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Economic Theory, Mechanism Design, Information Design, Market Design

• The Design and Price of Certification, 2024, with Mikael Mäkimattila and Yucheng Shang. (Latest version: June 2025)

  • R&R at Theoretical Economics.

  • Appears as an extended abstract at EC '25.

  • Slides

• Feasible Search Behavior, 2024, joint with Hiroto Sato. (Latest version: June 2025)

  • A preliminary result appears in "Information Design in Pandora's Problem," 2023. 

  • Slides

• Persuaded Choice in Ordered Search, 2023, joint with Hiroto Sato. 

  • R&R at Economic Theory.

  • A follow-up to "Information Design in Pandora's Problem."

• Information Structures in College Admissions, 2022, joint with Hiroto Sato. 

  • Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2025.

• Simple Manipulations in School Choice Mechanisms. 

  • American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2025. 

  • The paper was previously titled "School Choice: A Behavioral Approach."

  • The previous version of this article won the Kanematsu Prize in 2021! 

• Stable Core Partitions in a Cartel Formation Game with Licensing, joint with Satoshi Nakada. 

  • Mathematical Social Sciences, 2025.

• On the Core of a Patent Licensing Game, joint with Satoshi Nakada. 

  • Economics Letters, 2023.

  • A follow-up to "Stable Core Partitions in a Cartel Formation Games with Licensing."

• On the Unique Core Partition of Coalition Formation Games: Correction to Inal (2015), joint with Satoshi Nakada. 

  • Social Choice and Welfare, 2022.