Abstract Berlin: Tom Poljanšek

Veridical Perception in Games and Virtual Worlds

The paper argues that perception in games and virtual worlds can be veridical in the same way as ordinary perception in the ordinary world. To show this, I will critically engage with the thesis developed by O'Shiel (2022) that video games can be described as a case of "image-consciousness" in a phenomenological sense. I will then counter this thesis with a theory of experience, also motivated by phenomenology, which describes experience as 'immersion in situations'. Using various examples from everyday experience and the field of video games, I will then argue that and under what conditions perception in games and virtual worlds can be veridical in the same way as ordinary perception. For further clarification, the proposed account will be critically distinguished from disjunctivist theories of perception, such as those put forward by McDowell (2010), on the one hand, and Chalmer's (2022) realism of virtual objects, on the other.