Book "The Time River" (From Stalin to Gorbachev), 2022
Nuritdin Mukhitdinov
The Time River
From Stalin to Gorbachev
MEMOIRS
Moscow
June, 2022
Translated from Russian into English by M.N. Mukhitdinova and Sh.Sh. Burkhanov
First published in Russian in Moscow, 1995 by Rusti-Rosti, the Financial Industrial Corporation of the Russian Federation
CONTENTS
PREFACE
3
I
MY TEACHERS
7
II
WORLD WAR II: UP TO THE VOLGA RIVER– AND BACK
12
III
THESE DAYS OF THE INFINITE SPRING
19
IV
CREDENCE
31
V
STALIN’S DEATH. WHO WILL BE INSTEAD OF HIM?
58
VI
ON THE EDGE OF THE ABYSS…
68
VII
The 20th CONGRESS AND KHRUSHCHEV:
EXONERATION OF REPRESSION VICTIMS
85
VIII
INTELLIGENTSIA
OLD PROBLEMS – NEW IDEAS
108
IX
‘YEAR OF INDIA’
BANDUNG CONFERENCE
136
X
THE SUEZ CRISIS
149
XI
MOLOTOV OR KHRUSHCHEV?
154
XII
KHRUSHCHEV VERSUS ZHUKOV
163
XIII
NEW APPOINTMENT
MOVING TO MOSCOW
174
XIV
FACING THE EAST
195
THE FIRST ALL-UNION CONFERENCE CONCERNING ORIENTAL STUDIES
195
THE EAST
197
HERITAGE
199
THE BEGINNING OF THE ACTIVE EASTERN POLICY
204
XV
MOSCOW – BEIJING: LOVE AND DISAGREEMENTS
220
XVI
ECHO OF ‘ANTIPARTY’ SCANDAL
248
XVII
RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN CAIRO AND MOSCOW
254
XVIII
KABUL: GOOD WILL VISIT
264
XIX
PARTICULAR MISSION (TRIP TO INDONESIA, INDIA, AND BURMA)
270
XX
VIETNAM: NOT ONLY HUNTING TIGER
278
XXI
THE STRUGGLE FOR LIQUIDATION OF COLONIALISM
284
XXII
FROM MAGHREB – TO THE OCEAN
299
XXIII
RUPTURE OF RELATIONS WITH ALBANIA
308
XXIV
A CAR WRECK: AN ACCIDENT OR REVENGE?
316
XXV
KHRUSHCHEV'S LAST CONGRESS
322
XXVI
‘DAMOCLES SWORD’ IN SUSLOV’S HANDS
341
XXVII
THREE DAYS OF ‘SILENCE’
345
XXVIII
BREZHNEV’S ADVENT TO THE POWER
354
XXIX
KOSYGIN - HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT
369
XXX
NINE YEARS IN ‘HOT SPOT’
378
XXXI
LOCHIN – THREE GENERATIONS OF MY HORSE
408
XXXII
THE RETURN TO UZBEKISTAN
413
POSTSCRIPT (Instead of Afterward)
419
PHOTOS
424
NAME INDEX
436
PREFACE
Nuritdin Akramovich Mukhitdinov was born on November 19, 1917 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan at the time of transition of the Russian empire into the Soviet empire. He was born to a Muslim family, so he was brought up according to the Coran’s rules and laws. Also, he was educated under the influence of prominent Uzbek philosophers, writers, singers, artists, and other outstanding figures of literature and fine arts. After graduating from Moscow Political High School and Kiev Military School, he joined the Soviet army to participate in the Great Patriotic War (World War II). After the war he returned to Tashkent from where he gradually climbed up the political and party hierarchy ladder of the Soviet Union.
He held one of the highest positions in the government of the Republic of Uzbekistan. In late 1957 on December 17, at the peak of his political and party career, he was elected the Politburo member, the CC CPSU secretary at the age of 41. Thus, being the youngest in the supreme party echelon, he embodied cutting edge ideas and approaches of the time. The period of his four-year work in the supreme authority body was described by him in his first book ‘The Years Spent in the Kremlin’.
Afterwards L.I. Brezhnev, the successor of N.S. Khrushchev at the Soviet power, appointed N.A. Mukhitdinov as Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador to Syria where the author worked for over 9 years. For many years the author focused on the Eastern policy pursued by the Soviet Union both inside and outside the country.
The book of the memoirs by N.A. Mukhitdinov focuses on the most dramatic events of our recent past. The author describes the facts known by a narrow circle of people of the supreme power echelon, strictly basing on the documents. However, when there were and might be no records, the narrator describes the events by memory or by the evidences of eyewitnesses. The author does not hide his personal participation in the described events. But this personal attitude also reflects a history of the epoch when the USSR remained a superpower.
There is no that empire any more that ruled Soviet Euro-Asia for 74 years. Instead of it 15 independent states have emerged. The experience obtained by the Soviet republics, which are independent states nowadays, for about three quarters of the 20th century might be helpful for them even to date.
N. Mukhitdinov’s memoirs are of great interest since they have got a lot of examples of a primitive management of such a superpower as the USSR, the manifestation of many shortcomings of the very management system and its leadership, of brutal force of authorities exercised under peaceful slogans.
These days when our common history has become an object of political bargain and speculation, vivid evidences of the eyewitness who participated personally in the most crucial events of the 20th century are of particular value.
I’d definitely recommend this book to historians, diplomats, politicians and those who are interested in the post-Stalin policy pursued by the Soviet Union in the East for the time up to the USSR collapse.
Mukhabat N. Mukhitdinova (N.A.M.’s daughter)
Here is a letter from Sergei Nikitich Khrushchev (N.S. Khrushchev’s son) received by N.A. Mukhitdinov in February, 2003.
To: Nuritdin Arkamovich Mukhitdinov
January 25, 2003
Dear Nuritdin Akramovich,
I am glad to hear that you are in a good health and work actively. It is really important for you and for the society as a whole because future is nothing without the past. The past is the roots of a tree which bears fruit today.
Muborak gave me your book. Thank you very much. I have not only read it, but I have also studied it. The book contains the unique information about the important period of our history. It is unique. Besides you and my father, hardly anyone has written truthful memoirs about the postwar and post-Stalin years. At the same time, your memoirs cover such events that have never been described by anyone else, including the 1957-events (the anti-Party group’s conspiracy), Georgy Zhukov’s dismission and throwing a light on Lavrentiy Beria’s story.
It should also be noted that you made just a few mistakes relating to the dates and the event venues. You have still a perfect memory. As a rule, it is really difficult for a memorialist to specify real dates and places. I know it myself. It seems that something happened somewhere at a certain time that I am sure of. However, when I look into newspapers or other information sources like archives, I sometimes find out that the investigated events took place in a different place or at a different time than it was thought.
Your book is easy to read and is definitely more readable than Lazar Kaganovich, Anastas Mikoyan and Vladimir Semichastniy’s memoirs. Their narrative style is rough and bureaucratic while yours is fresh and very personal.
These days I am working on my own book titled ‘Butter Instead of Guns’. It is about my father’s reforms of those years and your book appreciably has helped me write some chapters.
Thank you ever so much.
American Professor William Taubman is going to publish in 2003 a thousand-page long biography of N.S. Khrushchev. I know that because I have read his manuscript and he also refers to your book. In science, citation and reference to a book is believed to be a remarkable sign of its publication value and your book does correspond to this rigorous criterion.
I wish you and your family health, success and peace in Central Asia.
Sincerely yours,
Sergey Khrushchev
The Soviet Union of the Socialist Republics – the USSR- existed for about 69 years, from the year 1922 to December 1991.
From a historical standpoint it is just a moment of a many-thousand mankind history, which, however, was remarkable by establishing a state that used to arouse and still arouses fear in the mind of the world's richest elite, as well as inspires billions of indigents all over the world with a big hope.
Indeed, for just 69 years what a colossal influence had that country on the further development of the humanity!
Yet, the main paradox is that it was Russia that first established that country and then destroyed its own creation. One can't help remembering a well known saying that it's impossible to comprehend a mystic ‘Russian Soul’ by mind or heart.
Soviet Russia existed for 74 years, from November 7th, 1917 (October 25th according to the old style) till December 8th, 1991, the date of signing the ‘Belavezha Accord’.
The author of this book, Nuritdin Akramovich Mukhitdinov, who from the late 1990s up to his death (he passed away on August 28th, 2008) used to say, ‘I am the happiest person because I am the only one of all the Politburo members who has lived up to present days.’
Nevertheless, we must also give credit to another member of the Politburo who not only lived to the very old age but also remained in power. That was Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan about whom they used to say quite seriously without irony, ‘From Ilyich Lenin to Ilyich Brezhnev without a heart attack and paralysis*.’ Under any circumstances, he proved to be genius in political and court circle tactics. At some point you might think that the author was on unfriendly terms with A. Mikoyan. However, the real life and experience showed that Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan treated Nuritdin Akramovich Mukhitdinov with deep respect for his principle standpoint. To Mukhitdinov’s great surprise it was clearly shown in Mikoyan’s unpublished memoirs received by N.A.M. as a gift.
Moreover, it is essential that the author of this book was not only the youngest member of the Politburo of the CC CPSU (he was about 40 years old when he was elected to the top leadership position of the country in December, 1957), but also the only one who came from the Muslim part of the country and reached the Olympus of the state power of the USSR.
Some people may scold Vladimir Ilyich Lenin for launching the October Revolution in the result of which that huge powerful country appeared on the world’s map and under the influence of which the 20th century passed. However, it was Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin who was the true founder of the USSR.
It is generally known that politics is only an instrument of non-economical methods used to solve economic issues. When societies find the common ground, their economies flourish, first of all, through trade. Therefore, entrepreneurs involved in mutually beneficial exchange become the main driving force of these societies. However, when economic contradictions arise among them, the politics comes up onto the stage and starts building bridges by applying pros and cons arguments. Finally, when it becomes impossible to sort out economic issues and disputes by political means, then military forces go on proscenium. So, who are those behind the stage ruling military armies? Of course, it's major business circles who launch any war.
Therefore, the Soviet top management focused on establishing such a system wherein all the enterprises scattered across that vast country were linked to and depended on each other. Though it was really hard to accomplish that task because of the ignorance of basic economics principles, without taking into consideration the shortage of sufficient raw material and human resources in the areas adjoining launched enterprises, the Soviet Union succeeded in the economic integration of the Soviet republics.
Nowadays, we see most major transnational corporations in so-called industrial developed countries run exactly the same production scheduling and management system as the Soviet one, which is called now globalization. Contemporary major corporations successfully apply the experience of the former Soviet Union.
So, de jure the USSR stopped existing about 31 years ago, but de facto… Is it really so?
Saida N. Burkhanova (N.A.M.’s daughter)
The time river in its stream
Takes away all people’s deeds
And drowns in an oblivion abyss
The peoples, kingdoms, and the kings.
Gavriil Derzhavin
My heart does not get dusty from someone’s steps,
I am not offending someone and getting angry,
I am not proud falsely of my destiny,
And I've got nothing to be ashamed of in myself.
Bedil Mirzo Abdukadir
I
MY TEACHERS
Near Tashkent city there is a settlement (a former village) called Alan. This name comes from the ancient realm, which had some influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The settlement is located off Chigatay avenue.
My forefathers included Shomukhitdin - my father, Akramsho - my grandfather, and Shoyakub - my great grandfather. They were handicraftsmen-saddlers and gardeners. They lived and supported their families by their own labor, cultivating gardens and selling their products. In the family there were no rich people, scientists, clerics or military leaders. They all were just faithful believers.
My parents and ancestors were literate, well-educated. They realized importance of knowledge and education. My father was a chairman of the settlement committee from the moment of the local council establishment till the late 1940s when he fell seriously ill.
From the very beginning of my education I had a chance to learn the Arabic language. In our settlement used to live a cleric, who was an educated woman called Kumri. We used to go to her house where she taught us (there were about ten boys apart from me) the Arabic language. She made us learn the Koran suras (chapters from the Koran). I also went to an Uzbek school where the Russian language was taught really well. Besides, Kambaraka, Abdulla Avloni and Abdulla Kodiri exerted most influence on my upbringing.
In 1932 still being at school, I joined the young communist league. A year later Umarov, the district committee secretary, assigned us and a few other guys to be responsible for the cotton collection. I came to the collective farm called Socializm Yuli (which means ‘a way to socialism’). It was the first time I saw and participated in collecting cotton. After two days of working on the cotton field the skin on my fingers got cracked and started bleeding. So, I got them bandaged and the foreman suggested that I stay for a while in the field camp. Soon Kambar, the chairman of the collective farm, drove up and took me to his house. There he told me, ‘You’d better be an agitator, visit groups of workers, explain people the current policy, tell them about the life in the city, and talk to them about other topics.’
His wife Khalima (they did not have any kids) added, ‘Be our son and stay with us.’
Once after dinner, Kambar took out of the chest two small tattered books written in Latin and asked me, ‘Can you read it for me?’
I glanced at him with great surprise and said, ‘Can’t you read it yourself?’
To which he smiled and replied, ‘Unfortunately, I am illiterate. We are from Fergana; and Yuldash Akhunbabaev, who was an elder in Uzbekistan, brought us here in the late 1920s to implement collectivization. Here we settled and set up a collective farm. In Fergana I was a chairman of the collective farm called Koshchi (which means ‘peasant union’).’
One of the books turned out to be the work by V.I. Lenin titled ‘About Cooperation’ and the other one was a booklet written by Stalin about Lenin.
Well, in the daytime we were working in the fields, and in the evenings, we had a collective reading session. I was really impressed by his words because being illiterate, Kambar was brilliant at oratorical, logical skills. He could speak to people without any texts, holding their attention for hours. He cited Lenin and Stalin from memory, speaking about the Soviet system, international friendship and general importance of cotton. Finally, the collective farm fulfilled its work plan and I went home with a recommendation letter.
One day, Pattakh, the school principal, told us beforehand that the next day there would be a meeting with an eminent scientist and outstanding revolutionary. The next morning, we swept the yard, placed the benches, tables and chairs. Getting all together we impatiently were waiting for the guest. At last he came accompanied by the principal. It was a man of an average height, dressed in naval jacket with high collar, wearing a skullcap, with a calm face. So, we all together greeted him. He replied to us with a greeting too and offered us to sit down.
The principal, introducing the guest to us, said, ‘You are happy, kids, because you are meeting the very respectable person, Abdulla Avloni. He is our prominent scientist, revolutionary and enlightener. He was the first to translate into the Uzbek language the book ‘The Manifesto of The Communist Party’ by Carl Marx and Engels in 1918. He created and is Head of the Central Asian Communist University, teaches history, politics and economics. He has established a few schools of political enlightenment, publishes a newspaper and a journal. He is going to speak to you.’
Abdulla Avloni stood up and, with a soft low voice, began telling us (we, holding our breath, were literally trying to catch his every word) who were Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, what is socialism and communism, what goals the communist party and the Soviet government have, what is motherland, nation, patriotism. He also told us that we should love and learn our mother tongue and culture, that it is necessary to unite at heart patriotism with the ideas of the world civilization development. About all these I first heard with the other guys from Abdulla Avloni, who was the Honorable Hero of Labor, professor, a respectable state and public figure, and I remembered it for the rest of my life.
In 1934 we had a guest at home who was accompanied by my uncle. My father heartily met him. He told me, ‘Tell your mother to cook pilau,’ then softly added, ‘This is the great writer, Abdulla Kodiri.’
In the yard there were five people. While serving them tea, I was listening to their conversation trying not to miss a word. When I brought another teapot, my father told Abdulla Kodiri, ‘This is my son; he is leaving for Moscow to study.’
The guest, with a gentle smile, seated me next to him and began asking me to find out how well I knew the Uzbek and Russian languages, what books I had read. Besides, he made sure that I knew the Arabic language. Finally, with some words of encouragement he said, ‘It is really good that you are going to Moscow to study. In addition to lessons, you should visit theatres, watch entertaining performances and improve your Russian. You should read the Russian literature, first of all, the books by Tolstoy, Chekhov, Turgenev and Mayakovskiy. When you return, I will test you personally.’
Before I only mentioned my ancestors from my father’s family. As for my mother’s family (my mother’s name was Sabrikhon), I must tell about her father who was fairly well-off, running a shop where he sold tea and haberdashery. He accomplished pilgrimage to Mecca. For that reason, he was called Mukhammadjon-Khodji. Also, he had two wives. I first saw him when my mother brought me to him before my going to Moscow. She told him about my future study and asked him for money to pay for my trip and accommodation in Moscow. He listened to her and thought for a bit, then gave her 5 rubles on the only term that after returning I would pay him back 10 rubles. Since then I have never seen him again.
There were six of us who were sent to Moscow as high achievers and activists by the young communist league and the national commissariat for enlightenment and education. We were welcomed in the Commercial and Cooperative Institute and accommodated in the dormitory. So, we started studying. Soon I was elected a member of the young communist league and actively participated in the youth’s life. When I had a chance, I went to the theatres. Also, I read many books and learnt the Russian language. In those years my mind was occupied with the so-called anti-Soviet Trotskiy’s bloc trial process under which Bukharin and Rykov were the main defendants. Among other defendants there were the former leaders of Uzbekistan: Akmal Ikramov and Faizulla Khodjaev. The trial took place in the Columns Hall of the Trade Unions House. Hearing session started on March 3rd in 1938. Since it was announced to be public, the leaders of the party committees, local trade unions and young communist league from organizations, factories, plants, educational institutions were invited to attend it. We were given permits in the middle of the procedure. It was the first time I was in the court room, where I saw the defendants, behind each of whom there were sentries with rifles. They were not allowed strongly to talk to each other. On the opposite side, there was the prosecutor of the USSR, A.Y. Vishinskiy, sitting with his assistants. The Chairman of the Military Board of the Supreme Court of the USSR, V.V. Ulrikh, was sitting at the presidium table between the two other court members, below them there was the secretariat. I was shocked when I saw A. Ikramov and F. Khodjaev among the defendants. Since my childhood I have loved and honored them. And then they looked absolutely exhausted, ruined and sick, sitting behind bars...
At the trial hearing I watched Vishinskiy interrogating Rykov and Krestinskiy. There was only one question asked to Khodjaev, which was about his friendship with Rykov. During a break we left the court because we had a permit for only one hearing. I showed insistence on getting another permit and I obtained it. So as an exception it was given to me for the next trial hearing. Right there the defendants were given a chance to speak out their last words after the sentence was announced by the prosecutor.
I got lucky (if it is an appropriate word to say) that I heard Akmal Ikramov saying his last words, which I remembered forever not only in my mind but also by my heart. I can recall them at any time. He was standing upright, with his head raised proudly, speaking calmly without any nervousness. He was not asking for anything. He only said, ‘Many mistakes and blunders I have made, but I have never been an enemy to the people, party and comrade Stalin. I have done my best in order to implement the strategic policies of the party. If I stay alive, at any job, at any place I will do my best and make all the efforts to prove and demonstrate my honesty and devotion to my homeland.’
Then he sat down. The other defendants were given about 15-20 minutes or so to speak out. Bukharin’s speech was particularly intense and well-reasoned. Faizulla Khodjaev’s speech was convincing too. Perhaps the shortest, brightest and the most memorable speech was delivered by Akmal Ikramov, in my opinion at least.
During a break we went home. Having heard all the defendants, the judges left the courtroom to discuss and make decisions. The next day we found out from newspapers that on March 13th at 4.30 in the morning there was the last court session when Ulrikh announced the following verdict: 17 people, including Bukharin, Rikov, Ikramov, and Khodjaev, were sentenced to capital punishment and the three others were sentenced to different terms of imprisonment. The following day on March 15th the verdict was carried into effect.
I was 21 years old and I could understand something in life and politics. Therefore, I could not grasp and put together my thoughts, reflecting that the leading figures, maybe having made mistakes at work or in some statements, actually had taken care of their people, had striven to improve the well-being of people. Despite this, they were announced as public enemies, nationalists, traitors who tried to separate Uzbekistan from the USSR and build a bourgeois government. And now they were executed by shooting…
After returning to Tashkent I could not fully understand and explain to myself how local people who were applauding their leaders not so long ago, who proposed toasts to them in their honor, now welcomed and were delighted (maybe they were not quite sincere?) with their death penalties for being traitors and public enemies.
On the following day after my returning I asked my father to take me to see Abdulla Kodiri. As we had agreed before I was supposed to report him about my study and experience in realizing his advice. Bitterly my father answered, ‘He was shot too as a public enemy, nationalist eulogizing feudalism and opposing the Soviet Power in his works.’
Those episodes, especially the court trials over the so-called ‘public enemies’ which I witnessed became a dramatic life experience for me. I grasped gradually reflecting over those events that I might have got education in order to look into them, to comprehend their meaning and how they could happen. Since then, yearning to expose the truth has become one of the most important intentions and actions for me.
After graduating from university, I came back to Tashkent and in 1938 I was sent to work in the town of Bukhara. There I was appointed as the deputy chief of the human resources department in the provincial consumers’ association and the head of the training center. Soon the provincial young communist league conference took place there. The conference was held in the two languages and I was asked to interpret speeches. I had to go up to the stage as many times as the speakers delivered their speeches, interpreting from Uzbek into Russian and vice versa.
At the conference I was elected as the chairman of the auditing committee of the provincial young communist league organization and as a delegate to the congress of the young communist league of Uzbekistan. The conference was managed by Khalil Turdiev who was the first secretary of the provincial committee of the communist party and later became a major party figure.
Upon arrival in Tashkent at the congress I first saw Usman Usupov who was elected as the first secretary of the central committee of the communist party of Uzbekistan instead of Akmal Ikramov. Usman Usupov talked to the delegates from the provinces. When he met the delegates from Bukhara, he asked them and me some questioned. Later he played an important role in my destiny.
I got an approval to stay in Tashkent for ten days in order to get married. I studied in the same school with Mukarram (my future wife) but in different classes (she is three years younger than me) and we got acquainted participating in different school activities and contests. Our parents knew each other. So, we got married. According to the national tradition on the following day after the wedding party, the young fiancée, in a feting atmosphere neatly dressed with the face covered with a nice veil, accompanied by the elderly relatives, comes out to the yard and silently bows to the father-in-law. He comes up to her and kisses her forehead, greets and wishes happiness and wellbeing, then he presents her a souvenir. After that the mother-in-law greets, bows and gives a present to the fiancée. Further the same ritual is repeated in relation to the other relatives, intimates and guests. On the same day the bridegroom gives a small party to his close friends, making a picnic he cooks pilau (a national dish of rice and meat). So, there were eight of us who went to a chayhona (a small outdoor café) to have a picnic on the bank of the Damirika river where we settled by the water. My friend Kasim, a potter’s (called Siddik) son brought us musallas (home-made wine). We drank it with pleasure. After I had closed the cauldron with a cover, it took about 20 minutes for the dish to be ready. Then I joined my friends. The huge guy, called Shamsi, who used to be a ringleader in games and fights, took out from beneath a floor blanket two bottles of vodka and poured me and the others. I refused to drink it but they persuaded me reminding that it was my party. They asked me to say a toast. That was my first time I tasted vodka.
My friends brought me home and then left. I entered the yard staggering, with my head down. There were still many guests. Seeing me, my mother was stunned; she held my hand and walked aside. My father came up and bitterly, painfully looked at me; he did not utter a word. My elder sister took me to my bedroom; she got me in bed, gave me a cup of strong tea and sat down beside me waiting till I fell asleep. Only the next day I came to consciousness.
Eight days later I left my wife with my parents and went to Bukhara. We met each other again after four years and only for one day.
I told about my first experience of tasting vodka. However, the worst happened to me when I first tried to smoke. When I was seven years old, my parents arranged a circumcision ceremony according to the national tradition. In the morning, the guests started gathering. I was dressed in a new traditional oriental robe, wearing a skullcap and boots. Everybody was standing on their feet, folding their arms on their chests and looking at the door. Eventually, Bobokhan, who was the great Ishan (Muslim leader) and the Chief Mufti of all the Muslims in Central Asia, accompanied by my grandfather came in the yard; all together we greeted him. He sat down on the place of honor and started saying prayers. All the guests, holding their breath, were listening to him reading the surahs (the chapters) from the Koran (the Islamic holy book), telling about the requirements of the shariah (Islamic canonical law). In the end he congratulated my parents and wished everyone wellbeing. I was standing next to him. He cordially embraced me, kissed my forehead and blessed me.
In the afternoon, the famous singer Mulla Tuichi Khafiz arrived with his pupils. He was singing songs in the oriental style, written on the verses by Navoi, Khafiz, Saadi and the other genius Central Asian poets.
When pilau (the national dish of rice and meat) was served to the guests, the three guys, who were my neighbors, took me away to another room. They were joking, laughing and telling me funny stories. Then they wrapped low grade tobacco in thin paper and started smoking. They offered me too but I refused. However, they persuaded me saying that I was an adult already and, of course, should try. At last they forced me to smoke it. I inhaled. Instantly everything seemed to be vague before my eyes. Then I did not remember anything. When I came to myself I found myself lying in a clean, nice bed. But I had a splitting headache; I felt giddy and sick. It was then after my wedding party that I swore I would never smoke tobacco and drink vodka again…
II
WORLD WAR II: UP TO THE VOLGA RIVER– AND BACK
In the summer of 1939 in Bukhara, K. Turdiev invited a few comsomol (the young communist league) activists, told us about the current international situation and the events occurring on the Soviet borders which had to be fortified. He also emphasized that political-educational work should be intensified in the army. In this connection he got a directive from the central committee saying that he had to send several young activists – volunteers to the army for the comsomol work. The six of us applied for it immediately. Three days later we arrived in Ukraine by train with some transfers. There Tursunov and I were accepted to the political activist school in the Kiev special military district. In September of 1939, Hitler’s army invaded Poland. On September 17th the armies of the Kiev and Belarus districts entered Western Ukraine and Western Belarus which were eventually united with the Ukraine and Belarus Soviet Socialist Republics.
Our separate pontoon bridge battalion, whose commander was major Nasonov, commissioner was Freedman, secretary of the party committee was Tolochko, and comsomol organizer was me, settled in the town of Berezhan. Actually, all the events happened quite peacefully. We, the army political activists, were expected to assist local people and activists in establishing their government and public authorities. After meeting with the most active youth, we held the constituent assembly where the municipal comsomol committee (MCC) was formed. Being a military person, I was elected as a member of the MCC bureau. On June 21st, 1941 in the town of Khotine where our separate regiment, which had been formed on the previous day by uniting three battalions, was stationed, the meeting of the regiment’s comsomol committee bureau took place in the late evening. Having come back to my apartment, I went to bed. All of a sudden I woke up because of my landlady’s screams, ‘Officer, we are under fire! It is war!’
I rushed to the window and quite clearly saw crosses on fuselages of the aircrafts that were directly laying fire. While I was dressing, the phone started ringing. I picked up a phone receiver and heard an orderly officer saying, ‘You have an order to come immediately to the headquarters. We are sending two soldiers to accompany you.’
In the headquarters Nasonov addressed us with the words, ‘Comrade officers, Hitler has perfidiously infringed the agreement by attacking our homeland. All that is going on now is perhaps the beginning of the war.’
He came up to the safe, pulled out an envelope, read it silently and put it back. Right away we started allocating responsibilities: who and where must be and what to do. To conclude he said, ‘Right now special order № 1 is being put together regarding launching military operations. You are to be familiarized with it.’
I came to the bank of the Prut River. Scattered on the ground there were bodies of the dead people; the wounded people were groaning; the pontoon bridge was smashed into smithereens with bombs; fascist aircrafts were firing continuously. The remaining alive soldiers were trying to take shelter wherever it was possible.
That was how the war started for us at 4 o’clock in the early morning on June 22nd in 1941 near the river to the opposite bank of which the fascists were coming closer, taking up a position.
After terrible losses, without any reserves and any hopes for backing up and reinforcement, our regiment being in combat, having lost equipment, having buried corpses of dead people in a hurry and evacuated wounded people when it was possible, started withdrawing. Some soldiers were armed with rifles, the others - with guns or just knives, or even spades.
On our way back, we were being chased by fascist airplanes, which in low-flying attacks were firing at people. There were on the ground scattered corpses of old people, women, and children; their houses were burned to the ground. The enemy airplanes were literally chasing our soldiers and officers on the roads and in the woods. Thus, having split into small groups, some of us on their own, having buried friends and companions on the way, feeling really hungry, exhausted, without any ammunition, equipment and vehicles, we, under the command of General Galanin within the army commanded by General Malinovskiy, eventually reached the bank of the Volga River, which was the long-awaited desirable destination on our way.
Our regiment was stationed in Kalach in the outskirts of Stalingrad where later the severest tank battle took place. There some new units were formed from the remaining soldiers and officers. Soon our regiment was reinforced by crews, pontoon equipment, transport, ammunition, and it became combat-ready for any military actions again. We got an order to defend the water line and fight up to the last ditch; we had to let only our retreating soldiers pass over the river to Stalingrad city, without allowing the fascist army to cross the river.
It is well known that waterways in all wars are very important objectives; and the armies at war rush to capture them with might and main. Sometimes it happens that there is only a river between two fighting armies. So, military pontoniers’ job is assembling and dismantling bridges, and they often have to do this under continuous fire by enemies shooting with various weapons from land and air with the only purpose to prevent them from doing their job. Indeed, they have to come up to the bank first, often being under heavy fire, then to assemble the bridge and staying on it to let military units pass to the enemy’s bank; afterwards they have to dismantle the bridge and load it up on a vehicle to move on. That was what our regiment did.
Thousands of books about World War II in different genres and numerous memoirs have been written; many-volume scientific researches have been carried out and a lot of movies have been made. For that reason, I am not going to write about the war in general (besides, a few of my articles and essays have already been published by the republic publishing house). I just want to share some of my thoughts over it with my readers.
Near Stalingrad city 22 German divisions of 310 thousand people, including 2.5 thousand officers, 24 generals and field marshal Friedrich Paulus, were surrounded and captured; only 40 thousand soldiers returned to Germany. Admittedly, not only the crucial turn in the war was the Stalingrad battle, but it was also the turn in the Germans’ minds, who realized that the Soviet Army could really free their homeland and not it only; there was also the turning point in the Soviet people’s minds, who were inspired with their victory which became true due to their endeavor and bravery, including our regiment’s pontoniers’ as well.
On February 6th in 1942 in a basement of a building in Stalingrad city, our regiment party meeting was held. After discussion of the commander’s report on the tactical situation and tasks, my application for being a member of the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks (AUCP(b)) was considered and unanimously approved after a short question-and-answer session. Going out of the building I met three officers at the exit, who were the friends of mine. From the bottom of their hearts they congratulated me saying, ’Nuritdin, let’s celebrate it.’
I was delighted to invite them to my apartment. On our way all of a sudden, we heard a deafening crash after which I did not remember anything.
When I came to myself, I found myself lying in the back of a truck; next to me there was someone groaning. I started checking my body to be sure that I was okay. I turned my head, moved my hands and the right leg. When the turn came to my left leg, I tried to move it a little and felt a terrible pain, and I moaned. Someone bent over me saying, ‘Calm down! You are alive.’
Next to me there was Sergey who lost his sight, and farther there were dead Sasha and Vasiliy. I recognized the person who talked to me; it was sergeant Shirokov. The temperature outdoor was minus thirty degrees Celsius; it was snowing a little and the piercing wind was blowing. I asked to lift my head slightly and saw that my pants on the left leg and the outskirts of my military overcoat were covered with frozen blood. I could not move my left leg.
‘Where are we?’
‘We are going to the field hospital.’
