sws371 [at] nyu.edu / CV
I'm a PhD candidate in the NYU Department of Philosophy, and undergrad emeritus at Carleton College.
I work on philosophy of cognitive science, metasemantics, and perception. My dissertation is on the question: what is it for mental representations to be structured?
I have also been teaching about philosophical issues raised by AI, both theoretical and normative.
Philosophy and Language Models
Barnard College, Fall '26
Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence
Barnard College, Fall '25
Logic
NYU, Fall '25
Minds and Machines
NYU, Summer '25
Philosophical Applications of Cognitive Science
NYU, Summer '22
Syllabus here.
Global Ethics (TA)
Instructor: Kwame Anthony Appiah, Spring '23
Philosophy of Language (TA)
Instructor: Matt Mandelkern, Fall '22
Philosophy of Mind (TA)
Instructor: Verónica Gómez Sánchez, Spring '22
Philosophical Applications of Cog Sci (TA)
Instructor: Michael Strevens, Fall '21
My philosophy-teaching philosophy: I really like teaching philosophy. My first goal is to get students thinking like philosophers. To me that means framing hypotheses, clarifying them, applying them to cases, revising them, and rooting out misunderstanding. I think studying philosophy is a particularly good way to practice these things. I put a lot of effort into making my classes welcoming and collaborative.
My dissertation committee is Michael Strevens, Ned Block, and David Chalmers.
Papers I'm working on:
"How to See Things"
Develops an account of what it is to visually represent objects, drawing heavily on empirical work.
"The Mirroring Account of Analog Representation"
Extends recent discussions of the iconic/analog/symbolic to apply to mental representations.
Technically, I have an Erdös number of 4 (Erdös - M. Kac - T. Jacobson - B. Allen - me), if you count these papers with nearly a thousand authors each. Maybe a better metric would be to weight each link by the log of the number of authors on the paper. Alas, on that definition my number goes up to 15.