1. Matching Game with Reciprocal Preferences under the Deferred-Acceptance Algorithm, (2024). Joint with Rémila E., Terzopoulou Z.

2. A Model of Embedded Coalition Formation and the Shapley Values for Games with Externalities, (2025). Joint with E. Algaba and E. Rémila.

1. An Axiomatic Characterization of the Proportional Threshold Methods: A Geometric Approach. Social Choice and Welfare, 2025 (accepted). Joint with Cato S., Gonzalez S., Rémila E.

2. Flow Methods for Cooperative Games with Generalized Coalition Configuration. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2025, 207 article number 22. Joint with. E. Algaba and E. Rémila.

3. Cooperative Games with Externalities, Marginalism and the Average Approach. Theory and Decision, 2025 (accepted). Joint with Navarro N., Rémila E.

4. Ranking Rankings: An Axiomatics Analysis. Theory and Decision, 2025 (accepted). Joint with Rémila E., Terzopoulou Z.

5. Sharing the Cost of Hazardous Transportation Networks and the Priority Shapley Value. Annals of Operations Research, 2025, 345: 59-103. Joint with Béal S., Navarro-Ramos A., Rémila E.

6. Characterizations of the Weighted Priority Values. International Journal of Economic Theory, (2023) 19: 787-816. Joint with Béal S., Ferrières S., Navarro-Ramos A.

7. A Core-Partition Solution for Coalitional Rankings. Group Decision and Negotiation, (2023) 32: 965-985. Joint with Béal S., Ferrières S

8. Axiomatic Characterizations of the Core without Consistency. International Journal of Game Theory, (2023) 53: 687-701. Joint with Béal S., Gonzalez S., Sudhölter P.

9. Lexicographic Solutions for Coalitional Rankings Based on Individual and Collective Performances. Journal of Mathematical Economics, (2022) 102: 102738.  Joint with Béal S., Rémila E.

10. Allocation Rules for Cooperative Games with Restricted Communication and A Priori Unions Based on the Myerson Value and the Average Tree Solution. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, (2022) 43: 818-849. Joint with Béal S., Rémila E. 

11. The Priority Value for Cooperative Games with a Priority Structure. International Journal of Game Theory, (2022) 51: 431-450 . Joint with Béal S., Ferrières S.

12. Infinite-Population Approval Voting : A Proposal. Synthese, (2021) 199: 10181-10209.  Joint with Cato S., Rémila E.

13. INFLUENCE : A Partizan Scoring Game on Graphs. Theoretical Computer Science, (2021) 878-879: 26-46. Joint with Duchêne E., Gonzalez S., Parreau A., Rémila E.

14. Lexicographic Solutions for Coalitional Rankings. Social Choice and Welfare, (2021) 57: 817-849.  Joint with Algaba E., Moretti S., Rémila E.

15. Cohesive Efficiency in TU-games : Axiomatizations of Variants of the Shapley Value, Egalitarian values and their Convex Combinations. Annals of Operations Research, (2021) 302: 23-47.  Joint with Béal S., Casajus A., Rémila E.

16. Cooperative Games on Intersection Closed Systems and the Shapley value. Mathematical Social Sciences, (2020) 104:15-22  Joint with Béal S., Moyouwou I., Rémila E.

17. Dilemma with Approval and Disapproval Votes. Social Choice and Welfare, (2019) 53: 495-517 Joint with Gonzalez S., Laruelle A.

18. Harsanyi Power Solutions for Cooperative Games on Voting Structures. International Journal of General Systems, (2019) 48: 575-602.  Joint with Algaba E., Béal S., Rémila E.

19. Coalitional Desirability and the Equal Division Value. Theory and Decision, (2019) 86: 95-106. Joint with Béal S., Rémila E.

20. The Social Cost Problem, Rights and the (Non)Empty Core. Journal of Public Economic Theory, (2019) 21: 347-365. Joint with Gonzalez S. and Marciano A.

21. The Proportional Shapley Value and Applications. Games and Economic Behavior, (2018) 108: 93-112. Joint with Béal S., Ferrières S.,  Rémila E.

22. Axiomatization of an Allocation Rule for Ordered Tree TU-games. Mathematical Social Sciences, (2018) 93: 132-140.  Joint with Béal S., Ferrières S., Rémila E.

23. Two-step Values for Games with Two-level Communication Structure. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, (2018) 35: 563-587.  Joint with Béal S., Khmelnitskaya A.