Wintry bad conditions of roads, bomb and shell holes caused shaking and jolts on the road; every bump brought about a sharp acute pain in my injured leg and head. At last we reached the destination. The truck side board was pulled down; a few people in white medical coats came up to it; four of them were carrying stretchers. A tall man in a white medical coat wearing an officer calpac on his head examined the brought injured people and said, ‘Take away the corpses to the morgue, the blind guy - to the ward and this guy (pointing out to me) - to the surgery room.’
I was brought in and laid on the floor, at that moment I lost consciousness again. When I woke up, I found myself among about ten people or so: some of them were groaning, the others were swearing, but all of them were obviously suffering. I asked one of the two nurses for a drug, ‘Can you give me a painkiller, please? It is so painful!’
An elderly woman answered, ‘No, honey. Be patient! You are lucky that you are still alive. Have some boiled water instead.’
I drank it. Finally, I was put on the surgery table, my clothes were cut with scissors and taken off, then I was covered with a white sheet, my wound was cleaned off the blood. I saw a tired-looking man sitting nearby the stove, wearing an astrakhan hat (a military cap made of sheep wool) on his head and I heard, ‘Comrade Major, the wounded are ready.’
He stood up quietly and started examining us: one by one. When he came up to me and touched my wound, I felt an acute pain. I tried to be patient as long as I could until I fainted.
‘We’ll cut his leg off,’ he said touching my leg on the site to be operated on.
Then he came up to the stove again. The surgery instruments were prepared and it was reported to the Major about it. He came up to me and said looking at me, ‘For this young fellow the war is over.’
Then added, ‘So many people live with this and they live long too. So, let’s cut it off. You’ll have to be patient.’
What could I say? Should I argue with him? An instant thought occurred to me: I shouldn’t let him do that. I immediately imagined a scene with myself coming home, walking on crutches; my mother was hugging and backing me up; I saw tears on my father’s face…
I wondered how Mukarram (my wife), my brothers and sisters would accept it. But could I object to it? Should I agree with it? The other assisting surgeon told him, ‘Doctor, I am ready.’
He put on his medical gloves, came up to me and said, ‘Well, let’s begin. Have you ever had anesthesia before?’ he asked me.
‘No, I haven’t,’ I said.
‘We’ve got it a little, so we are short of it. You’ll have to sustain the pain. Be strong and manly.’
In an instant, he looked closely at me and questioned,
‘You are a lecturer, aren’t you? Two weeks ago, you delivered a lecture on the international situation and convinced us that we would definitely beat the enemy, didn’t you?’
I could not utter a word and instead I just nodded.
‘What is your nationality? Are you Uzbek?’
‘Yes, I am.’
To which he turned to his colleagues and said, ‘Have you heard his lectures? What wonderful people are the Uzbeks! Here are our medical coats, sheets, bandages and wadding: all these are made of cotton they grow. It’s always sunny there and there is a lot of fruit there. What a beautiful country!’
Everybody smiled and I gained some strength and fortitude from those warm words about my countrymen and motherland. At last he changed his mind, saying, ‘No, we definitely won’t cut your leg off! Being a lecturer, a propagandist you will have to walk and drive to workers and collective farmers. Nevertheless, I’m going to hurt you. So, you will have to tolerate and withstand the pain, my dear lecturer.’
The art of surgery is amazing. With his sensitive fingers he found, palpated splintered bones and took out small bone fragments. I had three fractures on the left leg on both shinbones. After a long painful surgery, I had my operated leg bandaged, with a splint put on the fractures.
‘Well, we’ve done our best. From now on you will live on with your both legs! Look, your surname seems to be very long and difficult to remember and to pronounce.’
‘Yes, it is Mukhitdinov.’
‘Are all Uzbek surnames so complicated?’
‘Most of them are.’
‘Do you know my surname?’
‘No, I don’t.’
‘Do you like fish?’
‘Yes, I do.’
‘Well, my surname sounds like a fish called ‘carp’, so my surname is Carpenko.’
With those words he left me and I fell asleep. I do not remember how long I was sleeping but I think it was quite long. When I woke up, a nurse in a white coat came up to me, asking, ‘How are you are?’
‘Much better, thanks.’
‘When you recover, you will be able even to dance.’
The next day the doctor came up to me and greeted trying to pronounce my surname, ‘Hello, M…Mu…’
‘Mukhitdinov,’ I prompted him.
‘How are you?’
‘Thank you very much, doctor, for saving my leg!'
‘You are going to be sent to the rear hospital wherein you are going to be under the care of surgeons. There you will learn how to walk with crutches, after which you will be able to walk by yourself.’
‘Are you from Uzbekistan too?’ I wondered.
‘No, I’m not. I’m a medical doctor, have a PhD in medicine, used to live, teach students and operated on patients in Kiev, Ukraine. That is why now I’m a military doctor. When Germans attacked, I went to the front, but my family, including my mother and my wife were evacuated to Central Asia. I tried to find them, received their address there and wrote them. However, I haven’t received a reply from them yet.’
‘Where are they now? Are they in Tashkent?’
‘No, they aren’t. They are in a different city whose name starts with letter K.’
I listed the towns and cities in Uzbekistan by their names.
‘Is it Kokand?’
‘No, it isn’t.’
‘Maybe it’s Kagan?’
‘No, it isn’t.’
‘Kasan or Karshi?’
‘Yeah, you are right. It’s Karshi city!’
I told him that this city was the district center and promised to find out about his family and let him know about them. He thanked me and said, ‘I am sure they won’t be lost; Uzbeks will take care of them.’
I sincerely thanked the doctor. Since then we have never seen each other again. In a day, a few wounded people including me were sent to Tbilisi city to a military hospital. Approximately a week later in hospital the doctor told me that my friends from Stalingrad had arrived to visit me. They were the deputy head of the political department, the secretary of the party committee and two friends. They congratulated me with my recovery and handed me a party membership card. I asked them about the surgeon, Major Carpenko, and the other doctors and nurses. They became gloomy, saying, ‘They all were killed during bombing; the hospital was destroyed too.’
Such news was hard to accept. Having recovered I was discharged from hospital. However, returning to my job with such a leg was considered unreasonable. I refused to be discharged from the army in such a difficult period of the war. It was decided to re-train me. I was sent by the personnel department to Tomsk city to the Military Academy named after Budyonniy, which was redeployed there from Leningrad city. I was accepted to the training course for a specialist in radio technical communication components application on the forefront.
Fortunately, the train was delayed for a day in Tashkent city. I took the opportunity and hurried to visit my family and relatives. I came home at night. I was knocking at the door for a long time until someone requested, ‘Who is there?’
I said loudly, ‘Will you open the door, please?’
My mother recognized my voice and rushed to open the door. My mother, father and wife Mukarram cried with joy hugging me.
A short spell of my staying at home was unforgettable. According to the Uzbek custom, when a respectable man comes home after a long absence, all neighbors and relatives cook pilau and bring it in to the comer in the cauldron without opening. It sometimes happens that one family gets a few cauldrons of pilau. The comer must be the first to taste the dish from each cauldron. It used to be so in the past, but at that time my mother could only give some slices of brown bread, two or three loaves of corn bread and some dried fruits. All the relatives and neighbors brought in the similar food.
My family used to get my monthly officer’s salary, due to which they could afford themselves only a few loaves of brown bread. Because there was neither rice, nor meat, nor carrots and nor spices at home, my mother made pilau of some potatoes, onions, and bread. That is why that dish was called ‘nonpilau’ (‘non’ in Uzbek means bread). All of us ate it with a great gusto. The life became different from what it used to be, but that dish still remained very special for us. Besides, it was easy for any family member to cook it.
On that day a few dozens of guests, mostly old men and children, visited us. I did not see my peers except for a couple of two invalid guys: one of them was without legs, the other was without an eye. In our neighborhood there was only one big guy, who either because of the sickness or for some other reason did not go to the war and stayed at home. That man also came. But among old men, women and children he looked like a black sheep in the herd and the old visitors, particularly, those whose sons were sent to the forefront, were looking at him with reproach. I was very upset when I knew that my brother-in law, my Mehri sister’s husband, had been killed at the war. Mukarram’s two out of four brothers, my cousin Khakim and my two schoolmates were also killed at the war. My father, being a chairman of the neighborhood committee, told how many packages with clothes, shoes, dried fruits and veggies had already been sent to the forefront and how much money had been donated to the Defense Fund by every family.
But I was really impressed by my compatriots’ enthusiasm. In our neighborhood there was neither radio, nor was there electricity yet. Nevertheless, those old people, most of whom were semi-literate, were still aware of the nation interests and current war events at the forefront remembering commanders’ names and the names of the cities liberated by the Soviet army.
The people had only one dream: to beat the enemy army.
It should be emphasized that people fighting on the forefront and those ones supporting in the rear together made a single whole, which meant that the war was nationwide indeed. I would like to say a couple of words about the Uzbeks’ internationalism.
All the local people know about a noble deed of the Tashkent blacksmith Shoakhmed and his wife Bakhri, who adopted 16 kids of different nationalities and brought them up. Khamid Samatov from Kattakurgan lost his leg in the war. After returning from the war as a handicapped person, he with his mother Mangitopa adopted 13 kids of different nationalities. They brought up Uzbek Mirali, Russian Ivan, Tatar Kasim, Armenian Arslan, Belorus Jenya, Jew Liza, and the others. During the stern war years Uzbekistan gave shelter to over two hundred thousand evacuees.
I am going to tell further how Uzbekistan became a powerful arsenal of warlike equipment and ammunition during the war. Another proof of internationalism and international friendship was assistance rendered by Uzbekistan to local people staying on the liberated areas in their destroyed national economy restoration. About 2 thousand tractors and cars, hundreds of repaired locomotives, around 40 thousand freight trains, and nearly 3.5 thousand passenger trains were sent to the Ukraine Republic, to the Krasnodar and Stavropol regions. Collective and state farms gave to Ukraine 8 thousand horses and oxen, 170 thousand sheep and goats.
Many years later after the war thousands of people from the bottom of their hearts told and wrote: Uzbek people were like brothers, as if they were our close relatives, opened their doors to help and shelter millions of women, children and old people, who had had to leave their homes temporarily during the stern war years. All these things can be never forgotten…
After finishing training courses, I got an assignment to work in the field of radio reconnaissance. We were engaged in interception of conversations, cryptograms, direction finding of enemy airplanes and ships. I was appointed a deputy head of the task force of the special mission unit, which was stationed abroad. Later I became the head of that department. On May 8th, 1945 there were unusual activities on the air. The whole world was waiting for the most important news. That day in the evening I got an urgent notification of the forthcoming welcome news. On May 9th at night, people were not sleeping, even those who worked day shifts or had in the early morning to start their exhausting work. At 23:30 I also sat down next to a radio-set (our department had the cutting-edge radio technical communication components of that time). I tuned it up to the Moscow wave. After a while I clearly heard: ‘Attention! Attention! Moscow is speaking! The important message is to be broadcast soon.’ And it was repeated every one or two minutes. At 02:15 in the early morning on May 9th, Yuriy Levitan, with his unique solemn voice, radiobroadcast all over the world that the Act on unconditional surrender of Germany had been signed in Berlin. Then he announced that May 9th would be the official date of the Victory Day. Immediately it became unimaginably noisy in the information center building where it was usually quiet. Having taken off my headphones and turned off the radio-set, I turned back and saw everyone standing up, kissing each other and crying joyfully, ‘Victory!’ They started tossing up the political instructor and me. At 4 o’clock in the early morning everyone except those who were in charge of the devices came into the dining hall. On the tables there were sandwiches, dried fruit, canned food and everyone got a double front portion of dilute alcohol.
Afterwards many years later, I used to attend many official welcome parties given by kings, presidents, prime ministers, military leaders, political and religious figures and other outstanding people, listening to their toasts and raising toasts to them by myself. But I will never forget the feeling of enormous emotional rise and the greatest pleasure of being among the soldiers and officers, sitting at a frugal table in the military barrack at that time.
III
THESE DAYS OF THE INFINITE SPRING
My return to a peaceful labor happened in the following way. After the triumphal end of the war some officers were given short-term vacations for 7-10 days. So was I, and I arrived in Tashkent city. Literally the next day my childhood friend, called Yakub Aliyev, visited me to congratulate me with homecoming and said that he had just been appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Wearing a karakul papakha (a tall astrakhan hat), covert diplomatic overcoat with golden shoulder straps, buttons and cuffs, his white shirt, blue with dark polka-dot fabric tie and box calf boots, he looked really impressive, surrounded by kids. Of course, my military officer uniform was incomparable with his.
We hugged, kissed each other and sat down at the table. After having meal, he said, ‘Tomorrow I will take you to Usman Yusupovich. We will talk to him and ask to appoint you my deputy.’
We all went outside to see him off. He got in a bright black car and drove away; and the kids were running behind it for a while.
The following day he sent a car for me. In my presence he phoned up Yusupov and hanging up the phone said, ‘Let’s go.’
At first, we came to the secretary of the Central Committee on propaganda, M.G. Vakhabov, then we, the three of us, came to comrade Usman. He looked at me and said, ‘Have we ever met before?’
I said, ‘Yes, we have.’
I reminded him the comsomol congress held in 1939. Further he told us about the situation in the republic. Then he asked me about the military life and my personal life background. He told me that recently he had sent a letter to comrade Stalin and requested to demobilize 15 officers from Uzbekistan to let them participate in the party and management work in the republic, the list of whom was attached to the letter.
He added, ‘However, you were not included in the list. Our request was accepted and they are returning home. Now you must tell us your personal details, where you are serving at the moment.’
Then he told comrade Vakhabov, ‘Will you write down his army regiment, his commander’s full name and prepare a letter with a request to demobilize and send him to work for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (CC CPUz)?’
Thereupon we bade farewell and he added, ‘You must see me as soon as you return.’
Two months elapsed. I was interviewed in the political department; they were informed of me by the letter. I accepted the proposal and after a few days I was given a package with a copy of the reply addressed to Yusupov, Tashkent city, about meeting his request and assignment of N.A. Mukhitdinov for a job in the CC CPUz. A good reference letter and the order were enclosed.
At the beginning of 1946 I arrived in the republic. Aliyev heard about it and visited me warning,
‘Stay at home, please.’
The next day he came again, and we together went to the CC. We, the three of us with Vakhabov again, visited Usman Yusupov. He congratulated me with homecoming and confirmed that he had received the reference letter and the order and thanked me for honest military service saying, ‘I enjoyed reading reference letter about you. Where would you like to work?’
I answered, ‘Where you will find reasonable for me to work.’
Turning to the others he asked, ‘Where do you, guys, think it will be reasonable to get him work?’
To which Aliyev said, ‘I am requesting you to appoint him my deputy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.’
Mavlyan Gafarovich objected saying, ‘He’d better work in the CC.’
Then Usman Yusupov decided summarizing, ‘You left Uzbekistan long time ago to study, then to participate in the war. A lot of changes have occurred and new people have arrived since then. So, you’d better work as a CC lecturer at first; you should visit different regions, towns and cities to look into the current situation. Afterwards you will work on your own.’
He called his assistant V.I. Popov saying, ‘Prepare the resolution on Mukhitdinov’s appointment as a CC CPUz lecturer.’
He glanced at me and said, ‘Is it Okay?’
I gave a short military answer, ‘Yes, sir.’
He added, ‘You need to have a rest for a few days and then start working.’
Then I asked him, ‘May I go to Karshi on the day after tomorrow?’
‘Why are you in hurry and why Karshi city?’
I told him a story about surgeon Carpenko and his family, which had been evacuated to our land and added, ‘I would like to visit them.’
After listening to me carefully Usman Yusupovich uttered only one word, ‘Great.’
He immediately contacted the Kashkadarya regional committee party and told its first secretary N.M. Mangutov, ‘The CC lecturer (telling him my full name) is going to you. You should take utmost benefit from his visit. Also, he has a personal issue concerning his front friend, who was killed at war and whose family was evacuated to your place from Kiev, Ukraine.’
I arrived in Karshi and was met by the regional committee workers. We put together the plan of my lectures and speeches to be delivered in the regional center and different areas. Then I asked them to help me meet Carpenko’s family, the first thing to be done. I told his story in detail and they were found on the same day. They were staying on the factory territory. His mother, Maria Nikolayevna, was working as a bookkeeper there; his wife, Natasha, was a nurse.
It was an exceptionally stirring meeting. It turned out that they repeatedly addressed their requests to the competent authorities. However, they failed to find out anything about him. I told them the harsh truth about his death. Together we grieved for him.
On the next day some party officials and senior executives gathered together and I gave a lecture on the international situation. I started with telling the story about Carpenko and how he had saved my life. I also told about his death and his family in Karshi city. The story made an impression on the listeners.
On the following day the secretary of the regional committee on propaganda and I went to the Kitab area. On our way back, we visited Carpenko’s family to give them a present of two pieces of wonderful satins. When I entered the yard, I saw some people placing a cauldron, bringing in dishes and some fruit, cutting a sheep. The chairman of the city executive committee was arranging that party.
‘What’s going on?’ I wondered.
‘We decided to make a funeral repast this evening to commemorate comrade Carpenko. Now we are preparing.’
I handed in my gifts. In the evening a few hundred people, including a group of activists with their leaders, the first secretary of the regional committee and the chairman of the regional executive committee, came. There were five of us, including the first secretary of the city party committee and the chairman of the city executive committee, who were welcoming the guests. Every visitor came up to the Ukrainian women, condoled with them and handed them souvenirs. The reception was unforgettable and the food was great. Carpenko’s mother and wife were surprised at having such attention and goodness, which a little bit eased a touch of bitterness of their loss. I invited them to my house in Tashkent city. They thanked everyone and said that they were in a hurry to go back home to Kiev city. They were provided with all necessities for the trip and living for a while; and an employee of the maintenance department of the regional executive committee was assigned to accompany them in order to arrange their accommodation and boarding. A few people saw them off at the railway station. Afterwards we kept in touch by regular writing letters. Three years later I got a letter from Natasha. At that time, I worked in Namangan. She informed me that Maria Nikolayevna had passed away, and she had got married and moved to her husband’s place to Kremenchug city. She promised to give her new postal address and expressed a desire to visit sometime Uzbekistan and invited me and my family to visit her in Ukraine. Unfortunately, that was her last letter.
I worked for a few months as the CC lecturer. While working there, I visited Kara-kalpak, Khorezm, Bukhara, and Fergana valley. One day, Vakhabov invited me and said, ‘Let’s go to see Yusupov.’
When we entered his room, Usman Yusupov said to me, ‘Now you have familiarized yourself with the current situation in the republic, have visited the regions and talked to the activists. We want to recommend you to work as a secretary on propaganda in the Namangan regional party committee. What do you think?’
I said, ‘I am ready, of course.’
‘Then you must go to Moscow where you will be interviewed by the CC AUCP(b) executives.’
On the train I got acquainted with Valentina Ivanovna Pavlova and her husband Konstantin Stepanovich Safonov with whom I shared the same compartment. They were amazing people. Safonov was the former adviser to Sergo Ordjinikidze. He used to be a director of the Moscow electric cable manufacturing plant for a long time. He was an outstanding engineer, a well-educated person and a skillful production manager. During the war the plant with its workers was evacuated to Tashkent city. For the shortest spell of time they managed to mount the equipment, to settle the workers and launch production to meet military and nation-wide demand and needs.
We were talking from the early morning till the late night and I found out many interesting useful things. His wife Valentina was a teacher of the Russian literature and language. Since then we have made close friends. Though Konstantin Stepanovich passed away when I worked in Syria, I have been still on friendly terms with his wife Valentina Ivanovna, have always kept in touch with her. She was a director of a technical secondary school, deputy minister of the Public Education Ministry and the head of the department of the Ministers Council. Moreover, when I made speeches in Russian or Uzbek without any notes at major forums or conferences, which she always attended, she attentively listened to my speeches and then in private she pointed out and corrected stylistic mistakes I had made. I remembered her remarks for ever. I still consider her as one of my favorite teachers I’ve ever had in my life.
Upon arrival in Moscow I went to Old Square and for the first time I entered the building of the CC CP. I was interviewed by some department employees, from instructors to departmental heads, of whom M.A. Suslov was the last to interview me. We were talking for about an hour or so. At the end of the talk he wished me good luck and we bade farewell.
When I arrived in Tashkent, they told me that I got a permission from the CC for a job and I could move to Namangan. I was received by the first secretary of the Regional Committee, Arif Alimov. I introduced myself to him and he shortly answered, ‘I know.’
Frankly speaking, I felt that my appearance – I was wearing a military tunic (of course, without any shoulder straps, orders or medals), riding breeches, high boots, a leather overcoat and a military cap – did not make a good impression on him at all. Nevertheless, he called the head of the department and told him to provide me with a room. At the next plenum of the regional party committee I was appointed a secretary on propaganda.
In 1947, after being promoted to a different position, A. Alimov left his post of the first secretary of the Regional Party Committee. So, he left Namangan city with his family. And I was summoned to Tashkent city. P. Katishev, the head of the CC personnel department, received me. Talking warmly and treating me well, he offered a cup of tea; then he told me about himself and the CC’s work with its personnel. I was pleased with his goodwill and attentive treatment towards me. On the phone he told someone that I was in his room. Hanging up the phone he said that at three o’clock in the afternoon we were going to Yusupov.
We came on time. There were all the bureau members in the room. It was obviously the meeting of the CC Bureau. Talking to the participants and pointing out at me, Usman Yusupov said, ‘Here he is.’
Then he told me, ‘We would like to recommend you for a position of the first secretary of the Namangan Regional Party Committee.’
To which I replied, ‘I’ve been working there for a short time and been short of time to look into the situation there. Besides, I haven’t got a party work experience of such a scale yet.’
He answered, ‘We know and take it into consideration. But you have started working properly and the personnel have trusted you. We rely on your young age, energy, and initiative.’
Then he asked the others, ‘Well, comrades, do you think we should recommend him?’
And I heard the voices of approval from all sides, ‘Yes.’
‘So, you will have to fly to Moscow again. You are to be interviewed by CC secretaries. We have already talked with Malenkov. So, you are to be received.’
At the airport I was met by an instructor from the CC management office who accommodated me in the hotel ‘Moscow’. For two days I was interviewed in some departments by a few secretaries the last of whom was Malenkov. We were talking for a long time. He was more interested in the current situation in the republic than in my life background. I told him in detail, particularly, about the things I had seen in the regions including Namangan. Suddenly he interrupted me saying, ‘I am in a hurry, I’ve got some urgent matters. We will continue tomorrow, the first thing in the morning to be done.’
On the next morning we went on talking in the same way. Evidently Malenkov wanted to comprehensively know about Central Asia where he had never been yet. I gave him answers as complete as possible. Then he said, ‘We are going to approve of your candidacy. Do not let me down. If you have any serious problems, let me know.’
And we bade farewell.
Upon arrival in Tashkent, N.A. Lomakin, the CC second secretary, told me, ‘The CC AUCP(b) has approved your candidacy. You must go to Namangan and arrange the plenum there as soon as possible to discuss and decide on the matter. We have already informed Streltsov, the second secretary. Comrade Yusupov is sick now. We will tell him your regards and inform him of your departure to Namangan. The CC representatives will attend the plenum to introduce you.’
In Namangan, the bureau members agreed to hold the plenum in four days, with only one organizational point on the agenda. Streltsov was approved to be a speaker. All the members and probationer members of the regional and auditing committees, the municipal and regional committee secretaries and other party executives were informed. All the participants were involved in the plenum arrangement. Everyone knew that Mukhitdinov was recommended for a position of the first secretary of the Regional Committee.
A day before the plenum started when all participants were arriving, Streltsov came in my office. He looked worried and suddenly said, ‘Kosinov has phoned me up and told to postpone the plenum. He informed that Usman Yusupovich is arriving from Andijan these days.’
We looked at each other puzzled, not understanding what was happening. The plenum was put off because we were waiting for Yusupov.
At the fixed time the regional committee secretaries and the chairman of the regional executive committee went to the Narynskiy region located on the border with the Andijan region. When the train stopped, we came up to the government coach. Yusupov stepped down from there, greeted everyone without shaking hands and invited Streltsov to get into his car. He was accompanied by the first secretary of the regional committee and the chairman of the regional executive committee. However, that time he only invited the second secretary. I got into the third car. We drove up to the regional committee. In the lobby, the head of the general department spoke to me, ‘You must go home and stay there. You will be called if it is necessary.’
‘What does it all mean?’
At 11 o’clock I got a phone call and heard, ‘All of them have already gone out and are getting into the cars. Usman Yusupovich is about to leave and we are going to see him off.’
When I came to the railway station, he was bidding farewell to the mates. He usually spent 2-3 days in the region, visited collective and state farms. That time he arrived by a train coach, met the bureau members (except me) and on the same day he left for Tashkent city. It was strange…
On the next day Streltsov got a call from Kosinov who told him that I was expected to arrive by the first flight in Tashkent city. What was going on? It was impossible to understand. Nobody said anything.
I arrived in Tashkent city by the morning flight. Nobody met me. I came to the CC, knocked at Kosinov’s office door but he wasn’t there. I looked in Katishev’s office. To my greetings he replied curtly,
‘How do you do? You must go to Usman Yusupovich’s reception room where you are being waited.’
I understood that something serious had happened. But what …? I went upstairs. In the reception room there were a receptionist Elena Romanovna Golubeva and a typist Maya. To my greetings Elena Romanovna calmly replied, ‘Will you take a seat, please? You will be invited.’
While I was sitting there, some people were coming in and out aridly, hardly greeting me. I was getting more and more worried. Finally, I asked Maya, ‘May I take a seat and wait in the next-door room where your typewriter is?’
She took me there. Anyway, I was sitting and waiting there for hours, feeling confused and anxious. I even did not feel hungry though I had not eaten anything since the previous day. In the late afternoon Elena Romanovna invited me, ‘Will you come in?’
I entered the room and saw the bureau members, departmental heads and some other people sitting there. Standing at the door I greeted them, ‘How do you do?’
In reply I caught just a few glances. Usman Yusupovich came up to me and poking his finger into my chest asked me abruptly, ‘Why did you lie to the party?!’
‘I didn’t lie to anybody.’ Being stunned I answered.
‘Why did you hide your social origin?’
‘I have never hidden it and I have always written the truth.’
He was staring at me, looking in my eyes for a long time while I was standing as if rooted to the spot. At last he took the envelope and gave it to me with the words, ‘Read it!’
It was two pages of the unproperly written, illiterate text. It said that my father and my grandfather were prominent clergymen, who actively propagandized the Islam religion, made people follow the Islam and the Koran canons. Allegedly that could be proved by their and other people’s names. I read it twice; holding it in my hands and staring at it I felt at a loss.
‘Well, what will you say now?’
I pulled myself together and firmly replied, ‘It’s a lie and a slander!’
He was standing silently, staring at me without losing contact with me.
I said, ‘I have only one request. Could you verify it, please?’
Yusupov silently walked in the room and turned around. Then Lomakin said, ‘Let’s check into it!’
‘What do you think?’ Usman Yusupovich addressed to the others.
I heard the voices of support, ‘That’s right. It must be verified and looked into.’
‘Well, then we must do the following: you, Vasiliy Andreevich (he spoke to Bylbas, the CC secretary on agriculture) will be the chairman of the commission. Its membership will include Vakhabov (the CC secretary on propaganda), Baskakov (the KGB chairman), Chikovani (the first secretary of the Tashkent municipal committee of the party), and the first secretary of the regional committee from the place where Mukhitdinov’s parents live. Go there, thoroughly check it out and talk to everyone who can provide any information about his family. Then you will report on the results at the bureau meeting.’
‘As for you’, he addressed me, ‘do not return to Namangan. Stay in Tashkent city for a while. You will be summoned. You may go for now.’
After leaving the CC building I didn’t go home though I really wanted to. I went to a hotel, got a single room and stayed there for three days. On the third day Kosinov phoned me up and told me to come to the municipal committee of the party at noon. When I entered the room, which was big and long, I saw Vasiliy Adnreevich and the other commission members sitting around a table. Vasiliy Adnreevich, being the chairman, said to me, ‘Take a seat here, Nuritdin Akramovich. Well, we have verified all the facts, talked to your parents, neighbors, activists, elders; we went to the mosques and district organizations to find something out. We have ascertained that your father and grandfather are not clergymen and do not propagandize religious canons. All these have been proved. Do you have any questions to us?’
I shrugged my shoulders. He continued, ‘Tomorrow we are going to report to the bureau. You read that letter. Do you know who could write it?’
‘I have no idea. I don’t recognize this handwriting.’
‘But we have found the author of this letter. Tell him to come in.’
All smiled.
A thin short elderly man entered the room and took a seat in the corner. Vasiliy Andreevich turned to him, ‘You, the elderly man, said that you had written it?’
‘Yes, I did.’
‘Do you know Nuritdin’s parents?’
‘Sure, I do. I used to visit them.’
‘Have you ever seen him in person?’
‘Yeah, I used to hold him in my hands when he was a child.’
‘Could you recognize him?’
‘Sure. It’s not a problem.’
‘Will you turn round, Nuritdin?’
I stood up and turned to face the corner where that old man was sitting and came up to him saying in Uzbek, ‘Good afternoon.’
He was so stunned that he did not know what to do. He got down from the chair and knelt before me saying, ‘Sonny, forgive me, please! They forced me to do that!’ And turning to the others, he added, ‘You all will witness that I’m guilty of slandering him. But I’m not a criminal. I’m an honest man!’
Vasiliy Andreevich asked him, ‘Can you tell us how this happened?’
And the old man told his story, ‘I am illiterate. I work as a sexton in the mosque. Besides, occasionally I render different paid services to local residents. Once two men came up to me; one of them was wearing a police uniform. He said, ‘We know that your son is in jail because he was sentenced to 10-year imprisonment for theft and sales of distribution cards during the war. Here is ten thousand rubles, take it. Nothing is required from you, just sign this paper.’ I asked them what that paper was about? And that man told me, ‘You know the Mukhitdinovs, don’t you? Their son, Nuritdin, made a crime being in the army. This is a report about his family. And you must sign it because you know them. Take the money and your son, a breadwinner, will be released earlier.’ We live in poverty, you know. So, I took the money, thanked them for my son and signed the paper they showed me.’
Vasiliy Andreevich asked, ‘Is that all?’
‘Yes, that is.’
I helped the old man to stand up. He stopped at the door and said with emotion, ‘Now Allah will punish me. Forgive me, please, sonny! If you forgive me, then Allah will have mercy too.’
With those words he left. All breathed a sigh of relief and smiled.
Vasiliy Andreevich said, ‘Let’s congratulate him!’
‘Okay,’ the others agreed.
‘We have surveyed over eighty people. Here are two full folders. Tomorrow we will continue.’
The municipal committee secretary, Chikovani, joked, ‘According to the Georgian tradition he should give a banquet.’
‘But now he is busy with other things. See him in Namangan.’
Then I said, ‘Vasiliy Andreevich, I am still staying in a hotel and haven’t seen my parents yet. May I go and see them?’
‘Yes, of course, you may. Sorry for disturbing you.’
So, I went home immediately.
On the following day I participated in the bureau meeting. It was decided that the plenum in Namangan would be arranged by Baskakov and Vakhabov. Also, they would introduce me on behalf of the CC.
The experience I had could not be erased from my memory in a moment. So, I said, ‘There is no need to hold the plenum.’
He surprisingly looked at me.
‘Do not recommend me,’ I continued.
To which he uttered, ‘Are you offended?’
I was silent.
‘On the contrary,’ Usman Yusupovich said, ‘this event is beneficial for you. All the facts have been studied, comprehensively verified. So now everybody is sure that you are not an enemy and you have proved to be an honest man, who was born to the decent family. From now on no one will have any doubts about your life background. You must go. We have reported to Malenkov, who is the CC AUCP(b), and he will probably inform Stalin about it. When we got a letter about you, we immediately reported to the Moscow administration. Yesterday we agreed with Malenkov that the decision on your appointment would be in force.’
