How definitional confusion undermines the science of self-regulation 

Psychology’s fascination with self-regulation has produced striking claims about its power to predict life outcomes, from health to wealth to academic success. But much of this science rests on shaky definitional ground. In this talk, I argue that confusion between key constructs—most notably between trait and state self-control, and between self-control and self-regulation—has caused much confusion. Take the distinction between trait and state self-control. Trait self-control, often measured with conscientiousness or grit or the trait self-control scale, robustly predicts positive outcomes, even decades later. State self-control, by contrast, refers to the momentary shaping of behaviour in the face of cognitive conflict. Yet evidence shows that people high in trait self-control do not spend more time engaging in state self-control, in fact, they report spending less time doing so. Data also confirm that trait and state measures of control barely correlate. A related problem arises when self-regulation is collapsed into self-control. Self-control refers to regulation under conflict, but many of the most effective forms of self-regulation are conflict-free, such as cultivating desires through the right kind of motivation. By equating the two, we overlook these processes and misidentify the true engines of behavior change. Clearer definitions are not pedantic; they are essential for a cumulative and useful science of self-regulation.