Humans hate being monitored. Autonomy is prized—including by research scientists. Yet little is known about a fundamental issue in the modern world: What is happening to job autonomy in today’s workplaces as people move from youth on to middle age and then on to older ages? It would be natural to believe that individuals in the second half of their careers would be the senior ones with high autonomy. We provide evidence that such a belief is wrong. This study uses longitudinal data on hundreds of thousands of randomly sampled individuals, in three rich countries, who are followed through their working lives (n > 400,000). Workers’ feelings of job autonomy trace out a smooth concave parabola, increasing up to midlife, until approximately the surprisingly early age of 40, and then collapsing over the ensuing twenty to 30 y of a person’s working life. This is apparently not an illusion. We show that objective measures of autonomy—signified by managerial and supervisory job titles, for example—behave in a matching, hump-shaped way. As a further check, consistent qualitative evidence is given: a survey we ran asking managers about their experiences. We believe this paper’s results represent a foundational, essentially unknown, and intrinsically cross-disciplinary puzzle. 

This paper reports the first large-scale longitudinal links between one of the least known dimensions of wellbeing—hope—and long-term outcomes in a range of life arenas. Hope has agentic properties which are relevant to people's future outcomes. Following 25,000 randomly sampled Australian adults over a period of 14 years from 2007 to 2021 (N > 115,000), we find a strong link between hope and better contemporary and future outcomes. Individuals with high levels of hope had improved later wellbeing, education, economic and employment outcomes, perceived and objective health, and are less likely to be lonely. Hope is associated with higher resilience, ability to adapt, and internal locus of control. It also serves as a psychological buffer during bad times. Respondents with high levels of hope were less likely to be influenced by negative life events and adapted more quickly and completely after these major events. Better understanding the drivers and consequences of hope can ultimately inform public policy to improve people's lives. 

In a controlled field setting, in which the majority of people in our sample lose more than £90,000, we examine how human beings respond to major financial losses. University ethics boards would not allow this kind of huge-loss phenomenon to be studied with normal social-science experiments. Yet the scientific and practical issues at stake are unusually important ones. In the analyzed gameshow setting, individuals are handed £100,000 in cash. They then have to make risky decisions. Facing a sequence of seven questions, individuals are required to distribute their cash endowment over a set of possible answers. Participants lose any cash placed on a wrong answer. In a sample of British participants, we find that people become increasingly more cautious as they lose more of their cash endowment. A realized prior loss of £75,000 or more increases the propensity to fully diversify by 50 percentage points compared to a prior loss of £25,000. We find a similar cautious response in a smaller sample of US participants when the stakes are raised to $1 million US dollars. Our study appears to be the first to be able to calculate systematically how human beings react to large and unrecoverable financial losses. 

This paper documents a longitudinal crisis of midlife among the inhabitants of rich nations. Yet middle-aged citizens in our datasets are close to their peak earnings, have typically experienced little or no illness, reside in some of the safest countries in the world, and live in the most prosperous era in human history. This is paradoxical and troubling. The finding is consistent, however, with the prediction—one little-known to economists—of Elliott Jaques (1965). Our analysis does not rest on elementary cross-sectional analysis. Instead, the paper uses panel and through-time data on, in total, approximately 500,000 individuals. It checks that the key results are not due to cohort effects. Nor do we rely on simple life satisfaction measures. The paper shows that there are approximately quadratic hill-shaped patterns in data on midlife suicide, sleeping problems, alcohol dependence, concentration difficulties, memory problems, intense job strain, disabling headaches, suicidal feelings, and extreme depression. We believe that the seriousness of this societal problem has not been grasped by the affluent world's policy-makers. 

We use a natural field experiment to estimate the causal effect of race on discretionary favours in the marketplace. Test customers are randomly assigned to board public buses with no money to purchase a fare, leaving the bus driver to voluntarily decide whether to offer them a free ride. Based on 1,552 transactions, we uncover strong evidence of racial bias: bus drivers were twice as willing to let white testers ride free as black testers (72% vs. 36% of the time). Signals of wealth and patriotism improve minority testers’ outcomes. Our results show that white privilege extends to unregulated daily interactions. 

