Same Soul Many Bodies Pdf

Weiss advocates hypnotic regression as therapy, claiming that many phobias and ailments are rooted in past-life experiences whose acknowledgement by the patient can have a curative effect. Weiss also writes about messages received from the "Masters", or "super-evolved, nonphysical souls", he claims to have communicated with through his subjects. Weiss holds workshops and seminars across the United States that explain and teach self-regression meditation techniques.

Locke explicitly tells us that the case of the prince and thecobbler shows us the resolution of the problem of theresurrection. The case is one in which the soul of the prince withall of its princely thoughts is transferred from the body of theprince to the body of the cobbler, the cobbler's soul havingdeparted. The result of this exchange, is that the prince stillconsider himself the prince, even though he finds himself in analtogether new body. Locke's distinction between man and personmakes it possible for the same person to show up in a different bodyat the resurrection and yet still be the same person. Locke focuseson the prince with all his princely thoughts because, on his view, itis consciousness which is crucial to the reward and punishment whichis to be meted out at the Last Judgment. In this chapter on identity,Locke is also making a distinction between consciousness and thesoul, but that distinction is not crucial to the resolution of thekinds of problems that Boyle considered in his essay on theresurrection. Let us turn then, to the distinction between soul andconsciousness.

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Though the distinction between man and person is controversial,Locke's distinction between the soul or the thing which thinksin us and consciousness is even more radical. Locke holds thatconsciousness can be transferred from one soul to another, and thatpersonal identity goes with consciousness. In section 12 of theChapter of Identity and Diversity he raises the question: "...if thesame Substance which thinks be changed, it can be the same person, orremaining the same, it can be a different person." Locke'sanswer to both of these questions is affirmative. Consciousness canbe transferred from one substance to another and thus while the soulis changed, consciousness remains the same and thus personal identityis preserved through the change. And on the other hand, consciousnesscan be lost as in utter forgetfulness while the soul or thinkingsubstance remains the same. Under these conditions there is the samesoul but a different person. These affirmations amount to the claimthat the same soul or thinking substance is neither necessary notsufficient for personal identity over time. The arguments aredeveloped by analogy with the functional organization of animalswhich is preserved through the gradual changes in the atoms whichinstantiate that organization at any given time. So, at any giventime there must be a soul or thinking substance, but over time thereis no necessity that one have the same soul to preserve personalidentity.

Why does Locke make this distinction between soul and consciousness?This distinction has little bearing on problems about the same bodyat the resurrection. Still, the ressurection is important. I wouldsuggest that the answer lies in Locke's interest in justice atthe final judgment. Locke is skeptical about our ability toreidentify the same soul over time. He claims that if we were alwaysawake, we could be certain that we had the same soul. Butconsciousness has natural gaps in it, such as periods during which weare asleep. Locke claims that there is no way of knowing that onesoul has not been substituted for another during this period ofabsence of consciousness.

I would argue that the whole force of Locke's definition ofperson as a thinking intelligent being that can know itself as thesame thinking thing in different times and places is designed toaccount for the fact that we are creatures who are capable ofoperating the machinery of the law. When contemplating an action wecan think that in the future we will be the same being who will bepunished or rewarded for the course of action which we choose. Whenbeing punished we can look back and see that we are the same beingwho committed the act for which we are being punished. Locke holdsthat consciousness is essential for justice to be done. If one ispunished for doing something which one does not remember doing, it isequivalent to being created miserable. So, since consciousness playsthe most important role in our being punished or rewarded at the lastjudgment for our actions, and consciousness can be transferred fromone soul to another, and we have no mechanism to reidentify soulsover time, it becomes clear why consciousness is Locke's choicefor the bearer of personal identity, and why he makes the distinctionbetween the substance which thinks in us and consciousness. I thinkthis account explains a variety of oddities and difficulties inLocke's account. On his account, for example, memory must becompletely accurate -- at least in the respects relevant for divinejudicial purposes. Evidence which others might produce aboutone's identity has no role to play and so forth. Locke'saccount of freedom of action is also connected with his view of theforensic nature of personal identity. Freedom to review the decisionsone has made about how to act are clearly of great importance inbeing able to operate the law. If one could not pause to consider,and change one's mind about what one was going to do, it mightwell be said that one could not do otherwise. Return to John Locke

Locke claims that it was no farther beyond our comprehension thatmotions of the body could give rise to pleasure and pain, colors andsounds, than that an immaterial soul could feel pain or see colorsafter the occurrence of some motions in the body. Plainly, he is usingthe mind body problem to suggest that their are features of substancedualism that are just as puzzling as the fact that the standardcorpuscularian mechanism cannot explain thinking matter. Locke isputting the dualist and materialist positions on the same footing. Heimmediately draws the theological conclusion that follows from the twohypotheses being equally plausible:

Locke himself, however, seems to create a problem when hedistinguishes a mass of atoms (which he calls a body) and the livingthing which depends on that body for existence at a time. If livingthings and masses (which have a quite different set of individuativecriteria from living things) are both bodies, then we have two thingsof the same kind (bodies) in the same place at the same time! For adiscussion of the various ways that have been proposed to solve thisproblem see Stuart (2013) and Gordon-Roth (2015).