24. Axiomatization and Implementation of a Class of Solidarity Values for TU-games. Theory and Decision, (2017) 83: 61-94. Joint with Béal S., Rémila E.

25. Discounted Tree Solutions. Discrete Applied Mathematics, (2017) 219:1-17.  Joint with Béal S., Rémila E.

26. A Strategic Implementation of the Sequential Equal Surplus Division Rule for Rooted Trees. Annals of Operations Research, (2017) 253: 43-59.  Joint with Béal S., Rémila E.

27. Comparable Axiomatizations of Two Allocation Rules for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility and their Subclass of Data Games. Journal of Public Economic Theory, (2016) 18: 992-1004. Joint with Béal S., Deschamps M.

28. Characterizations of Three Linear Values for TU games by Associated Consistency: Simple Proofs using the Jordan Normal Form. International Game Theory Review, (2016) 18:1 1650003 (21 pages).  Joint with Béal S., Rémila E.

29. Characterizations of Weighted and Equal Division Values. Theory and Decision, (2016) 80: 649-667.  Joint with Béal S., Casajus A., Huettner F., Rémila E.

30. Axiomatic Characterizations under Players Nullification. Mathematical Social Sciences, (2016) 80: 47-57.  Joint with Béal S., Ferrières S., Rémila E.

31. Axioms of Invariance for TU-games. International Journal of Game Theory, (2015) 44: 891-902.  Joint with Béal S., Rémila E.

32. The Sequential Equal Surplus Division for Rooted Forest Games and an Application to Sharing a River with Bifurcations. Theory and Decision, (2015) 79: 251-283.  Joint with Béal S., Ghintran A., Rémila E.

33. Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its Kernel. Journal of Mathematical Economics, (2015) 60: 159-165.  Joint with Béal S., Rémila E.

34. A Geometric Examination of Majorities Based on Difference in Support. Social Choice and Welfare, (2015) 45: 123-153.  Joint with Baron R., Diss M., Rémila E.

35. Decomposition of the Space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf Value. Operations Research Letters, (2015) 43: 123-125.  Joint with Béal S., Rémila E.

36. A Decomposition of the Space of TU-games Using Addition and Transfer Invariance. Discrete Applied Mathematics, (2015) 184:1-13.  Joint with Béal S., Rémila E.

37. Preserving or Removing Special Players : What Keeps your Payoff Unchanged in TU-games ? Mathematical Social Sciences, (2015) 73:23-31.  Joint with Béal S., Rémila E.

38. 23. Solidarity within a Fixed Community.  Economics Letters, (2014) 125: 440-443.  Joint with Béal S., Casajus A., Huettner F., Rémila E.

39. Local Interactions and p-Best Response Set. Journal of Applied Mathematics, (2014), Article ID 415686, 7 pages.  Joint with Durieu J.

40. Accessibility and Stability of the Coalition Structure Core. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, (2013) 78: 187-202. Joint with Béal S., Rémila E.

41. The River Sharing Problem : a Survey. International Game Theory Review, (2013) 15 :(1340016)1-19.  Joint with Béal S., Ghintran A., Rémila E.

42. An Optimal Bound to Access the Core in TU-games. Games and Economic Behavior, (2013) 80: 1-9.  Joint with Béal S., Rémila E.

43. Weighted Component Fairness. Mathematical Social Sciences, (2012) 64: 144-151. Joint with Béal S., Rémila E.

44. Fairness and Fairness for Neighbors : The Difference between the Myerson Value and Component-Wise Egalitarian Solutions. Economics Letters, (2012) 117: 263-267.  Joint with Béal S., Rémila E.

45. The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games. Annals of Operations Research, (2012) 196: 27-51.  Joint with Béal S., Lardon A., Rémila E.

46. On the Number of Blocks Required to Access the Core. Discrete Applied Mathematics, (2012) 160: 925-932.  Joint with Béal S., Rémila E.

47. Compensations in the Shapley Value and the Compensation Solutions for Graph Games. International Journal of Game Theory, (2012) 41: 157-178.  Joint with Béal S., Rémila E.

48. Adaptive Learning and p-best Response Sets. International Journal of Game Theory, (2011) 40:735-747.  Joint with Durieu J., Tercieux O.

49. Average Tree Solutions and the Distribution of Harsanyi Dividends. International Journal of Game Theory, (2011) 40: 331-349. Joint with Baron R., Béal S., Rémila E.

