Charlie Kurth
Email: charles.kurth [at] wmich [dot] edu
Office Hours: Tuesdays, 3:00-4:00 pm, and by appointment
Office Location: Moore 3010
Emotions are central to how we perceive and evaluate the world around us. Fear not only alerts us to potential harms, but also helps us see those harms as dangerous—as things to be avoided. Similarly, feelings of joy, sadness, and love are all central to how we engage with and understand each other. But beyond such banalities, can we say more about what emotions are and how they function? That, in short, is the focal question for this seminar.
From a philosophical perspective, emotions are exciting because they bring a rich combination of conceptual, empirical, and phenomenological resources to bear on three sets of important questions.
- Metaphysical & conceptual questions. What are emotions—are they mere felt sensations, a species of evaluative judgment, distinctive forms of perceiving, motivations drives, or something else altogether? Relatedly, and in the vein of the philosophy of science: are emotions “hardwired” biological capacities that all humans have or are they better understood as culturaly-created phenomena? What distinguishes one emotion from one another and how do emotions differ from moods, feelings, and affect?
- Epistemological questions. Emotions are generally thought to provide us with information (e.g., fear informs us about danger, joy signals a success). But how might emotions do this? Moreover, emotions can misfire: we fear things that aren’t dangerous (the rubber snake), but we fail to be afraid of things that are dangerous (climate change). So why think emotions can serve as reliable epistemic tools? Pressing deeper: can emotions be (independent) sources of justification or understanding--does, say, my anger at what you said justify my belief that your comment was a slight?
- Evaluative questions. Emotions are often thought to have an important connection to morality and value. But it is difficult to give an account of the nature of this connection. Similarly, how are we to understand the importance of emotions for virtue and agency? Are certain emotions (e.g., empathy, anger, or compassion) essential to being virtuous? If so, why? Relatedly: what, if anything, can we do to regulate--even cultivate--the emotions we feel?
To explore these and other questions, this seminar will draw on research in philosophy as well as the social and cognitive sciences. Doing this should not only provide you with a better understanding of what emotions are (or might be), but also an appreciation for how philosophical research on emotions connects to central issues in the metaphysics, philosophy of science, epistemology, and ethics.
- Assorted readings available below
This course will have three graded components.
1) Class participation (15%). This course is structured as a seminar. So you will be expected to come to class prepared to discuss the readings. To give you some guidance, I will provide weekly reading questions. While you are not required to write up answers to these questions, you should come to class prepared to talk about them.
2) Reading responses (40%). Throughout the course, you will write four brief critical response essays: one response piece for each of the course's four sections (see below). That constraint aside, you are free to choose which reading you write about and you can use the reading questions as guide for your response papers. These essays should be approximately 500-600 words long (standard formatting).
In your response paper, you should do two things: (i) summarize an argument from one of the readings for that week, putting it into standard form (that is, explicitly lay out the argument's premises and conclusions), then (ii) raise an objection to the argument you've presented.
The essays are to be emailed to me by noon on the Thursday before the relevant Friday class meeting. The readings for Aug 31 are not eligible for reading responses.
3) Long paper (45%). The longer paper assignment invites you to explore one of the topics that we will be discussing in the course. Your paper should be approximately 15 pages long (double spaced, standard formatting). Though you are free to choose the topic for your long paper, you must get it approved by me before you start working on your draft.
You will need to turn in a draft of your paper by noon on Sunday, December 9. I will provide you with feedback by Thursday, December 13 (hopefully earlier). The final version of the paper will be due at noon on Saturday, December 15. You should email both your draft and your final papers to me.
While your draft needn't be a highly polished piece, the more developed it is, the better the comments I will be able to give you. Turning in a cursory draft may result in a grade penalty.
In order to help ensure a successful class, please heed the following rules and policies:
- Due Dates. Baring unusual circumstances, the due dates on the syllabus are non-negotiable. If you think you have reason to miss an assignment, it is best to inform me well in advance.
- Classroom Environment. Please arrive to class on time. All cell phones must be turned off during class. Texting, web surfing and the like is not permitted. Abuse of these courtesies may lead to penalties.
- Academic Honesty. As a student at WMU, you are responsible for making yourself aware of the University policies and procedures that pertain to Academic Honesty. These policies include cheating, fabrication, falsification and forgery, multiple submission, plagiarism, complicity, and computer misuse. In this class, you will be expected to abide by these obligations. This means that all work presented as original must, in fact, be original; the ideas and contributions of others (be they quotes, summaries, or paraphrases) must be appropriately acknowledged. More information about the WMU Academic Honesty rules as well as the rights of accused students can be found here.
