The Indian Ocean is the world’s most economically consequential ocean basin: it carries a major share of global seaborne trade and energy shipments, links the Mediterranean to the Indo-Pacific through the Red Sea and Suez, and funnels traffic through narrow chokepoints where a small disruption can trigger global price spikes. Yet the region remains persistently under-policed relative to its size. Piracy networks can reconstitute, smuggling routes adapt faster than bureaucracies, illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing drains coastal economies, and humanitarian shipments can be delayed or deterred by insecurity and rising insurance premiums. The General Assembly is convened to develop a realistic, implementable framework for cooperative maritime security that strengthens lawful commerce, protects vulnerable coastal states, and reduces escalation risk among major powers operating in the same waters.
This committee is not designing a war plan. It is designing the political and administrative architecture that makes maritime security possible: who coordinates, who pays, who has legal authority to act, and how cooperation can function when states distrust each other.
Money: Patrol ships, aircraft, fuel, crews, training, and port upgrades cost real money. If you propose something, you must say who pays and how (shared fund, voluntary donations, cost-sharing, etc.).
Who does the work: The UN does not own a navy. You must name which countries (or regional groups) will patrol, train, escort ships, or run operations. Whose ports will they use?
Where it happens: The Indian Ocean is enormous. You must choose priority areas (key chokepoints and busy shipping routes), because no one can patrol everywhere at once.
Rules and permissions: You can’t just board any ship anywhere. Countries have legal control near their coasts. Your plan must respect sovereignty while still allowing action against piracy and smuggling.
Coordination: If multiple navies operate in the same waters, they need shared rules so they don’t collide or misunderstand each other. Your plan needs communication + deconfliction.
Ports matter: Most smuggling becomes profitable at ports. A strong plan includes port security, customs upgrades, anti-corruption steps, and better tracking of cargo.
The United States and China don’t trust each other: If the plan looks like it helps one side spy on or control the other, the other side will reject it. Your plan must feel neutral and fair.
India–Pakistan rivalry: If India “runs” everything, Pakistan will resist. If Pakistan blocks everything, India will resist. Plans must allow cooperation without forcing one rival under the other’s command.
Iran vs Gulf states: Countries disagree about security in the Persian Gulf and near the Strait of Hormuz. Anything involving inspections or patrols can be seen as political pressure.
Sovereignty concerns for coastal states: Smaller states worry that “security cooperation” is a cover for stronger countries to operate too freely near their shores. They want clear limits and consent.
Chokepoints are sensitive: Places like Bab el-Mandeb, Hormuz, and Malacca are narrow and vital. They attract competition and can escalate quickly if forces act aggressively.
“Selective enforcement” accusations: If inspections or patrols seem to target only certain countries, the whole plan will be criticized as biased. You need transparent rules.
United States — Prioritizes uninterrupted sea lanes and rapid response capacity; will push multinational patrol frameworks, information-sharing, and deconfliction rules that keep chokepoints open.
United Kingdom — Focuses on trade security, maritime law, and insurer/shipping confidence; supports coalition enforcement models and standardized reporting/inspection regimes.
France — As a resident Indian Ocean power (overseas territories), emphasizes persistent presence and regional capacity-building; favors structured task forces, maritime domain awareness, and rules-based access.
Russia — Argues for sovereignty-first maritime security and skepticism of Western-led enforcement; supports anti-piracy cooperation but resists mandates that constrain state freedom of action.
China — Frames stability as protection of commerce and energy lifelines; supports patrols and port security that safeguard shipping while rejecting constraints on its naval presence and “external interference.”
India — Seeks leadership in Indian Ocean security architecture; pushes regional primacy, interoperable patrol networks, and intelligence fusion while guarding sovereignty and influence.
Pakistan — Wants secure trade flows and recognition of its security concerns; supports anti-piracy and port protection but is wary of Indian-led frameworks and intrusive verification.
Bangladesh — Protects Bay of Bengal trade and fisheries; favors funding and technical assistance for coast guard modernization, port security, and anti-trafficking enforcement.
Sri Lanka — A crossroads state that wants economic benefit without strategic capture; supports neutral, rules-based cooperation, port security investment, and balanced access arrangements.
Indonesia — Prioritizes sovereignty and control around archipelagic sea lanes; supports cooperative policing and anti-smuggling but resists foreign patrols perceived as encroaching on jurisdiction.
Malaysia — Emphasizes Strait-area stability and legal jurisdiction; supports coordinated patrols and anti-smuggling while defending national control over enforcement in adjacent waters.
