Recce Web Series !FULL! Download Telegram

These changes fixed majority of the problems with the first Telegram link, but it still needed to query Telegram everytime it initialized. There was no way around this until we started working on the Identifiers package, which gave us a permanent method of storing and accessing link related data. Storing the user_id into the identifiers file meant the link no longer had to query Telegram everytime it started, unless it needed to. We will talk more about identifiers in Part 3 of this series.

Now that we could write to the identifiers file directly, it became a lot easier to store any other information we would need. As mentioned in Part 1 of this series, the telegram link was greatly simplified and a lot unnecessary work was removed.

Recce Web Series Download Telegram

Download File 🔥 https://bltlly.com/2y2EpT 🔥

On July 31, the Inter-Sect Committee for the Defense of Buddhism released a statement taking issue with Nolting's statement. An open letter to Nolting, August 1, signed by "a group of Vietnamese patriots" and distributed to the news media at Xa Loi Pagoda on August 1, attacked Nolting's integrity and understanding of the Buddhist situation. Superior Bonze Tien Khiet on behalf of the Inter-Sect Committee sent President Kennedy a telegram protesting Nolting's statement. Nolting also received a letter from bonze Tam Chau deploring his statement to the UPI correspondent. (Telegrams 156, 159, and 160 from Saigon, July 31, August 1, and August 1, respectively; all ibid.)

/4/At noon, August 4, novice bonze Huyhn Van Le burned himself to death in front of the Monument aux Morts, Phan Thiet, Binh Thuan Province. This self-immolation was not part of a larger demonstration nor procession, and it was not witnessed by news reporters or photographers. Telegrams 178 and 183 from Saigon, August 5 and 6, contain reports of U.S. officials who later investigated the suicide. (Ibid., SOC 14-S VIET) Both telegrams are published in Declassified Documents 1975, 319B and 319C, respectively.

/3/Reference is to telegram 175 to Saigon, August 8, in which the Department sent the Embassy summaries of two related front-page stories on Vietnam in The New York Times, August 8. The first was by David Halberstam in Saigon, entitled "Mrs. Nhu Denounces U.S. for 'Blackmail' in Vietnam"; the second was by Tad Szulc in Washington and reported on growing concern in the Kennedy administration that the Diem government would not survive unless it became more willing to compromise on Buddhist demands. (Department of State, Central Files, POL S VIET-US)

/4/In telegram 180 to Saigon, August 9, the Department of State informed the Embassy that The New York Times and The Washington Post of August 9 both contained editorials critical of Madame Nhu. The Department provided extracts and noted that they might also be useful to Nolting in his upcoming discussion with Diem. (Ibid.)

/6/According to telegram 190 from Saigon, not attached, the Times of Viet-Nam on August 8 carried a declaration by Madame Nhu reiterating her contention made in a CBS News interview of August 1 that the Buddhist leaders were trying to topple the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. She defended her statement made on the news broadcast that all the Buddhists had done was to "barbecue a bonze" with "imported gasoline." Madame Nhu claimed the Buddhist leaders were neither true religious leaders nor representative of the Vietnamese people. (Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET) A copy of telegram 190 is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, 8/1/63-8/20/63.

Regret my delay reporting series talks with Diem, Nhu and others in effort curb Madame Nhu and make clear GVN policy conciliation on Buddhist issue. This business has been fast-moving, and Dept will appreciate difficulties keeping reporting up to date.

/3/In telegram 191 from Saigon, August 8, the Embassy reported that on August 7 the Interministerial Committee on the Buddhist problem, headed by Vice President Tho, issued a communique inviting relatives of any person detained as a result of the events of July 16-17 in Saigon to write or telephone the Committee and provide details so that the Committee could begin any necessary investigation. (Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET)

/5/According to telegram 185 to Saigon, August 12, the Department of State, including Ambassador-designate Henry Cabot Lodge, reconsidered and agreed with the Embassy that Diem himself should make a gesture in support of the policy of conciliation with the Buddhists. (Ibid., POL 15-1 S VIET)

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 S Viet. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC. According to a note on another copy, this telegram was part of the President's weekend reading file of August 13. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, 8/1/63-8/20/63)

