Hungary’s only military genius
General Artúr Görgey’s battles against Austria, Russia, and his boss, Lajos Kossuth
Part 2, the Spring Campaign
The Spring Campaign is one of the few Hungarian military victories that are forever embedded into the collective national psyche. It is heavily focused on in history class, it is the dramatic highpoint of a novel that every student is expected to read, and mentioned time and time again as an illustration of traditional Hungarian virtues: bravery, guile, and a desire for freedom. Its heroes, Klapka, Damjanich, Aulich, and Bem are remembered with the highest honor. With one exception: its main architect, the commander-in-chief who executed it all, Artúr Görgey. In this article I provide background and analysis of the success of the Spring Campaign of 1849, focusing on the perspective of the nation’s most talented military leader, a person who displayed all three of those virtues, but, somehow, also none of them. This piece is part two of a trilogy dedicated to Görgey’s exploits. Part one is available here.
An army better than its soldiers.
It is April 4, 1849, the war between pro-Habsburg Austrians and rebelling Hungarians enters its eighth month. A tactical mistake results in a skirmish between Austrian and Hungarian forces near the village of Tápióbicske. Due to both sides sending in more and more reinforcements, the affair quickly snowballs into a major battle. A pivotal moment sees two Hungarian battalions, the Szeged 3rd, and the Kassa 9th locked in a fierce fight for a bridge… with each other. Each demands the honor of crossing the river Tápió and engage the Austrians first. With the battle hanging in the balance – and the soldiers of the two units coming very close to start killing each other – the commander of the 3rd, Major Károly Földváry makes a heroic improvisation: he forces the battle standard of the 9th from the hands of their flag carrier, takes it across the river, and gallops at the enemy on his horse by himself. The two battalions stop bickering at once, stream over the bridge together, and charge the Austrian lines on the other side of the river – the 3rd does so to follow its commander, the 9th chases its stolen standard.
The battle was won, thanks, in no small part, to this episode which shows just how far the Revolutionary Army of Hungary had come. This was not the same force that ran from Schwechat and Kápolna. This was an army made strong by the patriotism of an awakening nation, the professionalism forged in the fire and icy cold of the Winter Campaign, and the iron discipline of its leader, Artúr Görgey.
As a true 19th century thing, the standard-bearer of the 9th was shot shortly after the battle for letting the flag out of his hands. The death penalty was requested on him not by his superior officers, but by his own comrades.
Prior to the Spring Campaign.
The last major event of the war covered in part one was the Austrian victory at Kápolna. Casualty-wise the battle was an indecisive affair, as neither side was particularly hurt, nor did they achieve any strategic objective or gain new territory. However, it was the Austrians who were left in control of the battlefield, giving their leader, Prince Alfred of Windisch-Grätz the bragging rights. This, he used to perfection. In his victory report he writes:
“I found the rebel hordes in terrible numbers at Kápolna; I scattered them all, destroyed most. The remainder fell back across the Tisza. I trust that in a few days I shall be in Debrecen and take control of the conspirators’ nest.”
Despite this, it was the Hungarian side that arguably came out stronger after the battle, as they finally replaced the useless Dembiński with Görgey as supreme commander. This wasn’t a smooth affair, and it came with many caveats but, for the first time in the war, the newly born Hungarian Home Defense Force (Honvédség) had a capable leadership and was free from the harmful influence of Governor-President Kossuth. The mission was the same as before Kápolna: beat the Austrian army in the field and retake Pest-Buda. Failing to do so would mean the end of the revolution. Not just in Hungary, in all of Europe. By this time the spark that ignited the Spring of Nations of 1848 had been snuffed out by the absolute monarchies of Europe. Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Prague, Milan, Munich, and Bucharest all fell before the forces of the anciens régimes. As Sándor Petőfi writes with more passion than accuracy (19th century strikes again):
Európa csendes, ujra csendes Europe is silent, silent again,
Elzúgtak forradalmai... Her revolutions have died down…
Szégyen reá! lecsendesűlt és Shame on her! For she has grown silent
Szabadságát nem vívta ki. And failed to win her liberty.