50. Nonspecific Networking. Games, (2011) 2: 87-113. Joint with Durieu J.,  Haller H.

51. Partial Cooperative Equilibria : Existence and Characterization. Games, (2010) 1: 338-356.  Joint with Béal S., Chakrabarti S., Ghintran A.

52. Rooted-tree Solutions for Tree-games. European Journal of Operational Research, (2010) 203: 404-408.  Joint with Béal S., Rémila E.

53. Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games. Mathematical Social Sciences, (2008) 56: 303-313. Joint with Béal S., Durieu J.

54. Ordinal Games. International Game Theory Review, (2008) 10: 177-194. Joint with Durieu J., Haller H., Quérou N.

55. Good Neighbors are Hard to Find : Computational Complexity of Network Formation. Review of Economic Design, (2008) 12:1-19. Joint with Baron R., Durieu J., Haller H., Savani R.

56. Complexity and Stochastic Evolution of Dyadic Networks. Computers & Operations Research, (2006) 33: 312-327.  Joint with Baron R., Durieu J., Haller H.

57. Finding a Nash Equilibrium in Spatial Games is an NP-Complete Problem. Economic Theory, (2004) 23: 445-454. Joint with Baron R., Durieu J., Haller H.

58. Adaptive Play with Spatial Sampling. Games and Economic Behavior, (2003) 43: 189-195. Joint with Durieu J.

59. Control Costs and Potential Functions for Spatial Games. International Journal of Game Theory, (2003) 31: 541-561. Joint with Baron R., Durieu J., Haller H.

60. A Note on Control Costs and Logit Rules for Strategic Games. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, (2002) 12: 563-575. Joint with Baron R., Durieu J., Haller H.

1. Games with Identical Shapley Values. in Algaba E., Fragnelli V., Soriano S., Handbook of the Shapley value, Chapman  & Hall/CRC, 2020. Joint with  S. Béal, M. Manea, E. Rémila

2. European Union REACH Regulation. In Marciano A., Ramello A., Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Springer, 2019, New York, NY. Joint with Béal S., Deschamps M..

3. Models of Adaptive Learning in Game Theory. In Arena R., Festré A., Lazaric N. (eds) Handbook of Knowledge and Economics,  E. Elgar, 2012, 246-266. Joint with Durieu J.

4. Contagion and Dominating Sets. In Topol R., Walliser B. (eds), Cognitive Economics: New Trends, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2007, 135-152. Joint with Durieu J., Haller H.

5. Stochastic Evolutionary Game Theory. In Bourgine P., Nadal J-P. (eds.), Cognitive Economy. An Interdisciplinary Approach, Springer, Berlin, 2004. Joint with Baron R., Durieu J., Haller H.

6. Location Games with Externalities. In Kirman A., Zimmermann J-B. (eds.), Economics with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, 503,  Lectures Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, Springer, Berlin, 2001.  Joint with Durieu J., Thoron S. 

Books

1. Théorie des jeux et applications, Economica, 2011. Joint with Durieu J., Dequiedt V.

2. Economie, républicanisme et république. Classiques Garnier, 2019. Joint with Bellet M. (direction de l'ouvrage).

Articles

1. La notion de propriété chez Sismondi : un premier positionnement à partir des Nouveaux Principes. Revue d’Histoire de la Pensée Economique, (2019) 8 : 241-267. Joint with Bellet M.

2. Règles d'allocation pour les programmes de pass culturel. Revue Economique, (2010) 61 : 1099-1109. Joint with Béal S.

3. Algorithme de fictitious play et cycles. Recherches Economiques de Louvain, (2003) 63 : 167-181. Joint with Baron R., Durieu J.

• Techer K., Multi-choice games and applications to pollution issues, 2023. Maître de Conférences (Ass. Professor), University of Franche-Comté.

• Lowing D., Values for Multi-Choice Cooperative Games with Applications to Sharing the Cost of a Gas Distribution, 2022. Maître de Conférences (Ass. Professor), ENS Rennes.

• Lardon A. Five Essays on Cooperative Oligopoly Games, 2011. Maître de Conférences (Ass. Professor), University of Saint-Etienne.

• Ghintran A., Social Network and Allocation Rules, 2009. Maîtresse de Conférences (Ass. Professor), University of Lille.

• Béal S., Machine Games and Social Networks, 2005. Professor, University of Franche-Comté.