy, it ranks 19th on the list of poverty rates for OECD countries, with a poverty rate of 11.6 percent. Furthermore, the number of senior citizens who are at risk of living in poverty has sharply increased over the past decade. In 2011, around 13 percent of pensioners were in danger of living in poverty, but by 2022, this figure had risen to almost 17.5 percent. This development is a reflection of inflation and shows that people who are relying on savings and their pensions are especially at risk of being unable to cope with the cost of living.“
#Jede fünfte Person im Ruhestand hat maximal 1400 Euro netto pro Monat zur Verfügung. Pressemitteilung Nr. N054 vom 2. Oktober 2025
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2025/10/PD25_N054_12_13.html
#Haan, Peter et al. (2017) : Entwicklung der Altersarmut bis 2036: Trends, Risikogruppen und Politikszenarien, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/168442/1/89093620X.pdf
Quote: “Im Folgenden werden zunächst die Entwicklung der Armutsrisikoquote und der Grundsicherungsquote über die Zeit beschrieben. Dazu gruppieren wir die Fortschreibungsperiode in vier Intervalle: 2015–2020, 2021–2025, 2026–2030 und 2031–2036. Wie oben beschrieben, weisen wir das Armutsrisiko für eine bestimmte Gruppe der älteren Bevölkerung aus: Wir beschränken uns für jedes Fortschreibungsjahr auf Haushalte, in denen eine Person – entweder der Haushaltsvorstand oder der Partner/die Partnerin – 67 Jahre alt ist. Diese Definition erlaubt es, über die Jahre eine vergleichbare Gruppe von Rentnerinnen und Rentnern abzubilden und den Trend im Armutsrisiko zu untersuchen. Die Auswertungen beziehen sich demnach auf die Kohorten, die zwischen 1947 und 1969 geboren wurden.
Unsere Berechnungen zeigen, dass das Risiko für Altersarmut über die Zeit ansteigt. Für die Jahre 2015–2020 simulieren wir eine Armutsrisikoquote von etwa 16 %. Diese Quote steigt im Zeitverlauf an und erhöht sich in den Jahren 2031–2036 im Durchschnitt auf über 20 %. Ein ähnliches Bild finden wir für die Grundsicherungsquote: Diese steigt von etwa 5,5 % in den Jahren 2015–2020 auf etwa 7 % in den Jahren 2031–2036. Für diesen Anstieg sind vor allem zwei Gründe zu nennen: zum einen die Auswirkungen der Rentenreformen, insbesondere die Absenkung des Rentenniveaus, zum anderen die zu erwartenden Veränderungen der Erwerbsbiographien jüngerer Kohorten. Der zweite Punkt wird bei der differenzierten Analyse der Armutsindikatoren nach verschiedenen Risikogruppen deutlich (vgl. unten).”
[transl. The following section describes the development of the at-risk-of-poverty rate and the basic income support rate over time. For this purpose, we group the projection period into four intervals: 2015–2020, 2021–2025, 2026–2030, and 2031–2036. As described above, we report the at-risk-of-poverty rate for a specific group of older people: For each projection year, we limit ourselves to households in which one person—either the head of household or their partner—is 67 years old. This definition allows us to represent a comparable group of pensioners over the years and to examine the trend in the at-risk-of-poverty rate. The analyses therefore refer to the cohorts born between 1947 and 1969.
Our calculations show that the risk of poverty in old age increases over time. For the years 2015–2020, we simulate a poverty risk rate of approximately 16%. This rate increases over time, rising to an average of over 20% between 2031 and 2036. A similar picture emerges for the basic income support rate: this increases from approximately 5.5% between 2015 and 2020 to approximately 7% between 2031 and 2036. Two main reasons can be cited for this increase: firstly, the effects of pension reforms, particularly the reduction in pension levels, and secondly, the anticipated changes in the employment histories of younger cohorts. The second point becomes clear in the differentiated analysis of poverty indicators according to various risk groups (see below).]
– Still, seniors and boomers, in total, own the vast majority of Germany's wealth.