Magára hagyták, egy magára The cowardly peoples have left
A gyáva népek a magyart; The Hungarians on their own, all alone;
Lánc csörg minden kézen, csupán a Every hand is in chains, it is only
Magyar kezében cseng a kard. The hands of the Hungarians that grip their swords.
The task of retaking Pest-Buda wasn’t an easy one: 55,000 men and 214 cannons stood between the capitals and the Hungarian army, which numbered 48,000 men and 198 cannons. The Austrian army was more numerous, better supplied, more experienced, and occupied a defensive position. If push came to shove it could easily retreat behind the Danube via the only stone bridge in the region (the newly built Chain Bridge), and rely on the river, the Buda hills, and on Buda castle for protection. In addition to all of this, time was on the Austrians’ side too, as their successes in suppressing the revolutions in the German, Italian, and Czech parts of the Empire meant that they could count on substantial reinforcements.
The Hungarians could count on three major factors to help them: better scouting information thanks to their versatile light cavalry, the hussars and the home-field advantage, better morale due to ever-rising nationalistic sentiments, and far superior leadership represented by the Big Four of the revolutionary war. Complementing Görgey as commander-in-chief were the leaders of the I., II., and III., corps, Generals Klapka, Aulich, and Damjanich.
György Klapka, was a bit of a coward on the battlefield, but he was probably the best tactician of the war, winning his spurs by defending the Tisza river and the temporary government seat, Debrecen, from the excellent Austrian General Schlik and his Galician army corps. Lajos Aulich was born into a German-speaking family, but he rose to be a talented and uniquely popular officer in the Hungarian army, proving himself by leading an entire division through an abandoned mine in the Tatras to escape encirclement. János Damjanich (born as Jovan Damjanić, and affectionately called “the old man”) was a big, resolute Serb of a good humor and a bad temper, a veteran of the brutal guerilla war of Southern Hungary. He was unique in the war for having never lost a battle despite staring defeat in the face on multiple occasions. Their chief, Görgey, was a clear-headed, rational commander and a born leader whom, despite his young age, officers and common soldiers feared and loved equally. By the beginning of the Spring Campaign he had matured into the most un-Hungarian Hungarian to ever be in charge of an army. He wasn’t brave, he was literally fearless, staring down incoming cannonballs without showing the least concern. Instead of guile, he possessed a keen intelligence, and a careful understanding of strategic strengths and weaknesses. Instead of a desire of freedom he envisioned an autonomous Hungary, an integral, valuable, but self-ruling part of the Habsburg Monarchy. But to realize that vision, he had to go through Windisch-Grätz.
Hungary awakens – March 31 to April 6.
The Austrians were determined to hold off the Hungarian advance before Pest. Their objective was to maintain a bridgehead on the eastern shore of the Danube, preparing for a decisive push against Debrecen once reinforcements arrive. This meant giving up the defensive advantage provided by river, hills, and castle, for a future offensive advantage. The Austrian forces, led by Jelačić, Schlik, Götz, and Csorich under Windisch-Grätz’s overall command fortified themselves near Gödöllő, making use of the rolling, forested, and swampy terrain of the area. Görgey and Klapka agreed that Kossuth’s order of a frontal attack along the Hatvan-Pest road was suicidal. Instead, they planned to flank the right wing of the Austrian lines from the south with three-quarters of the army, the I., II., and III. army corps, while presenting the main enemy forces with fourth quarter, the VII. corps. The plan presented major risks, as in order to disguise the maneuver the VII. corps needed to convincingly skirmish with an Austrian force many times its size – if the enemy went on the offensive the VII. corps would be chased back to the Tisza, and the remainder of the army would be cut off from Debrecen.
Nonetheless, Görgey approved the plan as he judged Windisch-Grätz too conventional to launch a full-scale attack from a well-defended position. Schlik, on the other hand took initiative with his army corps (the Austrian III.), going on the offensive at the same time as the VII., and engaging it in the Battle of Hatvan on April 2. The VII. was the strongest of the four Hungarian army corps, the majority of its forces coming from the Winter Campaign's Army of the Upper Danube and numbering 15,000 men to Schlik’s 11,000. Schlik retreated from what he assumed to be Görgey’s main force, allowing the Hungarians a valuable victory. After the battle the Austrians prepared to receive the main army from the northeast, while the Hungarian I., II., and III. corps were marching past the Austrian line way south.
