Note: Having reviewed a number of political-military related books, here are some thoughts on a recurring tsubjecy - nuclear arms control in the context of recent events in Iran involving Israel and the US.
There is a subsection of the recent Israel-Iran-US “twelve day war” that’s hard for the interested layman to understand, the thinking behind Israel’s and by extension the US’s seeming rejection of deterrence as a policy option when it comes to dealing with the possibility of Iranian nuclear weapons. but it's a proven policy that helped the US manage its strategic nuclear relations with the Soviet Union/Russia, China and North Korea since the dawn of the nuclear age. Using this as a template, it could work for Israel (and the US) against Iran as well. Deterrence also could be useful keeping any military conflict between Israel and Iran at a lower level of violence. This is not to even remotely suggest that a nuclear Iran is a good thing, but if it were to happen, there have to be better alternatives in managing the new relationship through screaming “existential threat” and attacking Iranian facilities. So why disregard it? Certain aspects of deterrence are scary to be sure, but it may just be that it’s the wrong policy at the wrong time for the current Israeli and US leaders.
The US exists in a constant state of potentially imminent, existential threat from Russia (Since 1949; 1718 currently deployed strategic nuclear warheads) and to a lesser extent China (1964; 600) and then North Korea (2006; 50). The US may not like this, but it accepts it largely because of its own nuclear forces (1945; 1670). It possesses enough diversely deployed weapons to absorb a nuclear attack and respond with devastating, civilization-ending force; a single (of 14) Ohio Class submarines carries 20 Trident ballistic missiles carrying 8-12 thermonuclear warheads. The US intelligence community (IC) also enhances deterrence in two ways: Through its robust signals intelligence capabilities, which can immediately detect and assess adversarial missile launches, which could trigger a US response even before the missiles land, and through the use of human intelligence assets to gain insight into the other nations’ technology and doctrine. The other three nations understand this and even if they don’t like it, making any bilateral nuclear war a zero sum game, i.e. both sides lose.
Apply all this to Israel and Iran and one could easily see deterrence as a workable policy for the former. Israel shares much of the US’s capabilities on a smaller scale. It allegedly has some 80 nuclear warheads as well as a purposefully vague nuclear doctrine; it has never officially acknowledged having them and says it will not be the first to introduce them into a conflict. Before the Israeli American attacks, Iran had produced weapons grade enriched uranium, and probably has the knowledge to build a weapon. There is no firm evidence that it has built or tested even a crude nuclear device that could be given to a terrorist group or that it had developed nuclear warheads for its ballistic missiles and combat aircraft. But even if it had, Israel can detect ballistic missiles from 500 kilometers away and has an extremely capable intelligence service that has clearly penetrated both Iran and its major non-national proxies, leaving it likely able to ascertain their intentions and capabilities. Iran has to understand that Israel would be able to tie it to any nuclear attack and, in accordance with its doctrine, respond overwhelmingly. Whether this constitutes an existential threat is dubious, and by deterrence/balance of power standards, Iran is in an easily deterrable position.
While no guarantee of overall peace and stability, bilateral nuclear deterrence is also useful for providing insurance along the military escalation ladder, keeping violence at an acceptable level and reducing the risk of nuclear war. India (1974; 180) and Pakistan (1988; 170) is the closest comparable relationship to Israel and Iran; nuclear armed, religiously infused rivals with a history of conventional conflict, directly and/or through proxies, most notably in Kashmir. It’s impossible to quantify whether their nuclear weapons kept the ultimate lid on the situation but equally impossible to deny it.
Israel and Iran have engaged militarily over the years, most often through proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah but more recently directly. Israel showed the ability to conduct counterforce – purely military – strikes on Iran, mainly with its attack aircraft, which it has done to great effect. Iran lacks this ability; its retaliatory strikes, whether intentional or not, have been countervalue – directed against civilian targets – a step up the escalation ladder, to which Israel has responded in kind. Right now, the only constraint on either party is Israel’s nuclear weapons pressuring Iran not to go too far with its countervalue targeting, but there is no corresponding pressure on Israel. If it thus continued with the types of countervalue strikes it’s conducted in Gaza, it lessens the chance of a termination of hostilities with Iran and courts international disapproval. Perhaps the presence of Iranian nuclear weapons and the creation of a deterrence based relationship with Israel would increase stability and pave the way for a (albeit unfriendly) detente.
Certain aspects of deterrence are scary, or at least offputting. Some people have a philosophical problem with relying on a policy that, if it fails, results in “mutually assured destruction” (MAD), while others more nationalistically inclined don’t like its “both sides lose” aspect. This is what drove US President Ronald Reagan to push for his unrealized “Star Wars” missile defense program in the 1980s, Israel to construct its similar Iron Dome system in the 2000s and for current President Donald Trump to push for a US Golden Dome. While consistent with Trump’s America First philosophy, one hopes the president has considered the program’s immense potential cost, that Israel is 0.2% the size of the US, that the Iron Dome doesn’t even cover all of Israel and that the latter would lead to interesting political discussions about what parts of the US get covered. Moreover, people forget that the current US missile defense system already protects against smaller threats like North Korea and (potentially) Iran.
Another fear: in a bilateral deterrence based relationship, both sides want to be sure the other’s leader is rational and doesn’t do something rash. One role of the IC is to assess the rationality of key nuclear armed world leaders…some possible analytical outcomes: Vladimir Putin may be an expansionist, autocratic thug but is also a pragmatist bent on maintaining control of Russia for him and his cronies. China’s Xi Jinping may be a Marxist publicly supportive of the death of capitalism, but also manages a huge mixed market economy designed in part to create wealth that partially compensates its citizens for living in an autocratic one-party state. Kim Jung Un is certainly eccentric and threatening, but uses his nuclear weapons primarily to get foreign nations to pay attention to North Korea.
But with Iran, both the US and Israel seem to publicly believe that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is not rational. He is, after all, a religious figure and any faith is inherently irrational, i.e. belief in something without tangible proof that it exists. He’s also a vocal opponent of Israel and the United States, so the inference is that he would authorize the use of a nuclear weapon at the first opportunity even if it risked national destruction. It would be interesting to read whatever rationality assessments the Israeli and US intelligence services have on Khamenei, i.e. whether his overt posturing is a more pragmatic political tactic designed to energize his base supporters and deflect attention from any of his regime’s multitude of shortcomings.
So, if MAD fear and rationality concerns are indeed overblown, what’s keeping the US and Israel away from embracing deterrence vis-a-vis Iran? Maybe it’s nothing more than it’s not a good personal fit for the current Israeli and US leadership. How so? Deterrence is essentially a passive policy, rarely mentioned out loud and successful when nothing happens. This makes it unsuited personally and politically to Netanyahu and Trump. They both clearly see themselves as great men of action; flexing military might is an obvious manifestation of this. This especially works for Trump, who is impulsive, may want to compensate for never serving in the military and seeks to dominate every news cycle. Natanyahu seems more calculating and has a far better understanding of war; he was on active duty with the Israeli Defense Forces during 1967-1972 and wounded in action. He also participated as a reservist in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. (Note: In its very early stages, Israel faced a truly existential threat when Egyptian and Syrian forces almost broke through the IDF on two fronts, threatening, in the words of Moshe Dyan, the “destruction of the Third Temple.” Prime Minister Gold Meir allegedly readied some of Israel’s nuclear weapons for use, from a military standpoint to bomb Cairo and Damascus should the breakthrough have happened and politically to pressure the United States to expedite the resupply of conventional weapons.) Keeping control of the news cycle by rallying Israelis around the flag in Gaza and Iran also keeps the domestic corruption charges against Netanyahu at bay.