- Accommodations for Disabilities. I am happy to make accommodations to assist students with documented disabilities (e.g., physical, learning, psychiatric, vision, hearing, etc.). Those wishing to arrange reasonable accommodations must contact Disability Services for Students. A disability determination must be made by this office before any accommodations are provided by the instructor. More information can be found here.
- Mental Health. WMU’s Mental Health Services’ professional staff members work with students to resolve personal and interpersonal difficulties, many of which can affect the academic experience. These include conflicts with or worry about friends or family, concerns about eating or drinking patterns, and feelings of anxiety and depression.
Tentative Schedule of Readings & Assignments
Introduction to the Philosophy of Emotion
Aug 31: Getting Started
- Read syllabus
- Deonna & Teroni (D&T): Chap 1, Chap 2
- Jesse Prinz, Gut Reactions, Chap 1
- Q: What should a good philosophical account of emotions do? What, for instance, do we want it to explain? What are the phenomenological, intentional, and epistemic dimensions of emotion? What is the unity vs. diversity issue?
PART 1: Metaphysics. What are Emotions?
Sept 7: Cognitivist Accounts
- Martha Nussbaum, "Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance"
- Q: What is the relationship between judgment and emotion on Nussbaum's account? How are emotions connected to evaluation on her view? What is the (Stoic) distinction between appearance and assent and how is it illustrated in Nussbaum's discussion of her grief?
- Robert Solomon, "Emotions and Choice"
- Q: What do you take the core of Solomon's account of emotions to be? In what ways does Solomon think emotions are like actions and why does he think these parallels are important? What considerations does Solomon take to count in favor of his proposal? How would Solomon explain a case of someone who is afraid of flying but judges there to be nothing dangerous about air travel?
- Justin D'Arms & Dan Jacobson, "The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotions" [recommended]
- D&T, Chap 5 [recommended]
Sept 14: Perceptual Accounts -- Direct versions
- Christine Tappolet, Emotions, Values & Agency, Chap 1 (Sec 1.2 and 1.6 can be skimmed)
- Robert Roberts, Emotions and Moral Life, Chap 3 (focus on pp. 38-53)
- Q: While both Tappolet and Roberts take emotions to be forms of evaluative perception, they differ in that Tappolet takes these perceptions to be non-conceptual while, for Roberts, they are conceptual. Explain this difference (with examples). Which do you find more plausible? Why? How are emotions analogous to sensory perception? How are the disanalogous? Do the differences matter? Explain.
- D&T, Chap 6 [recommended]
Sept 21: Perceptual Accounts -- Indirect versions
- Prinz, Gut Reactions, Chap 3, Chap 4 (focus pp. 97-102)
- Q: What is Dretske's account of mental representation (pp. 53-5)? How does Prinz think that emotions (as representational states) fit within a Dretske-style account (pp. 55-60)? Relatedly, what is the distinction between 'registering' and 'representing'--in the context of emotions, what gets registered and what is represented? Prinz denies that emotions require judgments in order to represent. Why is this an important feature of his account? How is representation possible without judgment--specifically, what is an "embodied appraisal" and how can they be "cognitively elaborated"?
- D&T, Chap 6 [recommended, especially pp. 71-4]
Sept 28: Motivational Theories
- Andrea Scarantio, "The Motivational Theory of Emotions" (focus on sections 1, 2, 5)
- Q: What does Scarantino see as distinctive of emotional motivation? Scarantino’s motivational theory takes emotions to be “action control systems”—what does this mean? Why does he think his motivational theory is well positioned to explain emotional motivation?
- Christine Tappolet, "Emotion, Motivation and Action: The Case of Fear" [recommended]
PART 2: Philosophy of Science. Are emotions natural kinds?
Oct 5: Emotions as Kinds
- SEP entry, Natural Kinds (focus on sections 1.0, 1.1, 1.2.2, 1.3.0)
- Paul Ekman, "An Argument for Basic Emotions"
- Jesse Prinz, Chap 4
- Q: What is a natural kind (give examples things that are kinds and things that are not)? What are basic emotions and in what sense are basic emotions basic? What is the relationship between (basic) emotions and evolution? How do we tell if an emotion is basic--that is, what features do basic emotions have? Does Ekman think there are non-basic emotions? Are basic emotions natural kinds--explain? How does Prinz's way of thinging about (emotions as) natural kinds differ from Ekman's? Do you find his proposal plausible?