However, before the maneuver was complete, Klapka, in his haste to enter the gap between Jelačić’s I. corps and Schlik’s III. corps, had his I. corps rush ahead to Tápióbicske, where they stumbled into the Austrian rearguard on April 4. Klapka’s column took volleys of infantry fire trying to enter the village, his cavalry fled the battlefield, leaving the Austrians in possession of an artillery battery which they used to rain death on the Hungarian columns crossing a bridge of the Tápió. The rest of Jelačić’s corps arrived on the scene and chased the broken I. corps, and the broken Klapka, from the field. The retreat ended with the appearance of Görgey and Damjanich. Görgey did what he could to rally the men while Damjanich unleashed his best division, made up from the 3rd and the 9th battalions, to take the bridge. After the brief scuffle for the right of way that was mentioned in the prologue, the division took both sides of the river, recovered some of the cannon lost earlier, and captured the village for good measure. The Austrians retreated. This victory came at a price, however. Klapka’s nervous leadership raised questions about his command abilities, and although Damjanich’s strong character and crack forces won the battle, the Hungarian plan was discovered. Görgey had to advance his timetable.
Knowing that the isolated VII. corps faced overwhelming odds if attacked, Görgey ordered all Hungarian forces to converge on the Austrian right, positioned to the south of Gödöllő. As for Jelačić, while he was able to correctly assess the strength of the Hungarian force at Tápióbicske at two army corps and thereby compromise the Hungarian plan, in his report to Windisch-Grätz – in true 19th century fashion – he claimed victory over the enemy. Windisch-Grätz thus ordered two corps of his own, Jelačić’s I. and Schlik’s III. to give chase to the supposedly fleeing Hungarians. The two sides clashed near a village called Isaszeg on April 6.
The Battle of Isaszeg on April 6, 1849. Grey and black colors represent Austrian, and Hungarian units. Half-white boxes (not to be confused with the diagonally half-white cavalry symbols) indicate unit positions before the battle, full boxes indicate infantry positions during the battle.
The battleground was an unusual one. In order to reach the village and the Austrian troops, the Hungarians needed to cross a heavily forested area (Királyerdő, the King’s forest). The treeline ended in a narrow field, widest in the center of the line. Both sides concentrated their cavalry here, while the infantry was deployed to the north and south. Beyond the field, on the heights, stood the Austrians. The village was located in the southern part of the field, forming a heavily fortified salient of the Austrian line. To the south, on the Austrian right, Jelačić’s I. corps occupied Isaszeg, facing Klapka’s I. corps. To the north, between the forest and Gödöllő, stood Schlik’s III. corps, facing Damjanich’s III. corps.
The battle began at 13:00 with Klapka and Damjanich engaging the enemy vanguard in the forest. The Austrian and Croatian light cavalry gave ground but set fire to the forest as they retreated. The Hungarians pushed through. Once clear the burning treeline and onto the field they found themselves face to face with the Austrian elevated positions. Klapka attacked Jelačić at Isaszeg but was beaten back. Soonafter Damjanich charged Schlik’s position but was equally unsuccessful. As the infantry charged on the wings, a giant cavalry mêlée has formed in the middle, with the superior Austrian line cavalry twice outnumbering their lighter Hungarian counterpart. Horse-to-horse fighting was – contrary to most depictions – relatively bloodless and thus the Hungarian hussars, despite being outclassed by Austrian cuirassiers, managed to hold their own, pinning the best Austrian units in fruitless fighting. On the sides, however, the Hungarian situation was critical. Klapka panicked once again and decided to leave the field, while Schlik’s forces repelled Damjanich and went on the offensive. By 15:00, the Hungarian left was routing, and the right dangerously pressured.
It was during this time that word reached Görgey in his headquarters that the battle with the Austrians – previously expected to take place a day later – had begun, and that it was about to be lost. He rushed to find Klapka and gave him such an earful that he gathered his forces and chose to face the Austrian musketfire over Görgey's words.