Some of the greatest human achievements are difficult to imagine without prosociality. This article employs a natural field experiment to investigate indirect reciprocity in natural social interactions. We find strong evidence of indirect reciprocity in one‐shot interactions among drivers. Subjects for whom other drivers stopped were more than twice as likely to extend a similar act to a third party. This result is robust to a number of factors including age, gender, social status, presence of onlookers, and the opportunity cost of time. We provide novel evidence for the power of indirect reciprocity to promote prosocial behaviour in the field. 

Nearly 100 years ago, the philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell warned of the social dangers of widespread envy. One view of modern society is that it is systematically developing a set of institutions -- such as social media and new forms of advertising -- that make people feel inadequate and envious of others. If so, how might that be influencing the psychological health of our citizens? This paper reports the first large-scale longitudinal research into envy and its possible repercussions. The paper studies 18,000 randomly selected individuals over the years 2005, 2009, and 2013. Using measures of SF-36 mental health and psychological well-being, four main conclusions emerge. First, the young are especially susceptible. Levels of envy fall as people grow older. This longitudinal finding is consistent with a cross-sectional pattern noted recently by Nicole E. Henniger and Christine R. Harris, and with the theory of socioemotional regulation suggested by scholars such as Laura L. Carstensen. Second, using fixed-effects equations and prospective analysis, the analysis reveals that envy today is a powerful predictor of worse SF-36 mental health and well-being in the future. A change from the lowest to the highest level of envy, for example, is associated with a worsening of SF-36 mental health by approximately half a standard deviation (p < .001). Third, no evidence is found for the idea that envy acts as a useful motivator. Greater envy is associated with slower -- not higher -- growth of psychological well-being in the future. Nor is envy a predictor of later economic success. Fourth, the longitudinal decline of envy leaves unaltered a U-shaped age pattern of well-being from age 20 to age 70. These results are consistent with the idea that society should be concerned about institutions that stimulate large-scale envy.

Objectives. To explore whether improvements in psychological well-being occur after increases in fruit and vegetable consumption.

Methods. We examined longitudinal food diaries of 12 385 randomly sampled Australian adults over 2007, 2009, and 2013 in the Household, Income, and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey. We adjusted effects on incident changes in happiness and life satisfaction for people’s changing incomes and personal circumstances.

Results. Increased fruit and vegetable consumption was predictive of increased happiness, life satisfaction, and well-being. They were up to 0.24 life-satisfaction points (for an increase of 8 portions a day), which is equal in size to the psychological gain of moving from unemployment to employment. Improvements occurred within 24 months.

Conclusions. People’s motivation to eat healthy food is weakened by the fact that physical health benefits accrue decades later, but well-being improvements from increased consumption of fruit and vegetables are closer to immediate.

Policy implications. Citizens could be shown evidence that “happiness” gains from healthy eating can occur quickly and many years before enhanced physical health.

We present a simple model of status-seeking over multiple socioeconomic domains by introducing the concept of conspicuous health as an argument in the utility function, in addition to the well-established conspicuous consumption term. We explore the implications of such a utility function for optimal non-linear taxation, where an increase in concerns for conspicuous health has an opposite effect on the marginal tax rate, compared to an increase in concerns for conspicuous consumption. Using life satisfaction panel data from Australia, along with an improved measure of exogenous reference groups (that accounts for the ‘time era’ of respondents), we find empirical evidence of a comparison health effect. 

We report on the trade-offs that 1,068 Australian university students make between absolute income and the rank of that income in hypothetical income distributions. We find that income rank matters independently of absolute income, with greater weight given to rank by males, migrants, and individuals from wealthy families. Rank-sensitive individuals require as much as a 200% increase in income to be compensated for going from the top to the bottom of the income distribution. Migrants residing abroad for longer periods of time, and with more affluent job titles, are more likely to compare themselves to others at the destination. A dynamic choice model of compensating incomes predicts the average respondent to need a permanent increase in income of up to $10,000 (70%) when moving from a society with a mean income of $14,000 (e.g., Mexico) to a society with a mean income of $46,000 (e.g., the USA).