I am a Ph.D candidate in Economics at the University of Bristol.
I am on the academic job market in 2026/2027.
Research interests: Macroeconomics, Public Economics, Environmental Macroeconomics
My CV can be found here and you can contact me at ridhwaan.korimbocus@bristol.ac.uk.
Working Papers
Job Market Paper: Carbon Taxes and Clean Technology Transition in an International Environment. September 2026.
Abstract:
I study optimal fiscal policy to address climate change in a two-country model with international trade, endogenous technological change, and competition between clean and dirty technologies. Carbon taxation affects both the technology used in current production and the direction of future R&D. Quantitatively, the welfare maximising tax rate is 9% under cooperation between two symmetric countries calibrated to the US and the EU, and in the asymmetric calibration, the cooperative optimal tax rates are 6% in the US and 30% in China, generating significant environmental benefits from lower emissions, but at the cost of a lower average output growth rate. I show that unilateral carbon taxes create carbon leakage by shifting production toward the untaxed jurisdiction, weaken clean R&D incentives and slow the green technological transition. The central contribution is to show that international competition creates strong free-riding incentives and affects the effectiveness of climate policies through both a static production-relocation channel and a dynamic innovation channel.
Abstract:
In recent years, there have been calls for the introduction of a wealth tax. However the major concern is that a wealth tax induces tax evasion. There is empirical evidence that hidden wealth cannot easily be used as collateral as it must be brought into formal financial channels which raises detection risks. This paper theoretically characterises the optimal wealth tax in a general equilibrium model with tax evasion and financial frictions. The main theoretical insight is a new optimal tax formula consisting of three components. First, a redistribution term, reflecting the welfare gains from transferring resources toward agents with lower wealth and higher marginal utility. Second, a general equilibrium-effect term. And, third, a behavioural-effects term including the key elasticity of evasion with respect to taxes. This elasticity depends on the curvature of the evasion costs and on the extent to which hidden wealth can be used as collateral. When hidden wealth cannot be used as collateral by entrepreneurs, the evasion elasticity and behavioural responses are lower, and the optimal tax rate is higher. The numerical exercise quantifies two main results. First, all else equal, the higher the share of hidden wealth that cannot be collateralised, the lower the elasticity of evasion. Second, as the share of hidden wealth that cannot be collateralised increases, the planner chooses a higher tax rate. Despite evasion levels being higher as the tax rate increases, the redistribution motive of the planner outweighs these additional distortions.
Work in Progress