Research Interests：

• Epistemic game theory and modal logic;

• Algorithmic game theory, Kolmogorov complexity and its application in games;

• Political economy (superpower competition, fake news, propoganda, and misinformation, influence of AI, social movements...);

• Ambiguity and misspecification.

Publications:

• Elimination of Dominated Strategies and Inessential Players (with Mamoru Kaneko), Operations Research and Decisions 25 (2015): 35-54. 

• Directed Graphical Structure, Nash Equilibrium, and Potential Games, Operations Research Letters 46 (2018): 273-277.

• Monotonic Core Allocation Paths for Assignment Games (with Takaaki Abe), Social Choice and Welfare 53 (2019): 557-573. 

•  Characterizing Permissibility, Proper Rationalizability, an Iterated Admissibility by Incomplete Information, International Journal of Game Theory 50 (2021): 119-148.

• Quantal Response Equilibrium and Rationalizability: Inside the Black Box (with Fabio Maccheroni), forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior.

Working Papers:

• Influence Structure, Nash Equilibrium, and Approximation of a Game.

• A Note on Gale, Kuhn, and Tucker's Reductions of Zero-Sum Games.

• Randomness, Predictability, and Complexity in Repeated Situations (with Zsombor Z. Méder).

• Ordered Kripke Model, Permissibility, and Convergence of Probabilistic Kripke Model.

• Epistemic Structure of Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies (only slides now).

• Knowledge and Unanimous Acceptance of Core Payoffs: An Epistemic Foundation for Cooperative Game Theory

• Rationalization, Quantal Response Equilibrium, and Robust Outcomes in Large Populations  (with Fabio Maccheroni)

• The Power of Non-Superpowers(with Tomoo Kikuchi)

• Level-k Reasoning, Cognitive Hierarchy, and Rationalizability 

• Reasoning about Bounded Reasoning (with Gabriel Ziegler)