#Germany's Growing Wealth Gap: Older Generations Far Outpace the Young IFCCI Research· Economic Analysis. 10 July 2025
https://www.ifcci.org.my/germanys-growing-wealth-gap-older-generations-far-outpace-the-young
Quote: “Age and Wealth: A Clear Correlation
One of the most striking patterns from the data is how closely wealth correlates with age. Households under the age of 35 held a median net worth of just €17,300, whereas those aged 55–64—the most financially secure group—had a median net worth of €241,100. The explanation is straightforward: wealth takes time to accumulate. Younger individuals are often at the start of their careers or managing student debt, leaving them with fewer assets. Interestingly, even households over 75 maintained substantial wealth, with a median net worth of €172,500, reflecting a strong capacity for asset preservation later in life.”
#Wealth and finances of private households in Germany: Results of the 2023 wealth survey
Monthly Report – April 2025
– Even in a high tax country like Germany there is plenty of wealth disparity
#Wealth and finances of private households in Germany: Results of the 2023 wealth survey
Monthly Report – April 2025
https://publikationen.bundesbank.de/publikationen-de/berichte-studien/monatsberichte/monatsbericht-april-2025-954594?article=vermoegen-und-finanzen-privater-haushalte-in-deutschland-ergebnisse-der-vermoegensbefragung-2023--954598
Quote: “Die verteilungsbasierte Vermögensbilanz des Haushaltssektors verdeutlicht eine insgesamt hohe Vermögensungleichheit in Deutschland. Über die Laufzeit des Datensatzes, das heißt ab 2011, hielten die obersten 10 % der Vermögensverteilung im Schnitt mehr als 60 % des gesamten Nettovermögens der Haushalte in Deutschland. Im gleichen Zeitraum entfiel auf die vermögensärmere Hälfte der Vermögensverteilung mit durchschnittlich 2,1 % ein äußerst geringer Anteil. Allerdings verschob sich im Beobachtungszeitraum die Verteilung leicht zugunsten der vermögensärmeren Haushalte. Der Anteil der vermögensärmeren 50 % der Haushalte am gesamten Nettovermögen stieg von etwa 2 % im Jahr 2011 auf mehr als 2,4 % im Jahr 2023. Ebenso deutet der zeitliche Verlauf des Gini-Koeffizienten – ein Maß für die Ungleichverteilung der Nettovermögen – auf einen leichten Rückgang insbesondere seit dem Jahr 2014 hin.
Auch im internationalen Vergleich bleibt die Vermögensungleichheit in Deutschland recht hoch. Gemäß der verteilungsbasierten Vermögensbilanz für den Euroraum bewegen sich die Gini-Koeffizienten der einzelnen Mitgliedsländer in einem Bereich von 57 % bis 77 %. Dabei rangiert Deutschland mit einem Wert von gut 76 % am oberen Rand (siehe Schaubild 2.8). Bei einem Ländervergleich ist allerdings zu beachten, dass das zugrunde liegende Vermögenskonzept der verteilungsbasierten Vermögensbilanz die Ansprüche an gesetzliche Alterssicherungssysteme nicht berücksichtigt. Entsprechende Berechnungen für Deutschland zeigen, dass die Nettovermögensungleichheit bei Berücksichtigung der gesetzlichen Altersvorsorge deutlich geringer ausfällt als ohne Einbeziehung.”
[Quote transl. “The distribution-based balance sheet of the household sector illustrates the overall high level of wealth inequality in Germany. Over the period covered by the data set, i.e., from 2011 onwards, the top 10% of the wealth distribution held, on average, more than 60% of the total net wealth of households in Germany. During the same period, the poorer half of the wealth distribution held an extremely small share, averaging 2.1%. However, the distribution shifted slightly in favor of the less wealthy households during the observation period. The share of the poorest 50% of households in total net wealth rose from approximately 2% in 2011 to more than 2.4% in 2023. Similarly, the trend over time of the Gini coefficient – a measure of the unequal distribution of net wealth – indicates a slight decline, particularly since 2014.
Wealth inequality in Germany remains quite high even in international comparison. According to the distribution-based balance sheet for the Eurozone, The Gini coefficients of the individual member states range from 57% to 77%. Germany, with a value of just over 76%, ranks at the upper end (see Figure 2.8). However, when comparing countries, it is important to note that the underlying wealth concept of the distribution-based balance sheet does not take into account claims on statutory pension schemes. Corresponding calculations for Germany show that net wealth inequality is significantly lower when statutory pensions are considered than when they are not.]