I thanked him and went out.
I arrived in Namangan. The local bureau members were aware of the happening and met me at the airport. Upon arrival at the regional committee residence we had some tea and the mates told me about the things I did not know.
Apparently, Usman Yusupovich arrived unexpectedly by a train coach and acted so strangely, not inviting me who was a candidate for the party regional committee secretary to take part in the bureau meeting, and then left on the same day because he was planning to summon a plenum and tell everything about me. What’s more, he was going to suggest not only to prevent me from being recommended for a new position of the first secretary, but also to make me redundant from the post of the secretary on propaganda, then eventually to remove me from the party regional committee. He accused me of 'being a son of alien class elements and religious figures, of betraying the communist party.’
At the same time, he was supposed to introduce a new candidate for the position of the regional committee first secretary, whose candidacy had already been approved on the phone by the CC AUCP(b) leaders without his presence in Moscow because he had already been interviewed there for his previous post.
Undoubtedly, if Usman Yusupovich recommended someone, then the latter would definitely be elected for a position…
However, being in the first secretary’s office he told about the received information about me (in my absence) and about his own intentions, to which Streltsov replied, ‘Usman Yusupovich, we have been working together with Mukhitdinov for nearly half a year. He has made a good impression on me and has proved to be a well-educated principled business man. I am sure he is an honest person, who passed the hard war school and came back with dignity. We should not decide the destiny of the young party member on the spur of the moment.’
Zakirjon Sattarov, the chairman of the regional executive committee, gave flattering testimonial about me, emphasizing the way I treated people, my personal skills. He added, ‘We with him were managing eight thousand workers, who were building Farkhad hydroelectric power plant in Begovat town.’
A few more people spoke about me in the same vein.
Usman Yusupovich hesitated for a moment, then asked a few questions and after getting positive references he said, ‘Okay, I agree. It needs to be checked out.’
On the following day I received a phone call. I was told to fly to Tashkent where the investigation started. Later I found out that that event was plotted against me by the two people I have mentioned above. Although one of them was wearing a police uniform, they both were conspicuous workers in other spheres: one of them was among the other candidates for the same position in Namangan and the other one was one of my close acquaintances, who did his outmost to secretly do nasty things to me to prevent me from being promoted at work. So, they both united and got together because of their ambitions and envies. The old man who had written a deceitful letter about me got blind afterwards and I have never seen him again. Those two notorious guys got into trouble later and their careers went down. One of them is not alive and the other one, my peer, is still alive.
After working as the first secretary of the regional committee for about ten days, I suddenly got a phone call from Moscow. Malenkov’s personal assistant contacted me by phone and connected me with his boss. We greeted each other and he asked me, ‘How are you?’
‘I have started working.’
‘Congratulations! What is the situation there?’
I informed him.
‘Do not hesitate to contact me if need be, and when you arrive in Moscow, visit me.’
That was just a short story about one of the numerous slanders. If there had not been such convinced principled unbiased men as Streltsov, Sattarov, and the others, then I would have died morally, politically and maybe physically from the poison of those slanders.
It was one of the episodes related to me, but thousands of similar events happened to others. These were the results of clean-up operations and struggle for party and society purges from so-called ‘alien’ elements and bourgeois ideas influence, which were launched in the country after the victory in the late 1940s. They were aimed at consolidation of proletarian class outlook as well as the offensive, led directly by A.A. Zhdanov, against nationalism, religious vestiges, praising the feudal past in literature, science and fine arts, for the Marxism-Leninism ideology purity and for attracting intellectuals and all the people’s attention to the Soviet reality. I was faced up with all those things, even at a larger extent, a few years later when I worked for the CC CP of Uzbekistan.
In Namangan in 1948, I was elected for the first time as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and a year later I was awarded with the order of Lenin.
While working there I directly communicated with the union executives including the country top management members. Since they embodied the style and methods of party activities of that time and manifested how resolutely the party centralization policy was implemented, how seriously the Constitution was infringed and how badly the Soviet republics and regions' rights were breached - I am going to tell you about a few life episodes in order to illustrate all these.
In the highlands area of Pap there was a mine for uranium extraction from the subsoil. When the resource was depleted and exhausted, it was decided in Moscow to close down the mine and the processing plant. All the specialists and equipment had to be removed. Three specialists from that plant came to me and said that the plant might have produced rubber mechanical goods including scarce Asian galoshes. I went there, but they did not let me in (despite the fact that I was the first secretary of the party regional committee?!). I was told to obtain a permit from Antropov, the minister of geology of the country.
When I came back to the regional committee, I called directly to the minister. Three days later on the phone the acting general director of the plant said that I could come over and inspect it. I visited all administrative and manufacturing premises, rooms, a dining hall, living spaces and clubs and I walked down to the mine. When I told him about our idea, the general director said that basically it was possible but it needed some time and fund investments. Besides, it would require a special permit from the union government.
I called to Tashkent to A. Abdurakhmanov, the chairman of the Ministers Council and told him about it. He advised me not to pry into it and added that the entity was strictly of the state importance directly controlled by Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beriya.
After thorough studying the matter, I called to Antropov again. He explained, ‘The only thing I need is the equipment and the specialists. However, I can transfer the plant itself if the union government gives permission for it.’
When I asked him about who could assist us in restructuring the plant, he referred to Tikhomirov, the minister of the chemical industry.
Therefore, I called him. His attitude to this case was positive. He said that he would do it with a great pleasure, especially knowing that there was an acute deficit in rubber galoshes not only in the Asian republics. There were only two factories manufacturing and supplying galoshes in the country. Moreover, it was a unique chance to earn money by exporting them abroad. However, it was necessary to obtain the Federal government’s permission to implement that project.
I asked him what I should do and what his advice would be.
He said, ‘You should directly appeal to Lavrentiy Pavlovich.’
I phoned him up a few times. Finally, my phone call went through. We greeted each other and I told him about the matter. Having listened to me he said, ‘You see, we do need uranium really much at the moment. At the site you are talking about the uranium stocks have exhausted. That is why all the specialists and equipment will be transferred to a new closest mine.’
I explained, ‘The only thing we want to keep is premises and civil equipment required for rubber mechanical goods production. We do not need the special equipment.’
Then Beriya agreed, ‘Okay. Some executives and a team of experts will visit you. You together with ministers will look into it and make suggestions.’
From Moscow Antropov and Tikhomirov and from Tashkent a team of Uzbek chemists and geologists led by the prominent scientist Khabib Abdullaev arrived in Namangan. They made a feasibility report and wrote the letter which was forwarded to the Ministers Council of the USSR with a request of gratuitous transfer of the plant premises with its civil equipment. The Federal government issued a permission and the work was launched. Now it is the biggest plant producing a wide range of rubber mechanical goods including well-known galoshes and other kinds of shoes and clothes. The plant covers the needs of not only Uzbekistan but also the CIS countries, the former Soviet republics. It also exports its products abroad.
I would like to mention another episode. I have found out that in the Silk Road time the Tashkent and Namangan regions located on the slopes of the mountain system Chatkal were bound by the direct road which went through the pass Kamchi; and a few thousand years ago camel caravans with goods were passing along it from China to Western Europe and vice versa. By the late 1940s the road had been so neglected that it got very narrow and it was really hard to pass it even riding a horse or a donkey. In the meantime, if you go from Tashkent to Kokand, Namangan and Andijan by train, it will take a day or two. However, if that mountain road was reconstructed, it would only take three-four-hour drive by car. Having agreed with the Tashkent regional executives, the four of us from Namangan went to Tashkent riding horses by that road. We made a halt three times and once we stopped at the peak of Kamchi. On the second day we arrived in Tashkent.
After giving a report in detail I got an approval of the CC executives and the republic government. So preparatory work was launched: the experts were studying the route, preparing the general plan, making technical drawings and financial estimates. However, when the basic data was already collected, the special authority gave a tip that for construction of that road, which was not only of economical importance but also, first of all, of military and strategic significance, the approval of the Union Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Domestic Affairs and KGB was required.
We with the chairman of the regional committee, B. Khaidarov, sent a letter to Stalin. We did not receive a response for a long time. After my calling to Beriya’s assistant a number of specialists from the relative departments arrived. They drove along the roads to explore the route, then they promised to report on the results in Moscow and to obtain an approval. I called to Beriya’s assistant again and informed him. Soon the order was issued by the USSR Ministers Council. Now this road is still one of the most comfortable interregional and interstate highway. It has dramatically improved commercial and economic relations and has helped the tourism development.
And the last episode is the following below. P. Leksashey, the head of the Central Asian Oil and Gas department, came to me and said that in the area of Chartak a team of explorers looking for oil and gas had found at the depth of 1.5-2 thousand meters three stratums of thermal mineral springs with the temperature of 40-60 degrees above zero in Celsius.
As to the content and variety of mineral salt they can compete with the waters of Karlovy Vary in Czechoslovakia. We immediately went there and saw a quite unattractive view: a couple of dozens of men and women of different ages, scarcely sheltered from the sun, were lying right on the soil on the both ditch sides, putting down their feet or hands into the dirty water. It turned out that they had arrived from different parts of Central Asia. They said that the water helped them recover from many illnesses. Nearby there was a primitive inn for visitors to stay at and have meals.
I phoned up B. Zakhidov, the minister of Health of Uzbekistan. He sent some experts to study the case. After thorough examining and testing the water, they highly appreciated its healing effectiveness and emphasized the beneficial water springs location for establishing a clinic or a sanatorium. We forwarded an official letter to the Ministers Council of Uzbekistan. In reply they wrote that all the explorers, including those who were looking for oil and gas, were directly supervised by the Union Ministry in Moscow, which was the place where the matter could be resolved. The republican government could not help with it at all.
I made a phone call to M. Kovrigina, minister of the Union Health and told her about our plans and difficulties we faced. She sent an expert team to study conditions and to assist in writing a report. Next, we sent our written request to K.E. Varashilov, deputy chairman of the USSR Ministers Council, who was responsible for social and economic matters. Kovrigina personally reported on the issue which was under submission in the Ministers Council. After making decision on the construction project implementation, the fund amounting a few million rubles was given.
Nowadays this is a health resort, designed for 1,100 people. This sanatorium has got all the facilities required for medical treatment and recreation. It is located on the territory of about 100 hectares covered with vineyards, fig and pomegranate groves and the fields of melons, watermelons and other different fruit. Mariya Kovrigina was an excellent executive and a nice person, who was in charge of making this come true.
In 1950 I was transferred from beloved Namangan to Tashkent where my family and I moved house.
IV
CREDENCE
In April of 1950 the plenum of the CC CP of Uzbekistan took place. There was only one question on the agenda: the current situation in the CC bureau. The first secretary of the CC, Usman Yusupov, and the chairman of the Ministers Council, Abdujabbar Abdurakhmanov, were made redundant from their positions. They both were removed from the membership of the CC bureau, after which they flew to Moscow. Yusupov became the minister of the cotton industry and Abdurakhmanov became the deputy minister of the state farms of the USSR.
According to the new appointments, Amin Irmatovich Niyazov became the CC first secretary, Abdurazak Mavlyanov – the chairman of the Ministers Council, Sharaf Rashidov held the post of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and I was promoted to the position of the CC secretary on propaganda.
The reasons for such radical changes and their dramatic consequences that occurred in the top administration of the republic, as well as the current situation in Uzbekistan at that time will be described in detail further in another chapter. Now I would like to devote some paragraphs to ideological work in order to give you an idea about what I had to focus on.
It is obvious that substantial losses during the war were innumerable. They cost millions of people killed in devastating war and terrible ravages of thousands of towns and cities. People were exhausted physically and morally by permanent malnutrition and hard life conditions, always feeling fatigue and stressful because of long excessive physical and mental tension.
Under such circumstances the party and the government started taking measures, first of all, to improve life conditions, to organize free trade, to revoke card system, to increase the local ruble currency rate and to build accommodations. Restoration work on the wrecked national economy started.
At the initiative of our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, the political and ideological situation in the world abruptly changed. Differences in approaches and attitudes to the fundamental issues, without mentioning the ultimate goals, began to be felt even at the Yalta Conference of the heads of the three great powers: the USSR, the UK and the USA. They were particularly evident at the Potsdam Conference. To prove this, it is sufficient to mention the well-known facts, including delay in the second (western) front opening, disagreements on the war end dates, on the postwar order in Europe in particular and in the world in general, various hurdles and delays in lend-lease deliveries, etc.
The end of World War II meant not only complete defeat of fascism, its army, government and party, but it also became the landmark of anti-Soviet aspirations growth in the western governmental circles and of the American nuclear bomb creation and its use against Japan.
Churchill’s speech in Fulton was characterized by a pronounced anti-Soviet attitude, which essentially marked the ‘cold war’ commencement by establishing military and political alliances such as NATO, SEATO and CENTO against the USSR and other socialist countries. Thus, after the end of the so-called ‘hot war’, the world found itself faced up with the start of the so-called ‘cold war’.
The Soviet authority undertook all the necessary measures to restore the national economy as well as to protect the Soviet people’s achievements and to be able to resolutely fight off any provocation in the cold or hot war.
The post war country was developing in versatile aspects. First of all, governmental and public bodies needed radical restructuring in order to become more effective and efficient in peacetime.
During the war for the sake of victory, the party leadership, the government and the army were extremely centralized and focused in one person. Let us look back: J.V. Stalin was the general secretary of the party CC, chairman of the State Defense Committee, supreme commander-in-chief of all armed forces, head of the government and minister of defense. He held the other positions too. After World War II, the restoration, to be more precise, the creation of the new structure started horizontally and vertically in the party, government, state and public institutions. Adherence to the principle of ‘democratic centralism’ was proclaimed, but in fact, it acted as the motto ‘national interests are above everything’.
Creation for a short time of atom and hydrogen bombs, different missile systems and other cutting-edge armaments, establishment of the Warsaw Pact (the USSR was represented by G.M. Malenkov and A.A. Zhdanov at the conference of the participant-countries) and foundation of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance had a sobering effect on militaristic circles of the west. It was like a hot shower in the cold war.
The same importance was given to radical restoration of ideological work, fundamental education of all Soviet citizens, especially young people, in a spirit of loyalty and love to the motherland and the socialist system.
The causes of serious flaws in spiritual sphere were particularly noted. It was emphasized in official documents and press that fascists on the occupied territories had tried to inculcate to the Soviet people’s minds the bourgeois ideology and anti-Soviets, that in the social sciences development appeared along with indisputable achievements some kind of alienation of research from the real life, from the socialist development experience, that dogmatism, doctrinarism, and subjectivism were revealed, which actually signified apostasy in favor of bourgeois ideology.
It was pointed out that despite overall success in literature and fine arts, the lack of ideology, political indifference, distortion of the truth about real life, deviation from realistic traditions and servility before bourgeois culture were found in works of some writers and artists. Some inartistic and even ideologically harmful works in literature and fine arts, imbued with disappointment and disbelief in future, as well as formalist deviations in music appeared. (All these wordings and assessments were taken out of the party documents published in the newspaper Pravda and in the magazine Communist of that time.)
A number of the CC AUCP(b) resolutions were promulgated. They included as follows: in 1946 – ‘On the magazines Zvezda and Leningrad’, ‘On the repertoires of the drama theatre and measures for its improvement’, ‘On the movie Big Life’; in 1948 – ‘On the opera The Great Friendship’, and so on. Scientific discussions on philosophy matters took place in 1947, on biology - in 1948, on physiology - in 1950, linguistics - in 1950 and political economy - in 1951.
Resolute replacement of the membership of the party, Soviet, trade union, and communist youth league bodies was going on.
Anything that seemed to the ruling authority to be manifestation of nationalism and parochialism was decidedly suppressed. So, 23 eminent medical doctors, who were mostly of Jewish nationality, were charged of attempts of murdering the top party and state executives. Also, the so-called Leningrad Case was opened, according to which the Leningrad’s residents were charged of arranging exhibition of their products and informing about it all the Soviet republics without concurrence with and approval of the central authority in Moscow. It was considered as an aspiration to act independently from the Federal Soviet government and a desire to make Leningrad the capital of the USSR again by flirting with the republics. In the result, the heads of municipal and regional administration were repressed. Then the so-called ‘Georgian case' was opened (for the third time). The excuse for this was the article by the famous Georgian scientist about original features and peculiarities and international significance of the Georgian language. Of course, the Georgian leaders and a few scientists were seriously punished.
Let us have a look at how those political resolutions and orders of the CC AUCP(b) and Politburo were manifested and implemented in practice in Uzbekistan.
Naturally, all of them were accepted for fulfillment. As it was noted in press, they were meant to eradicate by strict measures nationalism, parochialism, praising the feudal past, concentration on the history, groveling before bourgeois culture and its religious dogmata. It was necessary to draw scientists and intellectuals’ attention to the modern times, to the study and popularization of the Soviet reality, to the population consolidation around the party and the Soviet government led by J.V. Stalin.
After starting my job as the CC secretary on ideology at the end of April, 1950, I found myself in the vortex of the events called then the ’turning point’ of a new epoch. Soon I found out the names of the people repressed in 1948-1949; they included more than twenty eminent talented scientists, poets and writers who were charged with ‘nationalist deviation’. They were interrogated, judged and sentenced to the terms of between 15 and 25 years in closed sessions without publicity. Only direct participants in the investigation process knew about it and nobody, even close relatives, was aware of the place where the condemned prisoners had been banished to.
In those days a big team of scientists, cultural workers and a representative of the AUCP(b) arrived from Moscow. They scrupulously examined works of, literally, each eminent scientist and cultural worker of Uzbekistan. The meeting of the activists was held, where the team leaders severely criticized those who ‘perverted the national policy’ pursued by the party, ‘popularized archaisms’, ‘courtly poetry and music’, who attempted ‘to alienate the Uzbek culture and tear it off the Soviet Union’. Upon arrival in Moscow they wrote an official report on the situation in the spheres of ideology and culture in Uzbekistan.
In the late 1940s, the post of plenipotentiary representative of the CC AUCP(b) to Uzbekistan was established. S.D. Ignatiev, an authorized person, and his officers, including a couple of dozens of highly qualified experts in major economic sectors and culture, arrived in Tashkent. In those months the authorized apparatus basically focused on crucial issues of science development, culture, art and literature of Uzbekistan. Ignatiev wrote an official report on the results of the revision and sent it to the Politburo of the CC AUCP(b).
The Uzbekistan’s intellectuals were split up into groups with different views and attitudes. For example, in fine arts three groups were formed, one of which seriously criticized all the achievements not only of the Soviet period but also of its many-century-old history. Masterpieces of the national music, poetry and fine arts created by genius of ancestors were declared by them as archaic and outdated. They fought for the so-called new modern art genres of opera, ballet, symphony and so on. According to them, the Uzbek culture would definitely be enriched and rise to the world-wide level due to those cultural innovations.
Representatives of the other group firmly upheld the Uzbek art identity asserting that it was the national roots, including folklore music, songs and dances, that would enrich world culture and take a worthy place in it.
The third group was against contraposition of the two first groups’ views and attitudes. They upheld the necessity of their combination.
It was this position that got support of the CC and enabled us to oppose to any attempts to diminish and cry down the Uzbek culture and literature, which had a great many-century-old history. Also, it gave us an opportunity to popularize them in the republic itself and in the world. Due to the national culture–oriented policy, which started in the early 1930s, many national classical music masterpieces, including operas and ballets, were created.
In short, those busy days passed in hot discussions and disputes. We had to collectively watch movies, to discuss books, poems and essays, to listen to songs and other musical compositions in different places including conference halls of the party central committee from morning till evening, sometimes till late night. All the works were considered and assessed and the conclusions were made.
One day unexpectedly for me at the CC bureau, my candidacy was recommended for a position of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet (not the Presidium). And this happened. The deputies elected me during a session.
In those days I had a serious conversation with the first secretary of the CC CP of Uzbekistan, A. I. Niyazov. I have always respected Amin Irmatovich and I still do. He was considerably older, more experienced than me. He actively participated in agriculture collectivization. After graduating from the industry academy and becoming an engineer, he worked as the minister of finance and then as the chairman of the Presidium of the Republic Supreme Soviet for a long time. However, at that time we were on the strained terms for the following reason.
The head of the CC department brought me a folder and warned me, ‘This is only for your consideration. Comrade Niyazov is going to talk to you about it.’
It was the list of the 60 people whose full names and their positions were specified. Apart from that there was nothing else, nor were there any signatures. I attentively read it twice. That list included the names of the most respected competent scientists, distinguished poets and other prominent intellectuals. I took that folder, went to see Niyazov and showed him it.
He said, ‘These people, as we have been informed of, are actively involved in nationalistic activities which are essentially against the party policy and the government's interests. They periodically meet to secretly discuss issues, to harmonize and agree upon their assessment and attitudes and to recruit followers among intellectuals and youth.’
I said, ‘Amin Irmatovich, most of them are well-known not only in Uzbekistan but also in the Soviet Union and in the world. They have dedicated all their creative activities to the people. How can you suspect them in ideological sabotage? You do know each of them much better than I do. I have recently come back from the army and worked in Namangan.’
In reply I heard, ‘Mate, I do know them but some special service agencies have got convincing proves and evidence of their nationalistic activities. So, we can’t ignore them at all.’
To my question of who had made that list he answered, ‘They are people from the special service agencies together with some representatives of creative organizations and the science academy. You have to thoroughly study all the materials related to each person from this list and to ensure that the suggestions are implemented. For this purpose, you must prepare all the documents required.’
I asked him, ‘Who will introduce me to them?’
‘The representatives of the special service agencies and creative organizations will do.’
‘Well, what documents shall I prepare?’
‘For each one there must be a precise particular suggestion on submitted accusations.’
‘Are you going to make a particular decision on each one?’
'We will discuss it with you later. The decisions will differ by form. Some of them will be dealt with by the special service agencies. The only thing they need from us is our consent. The others might well be discussed at the Secretariat or Bureau meeting in order to give this case a wide publicity.’
I listened to him and said, ‘Amin Irmatovich, I find such an approach to intellectuals or any person wrong. I am ready to take a part in this case and give my view on it if you find it necessary.’
‘Nuritdin, let’s discuss it calmly! I am also worried about it like you are. I know them better than you do. I have read their works, personally know some of them and I am on friendly terms with many of them. But can’t you see what’s going on and what’s the current situation? We both hold high positions in order to fundamentally respond to such things and to firmly pursue the party policy.’
‘Amin Irmatovich, we’d better contact the ‘Centre’ in Moscow to let them know our point of view.’
‘I’m sure they know about it well.’
‘Then, may I tell them my point of view and get advice on this issue?’
‘We’ll see.’
Three days later Niyazov invited me and said that there had been a phone call from Moscow and we both were invited to visit Moscow for discussion at the Secretariat of the two reports one of which was made by the CC’s team and the second one - by Ignatiev’s team.
‘Prepare all the materials and we'll fly to Moscow.’
But on the following day he phoned me up and said that he had a flu and a high temperature and the doctors had prescribed him a bed rest to avoid complications. Then he added, ‘Now you’ll have to fly alone. I have already informed the Central Committee about it.’
I wished Niyazov to recover soon and on the following day I arrived in Moscow. I made a phone call to Malenkov’s assistant to inform him of my arrival and to tell him that I would like to be received. In the late evening I was told to come and see him at 10 o’clock in the next morning.
I called on Malenkov and greeted him.
He said, ‘Why do you work so feebly on implementing crucial changes in ideological political course in Uzbekistan? Tomorrow we are going to discuss at the Secretariat the Ignatiev and our team’s reports on the verified facts of nationalism, localism, glorification of the past and ignoring the Soviet people and the party’s achievements.’
He asked me if I had read those reports before. I affirmed.
‘Ok then, at the Secretariat you will explain it. By the way, why didn’t Niyazov come?’
I explained. He apprehended it silently.
Then I said, ‘Comrade Malenkov and the CC agency, authorized in Uzbekistan, have comprehensively studied these issues and the team members from Moscow carefully investigated them. We consider all these as assistance. Nevertheless, we cannot agree with rough generalization and unfounded accusations specified in the documents submitted to you. Besides, we disagree with neglecting and even ignoring the positive work undertaken in this direction. Such an approach can provoke discontent and even insult that may arise among not only intellectuals but also the people who have a thousand-year-old history of developed ancient culture. For example, the first academy of sciences was established in Khorezm in the 10th century. We all, Uzbekistan’s administration, sincerely want to overcome existing shortcomings and to achieve intensive growth in culture and science.’
He was listening silently. I continued, ‘The discussion by the Secretariat of the CC AUCP(b) and the decision to be taken will be useful. However, maybe it would be better if these reports were submitted for consideration by the CC CP of Uzbekistan? It would enable us to apply a self-critical approach to them and conduct appropriate work. In addition, this approach would raise responsibility of all the republic party bodies. As you know, comrade Niyazov and I have been working for only a few months and, perhaps, we have been short of time to sort out all the issues. All of a sudden, the decision on us has been made by the CC AUCP(b). We rely on the CC’s assistance and support. If we receive the reports, we will discuss them at the CC bureau and submit the whole package of the issues to the plenum agenda.’
Malenkov replied, ‘We will exchange our views at the Secretariat tomorrow.’
‘Georgiy Maksimilianovich, may I tell you my point of view on another issue? I have recently been familiarized with a list of scientists and art figures. They are allegedly involved in anti-party and anti-government activities. These people are honored esteemed intellectuals whose works and treatises are world-widely known. Of course, I do not know all of them personally since I came back to Uzbekistan in 1946 and shortly left for Namangan, from where I have recently been transferred to work in the CC. But personally, I doubt about correctness of the approach when political destiny of such eminent people is judged and decided on by the overall list of names. It should be taken into account that earlier the nation has already lost a large amount of prominent competent professionals.
In the 1930s and during the war a few thousand Uzbeks were killed, in 1948-1949 more than twenty writers and scientists were sentenced after the law proceedings, convicted for many years and banished. Now a new list has been drawn up. In my opinion, it would be better if there are any materials on anyone, they should be looked into and thoroughly studied regarding this particular person by the bureau or the CC CP secretariat. In this way, an unbiased objective opinion and judgement can be reached. In case of hostile activities by anyone, serious conclusions should be made. I think the best way to sort out problems is to investigate a case on a particular individual instead of the overall list of people some of whom are prominent scientists and writers, the laureates of Stalin’s awards.’
Malenkov interrupted me,
‘Is it your own opinion or the opinion of Uzbekistan’s administration?’
‘Right now, I am telling you about my personal opinion. We didn’t discuss this matter at the bureau. After having been familiarized with the list, I only talked about it with Niyazov and frankly told him my point of view.’
‘How did he react?’
‘We had a short conversation. He said that we should firmly pursue the party policy and each one included in the list would be dealt with by appropriate agencies.’
‘Niyazov noted correctly that the party policy must be pursued firmly. However, in this case you are right. We mustn’t decide people’s fates by overall lists. Each one must be tackled individually.’ ‘Georgiy Maksimilyanovich, if anyone can be convicted by overall lists, then whom will the CC of Uzbekistan work with? Actually, the republic cannot be managed without intellectuals’ participation. Moreover, among the Uzbeks there have been many scientists, writers, poets, singers and musicians for many ages and millenniums. It's obvious that particularly now, after the war, we must save every creative person.’
He looked at me and said, ‘That’s right.’
‘If you don’t mind I would like to raise one more question. After the war the institute of the authorized representative of the CC AUCP(b) was established in Tashkent city, Uzbekistan. The head of this organization is Semen Denisovich Ignatiev, who is responsible for the team of experts in different fields. Personally, I don’t have any complaints towards anyone of them and now I’m not talking about their activities. But as a young party member I am worried about the other point. During the first years of the Soviet power the Turkestan’s commission of the All-Union Central Executive Committee and the Council of the Peoples’ Commissars on Turkestan and later the Central Asian Bureau of the party CC were set up. Those authorities functioned in the whole Central Asia and Kazakhstan and in the middle of the 1930s were abolished. Nowadays there is the authorized representative organization of the CC AUCP(b) only in Uzbekistan, whereas there is no similar organization in the other republics. This causes different judgments and misunderstanding in this regard.’
‘What’s your opinion?’
‘The country achieved the brilliant victory in the war. All the Soviet peoples including residents of Uzbekistan actively took part in and contributed to this victory.’
Malenkov interrupted, ‘You, maybe, don’t know that during the war and a few years ago here in the CC we had to discuss incorrect behavior and mistakes of the Uzbekistan’s leadership.’
‘Maybe It was necessary at that time but I’m talking about the whole party organization, about the union republic and the whole people in general. In addition, sovereignty, rights and equality of the communist parties and the governments of all the union republics is stipulated by the Constitution and the other documents. Besides, national feelings may well be provoked if they are hurt or humiliated.’
‘What about Ignatiev?’
‘Semen Denisovich is an experienced party worker, who well knows national peculiarities of the republics where he has worked. He has got good people skills, keeps close contact with activists and other people. His team consists of qualified competent workers.’
‘Have you got a proposal? Do you want this organization to be abolished?’
‘I have told you my personal opinion. Perhaps we should think it over in order to strengthen the role, authority and responsibility of the party and Soviet bodies in Uzbekistan.’
‘Let’s think it over.’
The next day at the sitting of the secretariat Malenkov said, ‘You, comrades, have been familiarized with the two reports on ideological and political work in Uzbekistan. At the beginning we intended to include them into the agenda to discuss and to make a decision. Yesterday I talked with Mukhitdinov who told me in detail about the current situation in the republic and the measures taken and asked me to send these two reports to the CC CP of Uzbekistan for discussion and decision-making. Maybe, comrades, taking into account that Niyazov and Mukhitdinov have recently joined the republic administration and that the party body in Uzbekistan is basically experienced enough, I suggest to meet their request without discussing it here and including it into today’s agenda? As to the reports they will be sent to them so that by the end of the current year the CC of Uzbekistan shall report on the work done. What do you think of it?’
Some voices of approval sounded, ‘That’s right.’
‘Here is comrade Mukhitdinov. Maybe you have any questions to him?’
I stood up. Then Malenkov summarized the discussion, ‘Well, then we'll consider this issue settled. Now we will move on to the next point and start discussing the other matters of the agenda. As for you (speaking to me), we wish you good luck.’
Upon arrival in Tashkent I informed Amin Irmatovich about my conversation with Malenkov and about what had happened at the secretariat and the decision made.
Niyazov said, ‘Tomorrow we will hold the meeting of the secretariat and invite the bureau members in order to inform them and to decide on the actions to take.’
At the secretariat, with the bureau members’ participation, I spoke in detail about the subject matter. We agreed that upon receipt of the reports from Moscow, the bureau meeting would be held in order to discuss and determine our further actions. Amin Irmatovich said, ‘Nuritdin Akramovich, you are assigned to prepare the secretariat’s draft resolution related to the reports and specifying our further measures to be taken. It would be good if we agree on the subject-matter at the bureau meeting and, in addition to the discussion, hold a special plenum of the CC where, with participation of activists and heads of creative and ideological organizations, we might thoroughly examine and adopt a resolution.’
I proposed to let Niyazov make a report in order to raise the matter significance. In about a week we gathered at the bureau’s meeting. The main issue on the agenda was the reports from the CC AUCP(b). We read them. I will tell you straight it was an emotional discussion: many wordings and generalizations were one-sided and biased. At the same time in some aspects incompetency and tendentiousness of the conclusions were noticeable. Nevertheless, we decided to examine and use them to improve ideological work in all spheres. A. I. Niyazov was approved as the speaker. Also, a team was made up to prepare materials for the plenum.