/2/In telegram 219 from Saigon, August 13, the Embassy sent highlights of Tho's press conference of August 13 based on the notes of a USIA employee who attended it. (Ibid.) In telegram 220 from Saigon, also August 13, Nolting reported that at a farewell dinner in his honor on the evening of August 12, Diem promised to take U.S. advice and issue a declaration conciliatory to the Buddhists. According to Nolting, Diem also implied, without actually saying it, that his declaration would repudiate Madame Nhu. (Ibid., POL 15-1 S VIET)

/3/According to the account contained in telegram 219 from Saigon, Tho, in the question-and-answer part of his press conference, described Madame Nhu's recent public statements as the "personal opinions" of a prominent member of the Vietnamese National Assembly and compared them to Senator Mansfield's earlier reports which were critical of South Vietnam. Tho noted that Mansfield was a prominent member of the U.S. Congress and his criticism did not result in a change in the Kennedy administration's support of South Vietnam. Tho suggested that Madame Nhu and Senator Mansfield's situations were comparable.

/4/In telegram 222 from Saigon, August 14, the Embassy replied that it believed the Department of State had interpreted the Tho press conference too negatively. (Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET)

/2/Telegrams 178 and 193 to Saigon and telegram 208 from Saigon are Documents 248, 252, and 251, respectively. Regarding telegrams 185 to Saigon and 220 from Saigon, see footnote 5, Document 250, and footnote 2, Document 252.

On March 4, 1963, during a 70-minute meeting with President Nasser in Cairo, Ambassador Badeau delivered the oral message from President Kennedy contained in Document 175. Badeau also executed instructions contained in telegram 1653 to Cairo, March 3, that he emphasize to Nasser U.S. concern over UAR air attacks on Saudi Arabia and the detrimental implications that continued UAR military involvement in Yemen had on the disengagement process and U.S. Congressional support for economic assistance to the UAR. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 YEMEN) Badeau reported on the conversation in telegram 1379 from Cairo, March 5. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN) For text, see the Supplement, the compilation on Yemen.

On March 5, Komer sent Bundy a note suggesting that when Bundy showed Kennedy telegram 1379 from Cairo he also give the President the following memorandum from Komer to Kennedy. Komer added, "I'm a bit worried by Badeau's pitch." Komer's proposed memorandum to the President reads as follows:

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 SYR. Confidential. A typed note on the source text reads: "Approved per telephone call from White House--Mr. Komer, 8:00 p.m. 3/11/63. Telegram sent Damascus 3/11." Instructions were sent to Damascus in telegram 369 at 9:50 p.m. on March 11 informing the Embassy that the Department of State believed a formal act of recognition would be appropriate in view of Syria's request and the new regime's assumption of all executive and legislative powers. The Embassy was instructed to deliver a note to Foreign Minister Salah al-Bitar informing him of U.S. recognition of the new Syrian regime and expressing the good wishes of the U.S. Government. Ibid., POL 16 SYRIA)

/2/The Embassy in Cairo transmitted the text of the letter in telegram 1362, March 4. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN) On March 13, the Department of State sent the signed original of the letter and an unofficial translation to the White House. The March 13 covering memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy bears a notation: "White House agrees no reply necessary." (Ibid., POL 26 YEMEN)

We recommend that the attached telegram be sent to Ambassador Badeau authorizing him to express to Nasser or to Ali Sabri (a) thanks for Nasser's frank letter in which are found some welcome constructive elements, (b) continued concern for Saudi Arabian integrity, and (c) hope for restraint in future UAR actions./4/

/2/In telegram 2319 to USUN, the Department of State instructed Plimpton to emphasize to U Thant that President Kennedy considered it essential that there be a rapid follow-up to Bunker's mission. Plimpton was to propose that either Bunche proceed to the area, if the Saudis were willing to receive him, or Bunker would immediately return to explain the eight points to Nasser and Sallal. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN)

/3/Reference is to a story by Hedrick Smith in The New York Times on March 9. In telegram 1795 to Cairo, March 10, the White House instructed Badeau to inform Nasser that the United States was highly embarrassed by the "distorted stories" in the U.S. press and that President Kennedy regretted compromising a confidence between the two leaders. Badeau was also to emphasize the importance of continued UAR restraint while Bunker's mediation effort went forward. The Department of State added to the White House message the caveat that Badeau should proceed with the instructions if he believed it "appropriate." (Ibid., POL 7 US/BUNKER) In telegram 1445 from Cairo, March 11, Badeau advised against delivering the apology. (Ibid.) Additional documentation is ibid., POL 27 YEMEN, and in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, United Arab Republic. ff782bc1db