– And beyond pensions, the welfare and healthcare systems Germans rely upon may become unaffordable in the 2030s.
#Ben Knight. How to fix Germany's costly health care system. March 30, 2026
https://www.dw.com/en/how-to-fix-germanys-costly-health-care-system/a-76597471
Quote: “Germany's health care system is one of the most expensive in the world, with state health insurers alone spending around €1 billion ($1.15 billion) per day on health care — a number that is expected to rise even more in the next few years. Meanwhile, Germans' insurance contributions to those state health insurers rose by an average of around 3% this year, on top of a 2.5% rise in 2025.
But despite the rising contributions, state insurers' expenses are increasing even more rapidly. At the press conference, the commission held up a graphic — from the state insurers' association, the GKV — which showed that at the current rate, the shortfall between state insurers' income and expenses would increase from €15.3 billion in 2027 to €40.4 billion in 2030.”
– The vast majority of health care costs occur during the last quarter of your life.
#Cost of illness, cost of illness per inhabitant: Germany, years, sex, age groups
https://www-genesis.destatis.de/datenbank/online/url/89b07463
– So just as the healthcare workforce is shrinking due to demographics, the numbers of patients will explode.
#Long-term care projection: 1.8 million more people in need of long-term care expected until 2055. Destatis. 2023.
https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Society-Environment/Health/Long-Term-Care/_node.html#267160
Quote: “Long-term care projection: 1.8 million more people in need of long-term care expected until 2055
The number of people in need of long-term care in Germany will go up by 37% until 2055 just because the population is ageing. Their number will increase from roughly 5.0 million at the end of 2021 to approximately 6.8 million in 2055, according to the results provided by the long-term care projection of the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis). It will stand at roughly 5.6 million (+14%) already in 2035. No great changes are expected after 2055 as the large birth cohorts of the 1950s and 1960s, the baby boomers, will then be replaced by smaller birth cohorts of older age. In 2070, the number of people in need of long-term care as defined by the Long-Term Care Insurance Act (German Social Code, Book XI) is expected to total approximately 6.9 million (+38%). This is shown by a variant of the long-term care projection with long-term care rates being kept constant. The long-term care rate is calculated as follows: people in need of long-term care as a proportion of the population, by age and sex. It shows people’s risk of needing long-term care at a specific age.”
#DESTATIS. Pflegekräftevorausberechnung
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Bevoelkerungsvorausberechnung/pflegekraeftevorausberechnung.html
Quote: “Der Status quo-Variante liegen konstante Erwerbstätigenquoten in der Pflege nach Alter und Geschlecht zugrunde. Sie stellt im Wesentlichen den Einfluss der demografischen Entwicklung auf den Pflegearbeitsmarkt dar. Im Detail sinken die Zahlen laut Status quo-Variante bereits bis 2034 um 9 % auf 1,48 Millionen Pflegekräfte. Somit findet die stärkste Abnahme um rund 140 000 Pflegekräfte bereits bis 2034 statt. Hier wirken hauptsächlich die Renteneintritte der Babyboomer-Generation. Zwischen 2034 und 2049 nimmt die Zahl der Pflegekräfte dann nur noch um rund 20 000 Pflegekräfte ab. Insgesamt zeigt die Status quo-Variante demnach in den nächsten zehn Jahren eine klare Abnahme, die bis zum Ende des Beobachtungszeitraums 2049 in eine Stagnation auf einem niedrigeren Niveau übergeht. Die Zahl der weiblichen Pflegekräfte sinkt dabei im Zeitverlauf relativ betrachtet etwas stärker, da in der Babyboomer-Generation das Übergewicht weiblicher Pflegekräfte noch deutlich ausgeprägter ist als in jüngeren Jahrgängen."
[trnsl. The status quo scenario is based on constant employment rates in the care sector by age and gender. It essentially depicts the impact of demographic change on the care labor market. Specifically, according to the status quo scenario, the number of care workers will decline by 9% to 1.48 million by 2034. Thus, the most significant decrease, around 140,000 care workers, will occur by 2034. This decline is primarily due to the retirement of the baby boomer generation. Between 2034 and 2049, the number of care workers will then decrease by only about 20,000. Overall, the status quo scenario therefore shows a clear decline over the next ten years, which will then stagnate at a lower level by the end of the observation period in 2049. The number of female caregivers decreases somewhat more sharply over time, as the predominance of female caregivers is still significantly more pronounced in the baby boomer generation than in younger generations.]
