Journal articles
“(Not) Addressing Issues in Electoral Campaigns” (joint with A. Gerber). Journal of Theoretical Politics 35(4), 259–291, 2023. link
“Wine Rankings and the Borda Method” (joint with W. Bossert and J. D. Moreno-Ternero). Journal of Wine Economics 18, 122–138, 2023. link
“Opinion Aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited” (joint with W. Bossert). Journal of Economic Theory 210, 105654, 2023. link
“Order–k Rationality” (joint with G.de Clippel, A. Neme and K. Rozen). Economic Theory 73, 1135–1153, 2022. link
“Compromising on Compromise Rules” (joint with D. Coelho). RAND Journal of Economics 53(1), 95–112, 2022. link
“Deciding on What to Decide” (joint with A. Gerber). International Economic Review 63(1), 37–61, 2022. link
“Restricted Environments and Incentive Compatibility in Interdependent Values Models” (joint with D. Berga and B. Moreno). Games and Economic Behavior 131, 1–28, 2022. link
“Information Disclosure with many Alternatives” (joint with A. Nicolò). Social Choice and Welfare 57(4), 851–873 2021. link
“Daunou’s Voting Rule and the Lexicographic Assignment of Priorities” (joint with W. Bossert and K. Suzumura). Social Choice and Welfare 56(2), 259–289, 2021. link
“A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information” (joint with M. O. Jackson). Quarterly Journal of Political Science 15(3), 297–335, 2020. link
“Arrow on Domain Conditions: A Fruitful Road to Travel” (joint with D. Berga and B. Moreno). Social Choice and Welfare 54(2–3), 237–258, 2020. link
“On the Advantages and Disadvantages of Being the First Mover under Rules of k Names” (joint with D. Coelho). International Journal of Economic Theory 14(1), 51–60, 2018. Special issue in honor of Kotaro Suzumura. link
“Immunity to Credible Deviations from the Truth” (joint with D. Berga and B. Moreno). Mathematical Social Sciences 90, 129–140, 2017. Special issue in honor of Hervé Moulin. link
“Sequential Voting and Agenda Manipulation” (joint with A. Gerber). Theoretical Economics 12(1), 211–247, 2017. link
“Balancing the Power to Appoint Officers” (joint with D. Coelho). Games and Economic Behavior 101(1), 189–203, 2017. Special issue in honor of John O. Ledyard. link
“Group Strategy–Proofness in Private Good Economies” (joint with D. Berga and B. Moreno). American Economic Review 106(4), 1073–1099, 2016. link
“Meritocracy, Egalitarianism and the Stability of Majoritarian Organizations” (joint with C. Beviá and C. Ponsatí). Games and Economic Behavior 91, 237–257, 2015. link
“Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy–Proofness: On what Domains are they also Sufficient?” (joint with D. Berga and B. Moreno). Games and Economic Behavior 75(2), 490–509, 2012. link
“Group Strategy–Proof Social Choice Functions with Binary Ranges and Arbitrary Domains: Characterization Results” (joint with D. Berga and B. Moreno). International Journal of Game Theory 41(4), 791–808, 2012. Special issue in honor of Bezalel Peleg. link
“Domains, Ranges and Strategy–Proofness: The Case of Single–dipped Preferences” (joint with D. Berga and B. Moreno). Social Choice and Welfare 39(2–3), 335–352, 2012. Special issue in honor of Maurice Salles. link
“Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule” (joint with L. Ehlers). Social Choice and Welfare 37(4), 559–574, 2011. Special issue in honor of Prasanta K. Pattanaik. link
“Preference for Flexibility and the Opportunities of Choice” (joint with B. Grodal). Journal of Mathematical Economics 47(3), 272–278, 2011. Special issue in honor of Andreu Mas–Colell. link
“Top Monotonicity: A Common Root for Single Peakedness, Single Crossing and the Median Voter Result” (joint with B. Moreno). Games and Economic Behavior 73(2), 345–359, 2011. link
“Individual versus Group Strategy–Proofness: When do they Coincide?” (joint with D. Berga and B. Moreno). Journal of Economic Theory 145(5), 1648–1674, 2010. link
“On the Rule of k Names” (joint with D. Coelho). Games and Economic Behavior 70(1), 44–61, 2010. Special issue in honor of Ehud Kalai. link
“How to Choose a Non–Controversial List with k Names” (joint with D. Coelho). Social Choice and Welfare 31(1), 79–96, 2008. DOI.org/10.1007/s00355–007–0268–6
“Indifferences and Domain Restrictions”. Analyse und Kritik 29(2), 146–162, 2007. Special issue in honor of Wulf Gaertner.