Singapore — A global shipping hub focused on predictability; will champion standards, information-sharing centers, incident reporting, and practical enforcement mechanisms.
Thailand — Seeks stability in the Andaman approaches and trade continuity; supports multilateral coordination and capacity-building with an emphasis on non-escalatory mandates.
Iran — Frames Hormuz as sovereign-adjacent security space; opposes foreign-led enforcement while promoting regional arrangements and deconfliction that preserve its deterrence posture.
Saudi Arabia — Prioritizes energy export security and Red Sea stability; supports robust policing against missiles, drones, and maritime crime while favoring strong state control of enforcement.
United Arab Emirates — A major port and logistics actor; pushes high-capability patrol coordination, port/cargo security standards, and rapid-response frameworks that protect commerce.
Qatar — Energy-export focused; supports stability and predictable transit, preferring legalistic frameworks and coalition cooperation without expanding mandates into regime-change politics.
Oman — A key Hormuz gatekeeper with a mediator profile; supports de-escalation, hotline/deconfliction mechanisms, and practical joint maritime safety initiatives.
Kuwait — Trade and energy security focused; supports collective protection of shipping and compliance frameworks that reduce risk premiums and disruption.
Iraq — Seeks maritime access security and anti-smuggling; supports capacity-building and customs enforcement while managing regional power competition pressures.
Bahrain — A security and basing hub; supports coordinated patrol structures, shared maritime picture initiatives, and enforcement mechanisms that can actually be resourced.
Egypt — Protects Suez-linked trade stability; pushes strong anti-disruption measures, port security, and international cooperation that keeps Red Sea routes commercially viable.
Yemen — Wants recognition of humanitarian and sovereignty constraints; supports anti-smuggling/piracy goals but will be sensitive to enforcement designs that increase internal pressure or escalate conflict spillover.
Djibouti — A strategic logistics node; supports multinational coordination and information fusion while seeking investment, basing revenue, and clear rules to prevent escalation on its doorstep.
Sudan — Emphasizes Red Sea economic security and sovereignty; supports cooperative patrols and capacity-building but resists externally imposed enforcement that looks like control.
Ethiopia — Landlocked but trade-dependent; prioritizes guaranteed maritime access, port corridor security, and anti-smuggling measures that reduce supply shocks.
Eritrea — Sovereignty-heavy Red Sea posture; skeptical of foreign patrol presence, favors strict jurisdictional limits and bilateral arrangements over broad mandates.
Turkey — Seeks influence through trade and security partnerships; supports naval diplomacy, training missions, and rules-based corridors that expand its regional role.
Kenya — Focuses on coastal security, port integrity, and counter-trafficking; supports international assistance and joint patrol coordination tied to local capacity and jobs.
Tanzania — Prioritizes EEZ protection and IUU fishing enforcement; supports funding, surveillance, and coast guard modernization with strong respect for sovereignty.
Somalia — Central to piracy legacy and coastal governance challenges; supports capacity-building, legal reforms, and sustainable maritime policing that does not undermine sovereignty.
Mozambique — Concerned with insurgency spillover, offshore energy, and trafficking; supports targeted assistance, surveillance, and regional coordination with measurable deliverables.
South Africa — Focuses on Cape-to-Indian Ocean sea routes and sovereignty; supports multinational cooperation but wants strong regional ownership and clear limits on foreign enforcement.
Australia — Trade-dependent and alliance-oriented; supports coalition maritime policing, capacity-building for littoral states, and strong compliance metrics.
Japan — Highly dependent on Indian Ocean energy routes; supports strong anti-piracy frameworks, convoy/escort cooperation, and institution-heavy solutions with clear metrics.
South Korea — Trade-lifeline focused; supports practical maritime security cooperation, information-sharing, and enforcement mechanisms that reduce shipping risk and insurance costs.
Germany — Export-driven and legalistic; supports rules-based maritime governance, inspection standards, and financing/capacity-building that strengthens compliance.
Netherlands — Major port and shipping ecosystem stakeholder; pushes maritime law, port/cargo standards, customs coordination, and anti-illicit finance enforcement linked to smuggling.
Italy — Mediterranean-to-Indian Ocean trade exposure; supports EU-style naval cooperation, migration/trafficking disruption, and balanced mandates that avoid escalation.
Spain — Trade and maritime governance focused; supports multilateral patrol cooperation, port security standards, and verification/reporting systems that make resolutions implementable.