A month later Amin Irmatovich invited me to visit him. When I entered his office, I saw there the second secretary of the CC, R.E. Melnikov, and the authorized representative of the CC AUCP(b), Ignatiev. Niyazov told me, ‘In the Tashkent region the situation has become very hard, and the regional committee administration can’t fulfill its job well. Besides, there are other serious things. In this connection we want to recommend you for the position of the first secretary of the regional committee.’
I was silent. Then Melnikov and Ignatiev told me about actual facts necessitating replacement of the local administration. So, I accepted their proposal.
In a couple of days there was the plenum of the party regional committee where I was elected as the first secretary. Thus, I held three positions simultaneously: the CC secretary on propaganda, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet (not the Presidium) and the first secretary of the Tashkent party regional committee.
The text of the report and the draft resolution of the 10th plenum of the CC CP of Uzbekistan was prepared by the CC departments together with the leadership of the writers’ union and other ideological organizations. (As for me, at that time I was focusing on the regional committee’s work.)
The results of the plenum’s work as a whole could be assessed as positive, but unfortunately in some statements, including the report and articles in newspapers, there were defamations of many eminent representatives of intellectuals. There were repressions as well. Their destinies were looked into and revised again a few years later in the mid-1950s. Each case was considered individually and slanderous accusations were removed. The particular environment comfortable for their creative and scientific activities was established.
In the same summer I got a call from Ignatiev, who said to me, ‘I want to bid farewell to you.’
‘What has happened?’
‘With your help the authorized representative organization has been liquidated. Therefore, I have been fired from my job.’
To which I replied, ‘Semyon Denisovich, we have known each other for enough time, but for the first time I noticed that you can lie.’
He laughed and continued,
‘I have been appointed the head of the department supervising over work of the party, the trade unions and the young communist league organization of the CC AUCP(b).’
I congratulated him.
‘Do you mind if I come to see you?’
I said that I would come myself. We spent over two hours at his place and then we went for dinner to my cottage where we were talking till late. Eventually, he was seen off with respect and due attention. A few of his officers decided to leave for Moscow and the rest decided to stay in Uzbekistan. They were appointed on responsible positions in the municipal, regional and central committees. At the 19th party congress Semyon Denisovich was elected as the secretary of the CC CPSU simultaneously being the chairman of the KGB.
On April 7th, 1951 Niyazov invited me. R.E. Melnikov was there too. Amin Irmatovich said, ‘We would like to promote you to the Ministers Council so that you could lead the government.’
I was really surprised and said, ‘But comrade Mavlyanov works there, doesn't he? He is an experienced authoritative energetic person.’
‘Yes, we know about it, but he has applied with the request to allow him to leave his current post.’
‘Abdurazak Mavlyanov has been working for just a year. He is really experienced. We were working in the same region (I was in Namangan while he was in Andijan). I sometimes visited him as my elder mate for advice and consultation. He has got good people skills, being a highly respected man. It will be difficult to explain why such a distinguished person is dismissed from a high position of the head of the government.’
‘There are some serious reasons for that.’
Melnikov joined the conversation,
‘You will know about it later. But for now, you should accept the proposal and start working as soon as possible.’
Niyazov concluded, ‘Tomorrow we will hold the CC bureau meeting to resolve this matter.’
On April 8th at 11 a.m. the bureau meeting was opened. The chairman, Niyazov, announced that Mavlyanov was asking to let him leave the position of the chairman of the Ministers Council explaining that he had not had enough experience of working in the Soviet authority bodies and he had had difficulties with implementing comprehensive governmental activities. After saying that, Niyazov gave the floor to Mavlyanov.
Abdurazak Mavlyanov said, ‘Yes, comrades, Amin Irmatovich has properly informed you. Actually, I am asking the bureau to dismiss me from the position of the chairman of the Ministers Council.’
And he sat down.
Niyazov asked if anyone had questions or wanted to talk about it. In response a few people said, ‘No.’
He concluded, ‘Okay. We will grant comrade Mavlyanov’s request. Does anyone want to vote against or to abstain from voting? No, nobody does. Thus, we are making a decision on dismissing comrade Mavlyanov from his position of the chairman of the Ministers Council of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic under his request. Do you all agree? Then the decision has been taken. Comrade Rashidov, you will try to convene today the meeting of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet in order to adopt a decree on this matter so that tomorrow morning it can be published in press and broadcasted on radio.
Now let’s talk about the candidate. We have a proposal to appoint Nuritdin Akramovich Mukhitdinov to the position of the chairman of the Ministers Council in the Uzbek SSR. (The approving voices were heard, ‘That’s right.’) Is there another candidate? No? Does anyone want to talk about it? No one? Let’s vote then. I’m putting it to the vote. Who is voting for or against it? Is anyone abstaining from voting? Then it has been adopted unanimously. Comrade Rashidov, we must adopt and publish the decree on Mavlyanov’s dismissing and Mukhitdinov’s appointment at the same time… Tomorrow by 12 o’clock, let’s invite all the employees of the Ministers Council and departmental heads of the ministries and authority agencies in order to introduce them comrade Mukhitdinov. Do you have any objections? No one is objecting. Then I’m asking all of you to come to the Ministers Council and to take part in presentation and the CC and the Ministers Council's departments to notify today all the necessary people and to ensure that everyone shall be present.’
On April 9th at 12 o’clock all gathered together in a big conference hall in the government building. The CC bureau members were sitting at the presidium’s table. Niyazov stood up and read out the resolutions of the Supreme Soviet Presidium on Mavlyanov’s dismissal and my (Mukhitdinov’s) appointment. It was noticeable by the audience’s reaction that they had already known about it from mass media. Then Niyazov informed them about Mavlyanov’s request and motives concerning his resignation, then he gave a testimonial or a character reference about me and expressed the hope that the government, ministries and other authority agencies’ employees would support the new administration.
‘Let’s congratulate Nuritdin Akramovich with his new appointment and wish him success.’
In this way, the meeting was over. Having seen off the Bureau members, Mavlyanov and I entered his office. First of all, I asked him what had really happened. He told me strictly confidentially. It turned out that a few days earlier, he was invited by Niyazov, Rashidov and Melnikov, who told him about the facts of localism on his part. For instance, while holding top local party positions and later being at the top of the local government, he was promoting up the career ladder his relatives and friends from Turkestan and Chimkent displacing local Uzbeks and Russians. What’s more, he wasn’t interested in plans and budgets and didn’t want to go deep into his job, ignoring his deputies and their attitudes and views, and often solved important issues on his own, sometimes showing rude manners and insulting some employees.
In response he said, ‘I resolutely deny all these slanderous accusations. I am ready to resign If need be.’
With those words the discussion was over. However, his last phrase was used and immediately the so-called ‘Mavlyanov’s case’ was made up and the special folder was urgently sent by special delivery to the CC AUCP(b) with the proposal of dismissing him from the post of the chairman of the Ministers Council and appointing me to his place. After two days I was informed of the Politburo’s consent. That was the time when I was summoned. It was obvious that each bureau member had known beforehand about the report sent to Moscow and the Politburo’s approval. That’s why actually there were no discussions on this matter.
After hearing Mavlyanov’s story I was surprised with the biased accusation against him. He was Uzbek, originally from South Kazakhstan, an honest man of principle although he was short-tempered. Some of his friends from Chimkent and Turkestan were actually working in Uzbekistan and I knew them personally as skillful men devoted to their work and doing their utmost to implement their responsibilities. Also, in Kazakhstan a few Uzbeks worked as vigorously and honestly as Kazakh people did. Therefore, contrasting cadres for purely parochial or ethnic principle is not only biased but also it is harmful.
We both were sitting till late evening; he was advising me about work, cadres and plans.
On the following day, on April 10th in the morning, when I came to the office, I gathered all the deputies, spoke to them about work, then let them go and started talking personally with each employee. However, by the end of the day I had one doubt. Before, being recommended to any leading position, even the regional committee secretary on propaganda, I was summoned to Moscow to attend an interview and only after their approval I was allowed to start work. But this time no one summoned me, nor did anyone from the center phone me up. I thought, ‘Maybe I should phone them up myself and inform them of my new appointment?’
Reflecting over it, I was sitting till late and at last I decided to phone up the Kremlin by high frequency line to talk to A. N. Poskrebishev, who was Stalin’s chief assistant. I contacted him because his boss, Stalin, was the chairman of the USSR Ministers Council. So now I was to report him directly. Poskrebishev was available there and answered the phone. I told him my full name and the position I had been appointed to.
He replied, ‘We know about it. Congratulations.’
‘I would like to inform comrade Stalin about it.’
‘I will tell him.’
And again, there was no news from them for three days.
On April 12th at 6 p.m. there was a high frequency phone call. They asked if I was available and checked if audibility was good. Then I was told that soon there would be a phone call to me from the Kremlin. So, they checked the line a few times. Eventually I got a phone call from Kalyuzhniy, the minister of communications in Uzbekistan, who said, ‘You will have an important phone call. I will see to it personally.’
Approximately after ten minutes there was a phone call on the Kremlin phone device. After saying my full name and making sure that I was holding on the line, someone quietly checked if I heard well. Then I was asked if there were no people around me and warned me that I shouldn’t have anyone by me.
Hanging up the phone I immediately invited my assistant Sibirtsev and asked him to be in the reception room and not to allow anyone to enter the office, not to open the door and make sure that no one touched the government phone device. Then I closed all the windows and doors in the office.
Finally, I got a call. I picked up the phone receiver. A telephone operator told me, ‘I am putting you through to comrade Poskrebishev.’
Alexander Nikolaevich greeted me, asked me about my health and said, ‘Do you hear me well?’
‘Yes, I do.’
‘Now comrade Stalin is about to talk to you.’
I stood up instantly and waited, focusing on the coming conversation and being worried, of course. All of a sudden, I heard a low voice, ‘Comrade Makhatdinov?’
‘Yes, I am. How do you do, comrade Stalin?’
‘How do you do? Have you started working?’
‘Yes, I have.’
‘How is it going on?’
‘We are currently having a seedtime. We want to complete sowing of cotton and other crops before the holidays. The lambing time has been launched and we hope to get karakul more than last year. Silkworms are strenuously fattening. The outcome in industrial and other spheres for the first quarter is being estimated and the measures to fulfill the plan for the first half a year are being taken.’
‘I wish you good luck.’
Thus, the conversation was over. He hanged up the phone and I still holding a receiver in my hand was pondering: 'The conversation lasted just two or three minutes and he literally uttered four or five words, but I still can’t get over; my state was caused by the fact that it was Stalin himself to whom I talked for the first time; I heard his voice and answered his questions. He wished me a success!’
I immediately invited my deputies to tell them about it. I came to Niyazov and he called CC secretaries to inform them about the conversation. They all were surprised with the unexpected event and agreed, in the CC and the government, to unconditionally fulfill all the plans and to respond to the wish of success by deeds. However, I didn’t think at that time and couldn’t even imagine that after seven or eight months Stalin himself would punish me and Niyazov twice. Here is a wording of those resolutions.
On November 19th, 1951 I got the resolution of the USSR Ministers Council (№ 4675) ‘On the urgent measures in cotton growing’. In the first paragraph A. Niyazov and N. Mukhitdinov's attention was drawn to deficiencies in arranging cotton gathering campaign. On November 22nd (three days later) the new resolution of the USSR Ministers Council (№ 4834) was issued. The first paragraph ran as follows: ‘To attention of the secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, comrade Niyazov, and of the Chairman of the Ministers Council of the SSRUz, comrade Mukhitdinov, it must be pointed out that there is unsatisfactory managing cotton gathering campaign and raw cotton supply to the government, and they must be warned that if in the nearest time they do not take measures to intensify raw cotton procurement, they will be severely punished.’ On December 8th the third resolution (№ 5003) was received. It said: ‘The Ministers Council has noted that by December 5th the cotton procurement plan was implemented up to 87.1 %, whereas last year by the same date the plan was overfulfilled in Uzbekistan. Comrade Niyazov and comrade Mukhitdinov have not draw necessary conclusions from the warning of the Ministers Council about their personal responsibility for timely fulfillment of raw cotton procurement; they have not done their utmost to ensure proper managing harvesting work in the republic and continue putting up with the facts of irresponsible attitude of some party and Soviet authority executives to fulfillment of the government’s cotton procurement plan.
Comrades Niyazov and Mukhitdinov do not take into consideration that such a situation is unbearable any more when the Federal government renders comprehensive material technical assistance to collective and state farms of the republic; however, the republic poorly carries out its obligations on cotton supply to the state.
The Ministers Council enacts:
1. For unsatisfactory management of harvesting work and poor raw cotton supply to the government, comrade Niyazov, the secretary of the CC CP(b) of Uzbekistan, and comrade Mukhitdinov, the chairman of the Ministers Council of SSRUz, have been reprimanded.
2. …………………….
3. To oblige the CC CP(b) of Uzbekistan and the Ministers Council of the Uzbek SSR to report by December 15th, 1951 to the Ministers Council of the USSR on measures taken to implement the state raw cotton supply plan.
Chairman of the Ministers Council of the USSR, J. Stalin.
Executive officer of the Ministers Council of the USSR, M. Pomaznev.’
I read it three times and phoned up Niyazov. He said that he did not know how that resolution had been prepared and no one had talked to him about that matter.
I was deeply worried about it: for it was the first penalty in my life imposed by Stalin himself. Besides, I had been working for the Ministers Council for just a few months.
The next day I phoned up A. V. Malishev, vice-chairman of the Ministers Council of the USSR, with whom I was on friendly terms. From him I found out that that and other resolutions were submitted by the ministry of cotton industry of the USSR. He further added, ‘The imposed penalty is a means to pull up all executives as the country needs the cotton very much. As for you, apart from that, it was a lesson for your personal improvement. The penalty will be removed when you put straight the situation.’
Indeed, two months later on February 9th, 1952 after personal conversation with me, Stalin personally removed the both penalties from me and Niyazov and told off those who had submitted and approved the November and December resolutions adopted by the Union government on Uzbekistan.
In 1951 the raw cotton procurement plan was fulfilled up to 94% (in 1950 it reached its peak of 104%). In January, 1952 the special plenum of the CC CP of Uzbekistan was held, where the year outcome was discussed in detail. It was followed by the 8th national assembly of cotton growers where participants frankly talked about made mistakes and unused possibilities. On the basis of the plenum and national assembly’s decisions, the socialistic obligations, stipulating not only the fulfillment of the plan of 1952, but also the compensation of undersupplied cotton, were undertaken by collective and state farms in the regions and districts.
In the course of discussion, analysis and consideration of the existing situation were discovered a number of bottlenecks which seriously hampered development of many important economic fields and in particular, the cotton growing industry. There were many issues that could be solved by the union authorities only. In addition, it was found out that although plans for production, material technical procurement, trade, etc. were made yearly while five-year plans only stipulated major strategic directions of the national economic development, the republic administration had not reported for a long time to the CC AUCP(b) and the Ministers Council of the USSR on accumulated difficulties and arisen serious problems, sorting out of which had a basic impact on the further economic development in the republic.
The problems were discussed in detail at the CC bureau and it was found reasonable to report on the problems to Moscow. Niyazov phoned up the CC AUCP(b) and in the conversation with Ignatiev he said that we had faced a few unsettled problems we would like to report about to the CC AUCP(b) and the union government and to ask for help in their solving. Semyon Denisovich promised to advise with the leadership and to inform us. After three days Amin Irmatovich invited and told me that Ignatiev had phoned him up from Moscow to suggest us to prepare reports on each branch and to submit them to comrade Stalin.
We, including the second secretary of the CC R.E. Melnikov, the first vice-chairman of the Ministers Council A.N. Rudin, a number of the departmental heads of the CC, the chairman of the state planning committee, his deputies, the ministers and experts, arrived in Moscow in the middle of January.
Upon arrival in the capital Melnikov, Rudin and I visited Ignatiev. Having looked through the reports, he spoke to me, ‘We are seeking here for an opportunity of your meeting with comrade Stalin.’
Further he asked, ‘Would you like to meet anyone?’
I expressed my wish to see Malishev. Right away he gave him a call and told him about my wish. Hanging up the phone he said, ‘He is waiting you in an hour.’
Vyacheslav Alexandrovich met me by the door to his office. After warmly greeting me, he asked his assistant to bring some tea, then attentively examined each document and noted, ‘If comrade Stalin receives you, you should bear in your mind that you must not hand over your papers to him. Keep your documents with you and tell him in short the main point of each report; if he puts some questions, you must answer them and immediately move on to the next report.’
Further he said, ‘You’d better see comrade Beriya if he receives you. You should know that all the documents related to the Ministers Council are submitted to comrade Stalin after only having been endorsed by Beriya. As for the documents related to the CC, they are to be endorsed by Malenkov before being submitted to Stalin.’
From his office I phoned up Beriya’s reception room to tell them of my desire to be received by him and I gave them Uzbekistan’s permanent office’s phone number. In the next afternoon I was told to come at 17.00 o’clock. In a few minutes after my arrival at the reception room, an officer went out from the office, greeted me, asked my full name and said, ‘Let’s go.’ We both entered the office. Beriya, who was sitting at his desk, stood up. I said, ‘How do you do, Lavrentiy Pavlovich?’
After greeting me by nodding he offered me to take a seat and sat down himself in a chairman’s armchair at the head of the long table. The officer was sitting on his right and I was sitting next to him. So, between me and Beriya there was the officer who was writing down what was being said. Then we had the following conversation:
‘You are young,’ he noted.
‘In November I will be 35 years old.’
‘The cotton plan has not been implemented, has it?’
‘We are taking measures to catch up with a backlog this year.’
‘So why have you come?’
‘I have come to ask for your support in sorting out problems arisen in Uzbekistan.’
With those words I handed over a documents folder to him.
The officer took and opened the folder, then put the reports in front of Beriya. Having browsed the reports, he returned them to me and said, ‘Comrade Stalin will decide who will be studying and preparing proposals on your reports.’
Then followed a short conversation:
‘Are you Uzbek?’
‘Yes, I am.’
‘Where were you born?’
‘In Tashkent city.’
‘Do you know Yusupov?’
“When I returned home from the war, Usman Yusupovich appointed me for party work. Under his guidance I worked for four years. I respect him. I visited him in his office yesterday.’
‘Okay. Good bye.’
The officer saw me off to the door.
The conversation lasted for about fifteen minutes. Upon returning to the republic’s permanent office I contacted Semyon Denisovich to inform him of the meetings with Malishev and Beriya. He advised me to phone up Poskrebishev. So, I did, introducing myself, and told him that I wanted to personally inform comrade Stalin. He responded, ‘I will tell him about it.’
In the very beginning of February, I visited Stalin.
Before that I read his works, saw, heard and talked to him on the phone. And now, being for the first time nearby him, I could only utter, ‘How do you do?’
But the low voice and soft gestures of a short man with moustaches, pockmarked face, half-bent left arm and dressed in a plain single-breasted military coat let me pull myself together.
What kind of problems did I tell him about and how did he react? I briefly told him the content of each report. Meantime he put some questions to which I answered. Then I informed him about our intention to launch hydro-economic irrigation construction designed for watering the Barren steppe, the Karshi region, Central Fergana and setting up a large-scale rice farm in Kara-Kalpak.
He asked me about the origin of the name of the Barren steppe. I explained that it was an area of about a million hectares in the center of the republic. In the ancient time local people used it to grow the highest grades of cotton, fruit, grapes, vegetables and cereal. That region used to be densely populated, well-planned and prospering. However, the internecine wars between feudal rulers, invasions by foreign aggressors, especially by Mongols, had destroyed irrigational structures. The present territory was covered with salt and sand dunes; people, animals and birds had abandoned it. Local people called that area Mirzachul. There had been no scientific explanation for that name so far but there was a supposition that the eminent scientist and the ruler, Mirza Ulugbek, who was Amir Timur’s grandson, had built and improved a few wells there at that time so that people could use them for their camel caravans. In this way that place was called as Mirzachul, i.e.,, Mirza’s steppe.
The Russian scientist N.F. Ulyanov, who was the first to explore that territory in the 1870s, named it as the Barren steppe. Another eminent scientist and traveler, P.P. Semyonov, visited all the parts of the region in the early 20th century. In his report to the All-Russian Geography Society in St. Petersburg he told about peculiarities of Mirzachul and its difference from deserts and persistently recommended to start developing that area. For his services in studying Central Asia Peter Semyonov was given an honorary title of Semyonov-Tien-Shanskiy. Lenin in his works on agrarian issues in Russia, pointing out to big opportunities of the irrigation areas expansion in Central Asia, was guided by the ideas of those scientists as well. Then only the territory of 200 thousand hectares was used whereas another 600 thousand hectares might well be irrigated too.
Stalin asked me what Khodjimuradov was doing. I said that I neither knew him, nor what was he doing. I replied, ‘I do not know, comrade Stalin.’
He silently looked at me.
At the end of the conversation I committed an impudence. He poignantly glanced at me but said nothing. However, there was one thing that made me delighted: J.V. Stalin ending up the conversation remarked, ‘Your reports will be considered.’
As to the project of hydro-economic irrigation construction, he briefly noted, ‘Submit it.’
From the Kremlin I walked to the CC and came to see Ignatiev. Seeing me still being excited, he suggested me to sit in his office and asked his assistant to bring some tea. I wanted to make a phone call from there to the republic representative, Odilov, to tell him to gather all the team members with whom we had arrived, but Semyon Denisovich decided to phone himself and suggested me to have some rest. At that time the phone started ringing. He answered, ‘Yes, he is here. Okay, I will tell him.’
Hanging up the phone he said, ‘Malenkov is summoning you.’
I went up to the fifth floor and was immediately received.
Having familiarized with the reports contents, Malenkov directly called M.G. Pervukhin, the first vice-chairman of the Ministers Council, I.I. Kuzmin, the head of the engineering industry department of the CC AUCP(b), and A.I. Kozlov, the head of the agriculture department of the CC, and proposed them to urgently study our documents and submit the draft resolutions of the Ministers Council to the organizational bureau. On the same day, we all who had arrived from Tashkent city gathered together there where, with participation of the representatives from the state planning committee, ministry of finance and other union authorities, they started studying and discussing our reports and preparing necessary documents.
On February 7th the meeting of the organizational bureau of the CC AUCP(b) took place. When under the agenda our issues were to be discussed, the chairman of the meeting Malenkov gave me the floor. I briefly told about the year outcomes, opportunities and perspectives of the republic and noted that the presented draft resolutions reflected many existing problems of Uzbekistan. Malenkov addressing to the participants reminded that the draft resolutions had been handed out to everyone and asked if there were any considerations. Khrushchev enquired how much cotton the republic was going to supply that year. I mentioned the planned figure. P.K. Ponomarenko proposed to adopt the submitted resolutions.
All voted for it. The chairman of the meeting announced that the resolutions were adopted and addressing me asked if I had any other questions. I expressed my wish to take those resolutions copies with me. He told his assistant Sukhanov to quickly prepare them for final signing.
There were eight drafts, four of which were accepted without any remarks. As for the others, it was decided to specify some points more precisely. Three days later upon receipt the resolutions signed by J. V. Stalin, we instantly flew to Tashkent. In the afternoon took place the meeting of the bureau of the CC CP of Uzbekistan with participation of the executives from the CC, the Ministers Council, the ministries and committees. Niyazov suggested me to tell them how the resolutions had been prepared, discussed and adopted. Then I read them out. In short, I am going to familiarize a reader with some of them.
On the cotton growing – the resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of February 7th (№ 657) and of February 19th (№ 948).
They specified the following:
-To allocate and provide in 1952: tractors “Universal” – 600 pieces, harrows 15,140 pieces, cultivators 2,150 pieces, seeding machines – 1,321 ps, plows – 2,770 ps, excavators – 114 ps, ammonia nitre – 225 thousand tons, superphosphate – 300 thousand tons, lumber – 50 thousand cubic meters, electric motors – 300 pieces, expanded metal – 20 thousand square meters, pipes, cement, sheet irons, ferrous rolled metals, coal and fuel oil etc.
To empower the Council of Ministers of Uzbekistan to write off from cotton sowing collective farms of the republic arrears of the raw cotton contracting which were formed because of non-fulfillment of the plan.
-To approve regionalization of the cotton plants (attached).
-To approve measures on improvement of the formal acceptance, storage and reprocessing raw cotton and improvement industrial capacities of the cotton-cleaning industry.
-To approve workmanship and remuneration of labor of cotton combines drivers (attached).
-To adjudge the rate of pensions for long service of logistics managers and specialists.
On capital construction – the resolution of the Council of Ministers of February 7th 1952 (№ 691):
-To approve itemized lists of research and project works in 1952 for the further construction of the following: auto repair factory in Andijan, diesel engine power plant in Bukhara, hydroelectric power plant №3 in Namangan, thermal power plant in Karshi, power supply network in Samarkand, water supply system in Samarkand, Chirchik, Namangan and Margilan, sewage system in Chirchik, the change of tram railways to broad gauge ones in Tashkent city, the house of the Ministers Council in Nukus, the house of cotton growers in Tashkent city, the botanic garden in Tashkent city and so on.
On improvement of the local education – the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of July 10th 1952 (№ 3185):
-To build in 1953-1955 in the cities and settlements of the republic 42 school buildings for 13.6 thousand pupil seats.
-To provide in full the republic within 1953-1955 with tutorials and utility inventories by allocating 116.6 million rubles, constructional materials, devices, limits etc.
-To allocate in 1952 10 million rubles for purchasing tutorials and utility equipment for schools and 1 million rubles for stocking school library funds.
-To accept in 1953 at the expense of the government the costs for children institutions quotas for nutrition of additional 1,000 Uzbek girls and shepherds’ children who live in boarding schools.
-To accept the proposal of the Ministers Council of Uzbekistan on starting reorganization of Samarkand training institute from September 1952 and of Andijan training institute from September 1st 1953 into pedagogical institutes with enrollment of 250 students in Samarkand institute in 1952; on establishing on September 1st 1953 the teacher training institutes in the Andijan, Surkhandarya and Khorezm regions (the lists of staff, funds and payrolls are attached).
-To oblige federal ministries (specified) together with the Council of Ministers of the UzSSR to take part (scales are defined) in the construction of schools for 440 seats in the Margilan filature plant, in Chirchik and Samarkand – 3, Tashkent – 5, Fergana – 4; of seven-year training schools for 280 seats in the state farms “Dalvarzin”, “Pyatiletka”, “Bayaut”, “Gulbakh” in the Namangan region, № 8 and “Savay” in the Andijan region, “Udarnik”in the Samarkand region and “Ayak-kuduk” in the Bukhara region.
It may be boring to read in succession a few resolutions on economic matters. Nevertheless, I would like to cite the full text of the resolution issued by the Council of Ministers of the USSR (№ 391 of February 10th, 1952) ‘On measures supporting agricultural suburban areas of Tashkent city and other industrial centers of the Uzbek SSR.’
In order to improve providing the citizens of Tashkent, Samarkand and other industrial cities with vegetables, potatoes and fresh dairy products, the Council of Ministers of the USSR decrees:
1.To establish for Tashkent city and adjoining to it industrial centers of Chirchik, Angren, Almalik and Begovat, for Samakand, Fergana and Margilan the suburban zone including Kalininskiy, Karasuiskiy, Tashselskiy, Akhan-Garanskiy, Samarkandskiy, Comsomolskiy areas and vegetable growing collective farms in: Ordjonikidzkiy, Pskentskiy, Begovatskiy, Ferganskiy, Tashlakskiy and Akhunbabaevskiy areas.
2.The Council of Ministers of the UzSSR shall provide vegetable sowing collective farms with mineral fertilizers (amounts are specified).
3.To allocate in 1952 for logistics of the suburban zones: bulldozers – 4, scrapers – 4, graders – 6, milling ditchers – 32, potato diggers – 32, seedling planters – 8, mowing machines – 8, tractors ‘Universal’ – 40, cultivators KDM – 50.
4.Separately.
5.To allocate 7,500 tons of potatoes for seeding purposes.
6.Procurement Ministry shall accept from collective farms vegetables and potatoes instead of cereal in the amount up to 30% of the amount of required cereal supply to the government.
7.To set up retail chains and stands, to grant rights to collective farms to supply their vegetables directly to distribution outlet chains and catering enterprises at the expense of the government supply.
8.To provide collective farms, state farm workers, logistics and shepherds with flour, tea and other food products (the amounts are specified).
9.To increase production of milk and meat in state farms including Mirzachulskiy, Gallyaaralskiy № 6, Kokaralskiy №7, ‘Udarnik’ and ‘Gallya-Aral’ in order to provide the Tashkent population with these products (the measures supporting these state farms are specified).
Ministry of State Farms shall sell to collective and state farms of this zone 1,300 heifers of pedigree improved breeds.
Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR shall purchase overseas 3,000 heifers of pedigree improved breeds in order to sell them to collective farms of Uzbekistan.
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR J. Stalin
Deputy Chief Executive Officer of the Council of Ministers of the USSR M. Smirtyukov
Some doubts may arise as to why the resolutions were cited so extensively, one of which was even given in full. Maybe, they should have been given as an attachment to the book. It sounds reasonable. However, I was guided in this particular case by other considerations.
First of all, for party and soviet employees it was really important not only to know how to talk convincingly, make speeches in public, write accurate resolutions and communicate with people. All these were undoubtedly needed. But also, it was very valuable for them to be good at analytical thinking, objective assessing current events with realistic prospective vision and setting up objectives and tasks which people would perceive and apprehend as their own ones, playing their particular roles in their implementation.
Secondly, according to the present standards all the listed above amounts and capacities seem to be negligible. But let us recall the postwar years when fast restoration of the national economy ruined by fascists on the occupied territories required billions of rubles. Abolition of the card system and the currency reform entailed additional expenses of more billions of rubles. The complicated international situation was also connected with big allocations.
Under those circumstances, the organizational bureau of the CC AUCP(b), the union government and Stalin in person had to make decisions on development of all spheres of the national economy and improvement of well-being and cultural standard of life of the population of Uzbekistan.
On the basis of our reports, in addition to the given above documents, a number of other decisions were taken in those months. In particular, about reclamation of Central Fergana, construction of the Kairakkum reservoir in the Leninabad region (together with the CC and the Ministers Council of Tajikistan); about increase of purchase prices for cotton, karakul and silk; about measures for development of cotton growing and livestock sector in the Bukhara, Khorezm and Surkhandarya regions (on each region separately) and in Kara-kalpak; about switch over to the new watering system (nationwide spread of experience of the famous mirab (a person who knows irrigational system and methods of water use in short-of-water regions in Central Asia) Nazarali Niyazov); about construction of the hydropower station in Angren. The extensive resolution on improvement of large cities and regional centers of Uzbekistan. For example, in the section about Tashkent it was said as follows:
I. To increase the capital investment planned for the year of 1952 by 9.6 million rubles, including as follows:
a) 3 million rubles for asphalting streets, pavements and sidewalks and 1.0 million rubles for roads engraving;
b) 0.5 million rubles for constructing a bridge over the main canal ‘Kalkauz’;
c) 1 million rubles for reconstructing the city;
d) 2.1 million rubles for constructing the Kibray water supply system;
e) 0.75 million rubles for reconstructing the two children’s summer sanatoriums;
f) 1.25 million rubles for purchase of equipment, devices and transport facilities for establishing the tram and trolley-buses trusts.
II. To oblige the Ministry of Road Communications to start building overpasses on the Parkent and Lunacharskiy highways in 1953 and widening and reconstructing the railway station ‘Tashkent’ in 1954.
III. To oblige the Ministry of Power Plants:
a) to build in Tashkent in 1953, 10 transformer vaults and low-voltage overhead networks of 10 km extension;
b) to stipulate in the plan for 1953 construction of a new city substation of 35 kilowatt and its transmission lines in Tashkent.
