Panagiotis Kyriazis

Economic institutions often influence market outcomes not by controlling sellers' menus, but by shaping the market composition sellers face. We characterize the surplus possibility set of monopoly screening when the distribution of buyer valuations is endogenous. We show that the Pareto frontier is generated by market compositions with a sharp structure. If seller profit receives at least as much weight as consumer surplus, the optimal market collapses to the highest valuation. Otherwise, optimal markets feature no exclusion, no interior bunching, and an efficiently served premium-top segment. More consumer-oriented markets expand the rent-generating interior and shrink the premium-top segment, raising consumer surplus while lowering profit and total surplus. The lower frontier is generated by markets with the same structure. Under mild conditions on the cost of quality provision, the surplus possibility set is closed and convex, and every payoff pair admits a single-market implementation.  With a fixed average willingness to pay, the optimal market compositions that generate the constrained Pareto frontier separate shape from scale and preserve the no-bunching and premium-top segment structure.

We study exclusive ownership of an input that lowers the cost of quality provision. Two firms first compete for exclusivity and then compete in quality and prices in a covered discrete-choice market. We derive existence conditions for the quality–price equilibrium under non-exclusivity and exclusivity, and show exclusivity is the unique equilibrium outcome. Compared to non-exclusive access, the excluded firm offers lower quality and price, reducing net utility, while the exclusive owner raises both; with sufficiently weak downstream competition, price rises more than quality (pass-through above one), so exclusivity harms all consumers. Consumer surplus effects depend on the taste distribution: under logit demand exclusivity is always harmful, whereas under uniform tastes it can raise consumer surplus at intermediate levels of competition. With demand asymmetries, the larger firm wins exclusivity and consumer harm is smaller. Banning only large-firm exclusivity (partial ban) can reduce welfare and consumer surplus compared to laissez-faire or a complete ban.

Coordination facilitation and efficient decision-making are two essential components of successful leadership. In this paper, we take an informational approach and investigate how followers' information impacts coordination and efficient leadership in a model featuring a leader and a team of followers. We show that efficiency is achieved as the unique rationalizable outcome of the game when followers possess sufficiently imprecise information. In contrast, if followers have accurate information, the leader may fail to coordinate them toward the desired outcome or even take an inefficient action herself. We discuss the implications of the results for the role of leaders in the context of financial fragility and crises.

We investigate the relationship between product offerings, information dissemination, and consumer decision-making in a monopolistic screening environment in which consumers lack private information about their valuation of quality-differentiated products. An intermediary, who is driven by the objective of maximizing consumer surplus but is also biased towards high-quality products, provides recommendations after the monopolist announces the menu of product choices. We characterize the monopolist’s profit-maximizing finite-item menu. Our results show that as intermediaries place greater emphasis on consumer surplus over product quality, sellers are prompted to strategically expand their product range. Intriguingly, this augmented product variety decreases economic efficiency compared to scenarios where direct seller-to-consumer information provision is the norm. The role of information intermediaries proves pivotal in shaping consumer welfare, market profitability, and overarching economic efficiency. Our insights underscore the complexities introduced by these intermediaries that policymakers and market designers must consider when designing policies centered on consumer learning and market information transparency. 

We study the effectiveness of information manipulation by regimes within the framework of a regime-change global game. Contrary to previous findings, our analysis suggests that costly information manipulation may not necessarily enhance the regime's survival prospects when faced with uprisings. This finding parallels the findings of the signal-jamming literature in economics, where costly actions do not alter equilibrium outcomes but are undertaken nonetheless due to strategic considerations. Our study highlights a novel aspect of the possibility of manipulating information, for instance, via propaganda, where the regime, despite being informed about its strength, falls into a trap of its own making.