– If a country's pyramid looks like this and you want to stabilize it at the bottom, immigration will not do that. For one, it doesn’t actually make your country that much younger.
#Gut jede vierte Person in Deutschland hat eine Einwanderungsgeschichte. Pressemitteilung Nr. 181 vom 22. Mai 2025
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2025/05/PD25_181_125.html
Quote: “Über ein Drittel der 20- bis 39-Jährigen mit Einwanderungsgeschichte Personen mit Einwanderungsgeschichte sind jung im Vergleich zur Gesamtbevölkerung: In der Gruppe der 20- bis 39-Jährigen hatte 2024 mehr als jede dritte Person eine Einwanderungsgeschichte (34 %). Demgegenüber war es in der Gruppe der über 65-Jährigen nur jede siebte Person (14 %). Die Bevölkerung mit Einwanderungsgeschichte war 2024 mit einem Durchschnittsalter von 38,2 Jahren etwa 9 Jahre jünger als die Bevölkerung ohne Einwanderungsgeschichte (47,4 Jahre). Besonders jung waren mit durchschnittlich 25,1 Jahren die Menschen mit nur einem eingewanderten Elternteil.“
Translated: [Over a third of 20- to 39-year-olds with an immigration background
People with a migration background are young compared to the general population: In 2024, more than one in three people aged 20 to 39 had a migration background (34%). In contrast, only one in seven people aged over 65 had a migration background (14%). The population with a migration background was about nine years younger in 2024, with an average age of 38.2 years, compared to the population without a migration background (47.4 years). Those with only one immigrant parent were particularly young, with an average age of 25.1 years.]
– In Germany the birthrate of most of its immigrants isn’t higher than the locals’.
Even though the fertility rates of the foreign population is slightly higher than the German citizens, both are still below replacement level.
#DESTATIS. Total fertility rate (per woman): Germany, years, citizenship of the mother
https://www-genesis.destatis.de/datenbank/online/statistic/12612/table/12612-0010
– And if new immigrants have more children, they tend to adjust to the rest of the population within two generations.
#Holger Stichnoth And Mustafa Yeter. Cultural Influences On The Fertility Behavior Of First and Second-Generation Immigrants
Quote: “In the second generation, we find that the effect of home country TFR is reduced to 0.033. This is a very small (and statistically insignificant) effect compared to the average completed fertility of 1.9 children among second-generation immigrants in Germany. When cohort fertility rates (CFRs) are used as a proxy, the coefficient is 0.249 (significant at the 10% level). The comparison between the generations suggests that – conditional on socio-economic characteristic – the purely cultural effect on immigrant fertility diminishes considerably already in the second generation, a finding that is of interest in the current public policy debate about the long-run consequences of immigration.”
#Sandra Krapf, Nadja Milewski, Martin Bujard. BiB WORKING PAPER Stratified adaptation? Education and fertility patterns of the descendants of immigrants in Germany 2024
Quote: “The results of our regression analyses did not support the hypothesis that variations in education composition account for fertility differentials, except for immigrants from Turkey. Among them, differences in educational composition partly explain their higher probability of first births. In terms of the concept of stratified adaptation, our findings highlight variations in adaptation processes across educational groups, immigrants' region of origin and birth order. For first births (and to some extent second births), we observe a prevailing trend of convergence, especially among the highly educated, particularly those of Turkish and Southern European descent. This suggests that these groups are raised in a social environment that encourages young adults in the high educational track to pursue a career path with delayed first and second childbearing, akin to the choices made by highly educated in the majority group. Thus, the results for the descendants of immigrants from Turkey and Southern Europe are in line with our hypothesis 2a. In contrast, the results for immigrants from Eastern European
countries suggest a pattern of lower fertility as we have proposed in our hypothesis 2b. This is evident among second-generation immigrants from Eastern European countries for first births and among first and 1.5 generation individuals from the same region for second births. Similarly, highly-educated individuals whose parents immigrated from Southern European countries are less likely to have a second child than non-immigrants. It seems that for these groups, the decision to have children contrasts sharply with their career orientation, leading them to postpone childbirth more significantly than highly-educated non-immigrants.”
