Pierre Pecher
PhD in Economics
Pierre Pecher
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Research
Terrorism, Insurgency, State Repression, and Cycles of Violence
Amse Working Paper
Joint with Christophe Muller.
Over the last half century, violent conflicts between ethno-religious organizations and states have shaped the political and economic development context in developing countries. However, global empirical evidence on the dynamic and strategic underpinnings of these phenomena is lacking. Here, we investigate the dynamic violent relationships between the organizations that represent minorities at risk and the governments in Middle-Eastern and North African countries. Our estimates of dynamic panel data models of discrete strategic responses reveal dampened cycles of violence between states and insurgent politico-ethnic organizations due to violent mutual responses. However, such cycles are absent when the organizations target civilians instead, which is more likely after an insurgency spell. Finally, we provide an original game-theoretical interpretative framework for our results, which allows us to identify, on average and under sensible restrictions, the Stag Hunt game as an appropriate representation of the (possibly reduced-form) general strategic situations that link states and minority organizations in MENA.This is at odds with the frequent use of the prisoner’s dilemma setting in the literature, or of other ad hoc strategic hypotheses, to analyze conflicts
Ethnic Inclusiveness of the Central State Government and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa
Published in the `Journal of African Economies'
Joint with Frédéric Gaspart
We estimate the effect of the share of ethnic groups included in the central government on economic growth, distinguishing between democracies and autocracies in a panel of 41 Sub-Saharan African countries over the period from independence to 1999. We take advantage of the time variation of political participation, using Fixed-Effects and Difference-GMM estimations. Our dynamic-panel growth models display a robust positive effect of the proportion of included groups in democracies. Such an effect is offset in autocracies, and the difference is often significant. Our results support the view that institutional improvements must accompany the promotion of inclusiveness in low-income and weakly-institutionalised countries.
Download the Author’s Original Version here.
Transborder Ethnic Kin and Local Prosperity : Evidence from Night-Time Light Intensity in Africa
Joint with Christophe Muller.
Ethnicity often occupies a core role in integrated social, economic, and political development processes, which have mostly been studied within specific countries. Across countries, social and economic development may be supported by political capabilities achieved by ethnic kin abroad, although there is little hard evidence on politico-economic interactions through ethnic networks. We fill this gap by providing the first robust empirical evidence of the substantial effects of political predominance of transborder ethnic kin on local economic development in Africa. This is achieved by specifying and estimating dynamic spatial models of geolocalised luminosity and matching these data with other geolocalised information on geographic, political, and ethnic characteristics. Spatial and ethnic network effects are separately identified and jointly analysed. Not only distinct spatial effects and transborder ethnic effects are exhibited, but also are their complex dynamics and spatial distribution features in terms of local development. The results draw attention to the relevance of a broader international perspective on policies affecting ethnic politics within countries.
Download the AMSE or IRES Working Paper here.
Ethnic Divisions and the Effect of Appropriative Competition Intensity on Economic Performance
PUBLISHED IN 'ECONOMICS OF GOVERNANCE´
This paper features a growth model with an appropriative contest and a common-pool investment game between politically organised rival ethnic factions. I determine how the long-run equilibrium coalition shapes incentives to invest, show the existence of a unique steady state, and investigate how the ease to capture rents affects economic performance. The use of numerical simulations concerning a global sample of countries demonstrates that contest intensity can sometimes be beneficial, despite wasteful grabbing behaviours, due to a mechanism related to the concentration of power. When rents become easier to capture, dominant groups have an incentive to expand their influence further. This adjustment can be beneficial as these groups contribute most to capital accumulation.
Uniting Economic Prosperity and Ethnic Inclusion in Africa
DIALOGUES ÉCONOMIQUES
With more than 2,000 different ethnic groups in Africa, the cultural diversity of the continent is often faced with political fragmentation and development challenges. Does ethnic inclusion always guarantee economic growth? By studying 41 African states, economists Pierre Pecher and Frédéric Gaspart have demonstrated that ethnic inclusion has a positive effect on the GDP when stable, democratic institutions are in place.
Photo Credit: UN Photo/Tim McKulka
Pierre Pecher
References
Here are my academic references:
David de la Croix
Professor of Economics, IRES & CORE, Uclouvain
Demographic Economics, Human Capital and Growth in a Historical Context, and Conflict between Generations.
Christophe Muller
Professor of Economics, AMSE, Aix-Marseille University
Applied Development Economics, Mathematics and Theoretical Econometrics, Survey Techniques, and Economic Theory.
Frédéric Gaspart
Professor of Economics, Earth and Life Institute, UCLOuvain
Microeconomics, Development Economics, Social Choice, Agricultural Economics, and Game Theory.
Pierre Pecher