With the I. corps reengaged, Görgey went to deploy Aulich’s II. corps that was just entering the battle. He positioned it in the middle of the Hungarian line, covering Klapka’s reforming left flank, and assisting Damjanich on the right in his fight against Schlik. After this Görgey rode on to Damjanich. After listening to the old man’s angry outburst directed at Klapka, the commander-in-chief ordered him to hold his position at all costs before heading back south towards the main cavalry mêlée in order to micromanage the crucial part of the battlefield.
Görgey's order to Damjanich to hold implies that he acted under the assumption that the VII. corps was advancing from the north. Before riding into the thick of battle a messenger informed him that Gáspár – temporary leader of the VII. – was moving in from the north to outflank Schlik. If Damjanich held out, while Aulich and Klapka took Isaszeg, the arrival of the VII. could have delivered the knock-out blow to the tiring Austrian army.
Klapka rallied his troops, and with Aulich’s help he took the village, unbalancing the enemy line. In the meantime, Damjanich had to hang on for dear life. The Hungarian and the Austrian III. corps continued the battle well into the night – the VII. corps was a no-show. It turned out the messenger’s report was false, of Gáspár’s 15,000 men, only a couple thousand had advanced under György Kmety’s own initiative. Schlik realized he was getting flanked, and that he was getting nowhere with Damjanich, so at about 23:00 he ordered his forces to disengage and retreat. The battle was won.
Analysis of Phase I.
The trio of battles of Hatvan, Tápióbicske, and Isaszeg were a shock victory, and their effect on troop morale cannot be overstated. History gives the credit to the Hungarian hussars’ superior scouting, and the infantry’s death-defying bayonet-charges. Tactically, it was Görgey et al.’s superior maneuvering that made victory possible. At Hatvan, an enlarged VII. corps faced Schlik’s III. corps, 15,000 men against 11,000. Tápióbicske saw two Hungarian corps, with 22,000 men against a single one of the Austrians with 15,000. Isaszeg, the largest battle of the campaign saw the full Hungarian army of 45,000 (though only 31,000 participated) facing two corps with a total of 26,000 Austrians.
Despite being outnumbered in this theatre of the war, the Hungarians could deploy more men in all three engagements, as their units had been led with creativity, precision, and speed (excepting the mishap with VII. corps which was down to a lack of initiative from its commander and unlucky miscommunication). At any point during the early phase of the campaign, Görgey’s forces were within a day’s march distance from each other, whereas the Austrians protected a line that was 60 kilometers long, stretching from Vác to Gödöllő, allowing for a defeat in detail à la Napoleon’s Italian Campaign of 1796-97. Overconfidence, faulty intelligence, and a lack of coordination led to the most serious defeat to Austria since the War of the 5th Coalition in 1809.
Some argue that if the VII. corps had advanced at Isaszeg, the Austrian army could have been annihilated, and the war could have been won at Isaszeg, and therefore Görgey made a major error by not double-checking on Gáspár’s position. This opinion was used as basis to further the traitor-mythos against Görgey that arose after the war, but it is false. First, only the Austrian III. corps was in any danger of envelopment. It had 11,000 men, about 20% of the Austrian main army (and less than 10% of all Austrian forces in Hungary). Second, Schlik was a good commander and has escaped from worse odds before, so him getting utterly crushed at Isaszeg from a simple flanking maneuver is highly unlikely. Third, warfare in that period was weird. Infantry attacks alone could wear down an enemy, but to achieve a major breakthrough and destroy whole units, one needed mobile, horse-drawn artillery pieces and heavy cavalry units. Of the former Hungary was in short supply, while the latter was completely nonexistent in the Hungarian army. Despite the immense post-war hype, the Hungarian hussars (their undeniable efforts in scouting and in the mêlée notwithstanding, a true testament to their versatiliy) failed miserably to give chase even to previously shattered Austrian units, taking heavy losses in each attempt. As with many other revolutionary armies, it was the infantry that carried the day in each of the three battles, and like its counterparts, it suffered dearly for it – total Hungarian combat losses amounted to about 2,000 dead and wounded while the Austrians lost half that number. While the VII. corps would have been a welcome addition at Isaszeg, its absence would have been felt only if the Austrians had resisted Klapka and Aulich’s second charge. In my humble (but informed) opinion, complete annihilation of any Austrian unit could only have been possible if the Hungarian flanking attempt had not been discovered at Tápióbicske, and even then the possibility is scant.