When a man is once really dead, divers of the parts of his body will,according to the course of nature, resolve themselves into multitudesof steams that wander to and fro in the air; and the remaining parts,that are either liquid or soft, undergo so great a corruption andchange, that it is not possible so many scattered parts should beagain brought together, and reunited after the same manner, whereinthey existed in a human body whilst it was yet alive. And much moreimpossible it is to effect this reunion, if the body have been, as itoften happens, devoured by wild beasts or fishes; since in this case,though the scattered parts of the cadaver might be recovered asparticles of matter, yet already having passed into the substance ofother animals, they are quite transmuted, as being informed by the newform of the beast or fish that devoured them and of which they nowmake a substantial part. (Boyle 1675 [1979: 198])

Objection 1: It would seem that all will not rise again from ashes. For Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours. Yet His resurrection was not from ashes, for His flesh saw not corruption according to Ps. 15:10; Acts 2:27,31. Therefore neither will all rise again from ashes.

Objection 2: Further, the human body is not always burned. Yet a thing cannot be reduced to ashes unless it be burned. Therefore not all will rise again from ashes.

Objection 3: Further, the body of a dead man is not reduced to ashes immediately after death. But some will rise again at once after death, according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), namely those who will be found living. Therefore all will not rise again from ashes.

Objection 4: Further, the term "wherefrom" corresponds to the term "whereto." Now the term "whereto" of the resurrection is not the same in the good as in the wicked: "We shall all indeed rise again, but we shall not all be changed" (1 Cor. 15:51). Therefore the term "wherefrom" is not the same. And thus, if the wicked rise again from ashes, the good will not rise again from ashes.

On the contrary, Haymo says (on Rm. 5:10, "For if when we were enemies"): "All who are born in original sin lie under the sentence: Earth thou art and into earth shalt thou go." Now all who shall rise again at the general resurrection were born in original sin, either at their birth within the womb or at least at their birth from the womb. Therefore all will rise again from ashes.

Further, there are many things in the human body that do not truly belong to human nature. But all these will be removed. Therefore all bodies must needs be reduced to ashes. I answer that, The same reasons by which we have shown (Article [1]) that all rise again from death prove also that at the general resurrection all will rise again from ashes, unless the contrary, such as the hastening of their resurrection, be vouchsafed to certain persons by a special privilege of grace. For just as holy writ foretells the resurrection, so does it foretell the reformation of bodies (Phil. 3:21). And thus it follows that even as all die that the bodies of all may be able truly to rise again, so will the bodies of all perish that they may be able to be reformed. For just as death was inflicted by Divine justice as a punishment on man, so was the decay of the body, as appears from Gn. 3:19, "Earth thou art and into earth shalt thou go [*Vulg.: 'Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return']."

Moreover the order of nature requires the dissolution not only of the union of soul and body, but also of the mingling of the elements: even as vinegar cannot be brought back to the quality of wine unless it first be dissolved into the prejacent matter: for the mingling of the elements is both caused and preserved by the movement of the heaven, and when this ceases all mixed bodies will be dissolved into pure elements.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours as to the term "whereto," but not as to the term "wherefrom."

Reply to Objection 2: By ashes we mean all the remains that are left after the dissolution of the body---for two reasons. First, because it was the common custom in olden times to burn the bodies of the dead, and to keep the ashes, whence it became customary to speak of the remains of a human body as ashes. Secondly, on account of the cause of dissolution, which is the flame of the fomes [*Cf. FS, Question [82], Article [3]] whereby the human body is radically infected. Hence, in order to be cleansed of this infection the human body must needs be dissolved into its primary components: and when a thing is destroyed by fire it is said to be reduced to ashes. wherefore the name of ashes is given to those things into which the human body is dissolved.

Reply to Objection 3: The fire that will cleanse the face of the earth will be able to reduce suddenly to ashes the bodies of those that will be found living, even as it will dissolve other mixed bodies into their prejacent matter.

Reply to Objection 4: Movement does not take its species from its term "wherefrom" but from its term "whereto." Hence the resurrection of the saints which will be glorious must needs differ from the resurrection of the wicked which will not be glorious, in respect of the term "whereto," and not in respect of the term "wherefrom." And it often happens that the term "whereto" is not the same, whereas the term "wherefrom" is the same---for instance, a thing may be moved from blackness to whiteness and to pallor.

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