IV. To allocate trolley-buses, bulldozers, concrete mixers, truck cranes, lathes, mortar mills, compressors, pumps, metal, pipes, rails, roofing states, lumber, and cables to meet the Tashkent needs within the dates and in the volumes specified in the attachment.
The Tashkent executive office shall stipulate in the supply plans for 1952 supply of lorries and 5 cars, including ‘Pobeda’ – 2 cars and ‘Moskvich’ – 3 cars.
On February 10th I got a call from M. Pomaznev, who said that reprimands imposed on me and Niyazov had been canceled. Then he added, ‘Well, Nuritdin, you’ve given us it hot and strong. We’ve got in trouble, particularly some ministers.’
I wondered what he was talking about. He explained that Joseph Vissarionovich told him to verify in the ministries the list of the executives who had submitted projects to the government, the kind of projects and the feasibility report on each of them; to find out if a minister had taken decisions alone on his own and if the ministers who had submitted projects to the government of Uzbekistan had agreed on them with the party and Soviet authorities of the republic. He assigned to decrease the number of decisions made, to oblige the ministers to sort problems out on their own, to entitle the republic authorities with more rights in settling local issues.
At the end Pomaznev added, ‘All these have happened because of your information.’
The matter of fact was that at the end of the conversation with Stalin seeing his goodwill towards me I said the following, ‘Uzbekistan like the other republics has not fulfilled the planned cotton supply because of the circumstances beyond human capabilities. The year, particularly the autumn, was chilly and it was often raining and snowing. All the population took part in cotton gathering. Women and children dressed in winter clothes, together with men, were walking on the cotton fields in dirt, shaking the snow off every bush and pulling out frozen cotton bolls by fingers. Then all nights through they cleaned them off sitting in oriental tearooms and nomad tents.
Alexey Nikolayevich Kosigin was in Uzbekistan in those days. He supported us a lot and saw the people and the party organization working hard in order to save every kilogram of the harvest, doing their utmost in cotton gathering. Before me,’ I continued, ‘A. M. Mavlyanov was the chairman of the Ministers Council. He is an experienced prominent figure, the former head of the major regional party committee. However, after working for the government for less than a year, he was dismissed because of failure in his job. I never incurred any penalties before. However, having held this position for less than a year, within two months, November and December, a reprimand and two penalties related to only one issue – cotton gathering were imposed on me as well as comrade Niyazov by the USSR Ministers Council.’
Since Stalin was silently walking back and forth in his office I decided to tell him everything, ‘In 1951, the Ministers Council of the USSR adopted 5,443 resolutions, only 594 of which were received in Uzbekistan. The republican government employs 207 people, who are always short of time to study them thoroughly because they are too busy in their jobs. Meanwhile there are a lot of issues we might solve ourselves and report on results to Moscow. It would also be better if the ministers were in direct contact with the republics without overloading the Federal Ministers Council. Thus, by their joint efforts they might well implement tasks assigned by the party and the government.’
He didn’t say a word in response to my statements; and to our requests, as it turned out, he had a good attitude, in the result of which the mentioned above resolutions were adopted.
Afterwards the number of incoming resolutions of the USSR Ministers Council significantly decreased; the rights and responsibilities of the republican governments were expanded. The federal ministers and their deputies began to consult more with republican authorities, to visit and sort out issues on-site. Nevertheless, the reprimand I got from Stalin, which was in force for about 50 days, I remembered for the rest of my life.
Khodjimuradov was mentioned above. Who was he? How did Stalin come to know him? I phoned up Porjon Saidov, who was the first secretary of the regional party committee in the town of Nukus, and asked him who Khodjimuradov was and how Stalin had come to know him? It turned out that their meeting had happened in the following circumstances. The 70th anniversary of Stalin’s birthday was celebrated on December 21st, 1949. On this occasion the solemn meeting was held in the Bolshoy Theater in Moscow and in the evening the reception party was given in the Georgievskiy Hall in the Kremlin. The republics’ representatives were invited to participate in those events. One of the participants from the Uzbekistan’s delegation was a Kara-Kalpak man, called Matyakub Khodjimuradov, who was the chairman of the collective farm ‘Bolshevik’ in the Chimbay district.
Soviet leaders, leaders of foreign parties and governments and prominent figures of science, literature, fine arts, manufacture and agriculture spoke toasts to the hero of the occasion. At that moment Khodjimuradov, breaking the protocol and getting over opposing guards, came up fearlessly to Stalin. Speaking the mixed Russian and Kara-Kalpak languages, he congratulated and assured him that all the Kara-Kalpak people would do their best to successfully build socialism and to provide the Motherland with more cotton, meat, rice and other products. Stalin smiled and thanked him. All the participants were stunned at first, standing silently, then cordially applauded all at once.
Later on, Khodjimuradov used to have in his breast pocket the invitation cards for the solemn meeting in the Bolshoy Theater and the reception party in the Kremlin and always showed them to everybody. According to him everyone looked at those invitation cards with interest, which, like talismans, often helped him by opening ways and inspiring respect to their owner. He was a member of the Chimbay municipal party committee, a deputy of the Supreme Soviets of the SSR of Uzbekistan and Kara-Kalpak autonomous SSR. Nowadays he is in his well-earned rest and a retiree living in Nukus.
I recollected that I met Matyakubov Khodjimuradov in 1946, but when I had a conversation with J. V. Stalin, I got confused a little bit and forgot about it. On my return to Tashkent I visited Kara-Kalpak Republic and met him again. In 1983 we together had a vacation in the sanatorium ‘Chartak’ in the Namangan region. He was one of those who gave an idea of establishing the large rice sector in Kara-Kalpak and was also a direct participant in its successful implementation.
The resolution of the CC AUCP(b) on a convocation of the 19th party congress to be held in October, 1952 and its agenda was published in the newspaper ‘Pravda’ on August 20th, 1952.
The 11th congress of the CP(b) of Uzbekistan took place between the 20th and 23rd of September, 1952. It was special because the CC’s report was followed by discussion of the draft directives for the fifth five-year plan of the USSR development for the 1951-1955 period and the draft new party Regulations instead of the new five-year development plan of the republic as it used to be done before. Then those both documents were subjected to consideration at the 19th congress of the AUCP(b).
The 11th congress of the CP(b) of Uzbekistan approved the draft directives and the new party Regulations as well as the CC CPUz and the audit committee’s reports and elected the central party bodies of the republic and 36 delegates to the 19th party congress.
The most important event at that time was the forthcoming AUCP(b) congress. It was talked about and eagerly expected: friends abroad were happy for the USSR’s achievements, they noted its major role in the Soviet society and the world’s communist and labor movement whereas enemies tried to take advantage from it, emphasizing hardships and obstacles faced by the party and the country as a whole. Newspapers, magazines, radio and other mass media in all parts of the world published articles, notes and reports about the forthcoming congress and the Soviet Union.
The congresses of the republics’ communist parties and party conferences in the regions, areas, cities and districts aroused all-round interest. So, the 19th congress agenda promulgation manifested its historical significance.
Indeed, at the congress it was supposed to consider and discuss CC AUCP(b)’s report. That meant that the discussion had to focus on the party activities since the 18th party congress in March, 1939. For the past 13 years the Soviet people won a full victory in the Great Patriotic War; and World War II was over and resulted in crashing its instigators, suckled by imperialism – the German fascism and the Japanese militarism. According to the Soviet press at the time, in a number of countries in Europe and Asia the national democratic system was established. Thus, the world socialism system began forming. The colonial peoples got freedom one by one. The workers’ struggle in capitalist countries went up to a new level, consolidating working class and communist parties’ positions in the society.
For a short time, the Soviet Union restored the economy mainly in the regions which had been under fascist occupation, achieved major success in development of industry, transport, agriculture, science, technologies, culture and arts, as well as in nation’s well-being improvement and strengthening moral and political society integrity. The USSR’s authority and influence significantly grew in the international arena.
The five-year-plan directives specified support to the further economic growth, rise of material well-being of population and the public health care and cultural development. It is sufficient to say that it was planned, within a five-year time, to increase the manufacture industry level by 70%, with the average annual growth rate of about 14%, and to double the state capital investment. The fifth five-year plan was intended to ensure a considerable development of the whole Soviet society.
The new AUCP(b) Regulations and the elections of the central party bodies had to ensure further improvement of intraparty building, party democracy and to foster the party’s leading role. That was the main reason for huge interest in the world and to the Lenin’s party congress which was held between the 5th and 14th of October, 1952 in the Bolshoy Zal (Big Hall) in the Kremlin (at that time there was no Congress Palace).
The congress was attended by 1,192 delegates with a deciding vote, 167 delegates, representing 6,013,259 party members and 968,886 candidates to the AUCP(b) membership, with deliberative vote and the delegations from 44 fraternal communist and labor parties.
On October 5th in the morning, V.M. Molotov opened the congress with a short speech. The elected presidium consisted of 17 people. When Stalin showed up, all the attendees instantly stood up, greeting him with a rapturous applause. He saw Moris Torez sitting on the left-hand side among the guests, came up to him and bending over hugged him and firmly shook his hand. (M. Torez came from hospital after a heavy illness. He could not walk without assistance and was sitting leaning on a cane.)
While the delegates and the guests were applauding and chanting, Stalin said something to Malenkov, who with the others started fetching additional chairs. It turned out that Stalin, being informed that only the presidium members were to sit at the main table, suggested that the other members of the credentials committee, the editorial commissions and the secretariat should join them. So, they did it. Being strained and nervous, I did not watch the time and did not remember how long the ovation lasted. After Molotov's repeated attempts to calm people down, everyone at last sat down and silence settled down. Then the regulating congress bodies were elected.
The agenda and speeches time-limit were approved. The CC’s report was made by Malenkov, one of the secretaries, instead of the General secretary, who used to do it at the previous congresses, though in his presence. The report on the fifth five-year plan Directives was made by Saburov and the report on the party Regulations was made by Khrushchev.
Hard work lasted for 10 days. The congress approved CC AUCP(b) policies and practices and the central auditing committee’s report.
The fifth five-year plan outcome figures were inspiring. It was remarkable that many wishes and comments made on the congresses and conferences of the local party organizations were taken into account. The congress approved Directives with the addenda and adjustments.
The following resolution was adopted. It said: ‘From now on, ‘The All-Union Communist party’ (of the Bolsheviks) – AUCP(b) is to be called as ‘The Communist Party of the Soviet Union’ – CPSU.’
After hearing the report ‘On the amendments in the AUCP(b) Regulations’, the final-editing commission was established. Having heard the chairman’s message, the congress approved the CPSU Regulations.
The chairman spoke about necessity to arrive at agreement on the party program and gave a word to L.M. Kaganovich. The latter came up to the tribune and spoke about necessity to adopt a new party program which was to feature current stupendous changes in the country as well as in the world, party activities and world-wide communist movement growth. Also, it was to reflect current development of the Soviet society and socialism building and to show communism prospects. The speaker also suggested that the new CC members should prepare a draft party program for the further consideration, discussion and approval at the 20th congress of the CPSU.
‘Now,’ Kaganovich said, ‘our party as well as the whole Soviet society can consider Stalin’s works as a guideline; and the recently published book by comrade Stalin titled ‘Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR’ may replace the party program.’
The storm of rapturous applause broke out.
The chairman noted that obviously there was no need in further discussion of that issue and proposed, if there were no objections, to adopt the following resolution: ‘The congress has assigned the CC CPSU to prepare a new party program for the further discussion and approval at the 20th congress.’
The resolution was adopted.
The congress elected the CC, including 125 members and 111 candidates, and the central auditing committee of 37 people.
Stalin delivered a speech at the final meeting. His speech was short and devoted to the world communism and national liberation movement. On that part the congress was closed by singing the ‘International’ song.
There is one small deviation. On the sixth day of the congress Niyazov invited the members of the CC bureau and the first secretaries of the regional party committees, who were the delegates to the congress, to the permanent office of the CC of Uzbekistan.
‘I was invited to the CC,’ he said, ‘and asked about our attitude to the membership election to the supreme authority bodies from Uzbekistan. Let’s discuss our proposal. This evening I am to present the republic delegates’ opinion on this point before the chief executives. Who shall we nominate to the CC CPSU membership?’
All unanimously answered, ‘Comrade Niyazov, Amin Irmatovich.’
Their choice was motivated by the fact that only first secretaries of the CC CP of Uzbekistan had been always elected as members of the CC AUCP(b). Thus, Akmal Ikramov was elected at the 17th congress of the AUCP(b) in January-February, 1934, and Usman Yusupov was elected at the 18th party congress in 1939.
Niyazov thanked everyone and continued, ‘We need to nominate one candidate to the CC CPSU and one candidate to the auditing committee membership. We might nominate Melnikov as a candidate to the CC membership and Mukhitdinov as a candidate to the central auditing committee membership? What do you think of this?’
Everyone agreed with the proposal and started congratulating the nominees.
To me, it was undoubtedly a colossal trust: I was just 35 years old and had about ten-year party experience. Besides, at the previous party congresses the chairmen of the Ministers Council of Uzbekistan had never been elected as members of the CPSU supreme bodies. Of the six chairmen of the Ministers Council before me, only Faizulla Khodjaev was a member of the Presidium of the central executive committee of the USSR. Apart from that, by the time I had worked as the chairman of the government of Uzbekistan for about one and a half years. So, I realized how much I was trusted and the responsibility I undertook.
In the evening having returned from the CC meeting, Niyazov informed us that all our suggestions had been approved: Niyazov nominated as the CC member, Melnikov as a candidate to the CC membership and Mukhitdinov as a member of the central auditing committee. At the last congress meeting the last issue of the agenda on election to the governing bodies membership was discussed. They came to an agreement on the number of members and candidates to the CC and the central auditing committee membership. They began announcing the list of the proposed candidates. At first the list of the candidates to the CC CPSU was announced, including Mukhitdinov and Niyazov, mentioned in the alphabet order. Melnikov was in the list of the candidates to the CC membership and to the central auditing committee membership there was nobody from Uzbekistan. We, sitting in the hall, were puzzled looking at each other, and it was not appropriate to say or ask anything, while Amin Irmatovich was sitting in the congress presidium. Everyone voted and elected the whole list of the candidates as it was proposed.
None of us knew what had happened. We asked Niyazov during a break, but he shortly answered that no one had talked to him about it. Only after the plenum Ignatyev, meeting me in the corridor, congratulated and asked me, ‘Do you know what has happened to you?’
I answered in the negative. Then he said, ‘We - Malenkov, Shatalin and I - reported to Stalin on the personal list of the nominees to the governing bodies membership. When Malenkov announced the candidates’ names of the draft membership of the central auditing committee, Stalin heard your last name and proposed to transfer you to the CC CPSU membership. Apart from that, he had two more remarks and we immediately amended.’
The plenum started in the morning of October 16th in the Sverdlov Hall of the Kremlin. J.V. Stalin announced opening of the first CC plenum with the new membership, then submitted a proposal: in concordance with the Resolutions approved at the congress to abolish Politburo and instead of it to form Presidium of the CC CPSU of 25 people, with Bureau of 9 people included in it; to abolish Organizational Bureau of the CC and to entrust its functions to the Secretariat of the CC CPSU consisting of 11 people.
‘We also need to elect,’ he said, ‘the membership and a chairman of the party committee monitoring under the CC CPSU, and the central auditing committee members are to elect their new chairman.’
Then he proposed to abolish the title of General Secretary and replace it with First Secretary of the CC CPSU.
At that time Kaganovich sitting in the second row said, ‘We need to elect the party chairman.’
Turning to him Stalin asked, ‘Whom?’
Kaganovich repeated, ‘The party chairman.’
Stalin said again, ‘Say this louder again, whom you are suggesting.’
Kaganovich taken aback and with a tremulous voice repeated, ‘The party chairman…’
Stalin snapped out, ‘There won’t be any chairman!’
All burst into loud laughing in the hall. Kaganovich looked pitiful. He blanched and dropped his head.
Then Stalin said something like this, ‘Comrades! Do not nominate me for the position of First secretary of the CC. My health is getting worse and physically I cannot focus properly on party activities which we need to activate.’
Immediately Malenkov stood up, came up to the rostrum and said, ‘Comrades! I think it is extremely necessary for the party to be led by comrade Stalin as it was before. We need to elect Joseph Vissarionovich as First secretary of the CC.’
Some voices were heard from the hall, saying, ‘That’s right! That’s right!’ and then followed by the rapturous applause. He returned to his seat in the presidium.
Stalin continued, ‘Comrades! I do not feel good lately. My blood pressure has increased. I’ve got headaches, feel generally sick and I can’t sit in the same place for a long time. It would be better to appoint someone who is younger and healthier.’
Malenkov rose, came down to the rostrum again and said, ‘We all sincerely wish comrade Stalin strong health, but as you know comrade Stalin actively works and all our achievements and success related to the name and activities of comrade Stalin. Let’s ask Joseph Vissarionovich to accept a post of First secretary.’ (In the hall, ‘We’re asking you to accept a post! We’re asking you to accept a post!’ followed by ovations.)
Stalin raised his hand and asked to calm down. There was a complete silence in the hall. He pulled out a sheet of paper from his pocket and began announcing the membership of Politburo:
‘The First secretary – Stalin.’
All rose and applauded for a long time.
Afterwards he called by a/z the personal membership of the new authority body – the CC Presidium consisting of 25 people. No questions were asked. Everything he proposed was approved. He proposed the list of membership of the Presidium Bureau, which was approved unanimously. Further he announced the CC secretaries’ names, who were approved unanimously too.
Then he said, ‘Molotov and Mikoyan are not in the Bureau membership. Mikoyan has been a member of the leadership for a long time, but made a number of serious mistakes during World War II related to the army procurement, and also, during the postwar period in arranging trade with other countries. His irresponsibility cost our government and nation too much. As for Molotov, although he has done much for the country, especially in the foreign policy, but in some issues before, during and after the war he didn’t always show fidelity to the principle and overlooked a number of serious issues.’
We all were strenuously listening to and watching what was going on.
Molotov raised his hand and asked for permission to speak. Stalin nodded. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich came up to the rostrum and said, ‘Comrades! Of course, I’ve had mistakes and oversights in my work, but I’ve always been comrade Stalin’s apprentice.’ And he returned to his seat.
Mikoyan raised his hand and asked for permission to say a few words. Stalin nodded. Anastas Ivanovich came up to the rostrum and said, ‘Comrades! I admit that I’ve made mistakes, but they weren’t deliberate. I agreed with the others upon each action I took inside and outside of the country and tried to do my best to implement them in a better way and for our good…’
It seemed that Stalin got tired of listening to and he looked at Mikoyan standing with his back to him and waved his hand. The audience immediately started emotionally shouting, ‘Stop self-justifying! We know you, comrade Mikoyan! Stop misleading the CC!’
Mikoyan wanted to say something else, but the audience interrupted him and he took his seat again.
Stalin said, ‘Let them be in the membership of the Presidium. The membership list of the Bureau of the Presidium shouldn’t be published in the mass media because it’s an internal body of the CC. The membership lists of the Presidium, Secretariat and the Leadership of the Central auditing committee and the party control committee will be published.’
Everyone agreed with him. Then he said a few words about the tasks arising from the results of the congress and the current plenum and closed the plenum.
After that J. V. Stalin lived for only 4 months and 21 days.
V
STALIN’S DEATH.
WHO WILL BE INSTEAD OF HIM?
On March 1st, 1953 I flew to Moscow to the meeting of the government committee which took place on March 2nd. On the same day in the evening there was a call from the CC to the permanent representative office to summon me to the CC, and on March 3rd five or six of us, the CC members, were invited by N.N. Shatalin who informed us that on March 2nd at night comrade Stalin had a hemorrhage of the brain and was in a poor condition.
The best medical doctors were involved in his treatment.
We were immediately familiarized with the draft government message about comrade Stalin’s illness. It was suggested that on March 4th that message on behalf of the CC CPSU and the Council of Ministers should be published in the mass media and broadcasted on the radio and the bulletin about his health condition and his treatment should be published daily. We were asked to stay in Moscow for a while.
On March 4th in the morning, I got a call to my hotel room and was asked to come to the Sverdlov Hall of the Kremlin by 11 o’clock. It turned out that all who were in Moscow at that time, including members and candidates to the CC membership, members of the auditing committee, government and Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were invited there. We all together expected the appearance of the leadership. When we all sat down, Malenkov came up to the rostrum and literally said, ‘Comrades, from the government’s message and doctors’ bulletin that were published today you have known that comrade Stalin is seriously ill: hemorrhage has spread on the vitally important organs. It is highly likely that Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin will never return to work, and the government, party and the country cannot be without a leader. In this connection, it would be reasonable to consult with you about reorganization of some government bodies and redeployment of some employees occupying certain positions to make sure that all government bodies can function continuously. You all are aware of extreme importance of these changes for both internal and external reasons. I am going to pronounce some draft resolutions preliminary drawn by the members of the CC Presidium. Let us discuss them together and make a decision.’
The proposed changes were regarding the membership of the Council of Ministers, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and governing bodies of the CC CPSU. It was also suggested to considerably reorganize ministries. Without mentioning details, I would like to note the essential replacements in the leadership, which later played the crucial role in the country’s life. On Malenkov’s suggestion all the alterations were introduced on behalf of the CC CPSU, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. For that matter their joint meeting took place on March 6th.
All the proposals were adopted without any alterations and additions. G.M. Malenkov became the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and N.S. Khrushchev was reasonably released from the post of First secretary of the CC so that he could ‘focus on the work in the CC CPSU’. Beria, Molotov, Bulganin and Kaganovich were appointed as the first deputies of Malenkov. All of them, except Kaganovich, still remained as ministers. Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov and Pervukhin became the members of the CC Presidium.
On March 5th at night, we were invited to the CC, where Shatalin and two more employees of the CC informed us that Stalin had just passed away, and on March 6th in the morning the Statement to the party and the nation and the medical report would be broadcasted on the radio and published in the mass media. We were informed of the decision on the commission formation for the funeral arrangement. Also, we were told that the coffin with Stalin’s body would be placed in the Column Hall of the Unions House. Then a few of us, the CC members, were asked to be permanently available in the Column Hall to help the commission.
I had never participated in such events before. What’s more, it was about J. V. Stalin’s death and funeral. All I saw and heard at that time was deeply engraved in my memory…
When we came in the Column Hall, a special group of military people had already done appropriate preparations. We got also involved in it. The big portrait of J. V. Stalin in a funeral frame was hanged up on the pediment of the Union House (on Marx Avenue side). Inside the building in the center of the Column Hall, there was a large pedestal for the coffin. The scarlet cloths of banners were hanging above the head part of the coffin, all the marble columns of the hall were draped with red-black ribbons. Huge cut-glass chandeliers were tightened with crepes. Numerous wreaths were put in the back of the hall, behind and on each side of the coffin.
When we gathered again, we decided on the procedure of the meetings and sending-off the guests and foreign delegations, regulation and procedure of the honor guards and organizing citizens passing. We didn’t forget about paying tribute to his relatives. We thought in detail over the ending the farewell ceremony, taking out and escorting the coffin up to Red Square. Holding the funeral meeting and the burial were also the focus of our attention.
The coffin with the body of the deceased was brought in, put on the pedestal and the cover was opened. On its each side there were four soldiers dressed in service caps, military tunics, holding rifles and having funeral ribbons on the left arm. They were standing still at attention and looked as if they were made of granite. On the left side of the coffin there were his relatives, and on the stage, there were musicians from the Bolshoi symphony orchestra.
The farewell ceremony started at the fixed time. The first funeral watch was kept by the supreme leadership of the country, then by the government commission members and by us who were helping them. There was an unwritten but a firm procedure of the funeral organization. In the honor guards the Soviet people normally stood on both sides of the coffin in two rows from the sentinels: at the head and the foot side, there were four people at each side, making 16 people altogether, who stood there for three minutes. Each foreign delegation stood in the honor guard at the foot side of the coffin, facing the deceased. All visitors came to the Union House from Pushkin street past the October Hall, entered the Column Hall by two people approaching the coffin and without stopping went out of the 9th and the 10th exits to Georgievskii lane towards Gorkii street. All the ceremony, from the entrance from Pushkin street till the exit to Georgievskii lane, took five minutes. For the period, from the opening moment at 6 o’clock in the morning up to 2 o’clock in the next early morning, the flow of people didn’t decrease for a minute. Muscovites, people from the other republics, regions, areas and foreigners passed continuously.
It was very difficult to be permanently in the Column Hall. The symphony orchestra played non-stop soul tormenting funeral melodies. I didn’t see anyone whoever it was: a government officer, a party employee, a veteran of the world communist and working movement, an ordinary Soviet person who wouldn’t lament at the bottom of the heart, and many people cried.
When I was in the hall, a few times I looked intently and attentively at the face of the deceased. Previously, I had repeatedly seen, heard him and reported to him. Now I just wanted to imprint in my memory the look of the leader before his relegation to oblivion.
The atmosphere in the hall was so tense and strenuous that it was hard to focus. Nevertheless, different thoughts about him occurred to me. I remembered when he was alive glorification and laudation were close to an idolization. He was called ‘the genius thinker’, ‘the science coryphaeus’, ‘the wise leader’ and ‘the greatest commander-in-chief’ and so on. Now his body, lifeless forever, was lying in the coffin exposed to a public viewing and parting…
There were his relatives, mourning, with their heads down: Jacob’s children – Eugenii and Galya, Vasilii and Svetlana with their families and other relatives.
For the past years he suffered from old and new ailments… His left arm became half-bent as a result of beatings by gendarmes in prison. When he escaped from the Turukhan exile, he got a pneumonia followed by complications. Besides, in recent years he suffered from hypertension, rheumatism and other illnesses he mentioned at the last CC plenum…
The members of the supreme leadership of the CC CPSU and the Soviet government stood as honor guards with the funeral ribbons on the left arms, then came up to his relatives to express condolences to them: some kissed every one of them, some shook their hands, some said a few words of commiseration and then returned to the side room. The leaders of foreign delegations did the same.
At the honor guard there were the representatives of party bodies, Military forces, veterans, representatives of intellectuals, workers, peasants, and delegations from the republics, regions and districts. On the second day, a group of comrades led by A. I. Niyazov arrived from Tashkent city. We all represented Uzbekistan.
Brezhnev entered the hall alone: he didn’t join the leadership group. It was hard to recognize him: his eyes were red, face in tears, his eyelids and face turned purple. Coming up the coffin and seeing the deceased, he literally cried so loudly that the member of the funeral commission, marshal A. I. Vasilevskii, approached him and said quietly, ‘Leonid Iliich, pull yourself together. Everybody is looking at you.’
Brezhnev, as if he came to himself, looked around and went out of the hall with fast strides. Speaking frankly, I felt sorry for him. Because only a few days before he had been a member of the supreme leadership, driven on ‘Chaika’ car, followed by his bodyguards, lived in the mansion and had a country house. It wasn’t easy to get an appointment with him. His portraits had been taken out for holiday demonstrations. And now he was only a deputy chief of the general policy management of the Soviet Army and Military Navy Float. How may losses of positions and honors change a human…!
On March 9th at 2 o’clock in the early morning the Column Hall was closed. The funeral preparation was going on till the late morning. None of us slept a wink. The flowers were taken away from the pedestal, the body was covered with the red silk cloth. Then the coffin was closed and the USSR flag was spread on the coffin. His relatives were present there all the time.
In the early morning the leaders of the party and the government arrived. At 10 o’clock they stood before the coffin for the last time. At 10:05 they lifted it and headed to the entrance through the second main exit. In Marx Avenue the coffin was put on a gun carriage, and the Soviet Union Generalissimo’s cap was put on top of the coffin. The cortege moved slowly, led by the general who directed the procession, followed by two military officers who carried the funeral-framed portrait of the deceased. Further there were numerous wreaths, each carried by two people. Next marshals and generals carried the deceased’s orders and medals on velvety pillows. They were followed by the gun carriage with the coffin; with his family members and relatives walking slowly behind it. Next in the procession there were members of the supreme leadership and the commission, which organized the funeral. The next group included the CC members, ministers and heads of different foreign delegations. A brass band brought up the rear. The sounds of mourning melodies poured out.
We were striding along Marx Avenue, then turned left past the hotel ‘Moskva’, the building of the Historical Museum from the side of Alexandrovskii Garden, and went on along Kremlin Avenue towards the center of Red Square. We passed the distance between the Unions House and the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum, which was about a kilometer, for thirty minutes.
The weather was nasty and cold; it was snowing, but we all took hats off and were walking with our heads down. On the way a few battle-hardened revolutionaries, who had faced death many times, fainted. They were picked up by ‘ambulance’ cars. There were crowds of people everywhere: in avenues, streets, on building roofs and balconies.
At 10:45 the funeral cortege stopped by the Lenin Mausoleum. The coffin was taken off the gun carriage and put on a high pedestal facing the Mausoleum, with the cover removed. Behind the coffin, there were only his relatives; we moved towards the left platform while the other ones were occupied by the foreign delegations, diplomats. The Soviet people were standing on both sides of Red Square and opposite the Mausoleum. The members of the Soviet leadership and the funeral organizing commission came upstairs to the platform. There were also Gheorghiu-Dej, Bolesław Bierut, Pak Den Ai, Walter Ulbricht, Dolores Ibárruri, Otto Grotewohl, Vâlko Chervenkov, Mátyás Rákosi, Zhou Enlai, Pietro Nenni, Palmiro Togliatti, Jacques Duclos, Klement Gottwald.
Khrushchev opened the funeral meeting with a short speech. Then Malenkov, Molotov, and the others spoke. In an hour the funeral meeting was closed and all came downstairs. The representatives of the former Soviet leadership lifted the coffin and headed for the Mausoleum. There inside some specialists and scientists transferred J.V. Stalin’s body from the coffin to a sarcophagus. The clock on the Spasskaya Tower stroke 12:00 o’clock, and a salute of thirty salvoes was fired. All the factories, plants and steamships’ prolonged whistles were heard for three minutes; all the enterprises stopped working and city life came to a standstill for five minutes.
The same members of the leadership came upstairs to the platform. Before the Mausoleum the Moscow garrison units marched with a firm tread; some airplanes flew in an accurate order, paying last honors to J.V. Stalin.
The funeral ceremony finished at the fixed time. Everybody departed, and we immediately flew to Tashkent city. Besides, we were supposed to return to Moscow in four days for the congress of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
On March 14th the CC CPSU Plenum was held in the Sverdlov Hall. At a suggestion of G.M. Malenkov, who was the chairperson of the Plenum, we paid our last respects to J.V. Stalin with a silence minute. After discussing the agenda, we elected the Presidium of the CC CPSU, the composition of which was approved at the joint meeting on March 6th. Four secretaries were approved at that time, and additionally at the suggestion of N.S. Khrushchev, M.A. Suslov was elected as a secretary of the CC CPSU.
The fact of the matter was that Mikhail Andreevich was elected as a member of the Presidium and a CC CPSU secretary at the first Plenum of the CC, which was formed at the 19th party congress. However, he wasn’t included in the Presidium and the CC secretariat, becoming ‘nobody’ in fact at the joint meeting on March 4th. In ten days Khrushchev corrected that situation. Undoubtedly, he needed Suslov very much.
The Plenum dismissed G.M. Malenkov from the post of CC CPSU secretary because he was appointed the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Therewith it was stipulated without taking a special decision that he would be responsible for the work of the Presidium of the CC CPSU and be the chairman at the meetings of the Presidium and Plenum of the CC.
Afterwards there was the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in the Kremlin Palace, which was opened with a silence minute in the memory of Stalin. The deputies without discussions approved structural changes and the list of the new membership of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, ministries and offices. Also, the necessary changes and additions to the Constitution of the USSR, arising from those redeployment, were approved. So, the session was closed.
