N. Ángel Pinillos
Welcome to my website. I am an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies, Arizona State University (Tempe Campus). I have a PhD in philosophy from Rutgers University and a BS in Mathematics from Tufts University. I grew up in Northern New England where I immigrated from Peru at a young age.
I have written on a variety of topics but mostly in Epistemology, Philosophy of Language and Experimental Philosophy.
Here's my CV
I am organizing a conference in January of 2024 (Skepticism in the Real World). More info here.
CONTACT: pinillos@asu.edu
BOOK
Why We Doubt: A Cognitive Account of Our Skeptical Inclinations. Oxford University Press. October 2023.
Chapter 5 (The Narrow Function of Skeptical Doubt)
Chapter 7 (Skepticism in Society)
PAPERS
Cohen on the Attraction and Defeat of Skeptical Hypotheses. Essays in Honor of Stewart Cohen (2024). Matt McGrath and Juan Comesana (Editors).
Banks, Stakes and Normative Facts. Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. 2023
Bayesian Sensitivity Principles for Evidence Based Knowledge. 2022 Philosophical Studies
Evidence Sensitivity as a Heuristic for Doubt. Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Volume 45. 2021
De Jure Anti-Coreference and Mental Files In Singular Thoughts and Mental Files. Oxford University Press. 2020
A Counterfactual Explanation for the Action Effect in Causal Judgment With Paul Henne, Laura Niemi, Josh Knobe and Felipe De Brigard. 2019 Cognition
Asymmetric Belief Sensitivity and Justification Explain the Wells Effect. COGSCI 2019 (with Sara Jaramillo and Zach Horne).
Skepticism and Evolution in Pragmatic Encroachment. 2019 Routledge
Knowledge and the Permissibility of Action. Synthese. 2019.
Skepticism and the Acquisition of 'Knowledge' Mind and Language 2018
Cause By Omission and Norm with Paul Henne and Felipe De Brigard. 2017 Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Ambiguous Reference . (with Shaun Nichols and Ron Mallon). Mind 2016
Experiments on Contextualism and Interest Relative Invariantism in Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy 2016
A Bayesian Framework for Knowledge Attribution:Evidence from Semantic Integration in Cognition 2015 (with Derek Powell, Zachary Horne and Keith Holyoak)
Millianism, Relationism and Attitude Ascriptions. On Reference. Oxford University Press. 2015
Ambiguity and Referential Machinery in Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language, 2015. Bloombsury
Justified True Belief (in a Gettier case) Triggers False Recall of 'Knew'.(with Derek Powell, Zachary Horne and Keith Holyoak) (CogSci 2013)
Semantic Integration as a Method for Investigating Concepts (with Derek Powell and Zachary Horne.) 2014 Advances in Experimental Epistemology
Experimental Evidence in Support of Anti-Intellectualism About Knowledge 2014 Advances in Experimental Epistemology (Bloomsbury) with Shawn Simpson
Attitudes, Supervaluations and Vagueness in the World 2014 Vague Objects and Vague Identity (Verlag)
Knowledge, Experiments and Practical Interests, 2012 New Essays On Knowledge Ascriptions Oxford University Press.
Coreference and Meaning Philosophical Studies. 2011.
Time Dilation, Context and Relative Truth. 2011 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Recent Work in Experimental Epistemology . Philosophy Compass. 2011
'Philosophy's New Challenge: Experiments and Intentional Action. with Nick Smith, G. Shyam Nair, Cecilea Mun, Peter Marchetto. Mind and Language 2011
Counting and Indeterminate Identity. Mind 2003.
OP-EDS, REVIEWS, ENCYCLOPEDIA ARTICLES ETC
Why Arguments Still Work (November 11, 2020) The Medium.
Interview (In German)
Knowledge, Ignorance and Climate Change. New York Times (Nov 26, 2018) In 'Most Emailed Article' list in the NYT for two days in a row. Reprinted in Question Everything. WW Norton
Review of J. Saul "Simple Sentences, Substitution and Intuitions" Mind.
'Experimental Philosophy' (coauthored) Oxford Bibliographies Online.