Above is a map of the first (Hatvan, Tápióbicske, Isaszeg), and the second (Vác, Nagysalló, Komárom) phases of the Spring Campaign. Red and blue lines indicate Hungarian and Austrian troop movements.
Vienna, we’ve got a problem – April 7 to April 26.
Immediately after Isaszeg, Kossuth met Görgey in private in his headquarters. The Governor-President, who, until a week ago had been pleading with Windisch-Grätz to come to the negotiating table, now saw fit to outline his plans to declare Hungary’s independence. Görgey vehemently disagreed. Up till now, the army had been fighting to uphold the 1848 April concessions agreed to by the Austrian court, and then violated by them in October. A declaration of independence would not only turn every Hungarian officer into an oathbreaker, it would upset the delicate balance of power that was the Concert of post-Napoleonic Europe. Every government from London to St. Petersburg would fear – and fight against – the new source of uncertainty, he argued.
Kossuth saw that he was getting no support and quickly changed topics. He once again tried to meddle in the military’s affairs by urging Görgey to attack Pest-Buda. This time, the supreme commander’s reaction was more composed. He simply reminded Kossuth that taking Buda castle from across the Danube was impossible, and suggested that he return to Debrecen as “the nature of the upcoming troop movements would put his person into considerable danger if he continued to stay with the army”. On April 10, Kossuth decided to return to Debrecen. This, by the way, was at the absolute height of Kossuth and Görgey's relations who were both drunk on victory at the moment and even agreed to be on first-name-basis.
On the same day, Damjanich and Klapka reached Vác, some 30 kilometers north of Pest. There they found the rearguard of Windisch-Grätz’s forces, absent from all three previous battles, still anticipating an attack from a non-existent Hungarian army corps supposedly operating to the north-east of the capitals. After heavy house-to-house fighting that saw Major Földváry failing to repeat the same stunt he pulled at Tápióbicske (this time the desperate standard-bearer managed to hold onto the battalion's colors and keep his life), as well as Austrian Colonel Götz fall in battle, the I. corps and III. corps captured the town.
The plan of phase two of the Spring Campaign was this: Aulich, with the II. and VII. corps stays under Pest to convince Windisch-Grätz that an attack against the capitals is imminent, while Klapka and Damjanich with the I. and the III. follow along left bank of the Danube and make a dash to relieve the besieged fortress of Komárom – 60 kilometers to the west of Pest-Buda. The victory at Vác was crucial for both parts of the plan, which, if successful, would keep the strongest fort in the country in Hungarian hands, save its defenders, and cut off the main Austrian army from Vienna. As this was unfolding, the beaten Austrian main army retreated to the right bank of the Danube at Buda and sabotaged the bridges behind them. This freed up the VII. corps which was now able to follow the I. and the III. corps to the north in their desperate rush towards Komárom. Aulich stayed under Pest, pretending to have three times as many men as he really did, while the rest of the team went north.
The Austrian reply to the earlier defeats came on April 15. Windisch-Grätz was sacked and replaced with an aging Ludwig von Welden, a hero of the Napoleonic Wars. Just as Görgey, Welden also planned a flanking attack from the north, and was able to assemble a new force of 20,000 men from Bohemia and Upper Hungary. On April 17 the two forces made contact with each other along the Garam (today Hron, in Slovakia) river where Welden was reportedly astonished by the speed of the Hungarians' advance, calling them “the hordes of the ghost Görgey”. On April 19 as battle was looming, Welden suddenly felt sick and returned to his quarters, but ordered his subordinate, Wohlgemuth, to attack the Hungarians as they are attempting to cross the river.
However, it was Klapka and Damjanich who moved first. They completed their crossing before the Austrians could realize, and fell on them as they were forming up. Görgey observed the battle of Nagysalló (Tekovské Lužany) from a hilltop at Léva (Levice), preparing to intervene, as he was forced to do at Isaszeg and Tápióbicske, only if it turned critical for the Hungarians. This time, it did not. The battle was a bloody affair and it even saw a rare case of the two infantry lines crashing into each other with bayonets and grenades for a desperate free-for-all. Many Austrian units were caught with their pants down in their quarters and the Hungarians had to lay siege for every house in the village to clear them out. In the end, a spirited cavalry charge broke and routed the Austrian infantry. The way to relieve Komárom was clear.