Major changes in the higher echelon of the party, in the government, society, everything that had been created by Stalin and under his direct supervision were implemented within ten days.
In this way, J.V. Stalin whose death riveted all the world’s attention became history.
In those days when Stalin was ill and bedridden, neither in the country nor in the party, but in the Kremlin started a severe fight for the position of First secretary of the CC CPSU, i.e., the first leader of the party and the government of the Soviet Union.
I was one of those who unexpectedly were in an orbit of this conflict among groups and people from the higher leadership. Fortunately, I escaped from the trouble due to the July Plenum of the CC CPSU which took place in the same year.
Malenkov, Beria, and Khrushchev launched the most active purposeful fight for the highest position in the Kremlin hierarchy. Obviously, there were some other members of the higher echelon who also wanted to become the top person, but they realized they didn’t have any chance. So, keeping silence, they waited for fight outcome.
‘The Three’, ‘The Six’, ‘The Five’, ‘The Four’, ‘The Seven’… In this particular case I’m not talking about the playing cards, but I’m talking about illegal accusations and groups in leading circles. I will explain.
‘The Six’ was the group of the closest to Stalin people, especially during the war and in the early postwar period. It’s well known that at the CC Plenum, established at the 18th congress of the AUCP(b), were founded the Politburo, Organizational Bureau and the CC Secretariat. On their behalf and to their consent, decisions were made, orders were given, organizational, political and other activities were implemented. But being on top of the party hierarchy and all those executive bodies, Stalin mostly contacted, advised with, decided on all kinds of issues with Molotov, Shcherbakov, Zhdanov, Malenkov, and Beria. They made the so-called ‘The Six’ group led by Stalin who after advance discussion and agreement passed their decisions and instructions on any issue to the further formal endorsement by the State Military Committee, CC CPSU, government or Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in accordance with the document content.
‘The Five’ group included those who directly surrounded Stalin. It was them whom Stalin fully trusted. They were always with him. It was formed the day before and strengthened after the 19th party congress. They were Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Bulganin.
‘The Four’ group was established by N.S. Khrushchev when he had already become First secretary of the CC CPSU and later chairman of the Council of Ministers. It included Suslov, Mikoyan, and Kozlov. And ‘The Seven’, known as anti-party group, was also active during the Khrushchev’s time.
Collegiality and collective decision-making nature was superficially maintained. When it was urgent, the meetings of Politburo, Secretariat and Plenums were held, and sometimes they conducted a survey on one or another issue.
This ‘arithmetic’ doesn’t naturally reflect all forms of leadership’s work. Stalin, then Khrushchev didn’t always agree with the others on all matters; they sometimes moved away some and attracted the others instead, in this way trying to keep all the power in their own hands. However, the action scheme and their management methods exactly enough reflect the true situation.
Let’s take a closer look into it. My generation was formed in the 1930s-1940s under the influence of strong propaganda, agitation, appealing to infinite love and devotion to Stalin. His speeches and works were thoroughly studied, especially his ‘Short Course of the Party History’. During World War II we went to attack with a slogan of ‘For Motherland! For Stalin!’ His words, orders and just even his name had the strongest impact on us in any situation whether it was a defeat or a victory.
For the following years, having become a party employee, I also cited, popularized his works and name. As to the mass repressions in the 1930s, serious mistakes during collectivization and in the methods of industrialization, failures and substantial losses at the beginning of the war, we were strictly convinced, and we truly believed, that it all happened because of some others’ fault. Whereas Stalin was innocent, even ‘holy’, who had strategic vision on the future. At that time, it all seemed doubtless and was taken for granted.
But on October 16th, 1952 I saw different Stalin at ‘my first’ plenum. I was literally puzzled like most other new members of the CC by how drastically he condemned and took severe measures against Molotov, who had worked with Lenin and after Lenin’s death had always been with Stalin. Even when he was bemired, he vehemently assured of being a faithful Stalin’s apprentice and would remain forever. And Mikoyan, when he wanted to acquit himself in something, generally admitting his faults, once Stalin waved his hand, was subjected to obstruction by all the attendees in the hall. Kaganovich was respected in Uzbekistan. In the first years of the Soviet power he led the Tashkent Council, later he was repeatedly elected as a delegate to the party congresses and a deputy of the SU Supreme Soviet from Uzbekistan. But here at the plenum, he was almost brought to a heart attack only because he wanted to give a hint to Stalin to speak about the election of a party chairman. Stalin perfectly heard his hint, but deliberately forced him to say the same louder so that the whole audience could hear him. Then Stalin interrupted him abruptly.
At that plenum I was beholding the different Stalin: he was not only, as we used to see him, a wise, farsighted, caring leader, but also a dangerous, severe, merciless to people, who didn’t even spare his closest fellow fighters revealing in them any detail he perceived as an insufficient attention to his personality. I vaguely felt that he could not only remove anybody from the highest positions, delete all their merits and achievements, but also even liquidate physically. That’s why all the leading figures in the Kremlin toadied, fawned and lived in constant fear, since their rise and downfall up to a physical liquidation depended first of all on Stalin.
In such environment of permanent pressure and fear, our leaders, whom we adored and lavished compliments to them everywhere, had to voluntarily or not ‘compete’ with each other: who would brighter and more successful manifest his devotion and loyalty to Stalin. But on the other hand, perhaps, it made them seek for support among the closest people in their circle and from the grass roots. I noticed that when I was in Moscow, when Stalin was ill, and during preparation of his funeral.
Let’s try to analyze the situation. Thus, the resolution of the joint meeting of the CC, the Council of Ministers and Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR about the reorganization of the governing bodies and personnel appointments was adopted. In the press they didn’t mention the dates of its approval and signing. So, there was a question: who were the authors of that resolution and changes? How did they come to an agreement? Why did they decide to discuss them when Stalin was bedridden in a mortal agony? There is an assumption that the closest figures of that time – Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin – were actually the authors, who shared among themselves the positions and came to an agreement about the other candidates, having negotiated with each one on those redeployments in private conversation and on the phone. However, some of them found out about their appointment directly at the meeting as they hadn’t been contacted before. By the way, in the lobby after Malenkov’s report at the meeting, the rumors that all those alterations had been allegedly suggested by Stalin in his last will were ‘secretly’ whispered. Of course, there wasn’t in that a grain of the truth.
Could those people who came to power to come to an agreement among themselves after Stalin’s death? Most likely they couldn’t because they all were different people with different intentions and attitudes, they had disagreements, sometimes long lasting openly hostile. Being afraid of being accused of the power seizure, while Stalin was still alive, they arrived at the consensus on redeployment of new appointments, and on March 4th they got an approval of the CC members and finally formalized the agreement as the resolution on March 6th.
As for the fact of Stalin’s death, there were rumors that Stalin had been, allegedly, poisoned, although the doctors, scientists who had carried out postmortem examination confirmed that there hadn’t been revealed any poison traces. Was it possible to prolong Stalin’s life? I don’t know. He had been treated by the most experienced doctors of that time. But at the same time there was another question: were his closest people interested in his recovery? I’d take a risk to say ‘Hardly’.
Some eyewitnesses, who were attending and serving Stalin, constantly being nearby him in his country house for the whole period from the moment of his illness up to his death, informed the press how it had happened. Afterwards, I heard of some other details from some new leaders.
What makes me think over is the following. On February 28th, Stalin was visited by Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin. They were sitting, drinking, eating and watching a movie till 4 o’clock in the early morning of March 1st. After letting them go home, Stalin told his guards not to disturb him as he wanted to go to bed, and turned the lights off. As it was known he lived alone and none of his family members was with him. He used to get up at about 11-12 o’clock in the morning. But on that day, there were no calls from him for a long time. The guards and other attendants were worried about him. It was getting late evening, but he still didn’t show up. However, nobody dared to knock at his door and enter his room. At last, one of them feeling worried that something was wrong, phoned up Malenkov and told him about the situation. Malenkov, having listened to him without replying, put down the receiver. Thirty minutes later, he himself called back and said he couldn’t contact Beria and ordered the guards to find him and report to him about the situation. Beria was finally contacted in the late evening and was informed about the situation on the phone.
Beria immediately ordered not to tell or call anybody. After a few hours late at night he came together with Malenkov. They opened the door, entered a small dining-room and saw Stalin in a recumbent position leaning on an armchair. Coming up to him, Beria carefully looked at Stalin’s face and came back and scolded the guards accusing them that they were spreading provocative rumors whereas comrade Stalin was just asleep. Malenkov and Beria left together ordering the guards not to call or invite anyone. Seeing that Stalin wasn’t feeling better, one of the attendants serving him asked him how he was. Stalin opened his eyes, but couldn’t answer anything because his speech had already been paralyzed. He was transferred from the floor into his bed and regardless of Beria’s instruction they called Molotov.
Vyacheslav Mikhailovich arrived there right away (let’s remember what Stalin had recently done to him at the 19th congress). Seeing Stalin’s condition, he found it necessary to inform members of the CC Presidium (they arrived immediately) and to urgently call the minister of healthcare, Tretyakov, with some doctors. And only after that on March 2nd at night, the doctors arrived, started examination and treatment. That’s why the first bulletin about Stalin’s disease was dated on March 2nd at 2 o’clock in the early morning.
A few members of the presidium gathered together, were informed about the state of affairs and listened carefully to the doctors’ opinions. After that, four of the closest to Stalin people secluded to prepare those alterations which were reported and approved on March 4th.
Maybe, it wasn’t exactly like this and something was exaggerated here and there. Until now, for example, it’s not clear about the fact that one of the employees who were present by Stalin’s bed informed the press much later: the medicine doctors gave him some injection, then Stalin’s body quivered. After about ten minutes, the patient made a deep breath and passed away. What does it mean?...
Dethronement of Stalin’s personality cult was officially launched in February, 1956 by Khrushchev’s report at the 20th congress of the CPSU. Though the symptoms of changing attitudes to him and reassessment of his activities were already felt at the CC plenum which took place in four days after his funeral on March 14th, 1953.
Here are some facts. Ivan Fedorovich Tevosyan, who was an eminent metallurgist, machine builder, then the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, then minister of the USSR and a candidate to the membership of the CC Presidium, after hearing in Malenkov’s speech the words about the necessity of serious changes and improvement of work at all levels of the party and government established under Stalin’s rule, came up to the tribune and beating himself against his breast with his fist spoke out with Armenian emotionality, ‘Nobody can tear our dear teacher and the great leader, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, out of our hearts and memories!’
Soon he found himself in Tokyo to become the Soviet ambassador to Japan.
The oldest bolshevik, A.A. Andreev, after hearing that Malenkov, who was the chairman of the Council of Ministers, simultaneously would head the CC Presidium (Politburo), welcomed it with the words that Malenkov was the worthy successor of comrade Stalin. Malenkov immediately retorted, ‘The successor is the Presidium; now we have the collective leadership.’
Khrushchev expressively looked at Andreev and kept his eyes on him until the latter sat down. After a while, A.A. Andreev, who was a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet at the time, was dismissed from that position and appointed an advisor to the Supreme Soviet.
M.A. Suslov, at the joint meeting on March 4th, didn’t become a member of the Presidium and the Secretariat. Being the CC member and the Supreme Soviet deputy, he turned out ‘jobless’. Nevertheless, in ten days at the plenum, under Khrushchev’s suggestion and insistence, he was elected as the CC secretary. What actually happened? Malenkov hated Suslov for his being an apparatus officer and a dogmatist. However, Khrushchev needed him, for he realized that he himself was theoretically weak, unaware of science and culture fields. At the same time, dreaming of coming to power, he needed someone who used to be, not accidentally, in the past the chief editor of The Pravda newspaper.
As the result of the plenum, on March 14th, on the same day, there was a session of the Supreme Soviet. The situation in the highest echelon of power was as follows: there was no leader of the party – its First secretary, the CC Secretariat didn’t have a leading person because all the five secretaries were equal, and the CC Presidium was taken over by the chairman of the Council of Ministers and his deputies.
Thus, the leaderless party functioned for seven months. For that period, a hidden split and undercover conflicts among the executives in the Kremlin didn’t stop and gradually became more severe.
Many years later, we, Andrei Andreevich Andreev and I, being in India, sitting in the moonlight at the lovely table at the President’s country house, were talking and recalling the past.
Answering my question, he said that the situation immediately after Stalin’s death was as follows: the three executives, including Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev, pretended to the leadership. All of them were close to Stalin, enjoyed his special attention, but none of them had required qualities both subjective and objective in order to immediately replace Stalin.
‘I remember,’ he continued, ‘the 1920s, the conflict with the Zinoviev-Kamenev group and the confrontation between Trotsky and Stalin. At that time, it was more or less clear and they publicly spoke out against each other, stating their attitudes and views, criticizing their opponents. The Zinoviev-Kamenev group was easily secluded and later liquidated. Trotsky was a serious opponent, and it was really hard for Stalin to fight him. But he chose appropriate tactics: he spoke in his speeches and articles that there was nothing personal between them. The main issue was about the choice of Leninism or Trotskism. ‘I am,’ Stalin affirmed, ‘for an unconditional support and popularization of V.I. Lenin’s theory and politics, his experience and style, whose apprentice I am.’ That’s why,’ Andrei Andreevich continued, ‘we, since we all adored Lenin, unreservedly and wholeheartedly supported Stalin. Trotsky was dismissed, exiled and his conceptions were clobbered; later he was killed in Mexico… Now after Stalin’s death Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev intended to occupy his place, without having any serious policy program to be promulgates and promoted. So, they just were fighting for their personal leadership position. In that situation the leadership actually was taken over by Malenkov; Khrushchev wasn’t entitled with wide rights, nor was he supported by the lower strata. As to Beria, he was elbowing his way through his mates. Each one of them had strengths and some advantages in addition to pure careerism and ambitions. So, as you see, how could we make a right choice in such a turmoil and choose the right horse to bet…’
He had a deep breath in clean air, drank at a gulp the Scotch whisky mixed with ice and mineral water and, having comfortably suited himself in an armchair, was enjoying and admiring the beautiful scenery, tropical trees, some peacocks, ostriches, gazelles and Persian gazelles which were grazing in the velvety fields. He was listening to fanciful symphony of parrots and other eastern birds.
VI
ON THE EDGE OF THE ABYSS…
In 1953 Beria, causing clashes among his ‘peers and associates’ by manipulating and playing them, taking an advantage from their weaknesses, meanwhile was thinking over and trying to implement his nationwide plot.
Having been involved for a long time in work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and KGB, Beria had placed loyal to him employees in all the government bodies. How did he get a limitless trust of Stalin? I want to remind the readers of the main landmarks and points of his biography. He was born in Abkhazia in 1899. He joined the party membership in 1917, was a CC member from 1934, a Politburo member from 1946. From 1921 to 1931 he worked in the reconnaissance and counter-intelligence, was a deputy chairman of Azerbaijan Temporary Extraordinary Commission, a chairman of the Georgian and Transcaucasian government political administration. From 1931 he was the first secretary of the CC CP(b) of Georgia and at the same time from 1932 he was the first secretary of the Transcaucasian region committee and Tbilisi municipal party committee. In 1938 he showed up in Moscow and became a national commissioner of the internal affairs of the USSR and in 1941 became a chairman of the Council of National Commissioners of the USSR. He was a hero, deputy and marshal. In 1941 he was also appointed the General commissioner of the State Security of the USSR.
Obviously, he was involved to the marrow of his bones in reconnaissance and counter-intelligence, thoroughly knew how and was able to skillfully discredit people he disliked and, if it was necessary, to even liquidate them. He always took a benefit from people’s weaknesses, blackmail and manipulate persons with criminal past life for his own favor. But how did he manage to climb up to the top of the party-government Olympus?
I think there were two more reasons for that.
The head of the security bodies, Yagoda, was executed by shooting on March 15th, 1938 and Yezhov, his successor, - in May 1940. Thus, all the power of those security agencies passed to Beria. He was immediately surrounded by his buddies, whom he fully trusted. For example, in Uzbekistan repressions in the 1930s-1940s were led by Sadzhaya and Aresyan, his bosom friends in dark deeds.
Another reason was a nationality factor. In those years in Moscow in the higher authority, there were three Georgians: Stalin, Ordjonikidze and Yenukidze. Whatever internationalist a person would be, whatever post he would hold, one would still keep in one’s mind feelings of national identity, national customs and traditions. The second Stalin’s wife, Nadezhda Allilueva, wrote that Stalin had often spoken to Ordjonikidze and Yenukidze in Georgian. They used to lay the dinner table, drink and spend their free time in the Georgian custom. Eventually, Ordjonikidze shot himself and Yenukidze died in prison. Adroitly using those circumstances, Beria gained confidence of Stalin to enter his home.
There is another factor about it. In those years there were some foreign publications about dark episodes from Stalin’s childhood and adolescence. His (Stalin's)name was Joseph Djugashvili then. Perhaps, being thoroughly informed about it, Beria and his faithful companion by work in punitive bodies, Jaffar Baghirov, in their literature works such as articles, speeches, and brochures, emphasized that Stalin was born to a poor family, in his early youth participated in revolutionary movement, dedicated his poetical gift to poor peasants, workers and called them to fight for happiness. In his early youth he had to lead the revolutionary movement in Georgia, Baku and in all Transcaucasia. According to them, he developed and put into life the Transcaucasian revolutionary path independent from the Russian Bolsheviks revolutionary movement. In this way, Stalin as an organizer and a leader of the social-democratic liberation movement of the Caucasus entered the membership of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party. He got recognition in its ranks and allegedly became the closest companion and friend of Lenin. Of course, Stalin couldn’t help noticing and highly appreciated Beria’s efforts and ‘merits’. What kind of rights and influence Beria had I will tell you about in two examples, though I might give you a lot more. Uzbekistan in 1940 delivered 1.5 million tons of cotton but in 1943 – only 500 thousand tons, i.e., three times less. At the beginning of 1944 the leadership of the CC CP of Uzbekistan were summoned to Moscow and at the meeting of the organizational bureau, Usman Yusupov, the first secretary of the CC CP of the republic, made a report. A.S. Sherbakov, the chairperson of the meeting, addressed to Usman Yusupov saying, ‘Comrade Yusupov, are you going to leave the army and the people without pants in such difficult time for the country?!’
Organizational bureau strictly reprimanded him. Usman Yusupov got very upset and called Beria from the hotel to tell him about his worries and the organizational bureau’s decision. In the evening he received the call from Beria’s reception room. He was told that after thirty minutes there would be a car by the hotel entrance to drive him to see Lavrentii Pavlovich. When Usman Yusupov entered the reception room, Beria came out of his office and firmly shaking his hand said, ‘Let’s go.’
Together they arrived at the nearest Stalin’s country house. When they entered the hall, Stalin greeted them and noticing that Yusupov looked at the wall clock asked him, ‘Well, comrade Yusupov, don’t you have a watch?’
He pulled his own watch out from his pocket and gave him it. They had a good dinner. That anecdotal episode with the watch was covered in press and shown in a movie. And in the organizational bureau’s decision on Yusupov’s report appeared a phrase that his report on the necessity for the union national committees to render assistance to Uzbekistan was taken into consideration and officially noted, but there were no words about Yusupov’s reprimand. Undoubtedly, Stalin was contacted by Sherbakov or someone else under his order.
At the 19th party congress Alexander Fadeev, speaking in the report discussion, criticized Baghirov, emphasizing that in Azerbaijan the party authorities didn’t pay sufficient attention to work with intelligentsia – the writers didn’t get support; some of them were repressed under false accusations; and that happened under direct instructions of the CC CP of the republic. The audience applauded. However, in two days Fadeev asked again for a speech and mounting the platform said that in his previous speech he hadn’t objectively talked about the situation in Azerbaijan because he hadn’t known true facts and had falsely accused the republic leadership. In that connection he begged pardon of comrade Baghirov and his comrades from Azerbaijan. The noise rose in the hall, and people started whispering. His second speech produced an oppressive impression on many attendants.
It turned out that after the first Fadeev’s speech during the break, Beria summoned him and told him off, then told him to make a speech again to admit his accusations were wrong and apologize for them. Beria turned to Malenkov to involve him in it; the latter demanded the same from Fadeev. So, Baghirov was elected as a CC member at that congress; later on, at the party plenum he became a candidate to the membership of the CC Presidium.
Apparently, Fadeev could never forget his humiliation and revealed weakness. It happened, undoubtedly, along with other points, to be one of the reasons for his suicide in 1956. Beria was executed by shooting in December, 1953, and Baghirov - in May, 1956. Thereby that triangle was locked…
Many people remember the notorious ‘Doctors’ Case’. In January, 1953 the headline article in the foremost ‘Pravda’ newspaper and other mass media was saying that a group of doctors-subversives, traitors, betrayers, and murderers had been exposed and rendered harmless. It was said that they, being fully confidantes, had been engaged in killing members of the Soviet higher leadership. According to the press, the security agencies revealed that they had been employed by the foreign reconnaissance of England, USA and Israel. It was emphasized that their main objective was assassination of the eminent Soviet party and government figures by establishing deliberately inaccurate diagnoses and incorrectly administered treatment. The newspapers were saying their story about assassination of Gorky, Kuibyshev, and Menjinskiy by professors Levin, Pletnev, and their accomplices; professor-physicians Kogan, Feldman, Greenshtein, Etinger, and others were allegedly on a mission of foreign reconnaissance by assassinating Zhdanov and Sherbakov; and the USA government had allocated 100 million dollars for the mission realization on ‘the Soviet leadership liquidation’ with the help of those medical doctors and so on. It was said that all of them had been arrested, convicted and exiled to prison camps.
That happened in January, and immediately after Stalin’s death Beria released them from prison, exonerated them and gave them back their homes and jobs. With that probably, he won the sympathy and goodwill of the English, American and Israel secret service agencies and authorities. Inside the country his supporters propagandized him by all means as an upholder of the truth, fairness and humanity. In order to show his ‘objectivity’ he arrested a few distinguished figures of relevant authorities and shifted all the blames and faults onto the secretary of the CC CPSU, the minister of the KGB, S.D. Ignatiev, whom he decided to liquidate. Fortunately, if it’s possible to say so, Semen Denisovich was bedridden at the time because of the heart attack. Nevertheless, Beria managed to dismiss him from the position of the CC CPSU secretary.
Afterwards it was found out that the notorious ‘Doctors’ Case’ had been framed up by Beria’s henchmen. When Ignatiev recovered, he worked as the first secretary of the Bashkir region committee and later the Tatar region committee of the party. He passed away in November of 1983. To his funeral arrived representative delegations from all the republics and regions where he used to work, high-ranking employees of the CC, Supreme Soviet, and KGB. He was buried with honors on the Novodevichy cemetery.
After Stalin’s death Beria released from prisons and camps a great number of people who had been convicted for criminal cases and allowed them to return to their native heaths. Surely, they were personally informed that it was a personal order of Lavrentii Pavlovich. Again he ‘scored’!
He took up being involved in international affairs. He proposed to restore a good collaboration with Yugoslavia by taking the initiative from the Soviet side. At the same time, he gave them a clue that the current good affairs with the brotherly people and marshal Tito had been worsened because of a few members of the Soviet leadership. He submitted some proposals and publicly spoke about the necessity of improvement of foreign affairs with other countries. In that way, he tried to assure his authority growth in international spheres. Inside the country, he strenuously made advances to the leaders of the republics, regions and districts, talking to them over the phone much oftener than he had done before, meeting their requests, assisting them and advising with them on different matters.
In late April of 1953, as it was mentioned at the beginning of the book, we were invited to the office of the First secretary of the CC of Uzbekistan. The secretaries and the CC members gathered there. A.I. Niyazov informed us of receiving ‘L.P. Beria’s memorandum’. At the time he was a member of the Presidium of the CC CPSU, the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, the head of the Ministry of internal affairs, which was united with the KGB.
The memorandum was read aloud. There was a deathly silence. The fact of the matter was that in the ‘memo’ in the guise of ‘cares’ about the cadres, Beria basically pursued and imposed the policies of provincialism and the proclaimed by Stalin ‘autonomization’ in its worst form. Outwardly, it was justified as a desire to make sure that capable national cadres work at their places, in their homeland. Simultaneously, Beria adroitly tried to take over the local administration bodies out of control by the local party and government bodies. It should be noted that the ‘Memorandum’ came directly from Beria’s secretariat, and it had never been considered by the CC CPSU.
The chairperson invited all attendants to discuss it over. Someone proposed to make up the lists. I was suggested to verify the list of all top executive officers in the ministries, offices and apparatus of the Council of Ministers according to the national and territorial criteria and, on its basis, prepare proposals for the replacement of some officials by others.
When I got a chance to speak, I said that indeed the preparation of qualified officials from the native people - the Uzbeks in particular - was the vitally essential objective. Perhaps, we were short of experienced cadres. Currently, the basic authority echelons were actually staffed with skillful employees. Certainly, some cadres had shortcomings, neglects while others made serious mistakes. Each case should be sorted out independently. However, turning manpower policy into a short-term campaign was hardly reasonable. Besides, we should prevent people from national and territorial conflicts, which might lead to unstable and complication of political situation.
Someone told me, ‘Once the ‘Memorandum’ was sent to us, then we should take it seriously.’ To that I asked, ‘What will those comrades who were born and grew up in Uzbekistan but do not belong to the Uzbek ethnic group have to do? On the other hand, there are a lot of Uzbeks who live in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Does it mean they will be deprived of the right to work at leading administrative positions?’
Some comrades spoke out their negative opinion about the proposal stated in the ‘Memorandum’, but they did it carefully and reservedly. Since it wasn’t an official meeting, we without taking any decision agreed to think it over comprehensively and meet again.
On the following day I was sitting in the office with my deputies M.Z. Mirza-Akhmedov, A.N. Rudin, an assistant P.A. Sibirtsev and an administrator V.S. Gukasov; we were making an agenda for the meeting of the Council of Ministers. Suddenly there was a call from Moscow. We were told that Lavrentii Pavlovich would talk, then the connection was put through. Without greeting, he roughly asked me, ‘Why did you speak against my ‘Memorandum’?’
In reply I explained my point of view. He didn’t listen to me fully and started insulting me, abusing me by rude words and threatened he would fire me, ‘grind me into dust’; then hanged up on me.
Right away I called Niyazov to ask him and the other secretaries together to receive me. Two hours later I visited him. In his office there were R.E. Melnikov and M.A. Abdurazakov. I told them about the conversation with Beria and asked them to dismiss me from the current position. We were sitting for a long time. Amin Irmatovich said, ‘We'll think it over later. Let’s have a good, quiet holiday on May 1st after which we’ll discuss.’
On May 1st during the festive people demonstration in Tashkent city in Lenin Square I was also standing together with the other leaders of the republic on the tribune and answered to the greetings, smiled and feigned that everything was ok. But nobody knew what bleak thoughts were occurring to me.
Beria, more furious after talking to me, started involving the others. On May 3rd I was going to the region, but on the phone, I was told to come to the CC. The bureau members were already sitting there. The first secretary said there was a suggestion to dismiss Mukhitdinov from the current position of the chairman of the Council of Ministers.
General I.E. Petrov, the commander of the Turkestan military district, was surprised, ‘Why?’
Response, ‘It was recommended, they called us from Moscow.’
V.A. Bylbas, ‘Who called?’
A.I. Niyazov, ‘Lavrentii Pavlovich Beria did.’
Then all attending bureau members, particularly R.E. Melnikov, A.M. Baskakov, I.E. Petrov, and M.A. Abdurazakov, expressed disagreement and suggested to the chairperson that he report to Beria about their decision to keep N.A. Mukhitdinov on the post of the chairman of the Council of Ministers.
On May 4th I was invited again to the CC. When all the bureau members gathered, Niyazov informed that Beria had called and said that Ministry of the cotton growing of the USSR had been liquidated and he had recommended the former minister U. Yu. Yusupov for the post of the chairman of the Council of Ministers of Uzbekistan. I was the first to speak. I asked to send me to any region to work or to send me to the Academy of social sciences to study. Also, I proposed to appoint Yusupov as the chairman of the Council of Ministers instead of me. Some of the bureau members objected to my suggestion reasoning their standpoint that they had known Yusupov at work in the past. After a long, agitated discussion the Secretariat was suggested to prepare proposals.
On May 6th in the morning, Amin Irmatovich called me and asked if I could come to see him. In his office there were a few CC secretaries and Sh. Rashidov. He outlined the current situation and, referring to my insistent requests, gave me the document saying the following:
‘To submit for approval by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the SSR of Uzbekistan the following propositions:
-To dismiss comrade Mukhitdinov, N.A. from the position of the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the UzSSR according to his request;
-To appoint comrade Yusupov, U.Yu. as the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the UzSSR;
-To appoint comrade Mukhitdinov, N.A. (as per the protocol – the bureau member of the CC CP of Uzbekistan) as the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and the minister of the foreign affairs of the UzSSR.’
I asked again to send me to work in the periphery, but they strongly objected. And only after that I gave my consent for the work in the Council of Ministers.
In the afternoon there was a meeting of the CC. Niyazov read aloud the draft resolution. Nobody commented; all agreed silently. After the bureau meeting everybody went to my apartment. We were sitting together, talking and drinking tea till late night.
On the same day Sh. Rashidov, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of Uzbekistan and D. Ilkhamova, the secretary of the Presidium signed the resolution about my release. That was on May 6th, 1953.
On May 7th I was about to go to a new job when I got a call from Amin Irmatovich, who asked me to come directly to the CC. When I entered his office, he said that he had a call from the CC CPSU and they had proposed not to implement the resolution about me so far. It turned out that Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Molotov, Kosygin and Bulganin had doubted and found unreasonable my release from my current post. But Beria insisted, and he was supported by Malenkov, Kaganovich and Mikoyan. However, the majority was for keeping me at my current job. So Niyazov got informed about it.
Attention to my personality wasn’t out of line or anything outstanding. That could be explained that chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the union republics were high-ranking functionaries of the CC Politburo. Besides, I was a member of the CC CPSU and a deputy of the Supreme Soviet. Apparently, the main reason for that was that the Politburo members knew me personally.
So, the events continued developing. On the same day in the evening Khrushchev called Niyazov. He said, ‘We have thought and, in order not to aggravate the situation, agreed with L.P. Beria’s proposal. N.A. Mukhitdinov is young and will have time to work on high positions.’
The resolution about my release was published in the morning of May 8th. I immediately came to the Council of Ministers. I met Usman Yusupov in front of the building. We came to my office where I told him about what was going on, then we were sitting together, talking for a long time.
The next day, May 9th, was the Victory Holiday. All the people congratulated and greeted war veterans who were in the spotlight; flowers and gifts were given to them; also, there were street festivities and entertainments. As for me, being an officer who had participated in and gone through the war, who had got many wounds, orders and medals, meanwhile in the same morning I called for a van, loaded it with my chattels, got my wife into the car and myself with our kids occupied the rear seats. After vacating the apartment my family and I went to the Old city, to the place called Allan where my parents lived. My father met us with joy. He provided us with a small room where we lived till the further changes in my career life.
Having become a diplomat against my will, I flew to Moscow to find out more about diplomacy and how to realize it in Uzbekistan when the republic didn’t have direct relations with foreign countries. Everything done in this sphere happened only under permission or agreement of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
Upon arrival in Moscow I called from the permanent representative office to Molotov’s reception. Having contacted his reception, I asked to tell Vyacheslav Mikhailovich about my request relating appointment with him. After a while there was a call: ‘Vyacheslav Mikhailovich is waiting for you. Where would you like us to send you a car?’
When I entered the reception room, his secretary opened the door to his office (in the Kremlin) where he was standing by the threshold, wearing his impeccably sewed dark-blue suit, snow-white shirt, blue tie, and black shoes. He shook my hand and said, ‘Here you’ve become a diplomat. Now we are colleagues.’