Oct 12: Skepticism about emotions as kinds
- Lisa Barrett, "Emotions Are Real"
- Q: What is the “conceptual act theory of emotions”? In what way does Barrett think emotions are real (look at the flower/weed discussion pp. 416-417)? How does her account of emotion as real differ from what we saw from Ekman? What is Barrett's argument against Ekman-style views? Do you find it convincing?
- Paul Griffiths, "Is Emotion a Natural Kind?"
- Q: What is the distinction between emotions as a "scientific category" and emotions as a "superficial descriptive category"? What does it mean to say that a category is "projectable"? Why is Griffiths skeptical that emotions constitute a natural kind/scientific category (look at the examples in section 1.3)? Is 'emotion' like 'jade'--what would this amount to and what consequences would it have for our study of emotion?
- Charlie Kurth, "Are Emotions Psychological Constructions?" [Recommended]
PART 3: Epistemology. Are Emotions Epistemic Tools?
Oct 26: Perceptual accounts (epistemic sentimentalism) and their limits
- Catherine Elgin, "Emotion and Understanding"
- Q: In what way does Elgin think that emotions are epistemic tools? For instance, in what way(s) do they provide justification or understanding? What problems does she consider for the claim that emotions can be epistemic tool and what does she say to address those worries?
- Michael Brady, "Emotions, Perceptions, and Reasons"
- Q: What does Brady take the core elements of the “perceptual model” to be—that is, how do emotions provide reasons or evidence for the beliefs they’re associated with? Brady maintains that emotions are “responses to reasons” but sensory perceptions are not (139): what does this mean and why is it significant for his argument against the perceptual model? How is this argument augmented by Brady’s claim that emotions function to “capture and consume attention” (141)? Starting on p. 142, Brady develops his “double counting” objection. How does that objection work?
- Review Tappolet and Roberts readings from Sept 14 [Recommended]
- Michael Brady, Emotional Insight, Chap 4 [Recommended]
Nov 2: Rehabilitating Emotional Sentimentalism -- NOTE: rescheduled for Wed, Nov 7 from 4:30-7:00pm (in Dunbar 3216)
Nov 9: Feminist Epistemology of Emotion -- NOTE: rescheduled for Mon, Nov 12 from 4:30-7:00pm (in Dunbar 3216)
- Alison Jaggar, "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology" (focus on Sections I, IV, VII-XII)
- Q: What does Jaggar see as the traditional Western view of emotion's role in epistemology? On Jaggar’s account, emotions are social constructs—what does this mean? What does Jaggar see as the relation between emotions and values? What, in turn, does this imply about the relation between emotion and observation? What implications does Jaggar take her account of emotion to have for the traditional Western view (eg, pp. 163, 164)? In what way are Jagger’s observations a form of (philosophical) feminism (eg, what is the myth of the dispassionate investigator)? Do you find her argument persuasive?
- B.A. Lanre-Abass, "Feminist Epistemology and Human Value in African Culture" (focus on material starting on p. 62)
- Q: What implications might Jaggar and Lanre-Abass’s papers have for accounts like Ekman’s that take emotions to be hardwired mechanisms, not culturally shaped phenomena?
PART 4: Value Theory. How do Emotions Shape Value?
In this section of the course we will examine the ways in which particular emotions have/lack value and what implications they have for things like agency and virtue. Possibilities include: disgust, compassion, curiosity, and anxiety -- other suggestions are welcomed
Nov 16 -- Compassion: The central debate
- Martha Nussbaum, "Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion" [Sec III can be skimmed]
- Rodger Crisp, "Compassion and Beyond"
- Q: What is Nussbaum giving an account of (compassion the emotion, the viture, something else)? What is Nussbaum's three part account of compassion? Do you find it plausible? What concerns do Socrates and the Stoic (as well as Kant and Nietzsche) have about compassion's moral value? Do you find Nussbaum's alternative account of compassion's value more plausible? How do Crisp's concerns about Nussbaum's view--both her account of compassion and its value--change your assessment of Nussbaum's proposal? Do you find Crisp's alternative better? Explain.
- Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought [recommened--longer version of article in Part II of book]
- Paul Bloom, "Baby at the Well: The Case Against Empathy" [recommended]
Nov 23 -- No class, Thanksgiving Break
Nov 30 -- Compassion retooled?
Dec 7 -- Compassion: Complicating and extending the debate
Dec 9
- Term paper draft due at noon
Dec 15
- Revised term paper due at noon