The fortress of Komárom had been the single most important location of the war. Its position between Pest-Buda and Vienna made it strategically invaluable, while the fact that it was built upon both sides of the Danube and extended to the Vág (Váh) confluence meant that it was very difficult to effectively encircle. Fully stored, it could house up to 30,000 men with 300 guns. To capture the fort, the besiegers needed to raze its walls to the ground with heavy artillery. That’s exactly what the Austrians had been doing since December. The fort with its garrison of 12,000 men, most of them rookies, had been under siege since the beginning of the Winter Campaign, but the bombardment had only started in its earnest in March. General Simunich had 14,000 men conducting the siege, covered from the east by the main Austrian army at Pest-Buda and from the north by an additional army corps.
This latter force had been the one that was so firmly beaten at Nagysalló. A day later reinforcements started to arrive in the fort, and on April 22 the main Hungarian army descended on the Austrian siege lines, clearing it entirely on the north side of the city. Under heavy enemy bombardment, Görgey ordered a bridge to be built and on early April 26, Görgey, Damjanich, and Klapka crossed over to the southern side of the Danube. In a surprise attack they forced the enemy to give up their remaining siege lines. The Austrian side was reinforced by the main army arriving from Pest-Buda, and counterattacked. A tense, 14-hour fight ensued with the Hungarians being outnumbered 2 to 1. Relying on the fort’s defenses and making use of the captured Austrian siege lines, Görgey, Damjanich, and Klapka held, and the entire Austrian force withdrew to the west – as had been Welden's intention since Nagysalló. It was during this time that the Hungarian army ran out of gunpowder – and I don’t mean they had to start conserving it or rationing it, I mean at 15:00 their cannons went silent and the army just stood there watching the Austrians clear off the battlefield.
Analysis of Phase II.
Nagysalló was a crushing defeat of the Austrian forces and the most decisive Hungarian victory in a pitched battle of the war. Klapka claimed roughly 3,000 Austrian casualties including 2,000 prisoners, with more of the Austrian corps disintegrating in the next few days, for 700 Hungarians. Komárom saw the entire Austrian army clear Hungarian territory, losing another 2,000 men, 7 siege guns, and plenty of supplies. Much like in Phase I., the Hungarian plan to encircle the Austrian army in a lightning move was compromised (this time, by the appearance of the auxiliary force on the left bank of the Danube) and eventually thwarted by a general westward retreat.
Görgey’s ambitious plans, mimicking Napoleon’s Battle of Ulm led to an unimaginable series of victories. On the leadership’s part, a focus on proper military objectives (Komárom instead of Pest-Buda), intelligent movements (using the terrain, in particular, the Danube river to separate the Austrians), and great speed (six major battles within 24 days) made success possible.
Phase II., however, showed what had been one of the most major weaknesses of the whole campaign: Hungary had only one Görgey, when it needed two, or even three. The precision, discipline, and strategic thinking he brought to the main army was not complemented by a competent organizer in the hinterland – the army’s supply problems from the Dembiński days had only gotten worse, as illustrated by the ending of the Battle of Komárom. Furthermore, as Isaszeg had also shown, the Big Four needed at least a fifth member who could match the quartet’s abilities at the head of an army corps. At Komárom, for lack of an alternative, Görgey took personal command of the VIII. corps, formed from the fort’s rookie garrison and fought on the right flank – facing a certain General Haynau on the opposite side. Hungary needed Görgey the organizer, Görgey the commander in chief, and Görgey the army corps leader, but had to make do with only one at a time.
The crossroads of Komárom – April 27 to May 3.
The army was victorious, but it found itself at a critical juncture in many ways. On April 14, barely a week after Isaszeg, the political leadership declared Hungary’s independence. "The house of Habsburg-Lorraine, perjured in the sight of God and man, had forfeited the Hungarian throne." the declaration read. Kossuth’s efforts in bringing this move to a head was as impressive as it was devious. He bargained, threatened, and lied his way to get the votes. Most notably, he assured the representatives that Artúr Görgey himself – whose rising popularity he now feared more than anything – was with him in his cause.