He gave me a seat in the armchair and sat opposite me. Two cups of tea were brought in, on the table there was some sugar, candies, slices of lemon and bagels. He offered to have some tea and, a little bit stammering, said, ‘It seems in Uzbekistan people drink green tea but here we don’t know how to infuse it. And the climate in Moscow isn’t favorable for green tea.’
Then he imparted that he knew about the changes in the leadership of the republic.
He continued, ‘I regret very much I’ve never been to a wonderful, full of legends, beautiful and rich region as Central Asia.’ He inquired about the life, business and issues of the people in the republic. Then he fixedly looked at me and said, ‘You are still young. We also took part in the revolutionary movement when we were young.’
Then he told about his work with Lenin and how Vladimir Ilyich pursued foreign policy.
When he noticed that I was interested in the conversation, he told me about his meeting with Hitler, his negotiations with Ribbentrop and about their preparation and holding the Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences.
Within two hours of the conversation with Vyacheslav Mikhailovich I found out more than in what I’d read and heard about diplomacy before. This experienced politician, showing good diplomatic manners, charm, open-mindedness, encouraged and inspired me with self-confidence. I was really grateful to him for his attention to me and invited him to visit Uzbekistan. Unfortunately, he didn’t make it.
On July 1st, 1953 there was a call from Moscow. Niyazov, Mukhitdinov and Melnikov were asked to fly to Moscow on the same day. Furthermore, they added, ‘Please, inform us of the flight you are arriving to enable us to meet you at the airport where you’ll be informed of the reason for the invitation.’
We arrived in the late evening. Actually, we were immediately informed that on the next day, on July 2nd at 10 a.m. in the Kremlin Sverdlov Hall, the plenum of the CC CPSU would start. We’d be familiarized with the agenda when the plenum opened.
All the members and candidates to the CC membership, members of the Central auditing commission and specially invited people gathered in the hall. The members of the CC Presidium took seats in the plenum presidium. Malenkov opened the plenum by the following words: ‘There is only one issue on the agenda of the meeting. That is ‘Beria’s Case’. Are there any objections?’ Then he said that the CC Presidium had studied it in detail and found out a lot of outrageous facts of violations by Beria of socialistic legality, the party regulations requirements, abuse of official position, unauthorized actions which harmed the government and people.
After finishing his speech, he gave the floor to Khrushchev. Nikita Sergeevich told us about Beria’s criminal activities over a period of many years. Beria had fulfilled not only mass repressions of the Soviet people, but also had abused dramatically his position, which was actually a crime; he had harmed the core economic sectors, the internal and external policies of the USSR.
An emotional speech of Khrushchev was filled with serious and concrete examples. In conclusion he said that Beria was an enemy of the party and the people, disguised traitor; there was no place for him in the party, nor in the CC, nor any government bodies. His place was in jail. Then N.N. Shatalin came to the tribune. He said that a special commission had inspected Beria’s office, reception room, the country house and apartment, and he announced the results. They had found some documents discrediting many figures, including a few members of the higher echelon of the leadership, other secret materials, top secret information which had to be kept in special archives. All that meant that Beria had spied on the other members of the country’s leadership and collected ‘evidences’ to liquidate them when he got a chance. Talking about Beria’s moral make-up and principles, he said that some female clothes and even female underwear had been found in his safe.
Someone questioned, ‘Why is Beria absent now?’
The chairperson Malenkov answered, ‘After a comprehensive discussion in the CC Presidium, Beria was arrested in order to avoid provocations and even threatening actions on his part. At the moment he is in prison.’
At the suggestion of the leadership the plenum unanimously adopted the resolution to dismiss L.P. Beria from all positions, exclude him from the party and send his case to the judicial enquiry authorities.
And a few words more about that plenum. When discussing Beria’s crimes, he was blamed for his manipulating and making advances to the republic leaders. Also, his ‘Memorandum’ on the cadres sent to the local authorities was mentioned. It was obvious that the Memorandum was of provocative type, the essence of which was revealed and got to the core by other local bodies. Beria’s aim was to play on national feelings of the peoples, taking outwardly care about ‘peoples’ roots’ of local authority. Besides, he wanted to cause cross-culture clashes between the nations, their representatives by accusing some of them in nationalism and the others of chauvinism, thus, removing uncontrollable by him employees in the republics and replacing them with his protégés.
It is needless to say that after the plenum the ‘Memorandum’ was fully disavowed.
One evening later we were sitting privately, and Nikita Sergeevich, being in a good mood, indulged in confidences with us telling how Beria had been isolated. According to him, it was his idea. At first, he took a risk to talk about it with Malenkov, although he knew that Beria’s people watch every member of the leadership and all conversations were tapped. Moreover, Malenkov and Beria were old friends. Khrushchev and Malenkov discussed that issue in a whisper in the car. Georgii Maksimilyanovich, realizing the terrible role of Beria’s activities, after some hesitations agreed with Khrushchev’s arguments. The next day there was a confidential conversation with Voroshilov and then with Kaganovich, who listened and asked, ‘Who else is supporting Nikita Sergeevich’s opinion?’
After hearing the reply, he agreed to support.
Bulganin was resolutely inclined towards a removal and isolation of Beria. A plan of a discussion of Beria’s case by the Presidium and his immediate arrest was developed in strict top secrecy. It was decided that the whole operation would be fulfilled by the military forces. Marshal G. K. Zhukov was involved in its preparation, and marshal K.S. Moskalenko directly executed it.
How was the operation accomplished? At the appointed time, the CC Presidium members entered the conference hall. When one of the last, Beria entered and sat down on his seat, his bodyguards, attached people and assistants, who were in the hallways and reception room, were immediately isolated; those rooms were filled with the special mission units led by marshal K.S. Moskalenko. At the same moment, the guards were replaced on all the floors, inside and outside of the Kremlin.
Malenkov opened the Presidium meeting and announced, ‘Let’s consider a matter concerning comrade Beria,’ and gave the floor to Khrushchev. The latter spoke out straightforwardly and frankly, directly came to the point. When Beria flatly started refuting in what was said, the others got involved in accusations against Beria. Feeling the dangerous situation, Beria stretched his hand for his bag, which was on the table. At the same moment Nikita Sergeevich rapidly snatched, saying, ‘Don’t be naughty, Lavrentii!’ There was a hand gun in it. After a sharp wrangle Malenkov announced, ‘Let’s convene the Plenum to discuss the whole matter.’
Everybody agreed except Beria. When Beria got out of the conference room, he was arrested by the doors and driven away.
He was kept under deterrent detention not in a jail of the KGB or Ministry of Internal Affairs, but in one of the isolated, absolutely inconspicuous premises of the Moscow military command. Nobody could ever imagine that Beria was there.
There was another question: Plenum opened on July 2nd, but its resolution was published on July 10th. ‘Beria’s Case’ was discussed for a short time, the resolution was adopted quite fast within three days. What were they doing for the rest time? It turned out they were developing some documents concerning the issues related to the activities of special security agencies and their place in the government. They were specified in the resolution and, in more detail, in the speeches, protocol and practical actions. The key subject was about removal of dishonorable, dubious employees deliberately placed in those agencies by Beria and his supporters both from the central and local bodies of the united ministry of internal affairs; about making sure that many qualified, experienced party members and government officers were sent to work in those special agencies; about necessity of careful analyses of the cases of the people repressed in the 1930s and subsequent years; about condemnation of Beria’s attempt, and before him Yagoda and Yezhov’s, to put the internal affairs bodies and the KGB above the party and government; about establishment of the strict order under which those agencies could only act under the guidance of the party and their chief, being in its membership, was responsible before the government; about all the central and local party bodies responsible for and directly involved in the internal affairs bodies and KGB’s activities.
As for the further Beria’s destiny, after the interrogations, investigation and preparation of an indictment, it was supposed to launch the trial process. However, a problem arose unexpectedly. It turned out that if a person under investigation had a military rank, then he had to be only judged by the chief judge of a higher military rank or status. And Beria was the marshal and the Hero of the Soviet Union. Because of that the ‘special court’, which was led by the outstanding marshal, the twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Ivan Stepanovich Konev, was formed. It is well known how the process ended.
Soon after Beria’s arrest I was restored at my previous job - I was again appointed as the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the republic. Strictly speaking the procedure was the same. A.I. Niyazov and the CC bureau members, upon arrival at the Council of Ministers, took their seats in the presidium in a large conference hall. Amin Irmatovich started announcing the resolution, but was interrupted by the rapturous applause of the attendees. I was deeply touched seeing the emotions expressed on their faces and in such a reaction. I embarked on work immediately after the ceremony. To be more precise, for the rest of the day, after the leaders had left, I received congratulations, compliments from continuously coming comrades.
On the next day, the managing administrator told me that the apartment where I had used to live was free and nobody had lived there. Then he asked for permission to help my family move house. I thanked and told him to wait for a while. In the evening at home, I told my wife and children we could return to our apartment. It evoked no enthusiasm and my elder daughter even asked me, ‘What if we get evicted again?’
Nevertheless, two days later we moved house to our previous apartment.
Of the events held afterwards I would like to only note two: the scientific conference on the regional pathology and repricing agricultural products.
In late 1953 CC CP and the government of Uzbekistan, according to the advice of some eminent medical scientists, decided to hold a scientific conference on regional pathology and turned to the union authorities for support. The conference was held in 1954. Vice-president of the Academy of Medical Science of the USSR, F.G. Krotov, the first deputy minister of Health of the USSR, A.G. Shupik, minister of Health of Uzbekistan, R. Sagatov, and the prominent Soviet scientists: academicians K.S. Skryabin, E.N. Pavlovskii, professors: A. Yunusov, O. Pavlova, N. Muminov, V. Katsenovich, G. Makhkamov, and many others in their speeches analyzed the works accomplished in our republic during the Soviet power. They emphasized that elimination of such infectious diseases as trachoma, favus, guinea worm, plague, cholera, malaria, and others, was the great achievement. They spoke about necessity of establishing a chain of hospitals, outpatient clinics and medical stations in addition to preparing national doctors of various medical specializations, nurses, paramedics, medicine scientists. They also underlined importance of research development, improvement of household and sanitary awareness of the population.
Apart from that, the speakers touched many issues still unsettled. They spoke about a number of backlogs in scientific research and insufficient funding and material technical resources.
The delegates from 22 foreign Eastern countries attended the conference. Many of them spoke in their greeting speeches about a hard heritage they had received from the ex-colonizers; demonstrating interest to the achievements in the Soviet medicine they spoke about their desires to study and use them at home.
Afterwards, the decisions taken at the conference were successfully put into life. The research institute of endocrinology was established. The capable, energetic young scientist, Y.K. Turakulov, became its director. (Nowadays he is an academician and still the director of this institute.)
As for the oncological institute, in 1955 a relative of mine visited me at home. He was a young radiologist, called Djura Pulatov. We spoke about the necessity of establishment of an oncological institute in Tashkent, according to the medical scientists of the republic. I wasn’t sure it was possible because of the lack of appropriate specialists, scientific facilities, etc. In response he gave many examples of spreading the terrible disease - malignant tumors; besides, he mentioned a lot of venerable scientists and young specialists who worked in that or adjacent fields. I told him to prepare a paper with the proposal.
When meeting a talented scientist and well-known medical practitioner, Irgash Atakhanov, who became the first in Central Asia a corresponding member of the academy of sciences of the USSR, I told him about my conversation with Pulatov. He heartily supported the idea of the young scientist.
After a while, D. Pulatov came to see me together with D.M. Abdurasulov, who had just got PhD in medicine. They made the convincing paper. Then, being in Moscow, I met professor I.A. Kassirskii, who had worked for a long time in Uzbekistan and had awards for the public healthcare development and training national medical specialists. So, I got his support too. We consulted with the president of the Academy of Medical Science of the USSR, A.N. Bakulev, and the prominent oncologist, N.N. Blokhin. They promised to render a comprehensive assistance. After the discussion, we got the particular resolution by the Council of Ministers of the republic.
It was decided to build the institute in Ak-tepe district. That was the way of the establishment of the first oncological institute in the Soviet East. Nowadays, it has got 17 buildings with laboratories, other research institutions, facilities, and other services located in them. Over 300 scientists work in the institute. It’s one of the major oncological centers.
The following MDs, who had PhDs in medicine, were nominated for the position of director of the institute: I. Atakhanov, D.M. Abdurasulov and D. Pulatov. I. Atakhanov, being a physician, refused saying he wasn’t a specialist in that field. D. Pulatov was a radiologist. However, D.M. Abdurasulov was appointed a director, as he was more experienced, although he was also a radiologist. Afterwards he got a title of honored scientist and became a professor. Nowadays the director of this institute is a professor, MD, PhD in medicine Nariman Muratkhodjaev - a young scientist-radiologist.
In the middle of 1954 we submitted for approval to the CC CPSU and Council of Ministers of the USSR the proposal on a crucial issue of vital essential importance for local people of the region and for the agriculture development in the republic. It was forwarded to the both bodies: the CC CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
After a few days I called to the CC and asked if they had received our papers. They confirmed, ‘Yes, we did. The Council of Ministers will work on it because the CC from now on doesn’t deal with agricultural matters.’
I called the managing director of the Council of Ministers, M. Smirtyukov. He clarified, ‘Your papers are in the agriculture department.’
I asked him to report to Malenkov about it. After a few days I called them again to find out that our papers had been sent to the relevant ministries. Approximately one month later I received a call from the Council of Ministers informing that the minister of finance, A.G. Zverev, strongly objected our proposal. Having talked with Niyazov, I flew to Moscow where I got received by Malenkov five days later. He listened to me thoroughly, ordered the relevant departments to sort out the problem and invited the ministers concerned.
Well, in general, everything went on over again.
What were those papers about? The then-labor payment system for raw cotton was fixed in 1939. It depended on a sort, type, crop capacity, plan implementation and other criteria. In the substantially changed environment not only peasants but also collective and state farms in general weren’t interested in the cotton production increase because they didn’t have material incentives. In the result of the acting pricing, only strong collective and state farms could get richer furthermore, but the majority of the others, for many reasons, could hardly make the ends meet because of the high costs of the crop capacity increase. Thus, being initially poor, they continued getting poorer.
Having prepared all the necessary documented arguments and calculations, we submitted a detailed program, which could provide considerable material incentives in the cotton growing. The following objectives had to be fulfilled:
1. Increase the basic average-weighted procurement price for a ton of raw cotton of the domestic sorts from 2,150 rubles to 3,100 rubles and fine-fiber sorts from 3,660 rubles to 6,150 rubles for all collective farms.
2. Stop differentiated bonus payments to collective farms within the plan.
3. Pay out bonuses amounting 100%, added to the basic procurement price, for every ton of raw cotton supplied by collective farms beyond the contract plan.
4. In order to encourage collective farms for achieving big crops of raw cotton, to pay out bonuses in the amounts as follows:
When collective farms supply raw cotton to the government on average from 1 hectare
To pay to collective farms bonuses for the raw cotton supplied to the government, regardless of fulfillment of the supply plan, in percentage (%) of the main procurement price
From 25 to 30 centers
From 30 to 35 centers
From 35 centers and more
5
10
15
5. Cancel from January 1st, 1955 resolution of the Council of Ministers No 1720 of April 29th, 1949 on the payments for water used for field irrigation, production needs of enterprises and other utilities.
6. Entitle cotton growing collective farms to use their own discretion to fix the rates of contributions to indivisible funds in the range of 10-15% of the earnings; to allow collective farms to pay for workdays spent for irrigational constructions, building live-stock units and other premises, planting gardens, grapes, mulberry trees and other perennial plants at the expense of indivisible funds.
Write off cotton growing collective farms’ debts, as to January 1st, 1955, in contributions to indivisible funds.
7. Introduce for 3 years for collective farms of the republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia purchase prices for mineral fertilizers, which are exceeding current prices for collective farms of Russia, Belorussia, and Ukraine by 50%.
8. Decrease by 15-20% payment rate for tractor work of the MTS (machinery and tractor station); the MTS shall be responsible for crop capacity in collective farms.
9. Provide additional privileges for collective farms, developing new irrigational lands for cotton growing.
I would like to note with gratitude that the minister of agriculture of the USSR, V.V. Matskevich, with his statesmanship attitude to and good awareness of the situation in cotton growing, assisted and supported these proposals. However, during the first discussion we faced serious resistance of the then-minister of finance of the USSR, A.G. Zverev.
The deceased Arsenii Georgevich was a prominent financier, a great specialist in economy financing. He had enormous merits before the country. We all respected him, and his objections didn’t provoke our deep pessimism. Of course, the minister of finance didn’t right away agree with such a radical proposal that required government expenditures which were worth billions of rubles.
Also, other opponents to our proposals were some influential figures, who caviled at the proposals in general or their separate items. Actually, the only thing that most worried us was that such an attitude was basically dominating. Yet, after our additional persistent argumentation, the union government found it reasonable to implement required changes in material incentives for the cotton growing collective and state farms, but in the range of the total amount of costs without additional funds from the government.
We couldn’t agree with that because that option would dramatically decrease cash income in high productive farms, and in practice it would lead to an increase of impoverished state and collective farms.
With our project accepted, the situation would have been different: all collective farms would have benefited equally from the harvest from a hectare. All low-capacity farms would have been the first to benefit, which would have stimulated them to increase their effectiveness.
That issue was discussed over and over again by the union’s government. In the further sometimes sharp exchange of opinions, with the support of V.V. Matskevich, minister of textile industry, V.I. Chesnokov, minister of consumer goods, V.M. Mirotvortsev, and some executives of the CC CPSU and the state planning committee, our proposals were finally approved with some amendments. Yet, the joint resolution of the CC CPSU and the Council of Ministers wasn’t adopted as we expected. All the items were approved and documented in separate orders and acts of the government. We agreed with that because the essence of the matter but not its form was important.
We received those government papers in Uzbekistan at the end of 1955, with the note that they would come into force from January 1st, 1956. The next year and a half appeared literally ‘purgatory’ for us. The executives of Uzbekistan, including the CC secretary, M. Abdurazakov, the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, M. Mirza-Akhmedov, the chairman of the state planning committee, S. Ziyadullaev, the minister of finance, M. Isametdinov, and the others continuously made shuttle flights between Tashkent and Moscow, haunting union ministers and executives. To be frank, those papers could remain unapproved up to-date if I hadn’t turned directly to the new chairman of the Council of Ministers, N.A. Bulganin, with the seriously reasoned complaint.
The additional costs for cotton growing (about 3 billion rubles) were repaid with interest within two years. Thus, from the acceptance of that program benefited all including collective and state farms, MTS and their workers, government and the people in general. Besides, it fostered inflow of additional currencies to the government, enabled to improve dramatically provision of industry with raw materials and people with food products and consumer goods.
Now, as for G.M. Malenkov, after Stalin’s death he became the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and, though he wasn’t the CC secretary, became the head of the Presidium. It was obvious even at the March joint meeting of the CC and Supreme Soviet plenum that he was becoming the Stalin successor. In fact, everyone hinted and wished him success in congratulations coming from local organizations and foreign countries. But… in half a year he didn’t play a leading role in the CC Presidium any longer and two years later he stopped working for the government. He finished his career far away in Ust-Kamenogorsk in Kazakhstan, where he was excluded from the party and dismissed from the position of the director of the power station in Ekibastuz.
What happened? In all that undoubtedly Khrushchev “helped” him a lot. If Beria was eliminated by a “frontal attack”, the so-called “palace coup”, then the influence and positions of Malenkov loosened step by step.
In the detailed resolutions of the July plenum a substantial factor was a rise of the CC role, in the result of which the KGB became subordinate to the CC. Soon A.N. Serov was appointed the head of the KGB at Nikita Sergeevich’s insistence. He was a person who was formed in Beria’s encirclement and under his influence. He was well known because of his rudeness, tactlessness and vulgarity, who had done many illegal actions related to the whole peoples and eminent figures, but he was Khrushchev’s old friend. However, Malenkov couldn’t tolerate and despised him.
After return from the “honorary exile” marshal Zhukov was appointed the first deputy minister of defense of the USSR. Georgii Konstantinovich had fairly low opinion of Khrushchev. During the WWII in their relationship there was some “coldness” caused in the development and implementation of planning a few large battles. Zhukov’s return to eager activity, who was a prominent general renowned by the army and people, influenced to a certain extent the moods of military circles and fostered for a bit their sympathies to Khrushchev. Soon Zhukov fully supported Nikita Sergeevich and his actions.
Perhaps, the strongest punch kicked against Malenkov was that Khrushchev, after having got rid of Beria and becoming hyperactive in the party bodies, already in August put the matter to a vote in the Presidium about a necessity of an election of the First secretary of the CC. He referred to the communists’ sentiments, who were allegedly puzzled why for such a long time there was no party leader.
At the plenum of September 7th, 1953, Khrushchev made a report about a situation in agriculture and measures to its boost. After discussion and taking decision, he was elected as the First secretary of the CC. He immediately usurped and focused the Presidium activities on himself. He introduced essential changes in the Secretariat membership, returned Suslov, which, of course, reduced Malenkov’s influence. Soon he managed to dismiss Shatalin from the position of the CC secretary and transferred him to the Primorskii region committee.
That was another punch against Malenkov. The fact of the matterwas that Shatalin, being a smart, thoughtful and sober-minded person, was elected in the membership of the organizational bureau of the personnel department of the CC in 1946 when his supervisor was Malenkov. And exactly this matter later played an important role in Shatalin dismiss from the job in the CC.
Malenkov, being a party apparatchik to the backbone, after graduating from the High technical school named after Bauman and serving in the army, aged 24, became an instructor of the local party committee. For 20 years he had passed all the levels of the party hierarchy before reaching a position of a member of Politburo and a secretary of the CC CPSU.
As per the party charter there was no provision for the second secretary of the CC, but by the late 1940s he approximated to Stalin so closely and gained his confidence that in fact he became the second person in the party hierarchy. At the 19th congress of the CPSU the Secretary-General asked him to make a report of the CC to the congress. That unprecedented incident showed what position Malenkov held in the party hierarchy. That predetermined his playing the first roles literally within a few days in March.
About half a year later, he left the CC administration, which was the veiled powerful force. Nikita Sergeevich, on the contrary, impetuously took initiative, made fundamental suggestions on economy development, particularly agriculture, went deep into foreign policy and so on. He visited the republics, regions, widely talked to people, whereas Malenkov, who was inexperienced in the state affairs, didn’t visit the republics and felt that he was losing support from the party, authorities and army. He didn’t have anything serious to suggest, so he had to agree with the keen criticism of him at the CC Plenum, where he was directly told he couldn’t do his job properly as the head of the government. Thus, he had to leave his post. Being still the member of the CC Presidium, he became the minister of the power plants. So, Bulganin became the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR under Khrushchev’s suggestion. His candidacy was approved by the CC Presidium.
Nomination of Zhukov for a post of the minister of defense of the country meant his political rehabilitation. Georgii Konstantinovich, with his distinctive firmness, eagerly and resolutely started restructuring the army, improving the work of the headquarters, strengthening discipline and order. Nikita Sergeevich gradually began involving him in implementation of general and specified issues of the party and government policies. He gladly participated in it.
A.N. Kosygin’s return to his former job - he was again appointed the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR - in practice strengthened the government and increased its effectiveness.
Alexei Nikolaevich, an eminent economist, engineer and production manager, was perfect at planning, financing, manufacture and industry, especially the light industry, textile and food industries. Having an analytical mind, he was notable for his precise, accurate judgments, able to work with a pencil in his hand, verifying every number, scrutinizing thoroughly every phrase of a document. He was a person of big diligence, honesty and modesty.
I think I was lucky to meeting and make friends with Kosygin and Zhukov. I came to know and learnt a lot from them. At the end of the book I’m telling about my meetings with them in detail.
In December days I caught a serious cold and was in hospital. From there I went to the airport to meet a delegation from India, participated in a meeting, and having brought them to the country house, told them that I would make a speech on the next day and apologizing didn’t stay for dinner. On the 20th after the republican conference, I went to hospital again. On the 21st after seeing off the delegation flying to Moscow, I intended to go back to hospital, but was told to come to the CC for a while.
‘Recently when you were in hospital there was a meeting where the situations in the bureau and Secretariat were discussed, and their work was found unsatisfactory. We openly talked about serious mistakes and distortions made by Niyazov and arrived at the conclusion that he wasn’t able to do his job properly. After a long, detailed conversation, A.I. Niyazov had admitted that appropriate leadership of such a big party organization was a difficult task for him and asked to dismiss him from that post and transfer him to a different job more related to his education background and life experience. Now we are asking you to become a leader of the CC CP of Uzbekistan. It was decided to hold the plenum tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock.’
Nobody told me before about such a radical change in my destiny. I doubted suitability of such a replacement at that moment. But I was replied, ‘A preliminary conversation with the leadership of the CC CPSU showed that they supported the dismiss of comrade Niyazov from the position of the First secretary of the CC and election of you instead of him. It was decided that Abdurazakov would inform about Niyazov’s request and comrade Rashidov would propose your candidacy on behalf of the bureau.’
Everybody departed and I went to hospital. In the evening Amin Irmatovich phoned me up saying he would like to meet me. I offered to go to his place, but he refused, ‘No, don’t do that. I’d like to visit you by myself.’
We had a frank and long talk with him. He told me about the meeting of the bureau, which accusations he found appropriate and with which he disagreed. In the end he said, ‘I have to leave the bureau, and in the Secretariat, it’s not so smooth; and not to all major matters, especially to fundamental issues, we have identical attitudes as you know. That’s why at this meeting I officially requested to dismiss me. Thank you for your collaboration and I sincerely supported your candidacy. I’ll make the same statement at the plenum.’
Frankly speaking I was in an embarrassing situation. I couldn’t persuade Amin Irmatovich to withdraw his dismissal request. What’s more, it was impossible as the matter had been already decided by the bureau. It wasn’t acceptable to discuss or judge what had already been decided on. Also, it was improper for me to commiserate or assuage him because he was older and occupied a higher position than me. I learnt a lot from him when we worked together. Of course, we had arguments and sometimes disagreements, but they were strictly related to the job and we never had personal enmities against each other.
The next day on December 22nd the plenum took place. There were all the leadership members besides the members and candidates to the CC membership, the members of the auditing committee. Roman Efimovich Melnikov opened the plenum by announcing that on the agenda there was only one issue to discuss, which was about the CC leadership.
The floor was given to M. Abdurazakov for proclaiming the bureau’s proposals. Malik Abdurazakovich pronounced the decision and commented the reasons for such a proposal of the bureau. He sharply criticized Niyazov’s work. A few members spoke in the same way, then the floor was given to Niyazov. He accepted the criticism and said that he wasn’t satisfied with his own job and asked to dismiss him from the current post. The issue was put to the vote and the decision was adopted unanimously.
After that from the tribune Rashidov vaguely explained what kind of personality and qualities of character the first political leader of the republic should possess. He literally said the following:
‘What kind of a person must be the First secretary of the CC CP of the republic of Uzbekistan? The First secretary of the CC CP of the republic must be the most cultured in our party organization. He must be the most impartial person among us. At the same time, he must be sincere and incorruptible in any relations, extremely honest and almost ideally unimpeachable person!’ And so on and so forth.
Having emotionally and vaguely described the personality qualities of the would-be first party leader, Rashidov said, exciting the audience, ‘We, the CC bureau members, unanimously approved and are putting to the vote the election of comrade Mukhitdinov, Nuriddin Akramovich for the position of the First secretary of the CC CP of Uzbekistan.'
The audience refused discussing the candidacy. They voted and elected. Then the floor was given to me.
I still didn’t feel well and arrived at the plenum with a high temperature. That’s why I didn’t go to the tribune and thanked the comrades from my seat. I assured them that I would justify their confidence, pronounced many wishes towards the team. I warmly talked about Amin Irmatovich Niyazov, about our joint work for five years, during which I hadn't seen from his part any insincerity, hypocrisy, discredits and ignorance of my opinion. I emphasized that he was an honest, modest, hard working person.
Of course, he had made some mistakes and lapses. But for those things we, the bureau members, should also feel our responsibility. Hence, the top priority task was to eradicate by joint efforts all negatives spoken about at the bureau meeting and plenum.
S. Kamalov was recommended for the position of the chairman of the Council of Ministers. At the time he worked as the CC secretary on agriculture. Then the plenum was closed. I asked the first secretaries of the regional committees and the chairmen of the regional executive committees to stay, and after a short break we discussed some concrete urgent matters. Later I directly returned from the meeting to hospital.
So, for the third time I joined again the team of the CC CP of Uzbekistan: in the beginning of 1946 I was appointed a lecturer of the CC, in April of 1950 at the plenum I was elected as a bureau member and the CC secretary on propaganda, and now, in 1955 I became the First secretary.
VII
The 20th CONGRESS AND KHRUSHCHEV:
EXONERATION OF REPRESSION VICTIMS
We may say that in 1955 basically the first phase of the higher echelon staff redeployment was finished. Nikita Sergeevich planned to call the 20th congress of the CPSU before the scheduled date in order to consolidate his position of the party leader and get approval of accomplished work for the last two-three years and the main aspects of home and foreign policies, as well as to change considerably the CC and Presidium membership.
We exchanged comprehensively our views at the CC Presidium and decided to hold the congress in February, 1956. We specified an approximate agenda, after emotional discussion we agreed preliminary about assessment of Stalin’s activities, gathering and studying repression papers of the 1930s-1940s in order, after having been familiarized with them, to determine how and to what extent to reveal them at the congress.
It should be noted that an idea of calling the congress with such an agenda occurred to Nikita Sergeevich (as afterwards he spoke about it in a close circle at the moment of frankness) on September 8th, 1953, i.e., literally the next day after he had been elected as the First secretary of the CC. In that way, he started secretly preparing the congress.
I first talked to Khrushchev in Aktyubinsk city in Kazakhstan republic, in late November in 1953. Of course, I’d heard and seen him before at the plenums, sessions and congresses; on February 7th, 1952 when I made a report at the meeting of the CC organizational bureau on the issues in Uzbekistan, he put some questioned to me.
Niyazov, Melnikov and I voted for him to be elected as the First CC secretary at the plenum in September, 1953, and the next day we visited him in his new office to congratulate and invite him to visit Uzbekistan.
But in Aktyubinsk the conversation was unofficial and related to a wide range of issues. That was due to the following circumstances.
At the end of 1953 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decided to send a delegation to Finland at the invitation of Mr. Fagerholm, the Sejm chairman. The delegation consisted of deputies N.V. Popova – the chairman of SSOD, A.N. Volkov – the chairman of the government committee on labor and salary, N.N. Smirnov – the chairman of administration body of Leningrad Council, me and the other deputies.
The Finns warmly welcomed the first Soviet parliament delegation. The negotiations of the two parliament representatives took place. They were on current topic bilateral and international issues; also, we visited a few cities. We were invited by the prime-minister Urho Kekkonen. When departing we were about to bid farewell, he told us that the next day we would meet again. Indeed, on the following day after a conversation in the Sejm, in the evening, Fagerholm came to pick us up from the hotel. Seeing all of us in the lobby, he told Nina Vasilyevna there was a particular program for her and in a few minutes, she would be picked up by his wife.
We all, dressed smartly, came to a small house on the lake shore. When we entered, a doorkeeper asked us to undress. Fagerholm was the first to take off his clothes; seeing us embarrassed he invited us to follow his lead. We together with him entered the second room and, astonished, were about to walk backward. In the center of the room, Kekkonen, being tall, skinny and bald, wearing the ‘sauna clothes’ was waiting for us. Then we all went to the sauna. Since we were there for the first time, the air dryness, the heat of about 100 degrees Celsius above zero, its cozy and comfortable construction, three-story racks and a wonderful fireplace with a pleasant pine scent impressed us favorably. In 8-10 minutes the sweat was pouring down. The prime-minister stood up and commanded, ‘Everyone, follow me.’