“A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games” (joint with A. Gerber). Economics Letters 95(1), 85–90, 2007. DOI.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.09.018
“Locating Public Facilities by Majority: Stability, Consistency and Group Formation” (joint with C. Beviá). Games and Economic Behavior 56(1), 185–200, 2006. DOI.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.002
“On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union” (joint with M. O. Jackson). Journal of Political Economy 114(2), 317–339, 2006. DOI.org/10.1086/501172
“El programa Ingenio 2010 y su reflejo en el presupuesto del Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia”. Presupuesto y Gasto Público 42, 137–147, 2006.
“El Plan Nacional de I+D+i 2004–2007 y su financiación en los Presupuestos Generales del Estado de 2005”. Presupuesto y Gasto Público 38, 167–179, 2005.
“Voting by Committees under Constraints” (joint with J. Massó and A. Neme). Journal of Economic Theory 122(2), 185–205, 2005. DOI.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.006
“Choosing How to Choose: Self–Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions” (joint with M. O. Jackson). The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(3), 1011–1048, 2004. DOI.org/10.1162/0033553041502207
“On Coalition Formation: Durable Coalition Structures” (joint with A. Gerber). Mathematical Social Sciences 45(2), 185–203, 2003. DOI.org/10.1016/S0165–4896(03)00025–8. “Corrigendum” in Mathematical Social Sciences 46(3), 355–356, 2003. DOI.org/10.1016/S0165–4896(03)00082–9.
“Book Review” of Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory by W. Gaertner (Ed.) [Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. XI, 153pp, 2001]. Journal of Economics/Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 79(1), 104–107, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1007/s007120300021
“Supporting Others and the Evolution of Influence” (joint with A. Perea). Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 26(12), 2051–2092, 2002. DOI.org/10.1016/S0165–1889(01)00022–7
“Self–Selection Consistent Functions” (joint with C. Beviá). Journal of Economic Theory 105(2), 263–277, 2002. DOI.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2860
“Strategy–Proof Social Choice Correspondences” (joint with B. Dutta and A. Sen). Journal of Economic Theory 101(2), 374–394, 2001. “Corrigendum” in Journal of Economic Theory 120(2), 275, 2005. DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2782.
“An Introduction to Strategy–Proof Social Choice Functions”. Social Choice and Welfare 18(4), 619–653, 2001. DOI.org/10.1007/s003550100151
“Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution” (joint with M. Maschler and J. Shalev). Games and Economic Behavior 37(1), 40–78, 2001. DOI.org/10.1006/game.2000.0827
“Incentive Compatible Reward Schemes for Labour–Managed Firms” (joint with B. Dutta). Review of Economic Design 5(2), 111–127, 2000. DOI.org/10.1007/s100580000015. Also in B. Dutta and M. O. Jackson (Eds.) Networks and Groups. Models of Strategic Formation. Heildelberg: Springer, 453–469, 2003.
“Maximal Domains of Preferences Preserving Strategy–Proofness for Generalized Median Voters Schemes” (joint with J. Massó and A. Neme). Social Choice and Welfare 16(2), 321–336, 1999. DOI.org/10.1007/s003550050146
“Strategy–Proof Probabilistic Rules for Expected Utility Maximizers” (joint with A. Bogomolnaia and H. van der Stel). Mathematical Social Sciences 35(2), 89–103, 1998. DOI.org/10.1016/S0165–4896(97)00043–7
“Notas sobre incertidumbre, flexibilidad, y ordenaciones de conjuntos”. ISEGORÍA, Revista de Filosofía Moral y Política 18, 223–233, 1998.
“Strategy–Proof Voting on Compact Ranges” (joint with J. Massó and S. Serizawa). Games and Economic Behavior 25(2), 272–291, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0643. Also in C. d'Aspremont (Ed.) Social Organization and Mechanism Design. Proceedings of the Second Francqui Colloquium. De Broeck & Lacier, S.A., 1999.
“Voting under Constraints” (joint with J. Massó and A. Neme). Journal of Economic Theory 76(2), 298–321, 1997. DOI.org/10.106/j.jet.2004.05.006
“Strategy–Proof Allotment Rules” (joint with M.O. Jackson and A. Neme). Games and Economic Behavior 18(1), 1–21, 1997. DOI.org/10.1006/game.1997.0511
“Protective Behavior in Matching Models” (joint with B. Dutta). Games and Economic Behavior 8(2), 281–296, 1995. DOI.org/10.1016/S0899–8256(05)80002–8
“Strategy–Proof Exchange” (joint with M.O. Jackson). Econometrica 63(1), 51–87, 1995. DOI.org/10.2307/2951697
“Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy–Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems” (joint with J. Alcalde). Economic Theory 4(3), 417–435, 1994. DOI.org/10.1007/BF01215380
“A Characterization of Strategy–Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods” (joint with M.O. Jackson). Social Choice and Welfare 11(3), 241–252, 1994. DOI.org/10.1007/BF00193809
“Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees” (joint with F. Gul and E. Stacchetti). Journal of Economic Theory 61(2), 262–289, 1993. DOI.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1069
“Voting by Committees” (joint with H. Sonnenschein and L. Zhou). Econometrica 59(3), 595–609, 1991. DOI.org/10.2307/2938220
“El análisis axiomático de problemas distributivos: consideraciones éticas en un marco formalizado”. Información Comercial Española 691, 75–85, 1991.
