Research

Central banks and Financial Integration: Evidence from the Eurosystem Collateral Framework. [current version]
[DIW Wochenbericht in German]  [Suerf Policy Brief]  [Bundesbank Discussion Paper]  co-authored with Matthias Kaldorf

Presentations: 2021 Day-Ahead Workshop on Financial Regulation (Zürich), 2021 Banking Workshop (Münster), HU-IWK Joint Junior Seminar in Finance (Halle), 2022 Paris Financial Economics Meeting, AEFIN Finance Forum (Santiago de Compostela), ECB Money Market Conference (Frankfurt), 2023 Royal Economic Society (Glasgow), Humboldt University, DIW Berlin, University of Cologne, Bundesbank Research Center and Banca d'Italia.

Can central banks effectively contribute to financial market integration? This paper exploits that the Eurosystem started accepting loans to non-domestic euro area firms as collateral in 2007, thereby enhancing the (cross-border) liquidity of bank assets. We show that banks holding a large share of newly eligible loans increase loan supply by 14 %. Firms highly exposed to affected banks increase their debt issuance and investment. However, the effect on cross-border lending is limited to syndicate participation and does not extend to direct bank-to-firm lending, suggesting that collateral policy can barely overcome real barriers to financial integration in the Euroarea. 

When Credit Turns Political: Evidence From the Spanish Financial Crisis. [current version]

Presentations:  2022 Joint HU-IWK Junior Finance Seminar (Halle), 2023 WIMLEEH workshop University of Bonn, 2024 Scottish Economic Society Annual Conference (Glasgow), Spanish Finance Forum AEFIN (La Laguna), 2025 Conference oneRuopean Politics and Economics (Milan), Humboldt University, DIW Berlin 

This paper provides causal evidence on the effect of credit crunches on political polarization. Combining data on bank-firm connections and electoral outcomes at the city-level during the 2008-2014 Spanish financial crisis, I construct an instrument for unemployment based on the city-level exposure to (foreign) weak banks. I find that a one percentage increase in (instrumented) local unemployment rates translates into an increase in polarized voting of 6.9 percentage points. This suggests that credit contractions do not only impact firm performance and economi coutput, but also shape voter behaviour through the channel of economic uncertainty. 

They Who Pay the Piper Call the Tune: Bailouts and Political Connections of Bank Boards. [current version]

Forthcoming at the Review of Corporate Finance, Special Issue on “Developments in International Corporate Governance, Ethics and Social Responsibility” 

This paper investigates the political ties of too-big-to-fail bank boards in times of crisis. I argue that, after a bailout, governments are likely to influence bank board compositions in order to secure control rights. Combining two novel datasets on political ties of banks and state aid in the European Union, I find that the number of politically connected board members increases by 24% following government support. In particular recapitalization measures have an impact on political ties. Bailed-out banks with these new political ties are more likely to increase non performing loans, and perform better in terms of market valuation than bailed-out banks without these ties. This evidence suggests that newly appointed political directors strongly influence bank's post-bailout financial performance.