Research Interests:

The current study of the interaction between economies and defense lacks theoretical grounding and cause-and-effect structure, missing or ignoring the general equilibrium and multilateral nature of warfare. Even U.S. military assessments are siloed to ignore the simultaneous involvement of multiple states with mixed incentives because of limited time and resources to plan and practice. However, coalitional relationships can be decisive and are inherently network games of private information. In fact, history is littered with examples of the grave errors and miscalculations that discounting these relationships induces. Imagine if, at the beginning of 2022, there was the general consensus, with high confidence, that NATO and EU nations would provide military support to Ukraine if it were attacked by Russia. Would Russia have invaded?  Russia, having undermined the NATO and EU relationships for years, failed to anticipate that these links would coalesce, a costly and impactful error.

I apply geoeconomic coalitions accounting for the flows of trade, finance, capacity, and high-innovation start-up industries to expose the blindspots in defense and economic policies. My goal is to apply mathematical methods from the realms of Industrial Organization, Competition, Strategy, and Macroeconomics to better understand how strategic coalitions can be constructed and how they break apart to improve policy.