“Strategy–Proof Voting Schemes with Continuous Preferences” (joint with B. Peleg). Social Choice and Welfare 7(1), 31–38, 1990. DOI.org/10.1007/BF01832918
“Algunas dificultades en torno al concepto de equidad”. Economía Pública 3(2), 3–17, 1989.
“Maximin, Leximin and the Protective Criterion: Characterizations and Comparisons” (joint with M. O. Jackson). Journal of Economic Theory 46(1), 34–44, 1988. DOI.org/10.1016/0022–0531(88)90148–2
“Teoría de juegos y métodos de votación”. Cuadernos Económicos de Información Comercial Española 40(3), 195–216, 1988.
“General, Direct and Self–Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Protective Equilibria” (joint with B. Dutta). Mathematical Social Sciences 11(2), 109–127, 1986. DOI.org/10.1016/0165–4896(86)90020–X
“Falmagne and the Rationalizability of Stochastic Choices in Terms of Random Orderings” (joint with P. K. Pattanaik). Econometrica 54(3), 707–715, 1986. DOI.org/10.2307/1911317
“On some Axioms for Ranking Sets of Alternatives” (joint with C. R. Barret and P. K. Pattanaik). Journal of Economic Theory 33(2), 301–308, 1984. DOI.org/10.1016/0022–0531(84)90092–9
“Extending an Order on a Set to the Power Set: Some Remarks on Kannai and Peleg's Approach” (joint with P. K. Pattanaik). Journal of Economic Theory 32(1), 185–191, 1984. DOI.org/10.1016/0022–0531(84)90083–8
“El análisis de incentivos en economía normativa”. Revista Española de Economía 1(1), 99–131, 1984.
“Book Review” of Choice, Welfare and Measurement by A. K. Sen (Ed.) [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 460pp, 1982]. Journal of Economic Literature XXII(2), 583–584, 1984.
“Collective Probabilistic Judgements” (joint with F. Valenciano). Econometrica 51(4), 1033–1046, 1983. DOI.org/ 10.2307/1912050
“Strategy–Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem”. International Economic Review 24(2), 413–417, 1983. DOI.org/10.2307/2648754.
“Implementability via Protective Equilibria” (joint with B. Dutta). Journal of Mathematical Economics 10(1), 49–65, 1982. DOI.org/10.1016/0304–4068(82)90005–2
“Pivotal Voters: A New Proof of Arrow's Theorem”. Economics Letters 6(1), 13–16, 1980. DOI.org/10.1016/0165–1765(80)90050–6
“Stable Voting Schemes”. Journal of Economic Theory 23(2), 267–274, 1980. DOI.org/10.1016/0022–0531(80)90011–3
“A Note on Group Strategy–Proof Decision Schemes”. Econometrica 47(3), 637–640, 1979. DOI.org/10.2307/1910411
“Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework”. The Review of Economic Studies 46(2), 379–389, 1979. DOI.org/10.2307/2297058
“Preference Aggregation with Randomized Social Orderings” (joint with H. Sonnenschein). Journal of Economic Theory 18(2), 244–254, 1978. DOI.org/10.1016/0022–0531(78)90081–9
“Justicia, equidad y eficiencia”. Hacienda Pública Española 51, 213–248, 1978.
“Prohibiciones metodológicas y economía de bienestar” (joint with J. C. García–Bermejo). Cuadernos Económicos de Información Comercial Española 3–4, 146–166, 1977.
“The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave “Too Much” to Chance”. Econometrica 45(7), 1573–1588, 1977. DOI.org/10.2307/1913950. Reprinted in M. O. Jackson and A. McLennan (Eds.) Foundations in Microeconomic Theory: A Volume in honor of Hugo F. Sonnenschein. Heidelberg: Springer, 83–100, 2008.
“Manipulation of Social Decision Functions”. Journal of Economic Theory 15(2), 266–278, 1977. DOI.org/10.1016/0022–0531(77)90101–6
“Desarrollos recientes en la teoría de la Elección Social”. Hacienda Pública Española 44, 247–269, 1977.
“Introducción: Teoría de la Elección Social: algunas líneas de desarrollo”. Hacienda Pública Española 44, 271–273, 1977.
“Racionalidad, decisividad e independencia de alternativas irrelevantes”. Cuadernos de Economía 4(11), 418–439, 1976.