Görgey was shocked, while the army's reaction was mixed to say the least. Many celebrated, but a large part of the officer corps, especially the ethnically non-Hungarians, found themselves in an impossible position. Not only did this move make every chance of a compromise with Vienna impossible, this meant certain death for every officer in case of a defeat. For much of the army, particularly for those units who were part of the Imperial army until 1848, the fight was only about the breach of Hungarian autonomous territory by Jelačić's and Windisch-Grätz’s invasions. Phase II. of the spring campaign freed the country (with the exception of Buda Castle), but now Kossuth’s decision destroyed what was left of the legitimacy of the April constitution. The only possible way out for the officers to avoid treason charges was to seek commissions away from the frontline, but doing so would mean betraying the cause they fought for. It was an impossible moral choice. Aulich requested sick leave, while Damjanich and Klapka had taken up political roles – though Damjanich broke his foot in a freak accident before he could assume his post, ending up as a garrison commander in Arad fortress instead.
Of the Big Four, only Görgey remained. With his notable – and borderline sociopathic – lack of fear he always chose the option that carried more danger to his life. He wanted to see things through to the end, but never stopped believing an autonomous, Habsburg Hungary. Now he faced another impossible choice: take the men, drunk with victory, but shaken by the losses, hindered by the lack of supplies, and confused by the political situation towards Vienna in the west, or towards Buda Castle in the east.
Görgey knew that Austria needed to be beaten again if he wanted any terms of peace. The enemy armies were on the run, and Vienna showed last year twice that its revolutionary sentiment against the Habsburgs was strong. But he also knew that without reliable supply of gunpowder, reserves in men, and able officers, he had no chance to beat the 75,000 Austrians he had evicted from the country (though at the time only 50,000 of those were in fighting shape). Those men were now regrouping before Vienna, while Görgey could only count on a mere 30,000 for offensive operations.
On the other hand, taking Buda would shorten his supply lines, and give a capital for the newly born nation. Hopes were still high on Kossuth’s part that the declaration of independence would stir up international support for the Hungarian cause, but without a capital, that cause could not be taken seriously. With Kossuth’s assent this time, the army marched on Buda, in hopes of a quick victory.
Pest-Buda's panoramic view from Gellért Hill in the 1840s. From left to right we see Buda Castle, the Chain Bridge, the Pest riverside, and the semi-permanent Pontoon Bridge.
The Siege of Buda – May 4 to May 21.
Buda Castle was an outdated fortress by this time, but its position on Castle Hill, its 5,000 men strong garrison, and a notable effort by Austrian engineers made it a much tougher nut to crack than previously expected. Its commander, Heinrich Heintzi, firmly refused Görgey’s call to surrender. Görgey tried to bargain with Heintzi to spare the booming city of Pest, even promising not to conduct a siege from the east side of the castle, while vowing to put the whole garrison to death if the city was bombed. Heintzi replied by bombing the city – as a warning at first for the Hungarians to back away. They did not.
The siege dragged on for weeks, as Hungarian field batteries were not strong enough to breach the castle walls. Görgey had to wait 10 days before bombardment could be started in earnest, as the commander of the garrison of Komárom fortress, citing Görgey’s temporary title, refused to hand over the Austrian siege guns captured in the Battle of Komárom.
But once the bombardment against the walls began, Heintzi rained fire upon Pest, and by the night of May 13 the city was in flames. While the destruction of Pest served no tactical purpose, it succeeded in provoking an enraged Görgey to attack prematurely. On May 18 the Hungarians stormed the castle and were beaten back, losing over 200 men. However, the defenders’ morale was running low, and the breach on the walls was getting wider every day – Hentzi’s focus on bombing Pest allowed the attackers to proceed with their own efforts largely unmolested.
At 3:00 May 21, a salvo from every single piece of Hungarian artillery sounds the final charge. The defenders fight fiercely on the walls but those crumble below them in face of the heavy blows. After hours of fighting, the Hungarian infantry takes the walls, and the Austrian units surrender in droves. Heintzi’s final stand is in the streets, where he is mortally wounded by a musket shot. Before the battle is over, however, a thunderous explosion breaks open the sky, as by Heintzi’s final, senseless order, Austrian Colonel Alois Alnoch von Edelstadt ignites four kegs of gunpowder to blow up the Chain Bridge, a symbol of Pest-Buda, and of Hungarian national pride. When the smoke clears, the bridge still stands, but von Edelstadt is nowhere to be found – by a freak accident and a rare case of poetic justice he himself was obliterated by the blast, while the bridge only sustained superficial damage.
