Abstract: I study a single-product monopoly in which partially informed consumers can disclose information at a privacy cost to receive personalized prices. Consumers learn their exact valuations afterward. Under regular demand with single-peaked profits, disclosure raises the non-disclosure price and is inefficient from a consumer-surplus perspective. Reducing privacy costs encourages disclosure and can lower consumer surplus. For sufficiently small positive privacy costs, I characterize the consumer optimum over all Bayes-plausible information structures and show when refining consumers’ information can implement it. Unlike the baseline, the constructed information generates profit functions with separate low- and high-price maxima. Disclosure then lowers the non-disclosure price below its level without a disclosure option.
Revise and Resubmit: Marketing Science
Abstract: We study pricing and product design choices in a duopoly model of directed search. Product design determines both the expected valuation and the dispersion of consumers’ match values. While greater dispersion increases the option value of search, it also increases expected search duration. Consumers with lower search costs therefore benefit more from products with high dispersion than consumers with higher search costs. When firms choose product designs with different levels of dispersion, consumers sort by search cost in their initial search decisions. Firms thereby gain prominence for different consumer segments, which softens price competition. We show that, in equilibrium, firms choose maximum differentiation.
Abstract: Advertisers place ads on publishers’ websites to attract the attention of multihoming consumers. Because of competition in the product market, advertisers may have an incentive to partially or fully foreclose their rivals. A gatekeeper may be able to limit publishers’ access to some of the consumers. We fully characterize the equilibrium in which the gatekeeper, publishers, and advertisers make strategic pricing decisions. We show how the presence of the gatekeeper affects the advertisers’ foreclosure decisions and the surplus of the different market participants.