#Hulu et al. Fertility by Birth Order among the Descendants of Immigrants in Selected European Countries. 2017.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/padr.12037
Quote: “The analysis supported the idea that both the mainstream society and the minority subculture have shaped the childbearing patterns of the descendants of immigrants in Europe. Overall, the descendants of immigrants from high-fertility countries had lower parity-specific fertility than did their parents’ generation. Furthermore, in Sweden and Germany, the second generation exhibited fertility levels that were very similar to or even lower than those of natives. However, we also observed relatively high first birth rates for some and high third birth rates for many ethnic minority women, which suggest that factors specific to ethnic minorities have also shaped fertility patterns.”
– Sure immigration over the last few decades has delayed the coming crash and in the transition period we’ll run into serious worker shortfalls, especially in health care and nursing. So zero immigration doesn’t seem wise or feasible.
Since fertility rates were below replacement since 1970, the population in Germany has grown through immigration. Natural growth rate, i.e. growth rate without migration, has been negative.
Workforce participation of immigrants in Germany is also quite high.
#State of Immigrant Integration – Germany. OECD.
Quote: “The successful labour market integration of Germany’s 11 million working-age immigrants is an important element in the country’s strategy to alleviate labour shortages. Overall, the labour market outcomes for immigrants in Germany are positive in international comparison. At 70%, the employment rate of immigrants is significantly higher than in most other EU peer countries.
Over the past decade, the employment rate of immigrants in Germany has increased, as the country recovered from the Great Recession of 2007-08 (see Figure 4). However, employment growth was weaker in comparison to immigrants in the remainder of the EU and that of the native-born, widening prior gaps. This can be partly attributed to the large number of new arrivals, particularly refugees, whose access to the labour and training markets is limited during the initial stages of the asylum procedure and whose integration into the labour market takes more time (see Section III.2). By contrast, among immigrants who have been residing in Germany for at least ten years, employment growth was comparable to that of the native-born population.”
#DESTATIS: Beschäftigte mit Einwanderungsgeschichte 2024 in vielen Mangelberufen überdurchschnittlich stark vertreten. Pressemitteilung Nr. N057 vom 22. Oktober 2025.
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2025/10/PD25_N057_13.html
Quote: “Knapp ein Drittel der Beschäftigten in der Altenpflege hat eine Einwanderungsgeschichte
Deutlich über dem gesamtwirtschaftlichen Durchschnitt liegt der Anteil der Beschäftigten mit Einwanderungsgeschichte auch in weiteren Mangelberufen: so etwa in der Kunststoff- und Kautschukherstellung (44 %), im Hotelservice (40 %), bei Berufskraftfahrerinnen und -fahrern im Güterverkehr (39 %), in der Metallbearbeitung (37 %), in der Altenpflege (33 %), bei Speditions- und Logistikkaufleuten (32 %) sowie im Metallbau oder der Elektrotechnik (je 30 %).”
[trnsl. Nearly a third of employees in elderly care have an immigrant background.
The proportion of employees with an immigrant background is also significantly above the overall economic average in other shortage occupations: for example, in plastics and rubber manufacturing (44%), hotel services (40%), among professional drivers in freight transport (39%), in metalworking (37%), in elderly care (33%), among freight forwarding and logistics clerks (32%), and in metal construction or electrical engineering (30% each).]
#Martin Werding. Migration Und Ihr Beitrag Zum Staatshaushalt. 2025.
Quote: “Migration bedeutet höhere Kosten, aber auch Ersparnisse und Einnahmen für den deutschen
Staat. In der Summe entlastet Migration die öffentlichen Haushalte.
• Eine um 200.000 Personen höhere jährliche Netto-Zuwanderung nach Deutschland reduziert die
dauerhaft bestehende Finanzierungslücke der öffentlichen Haushalte um knapp 2,5% des Bruttoinlandsprodukts – oder, gemessen in Werten für 2024, um rund 104 Mrd. Euro jährlich.
• Jede Person, die im Zuge dieser kontinuierlich hohen Zuwanderung nach Deutschland kommt,
entlastet den Staatshaushalt um 7.100 Euro im Jahr.