With the capture of the capital, the Spring Campaign, or as it was to be known by its epithet, the Glorious Spring Campaign was over. In two months the occupied country was entirely liberated, the red-white-green tricolor was flying from Kolozsvár to Győr. Görgey, despite his earlier threats, spares the captured Austrian garrison of Buda, and even provides (cold) comfort to the dying Heintzi. He once again refuses Kossuth’s offer of land and decorations, he knows the war is far from over. His prisoners of war are so numerous he has nowhere to put them, but it’s not their placement that worries him, it’s the stories they tell. They speak of a conference between the Emperor and the Tzar, and of a grand alliance against the fledgling nation. Kossuth and the political leadership dismisses these claims, there’s no way the powers of Europe could allow this!
But across the ranges of the Carpathians, beyond the plains of Galicia, the clouds were gathering. An army, the size of which Hungary has never seen before in its 900 years of history, was forming up, waiting for the signal to move. On May 21, the same day as Buda Castle falls, the signal is given, and 200,000 muskets and bayonets make their way towards the mountain passes, ready to pour onto the Hungarian Plain. Görgey knows how quickly the politicians’ big words will turn into desperation, he’s seen it before. Yet the Summer Campaign starts and he will have one more display of utter brilliance before the war is over.
(To be concluded in part 3)
February 24, 2018.
Again, a number of caveats are in order:
In late 1848, Franz Joseph replaced the infirm Ferdinand as the Emperor of Austria. In order to be free of the April constitution, signed by Ferdinand, he did not take the title of King of Hungary. Until April 1849, the Hungarians considered Ferdinand as their rightful king, and even signed their officers' commissions under his name with the words "With the hopes of His Majesty's future approval".
The war had two other theaters. The more notable was the Transylvanian front, where Hungarian and Székely forces under the famed leadership of Józef Bem were fighting Austrian, Romanian, and, informally, Russian (Putin would be proud) troops with limited success. The other was the Southern Hungarian front, where some of the best Hungarian units were fighting a brutal, near genocidal guerilla war with ethnic Serbs who were supported by Croatia, Austria, and the Principality of Serbia. Görgey tried multiple times in vain to rally these forces to the main front, but his temporary title did not give him enough authority to be listened to.
Of the Great Powers of Europe, only Prussia had any interest in a Hungarian victory, as it would weaken their main rival, Austria, in the German unification. However, the fact that Hungary was supported by a substantial number of Polish rebels went against the interests of the Holy Alliance of Prussia, Austria, and Russia. This alliance was centered around the strategic interest of not allowing an independent Poland to be formed, killing off any chance of support. The major players, England and France disliked the Habsburgs, but they favored a strong Austria in order to serve as counterweight against an ascendant Russia.
The Big Four was an extremely effective partnership, but it was not a friendship. While Aulich was well liked by all others, Klapka and Damjanich clashed and feuded with each other all the time. Görgey's orders had them fight every battle of the campaign side by side, and their contrasting personalities often brought out the best of each other, most notably during the Battle of Nagysalló. Klapka was the superior tactician, but Damjanich was a far better leader of men, which Görgey recognized as a good combination. Off the battlefield, however, there was no peace between them. Klapka was a young man, only 29 at the time, he was weak-willed and a hard nationalist heavily influenced by Kossuth. Damjanich was 15 years his senior, with unrelenting willpower, but of Slavic origin, which was typically looked down on. Their rivalry, unlike the Görgey-Kossuth rivalry, was an extremely productive one and it's worth a special mention.
A few sources and links (in Hungarian).
http://mek.oszk.hu/04700/04739/html/gorgey1040/gorgey1040.html
http://magyarhirlap.hu/cikk/19721/Az_1848as_honvedzaszlok_kalvariaja
http://www.rubicon.hu/magyar/oldalak/1849_aprilis_26_a_komaromi_csata/
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