I work on microeconomic theory, specifically game theory, information economics, and networks.
I graduated with a Ph.D. in Economics from MIT in June 2024. In July 2025, I joined the Department of Economics at Stanford University as an Assistant Professor. Previously, I was a Cowles Postdoctoral Fellow at Yale University.
My CV.
1. Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport — with Anton Kolotilin and Alexander Wolitzky.
Journal of Political Economy, April 2025.
2. Dynamic Opinion Aggregation: Long-Run Stability and Disagreement — with Simone Cerreia-Vioglio and Giacomo Lanzani.
Review of Economic Studies, May 2024.
3. On Concave Functions Over Lotteries — with Drew Fudenberg and David Levine.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, April 2024.
4. Nonlinear Pricing with Under-Utilization: A Theory of Multi-Part Tariffs — with Joel P. Flynn and Karthik A. Sastry.
American Economic Review, March 2023.
5. Epistemic game theory without types structures: An application to psychological games — with Pierpaolo Battigalli and Federico Sanna.
Games and Economic Behavior, March 2020.
6. Incorporating belief-dependent motivation in games — with Pierpaolo Battigalli and Martin Dufwenberg.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, November 2019.
1. The Bounds of Mediated Communication — with Yifan Dai.
Revise and Resubmit at Econometrica.
2. Contractibility Design — with Joel P. Flynn and Karthik A. Sastry.
Revise and Resubmit at Econometrica.
3. Nonlinear Fixed Points and Stationarity: Economic Applications — with Simone Cerreia-Vioglio and Giacomo Lanzani.
Revise and Resubmit at Journal of Political Economy.
4. (Un-)Common Preferences, Ambiguity, and Coordination — with Simone Cerreia-Vioglio and Giacomo Lanzani.
Revise and Resubmit at Theoretical Economics.
5. Randomization, Surprise, and Adversarial Forecasters — with Drew Fudenberg and David Levine.
Revise and Resubmit at AEJ: Microeconomics.
6. On Browder's and Halpern's schemes for Fixed points — with Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Giacomo Lanzani, and Alessandro Pigati.
7. Mediation Markets: The Case of Soft Information.
8. Targeting in Networks and Markets: An Information Design Approach.