• Diese Ergebnisse lassen sich aus Berechnungen für den im März 2024 veröffentlichten Sechsten
Tragfähigkeitsbericht des Bundesfinanzministeriums ableiten. Die Effekte der Zuwanderung für
den Staatshaushalt sind damit insgesamt positiv.
• Bisherige Berechnungen, nach denen Zugewanderte auf individueller Ebene lebenslang eine negative „fiskalische Bilanz“ aufweisen, werden oft missverstanden. Dies gilt nämlich auch für nichtzugewanderte Personen. Vor allem vernachlässigen solche Berechnungen die Auswirkungen der
Zuwanderung auf das Wirtschaftswachstum sowie die Frage, wann ihre fiskalischen Effekte anfallen.”
[trnsl. Migration means higher costs, but also savings and revenues for the German state. Overall, migration relieves the burden on public budgets.
• An increase of 200,000 people in annual net immigration to Germany reduces the persistent public budget shortfall by almost 2.5% of gross domestic product – or, measured in 2024 figures, by around €104 billion annually.
• Every person who comes to Germany as a result of this consistently high level of immigration relieves the state budget by €7,100 per year.
• These results can be derived from calculations for the Sixth Sustainability Report of the Federal Ministry of Finance, published in March 2024. The effects of immigration on the state budget are therefore positive overall.
• Previous calculations, according to which immigrants have a negative "fiscal balance" on an individual level throughout their lives, are often misunderstood. This also applies to non-immigrants. In particular, such calculations neglect the impact of
immigration on economic growth and the question of when its fiscal effects will occur.]
#Benita Zink. 706 billion euros of GDP due to foreign workers. August 2025.
Quote: “Employees without German passports significantly impact the German economy. A new analysis by the German Economic Institute (IW) shows that, considering overall economic effects, foreign workers contribute over €700 billion to value creation. In the past ten years, millions of workers from abroad have found their way into the German labor market.
Around seven million foreigners worked in Germany in 2024, with almost one in six employees not holding German citizenship. In 2015, when then-Chancellor Angela Merkel uttered the historic phrase "We can do this" at the Federal Press Conference, only one in ten employees lacked a German passport. This is also reflected in the economy: Last year, foreign workers contributed €536 billion to value creation. Those who arrived in Germany since 2015 alone generated €240 billion. If one also considers upstream value creation effects and consumer spending, a staggering €706 billion of value creation in Germany is dependent on foreign workers.”
#Yuliya Kosyakova. Germany’s Demographic Challenge and the Central Role of Migration
19/12/2025
https://iep.unibocconi.eu/germanys-demographic-challenge-and-central-role-migration
Quote: ”Maintaining a stable labour force would require an annual net migration of around 400,000 individuals, implying even more gross inflows. These estimates highlight the scale of demographic adjustment necessary to support current levels of economic activity and social protection.
Migration has already played a central role in stabilising the labour force. Since 2010, the native working-age population has declined by about 10 percent, while the number of foreign nationals of working age has roughly doubled, resulting in an overall stable labour supply. Employment has grown by nearly 20 percent during this period, and almost 70 percent of this increase is attributable to workers with foreign nationality.
Immigrants’ employment rates have risen more strongly than those of the German-born population, indicating that labour market integration processes have been effective for many groups.”
#Bhattacharjee, Natalia V et al. Global fertility in 204 countries and territories, 1950–2021, with forecasts to 2100: a comprehensive demographic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2021.
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(24)00550-6/fulltext
Quote: “Sustained low fertility rates might likewise lead to labour shortages in some sectors, potentially hindering economic growth. If productivity per working-aged adult does not increase in accordance with declines in the working-age population, growth in gross domestic product will slow.4 Reliance on immigrants will become increasingly necessary to sustain economic growth in low-fertility countries.45 The shifting global distribution of livebirths, with a higher proportion occurring in current lower-income countries, could make immigration a viable way to address these issues. However, this approach will only work if there is a shift in current public and political attitudes towards immigration in many lower-fertility countries and if there are sufficient incentives in place for people to migrate from higher-fertility countries. Continued skilled worker migration to high-income, low-fertility economies—a concept referred to as brain drain—can also have devastating effects on the economies these workers leave behind.46,47 This underscores the importance of developing ethical and effective immigration policies with global cooperation.”
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