In the yard he jumped right away into the pond, thereupon we did the same thing. The water felt freezing, the air temperature was about 2-3 degrees Celsius above zero. We couldn’t not only talk but also breathe. It seemed as if thousands of needles got stuck in the body.
We got out of the water and again went back to the sauna. When we got warmed up so that we started sweating, we took a cold shower and sat down at the table. For the first time in my life I saw such eminent guests sitting at the splendidly laid table. The Finns are thought to be morose, cold, unsociable and laconic people. This is not true. Kekkonen and Fagerhold were so witty that their jokes were making us laugh out loud.
Smirnov asked what “sauna” meant and was interested in the history of this type of the common bathhouse. We were told that in severe natural conditions in Finland sauna was the earthly paradise for the Finns. Finns are connected with sauna through the whole life. They compare it with mother’s womb, hugging a woman, hospital, church and cultural institution. Finns invite any visitor to the sauna, sometimes even by force. They see it as an inexhaustible source of happiness. For Finns sauna has got a sentimental value like a pet dog and home. In Finland there were over a million saunas per four and a half million people. However, as we were told, sauna hadn’t been invented by Finns. It had been adopted from ancient Romans and Arabs. Finns’ merit was that they made sauna more comfortable and civilized and later spread it throughout the world as their national pride.
Then the conversation shifted from the sauna topic to others.
Kekkonen said, ‘President Paasikivi is an old sick man and he wants to resign. Of the numerous candidates for president position, only we – Fagerholm and me – have the greatest chance. I’m sure I will win.’
To which Fagerholm answered, ‘We’ll see. I’ll try to leave you a long way behind me.’
Two years later the president election took place in Finland. Indeed, at the final stage of election only Kekkonen and Fagerholm were racing for the president post. In the final voting of 301 voters 151 voted for Kekkonen and 150 voted for Fagerholm. Thus, Kekkonen, prevailing for just one vote more, became the president and remained at this post for a quarter of a century.
I urgently flew to Tashkent. When the stopover in Aktyubinsk city, the chairman of the regional executive committee, coming up to a boarding ramp in order to meet some guests, saw me, and greeting me said that Khrushchev was there on his way back from Tashkent to Moscow and invited me to go in the VIP lobby. However, I found it inappropriate and entered the public lounge. In a few minutes the first secretary of the regional committee, Zh.A. Tashenov, and Khrushchev’s assistant, Lebedev, came up to me and said that Nikita Sergeevich was inviting me. Together, we entered the small VIP hall where there were about ten people sitting at the table covered with a lot of delicious food. I was seated opposite Nikita Sergeevich, then we had the following conversation.
Addressing to me he said, ‘We all have become cotton growers. We have just visited your homeland and have been really impressed. The meeting of the leaders of the cotton growing republics was held well. The Tadjiks are seriously engaged in cotton growing, but the Uzbeks are very conservative, opposing new, up-to-date methods of agrotechnology and the cutting-edge practices, in particular, square pocket planting and double-sided cultivation. The opponents are led by Yusupov who doesn’t find mechanization helpful and useful. The Uzbek workers from the collective farm “Tursunkulov”, where the meeting took place, told me about it. I supported them and pointed out the wrong Yusupov’s standpoint. The offered measures I think will provide additional at least 500 thousand tons of cotton.’
I had to promptly react to his words.
‘Your visit to the Central Asian republics will give good results, particularly because until now the party and government leaders have seldom visited our region. No doubt that people in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan heartily welcomed you. I feel sorry I didn’t have an opportunity to be there then.
Undoubtedly, the main way for cotton growing development is the wide-spread use of up-to-date scientific techniques, technologies and cutting-edge practices. The new approaches in agrotechnology such as square pocket planting and cultivation of plantations in two directions were invented by an Uzbek crop grower, called Tishabai Mallabaev, who worked in a collective farm in the Namangan region. Even in 1934-1935 he already sowed cotton seeds by square pocket planting, ploughed and cultivated along and across a field. That’s why his collective farm was then named ‘Kizil Shakhmatchi’ (‘Red Chess Player’). Later Mallabaev was appointed a chief consultant of the people’s commissariat in the republic agriculture. But for some reasons, including the lack of machines, the labor shortage and I can’t help mentioning the authority's negligence, particularly during the war, that experience and technique weren't widely spread in Uzbekistan.
New methods of agrotechnology must be based on industry. We think the determining factor is first of all availability of tractors with special devices and contrivances, trailers and mechanisms. In the recent years we have been busy working on this issue.’
Further I said, ‘As for Usman Yusupov, I don’t know what our comrades told about him, but he has been working in difficult conditions for a long time. We know him as a devoted communist, honest patriot, who has great merits to our country and republic in development of economy and culture of Uzbekistan, especially during World War II. He perfectly knows the region peculiarities, is closely connected with and supported and respected by common people. He is not alone to be responsible for the drawbacks in some matters of cotton growing. We all are responsible too.’
Nikita Sergeevich, reluctant to continue talking about this topic, asked me how Finns had welcomed us. When I was about to reply, he was informed that the aircraft was ready. Heading to a boarding ramp he called me and said, ‘I agree we shouldn’t approach towards cotton growing as usual. And I know Yusupov much better than others do. I left a copy of my speech, and they must have already prepared the report about the meeting. Take a look at it before it has been published. If you have any remarks or comments, call me.’
Then his airplane left for Moscow.
Because of worsening weather our airplane was delayed, and we arrived in Tashkent only on the next day, when the report on the meeting and Khrushchev’s speech had already been published. On the phone I informed Khrushchev’s assistant, Lebedev, my views on separate items of the publications.
At the very beginning of 1954 I was invited to the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for a discussion of projects on economic plan and budget. We, the republic representatives, started expressing our remarks, comments, suggestions on sorting out painful problems.
However, the chairman of the state planning committee of the USSR, G. P. Kosachenko, said, ‘The given project, including its breakdown for the republics, was approved by the CC Presidium. The document was adopted unanimously.’
The ‘discussion’ and adoption of such important documents, related to vital activities of all the state bodies in all sectors and all republics, took less than two hours… Upon returning to the permanent republic representation office, I called Lebedev to say that the meeting of the Council of Ministers had been over and asked if Nikita Sergeevich would be able to receive me for a few minutes. He said that he would let me know about it. At my request, reported by Lebedev, Khrushchev received me on the following day at 12 o’clock at noon.
I came in. Right away Nikita Sergeevich asked me how the leaders of the cotton planting republics were implementing the meeting’s resolutions and whether they were applying his recommendations.
Then in his bitterness, he shared his thoughts, ‘People must be fed and dressed. Our life standard is low. Malenkov has raised a question about a necessity to pay close attention to and channel more funds into the group “B” industry growth. The detailed resolution was approved and adopted, but as you know there have been no improvements at all. So, the resolution just remained on a paper. This has happened because his speech was intended to flirt with people, He was just playing to gain cheap publicity. Malenkov might not realize that in order to produce more bread, meat, milk, potatoes, sugar as well as other consumer goods like clothes, shoes, and other products, it’s required first of all to boost agriculture because without raw materials, neither light industry, nor food and textile ones, nor the other economic sectors can be developed and improved.
Our housing situation is also bad. Soon it will have been ten years after the war, but millions of people still don’t have houses to live in. The Central Asian people have apartments, houses and farmlands. Of course, not all of them have similar accommodations. But if you go to Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to look at how people live there, you’ll see whole villages literally dead, abandoned by villagers, the roads in poor conditions, no public municipal services and utilities. There is an acute shortage of schools and hospitals. During the war we had to evacuate people, but now they are abandoning their native places, where their parents and grandparents were buried, in search of some bread, places to live in and jobs. That’s what we have inherited.’
Having listened to my opinion, he continued, ‘The population is in a low mood. Bitter memories about deaths of people at war fronts… But it was the war. However, the mass extermination of cadres and officers during repressions in the 1930s will never be forgotten. People can’t understand and are demanding an explanation of what happened, for what reasons thousands of people, including foremen, national commissioners, and others, were slain. We have to sort it out, clarify it and let people know the truth. And how did the 1930s repressions take place in your homeland?’
I told him briefly that I didn’t know in detail, to which he said, ‘I used to know the then first secretary of the CC of Uzbekistan, but forgot his name.’
‘Akmal Ikramov,’ I said.
‘Exactly. It was an interesting, handsome, manly person. I attended the Politburo sessions, where they discussed his statement in summer in 1937. It was first read out, then the floor was given to him. He behaved confidently and spoke convincingly. Then he answered to a few questions. Stalin seriously rebuked him about his political beliefs, his approach in cadre management, class attitudes and his job done unproperly. Ikramov was answering self-critically and finally said he would his best to learn a lesson and make an appropriate conclusion from it. He was told to stay in the reception room for a while. When he came out of the room, Stalin said, ‘Of course, Ikramov has made many mistakes, but I think he is an honest man and was speaking here sincerely.’ Nevertheless, the authors of the case, including Ezhov, Beria, Kaganovich and Mikoyan, suggested that Ikramov should be relieved from his job, be excluded from the party and brought to trial. They insisted on their suggestion. Ikramov flew to Tashkent. And the Secretariat was assigned to prepare all the necessary documents that determined his destiny.
I asked if I could familiarize myself with the documents of that Politburo session.
Nikita Sergeevich replied, ‘Unofficially without publicity, we have already started studying the mass repression papers of those years. Pospelov, Peter Nikolaevich has been assigned to focus on the matter. He has already started. You may talk to him. Moreover, you may participate in the study of those materials to make sure that the prepared documents reflect the true situation not only in the Center, but also in the republics, so that they clearly show how the sons of the other peoples were slain.’
After that he picked up a phone receiver and called P. N. Pospelov, ‘Peter Nikolaevich, comrade Mukhitdinov from Tashkent is here in my office. You know him. He is interested in the cases of the repressed people in the 1930s in Uzbekistan. I think he is right in this. Could you help him to study the Politburo minutes of the 1937 summer, where Ikramov’s case was discussed? Actually, you may involve him in this work. He will assist us to sort out what happened then in the republics. He will come to see you.’
Hanging up the phone he told me, ‘When you finish studying all the materials, you will tell us, but not officially. Agreed?’
Having parted with Khrushchev, I immediately went to see Pospelov. We warmly greeted each other and sat down. He said, 'An investigation of the cases of political repression victims is not for me, and I’m not a specialist in it. But Nikita Sergeevich ordered to collect and familiarize myself with the documents and, if possible, to try to summarize them. As a historian and politologist I can impartially assess. So, I agreed and I’m involved in this job at the moment.'
He immediately called somewhere and informed me that all the requested papers would be brought to me in about an hour and a half or so…
A small folder was brought in. There were no shorthand records about the Politburo sessions, but there was a short protocol with Ikramov’s statement, his explanations, the questions and answers, his final speech, Stalin’s remarks and comments, the ‘case’ authors’ blames and the assignment to the Secretariat. Having read I asked Peter Nikolaevich why Kaganovich, Beria, Yezhov, and Mikoyan, despite Stalin’s positive comments about Ikramov, had still insisted on taking extreme measures to punish Ikramov.
‘They,’ he explained, ‘were obviously interested in his liquidation.’
‘Could Stalin, using his power and position, save Ikramov?’
‘Of course, he could.’
‘Then why didn’t he do it?’
‘That’s Stalin’s style and management method. He wanted to remain in the history annals as an unbiased, fair person, but at the same time to make the other attendees responsible for these cases. And they realized it.’
‘Can I take a look at the Secretariat’s resolution?’
After talking on the phone, he said the additional documents would be prepared within two-three hours.
We agreed to meet in the next morning.
On the following day I had the document in my hands…
This letter is addressed to the Plenum of the CC CP(b) of Uzbekistan.
Got familiarized with:
a) The affidavits of the arrestees: Bukharin, F. Khodjaev, Razumov, Rumyanzev, Polonskii, Khodjanov, Antonov, and Ryskulov;
b) The minutes of the confrontation of comrade Ikramov with Bukharin, F. Khodjaev, Antipov, Razumov, Rumyantsev and
c) The statement of comrade Ikramov-
The CC AUCP(b) has found out that comrade Ikramov showed not only political blindness in relation to the bourgeois nationalists, enemies of the Uzbek people (F. Khodjaev, Khodjanov, Baltabaev, Tadjiev, Karimov, and others), but also, he sometimes patronized them;
Ikramov probably had connections with the leaders of the Trotskyist right-wing anti-Soviet groups in Moscow (Bukharin, Antipov, and others).
The CC AUCP(b) decided:
1) To suggest to the Plenum of the CC CP(b) of Uzbekistan to discuss the matter about comrade Ikramov and inform the CC AUCP(b) about their opinion;
2) To send on an official trip the member of the Politburo of the CC AUCP(b), comrade Andreev, A.A., to Uzbekistan to explain the matters related to the current letter.
10. IX. 1937
Moscow city
J. Stalin
V. Molotov
Yet, I couldn’t comprehend and grasp what a crime Ikramov had committed.
Peter Nikolaveevich tried to explain the situation:
‘As far as I understand the case was not about Uzbekistan nor about Ikramov’s mistakes. The point was about a different thing. Stalin was getting rid of those whom he considered to be his opponents and rivals. The most dangerous of them for him were Bukharin and Trotsky. He got rid of Trotsky by exiling him to Kazakhstan, then to Mexico, where afterwards the latter was slain. Bukharin didn’t openly pretend to the party leadership, but he had fundamental theoretical knowledge, was really good at polemics and well-grounded arguing for his standpoint, which often didn’t match or coincide and even controverted the mainstream Stalin’s policy. He exercised an infinite authority in the party. Such a personality got obviously stuck in Stalin’s throat, who, if we take into account his cruel, tough character, couldn't tolerate any objections. However, your Ikramov, knowing all that, was befriended with Bukharin, and every time arriving in Moscow, he visited Bukharin at his apartment or the country house. On the other hand, Bukharin also, when visiting Uzbekistan sometimes, was staying in Ikramov’s apartment for weeks. Moreover, Ikramov married a Bukharin’s relative and became his relative. All these were a good reason to declare him a confederate of Bukharin.’
‘What happened with this letter later?’
‘Andreev arrived in Tashkent, where the plenum of the CC CP of Uzbekistan took place. Ikramov was excluded from the party, fired from the job, got arrested and brought to Moscow.’
‘May I get familiarized with the documents of that plenum and the trial process?’
‘The Plenum documents are kept in Tashkent. Try to find them there. As for the shorthand record of the investigation and the trial, I haven’t seen them yet. By your next arrival I hope I’ll have got them.’
Saying goodbye to me he said, ‘I hope you will actively take part in the preparation of the repression materials. After studying the materials available in the republic, come to see me.’
Coming back to the permanent republic office, I was walking about a room for a few hours, pondering, trying to comprehend…
In March, 1938 at the ‘Trotsky right-wing block’ trial, it was A.Y. Vyshinskii, V.V. Ulrikh, the court members, I.O. Matulevich, B.I. Ievlev, and their colleagues, whom I found so inhuman, violating rights of people and the laws. And in January, 1954, having listened to Khrushchev and Pospelov, read the documents, I started to realize that those, who had judged and sentenced the members of the group, were actually just the executors of the rulers’ will. Their task was to gather materials, necessary to ‘create and launch a case’, arrest, interrogate, judge and execute by shooting or exile to camps… They and those like them were zealous and even ‘competed’ in order to carry out directives in the best possible way and played up to those who were in the Kremlin and gave orders.
Upon arrival in Tashkent, I told Niyazov about the meeting of the Council of Ministers and briefly retold him my conversation with Khrushchev. At an open meeting of the government, with participation of the regional executive committees’ chairmen, ministers, leaders of republican organizations, the plans and budgets of the regions were approved, and the urgent measures for their fulfillment were discussed.
Upon arrival in the republic, A.P. Byzov, who was a professional intelligence agency officer, an upright and objective person, was appointed as the chairman of the KGB of Uzbekistan. I asked him about the documents of those “cases…”, including the cases of V.I. Ivanov, who was the First secretary of the CC CP(b) of Uzbekistan until 1929, I.A. Zelenskii, who was the chairman of the Central Asian bureau of the CC AUCP(b) until 1934, Akmal Ikramov and Fayzulla Khodzhayev, who had been the chairmen of the Council of National Commissioners since 1924. Alexei Petrovich said that those documents were not available in his office because all those people had been charged with the crimes as the members of the group of N. I. Bukharin and A. I. Rykov.
So, Fayzulla Khodzhayev was arrested right in Moscow where he arrived on a business trip, and Ikramov was arrested immediately after being dismissed from the job at the CC plenum of the republic and then sent to Moscow. Pondering over those matters I arrived at the conclusion that all the documents related to launching Ikramov and Khodjaev’s cases during their stay in the republic must have been kept in the party archives. Also, I requested Byzov to look for those documents again in his office.
Having invited the director of the Communist Party History Institute of Uzbekistan, K.E. Zhitov, I requested him to bring from the archives the materials of the 7th congress of the CP of the republic, when F. Khodjaev was removed from all his positions, and of the CC plenum, where ‘A. Ikramov’s case’ was discussed. He brought me them, and that’s what I discovered there:
In Tashkent on September 16th, the 3rd Plenum of the CC CP(b)) of Uzbekistan was opened. It was attended by 42 members of the CC, 18 candidates for the CC membership, 8 members of the auditing commission, 73 secretaries of the regional, municipal and district committees.
There was comrade A.A. Andreev, the secretary of the CC AUCP(b).
They listened to:
1) The letter of the CC AUCP(b). A report by comrade A.A. Andreev about A. Ikramov and A. Ikramov’s explanation.
77 people were included in the list of the debate participants; of them 35 people spoke out.
After four-day discussion, the resolution, submitted by the commission of 15 people, was approved.
2) Organizational matters:
a) About a date of convocation of the 4th Plenum of the CC CP(b) of Uzbekistan.
It was decided:
The 4th Plenum of the CC CP(b) of Uzbekistan is to be held in 6 days;
b) About the secretary of the CC CP(b) of Uzbekistan (A.A. Andreev).
It was decided:
Yakovlev, Pavel Nikitovich, is to be elected as the Second secretary of the CC CP(b) of Uzbekistan.
And there was another document.
The resolution of the 3rd Plenum of the CC CP(b) of Uzbekistan on the letter of the CC AUCP(b) and the report on Ikramov by comrade A.A. Andreev, the Politburo member of the CC AUCP(b).
The Plenum considers it proved that the First secretary of the CC CP(b) of Uzbekistan, Ikramov:
a) gave the recently exposed nation's enemies a full opportunity to climb up to the leading posts in the party and Soviet government;
b) protected and prevented a disclosure of the recently arrested nation’s enemies: Karimov, Tsekher, Baltabaev, Shermukhamedov, and others; also, he had very close relations with them, suppressed criticism of the party members against a sworn foe of the nation, Fayzulla Khodzhayev;
c) hid from the party organization of Uzbekistan his membership in the Trotskyites group in 1923.
The Plenum of the CC establishes that in the result of Ikramov’s patronage to the sworn enemies of the Uzbek people, Trotsky right-wing and bourgeois-national traitors (F. Khodjaev, Tsekher, Baltabaev, Nemtsovich, Manjara, Moor, Shermukhamedov, Karimov, Zelkina, Tadjiev, and others), those got a chance to climb up into the CC bureau to occupy high positions and were doing hostile work for a long time.
In view of the above, the 3rd Plenum of the CC CP(b) of Uzbekistan decides:
to dismiss Ikramov from a job of the First secretary of the CC, to exclude him from the membership of CC CP(b) of Uzbekistan and the party, and to forward his case to the investigation authority, with the demand of arresting him immediately.
The Plenum of the CC CP(b) of Uzbekistan calls all the party and non-party Bolsheviks of Uzbekistan to a final defeat and root out all remainders of counter-revolutionary nationalists, to more closely unite around the Stalin CC AUCP(b) and to lead the Uzbek people to new victories in fighting for socialism.
To inform about a current situation the CC AUCP (B).
21st September, 1937.
Norbekov, Yakovlev.
At that plenum, of the twelve members of the CC bureau, elected at the previous plenum, six people were excluded from the party; of the seven candidates to the CC bureau membership one person was excluded; 19 members and 3 candidates to the CC membership were excluded from the CC membership. Altogether 22 people became “the enemies of the nation”.
On September 26-27th, 1937 the 4th plenum of the CC considered a few candidates and elected Usman Usupov as First secretary of the CC CP(b) of Uzbekistan.
During the following few days there were meetings and rallies all over the republic. The participants approved decisions of the plenums, in the adopted resolutions they showed their ardent love to the nation leader, Stalin, and swore that the fight against ‘nationalistic, counter-revolutionary and other hostile forces’ would be continued.
After Ikramov, Khodjaev, and the other workers had been charged with crimes and prosecuted, their wives, children, parents and close relatives underwent repressions.
I persistently continued pondering over that time…
J.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov’s letter was in essence and by form a gross violation of the party Regulations, democratic centralism principles because it was directly addressed to the CC plenum. Whereas any document of such a significance was supposed to be directed to the CC CP of the republic to be familiarized with by the republic bureau, which in turn was to decide where and how it should be discussed and make an appropriate decision. Perhaps, the authors decided to address directly to the plenum because by that time most bureau members had already been arrested and only three members had remained available. So, they weren’t enough even for a quorum.
As the result, there was nobody to be the chairman at the plenum when the case of the first secretary was discussed. Therefore, first of all, Yakovlev, who had arrived in the republic, was elected as the second secretary. However, who would be elected as the first secretary? They couldn’t make a decision immediately.
Why? It was really difficult to solve the matter right away in such a situation. Nevertheless, a few candidates were nominated. Any of them might be elected, but the problem was that the candidate had to be approved in Moscow by the Politburo of the CC AUCP (b). The candidate had to be interviewed in Moscow and only after that his further destiny could be determined. In view of that it was decided to postpone the 4th plenum for a few days.
Of the three candidates it was decided to elect Usman Yusupov. Moscow approved his candidacy without inviting him for an interview to the capital since Kaganovich knew him very well when they worked in the trade unions and Mikoyan knew him when Usupov was the national commissioner of food industry of Uzbekistan. They described him positively and the Politburo approved. Nevertheless, according to the documents there was a heated discussion in Tashkent. However, eventually he was elected as First secretary.
Though we can see in this case at least some decorative elements of democracy, the other political figures, whose basic rights and merits were rudely violated, were treated a lot worse.
For example, Fayzulla Khodzhayev was the chairman of the Council of national commissioners of Uzbekistan from the very first day of its establishment and he had held that post till June, 1937. He had a tremendous authority in the republic and the Soviet Union, which was proved by the fact that he was one of the chairmen of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and a member of the Supreme Soviet of Defense of the country.
In June, 1937 the 7th congress of the CP(b) of Uzbekistan took place. Fayzulla Khodjaev sat at the presidium table, chaired the meetings and delivered speeches, but when they moved to considering organizational matters, he, who was the second person in the republic, wasn’t nominated to the CC membership. To the questions of the confused, puzzled attendees there was a brief ‘explanation’: he was accused of nationalistic, hostile activities.
On June 17th the congress was over. For three days Khodjaev was staying in bed because of the heart attack. On June 21st he came back to work, at the end of the day he signed resolution of the Council of national commissioners No 840 on the current affairs, which was the last document of the government signed by him. At night, he with his mother, wife, and daughter went by train to Moscow in order to be received by Stalin. Stalin knew him well, even once he called him ‘the best economist’. Earlier Khodjaev had visited Stalin at his apartment and country house; and their daughters Svetlana and Viloyat had made friends. But now he didn't get an answer to his repeated requests on his reception by Stalin. Instead, he was arrested in his hotel room.
I should mention a few words about Sultan Segizbaev, who became the chairman of the Council of national commissioners of Uzbekistan after F. Khodjaev. At the age of seventeen years old, he took part in the famous national liberation insurrection in 1916. He joined the party in 1918; and once the communist organizations had been established, he became one of their leaders. He graduated from Moscow Institute of red professorate, then he became a professor and started lecturing history and economy at the same institute and in other Moscow and Tashkent universities. In September, 1938 in Tashkent, the regional party conference took place. Segizbaev was sitting in the presidium together with Usman Usupov and Apresyan, who was the national commissioner of the internal affairs, and some other CC bureau members. At that time someone came up to him from behind and said that in the hall a person was waiting for him to inform him about an urgent matter. He stood up and left the conference room and never came back. On June 21st he was transported to Moscow and on February 25th, 1939 he was condemned and sentenced to a capital punishment by the military tribunal. On the same day he was executed by shooting. Alas, there were too many facts like that one, and I’m not going to enumerate them further.
I have already written that in 1950, when I worked as a propaganda secretary, I saw in the CC the list of science, culture and art people, who had been accused, ‘at someone’s proposition’, of nationalism, yearning for separatism, and so on. Three years later, when I was the chairman of the Council of Ministers, I found out in detail from one of the appointed to see me visitors about that terrible devastating storm initiated by the Central Bureau, which resulted in death or broken lives of tens of thousands of talented people…
Having received consent of the First CC secretary, Niyazov, I met the KGB chairman, Byzov, a few times. He familiarized me with all the materials because all of them had been condemned at the trials held by the military prosecution in Tashkent. In order to start studying each person’s case and preparing appropriate proposals, I needed an approval from the Center.
I was summoned to Moscow to participate in two conferences held in the CC by Khrushchev: on the cancellation of product payments for machine and tractor stations (MTS) and fundamental improvement of relationship between collective and state farms and MTS, on the management reorganization in industry and construction.
We arrived at the Center with the relevant ministers and specialists. Within three days two meetings were held, where I had a chance to speak. The objective of all discussed measures was to increase considerably labor productivity in rural areas, decrease the cost of agricultural products. In fact, it was the first step to liquidate machine and tractor stations and transfer all their assets: equipment, technologies, employees, service and maintenance depot to collective farms. After a while that came true.
As for the management reorganization in industry and construction, Khrushchev emphasized that on peripheries there were too many plants, factories, mines and construction organizations under union subordination. They were cut off Moscow and simultaneously not bound with the republican, regional and district organizations, which were not responsible for their work. Such an enormously diversified economy can’t be efficiently managed from the same Center. It’s necessary to raise the republican, regional and district roles in work with those enterprises.
During the discussion (it was a preliminary exchange of our views) there were different standpoints. A few union ministers generally approved the idea and tried, openly or in whisper, to argue that the single economy complex could hardly be reasonably broken down into small units. Besides, some separate key sectors were so specific that they could be skillfully managed by the Center only. We, the local republic representatives, convinced them that it would be reasonable to devolve as many as possible sectors and enterprises to the republics. In that way the first signs of conflicts and disputes appeared in the management hierarchy of industry and construction: vertically and horizontally. It was necessary to balance these contradictions reasonably and effectively. That meeting initiated further redundancies of union ministries and authorities and establishment of national economy councils.
After the meeting I delayed for a few days in Moscow. I went to see Pospelov and told him about all the documents and materials about the 1930s repressions I got familiarized with in the republic. Then I told him what I had found out about the groups of scientists and writers of Uzbekistan and the accusations against them in the late 1940s.
Peter Nikolaevich proposed me to get familiarized with the shorthand record of February-March Plenum of the CC, 1937. He promised he would consult the Ministry of Internal Affairs, KGB and Prosecutor General Office about the Uzbek intelligentsia repressed in the 1940s.
We agreed to meet in the next morning.
At 3 o’clock in the afternoon I entered the general department, where a thick folder of the plenum documents was given to me, then I was seen off to a separate room where I could read. Till late evening I couldn’t tear myself away from those documents. I read twice the Bukharin case, A.I. Mikoyan commission’s proposals and the plenum resolutions.
Now all those materials have been published and have become a study subject for historians and political scientists. Therefore, I’m not going to turn over those terrible, bloody pages of the history again. I can only say that up to date I still see before my eyes the three words: ‘arrest, convict, shoot’. That prescription was written by the chairman of the commission, which was established after the February-March plenum, 1937 for ‘comprehensive and deep’ study of Bukharin and his group’s activities. That was Mikoyan’s proposition after the commission had made conclusion. So, the Court implemented exactly what Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan had proposed.
As it was agreed before, I came to see Pospelov in the next morning. I frankly admitted that the plenum materials shocked me, because there was no information about existence of the organized bloc; no plans, the charter, program or protocols of meetings, conferences and so on had been submitted to the Court.
‘Nobody was interested in these questions at that time. The main objective was to defeat Bukharin, Rykov and those who actively supported them,’ replied Peter Nikolaevich and continued, ‘As for the Tashkent repressed groups of the intelligentsia, I have consulted about them. Since those trials were held locally and, what's more, covertly, the republican government may study the materials on their own and define their standpoint on each convict, if need be. Thereupon the relevant authorities must take a decision.’
‘It might be helpful,’ I said, ‘if from here the ministry of internal affairs, KGB, and the prosecutor general gave their instructions to the republican authorities so that they could collaborate with, provide and familiarized us with their materials and define measures and decisions together with us.’
P.N. Pospelov promised to talk it over.
In the same afternoon I was received by Khrushchev. Nikita Sergeevich was interested in my opinion of the recent discussions. I assured him that we would thoroughly study and prepare our suggestions and proposals.
I was so deeply impressed by the material I had read the previous day that I started talking about the repressed people’s cases and my depressing impression of the materials of the February-March plenum, 1937. He answered with satisfaction, ‘It’s good that you are getting involved directly in this matter! Now you will know what crimes were committed in those years.’
‘Is it possible to exonerate them? In particular, the former leaders of Uzbekistan?’ I asked.
‘No,’ he said, ‘not now. First of all, we need to prepare and consider this issue thoroughly at the congress. Once we’ve got an approval from the party, we will act in practice. We, at the Presidium, still haven’t arrived at consensus on this issue. Some comrades have already been worried, doing their best to prevent publicity about it. Soon we are going to consider P.N. Pospelov’s information preliminarily at the Presidium and we’ll see the feedback. Meanwhile, you should actively continue participating in it. If you have any suggestions, let Pospelov know about them.’
Using an opportunity of that meeting I raised a question about necessity of an abrupt increase of hydro-economic construction in Uzbekistan, which would enable to dramatically increase irrigated fields first of all on account of cultivation of barren steppe and other virgin regions. I added that in the early 1952 this suggestion was reported to Stalin and he approved it. When Khrushchev heard Stalin’s name, his face distorted and I regretted mentioning him.
He said, ‘In principle it’s helpful. Irrigated agriculture is the most effective in the rural economy. When it is the right time, we will support this idea, but at the moment the most important for us is to feed people with bread and increase meat ration a little bit. Hence, the primary task of the party is to substantially increase output of grains and livestock products in the whole country, including Uzbekistan.’
I said that we wanted to increase irrigated agriculture not for cotton only, but also for the output increase of grains, fruit, vegetables and livestock products. Therefore, we would pay a particular attention to those sectors. As for other matters which could be only approved by the Center, we would prepare calculations and proposals to be submitted further for discussion. N.S. Khrushev agreed, and on that we parted.
A preparation for the 20th party congress started more than two years beforehand, to be more precise, after the September plenum of the CC CPSU in 1953, when Khrushchev was elected as the First secretary. What was special about that pre-congress period? I would like to note a few moments.
The management style and methods of supreme authorities of the party and government started changing essentially, which was felt considerably by the regions within the country and overseas.
Stalin’s style of work and even personal life was quite specific, different from the common standards. He used to come to the office in the afternoon, not earlier than between 11 and 13 o’clock, whereas all the working people started work at 9 o’clock in the morning. He used to stay up in his office till night or even early morning, whereas workdays formally finished at 6 p.m. However, his inner circle and administration officers, of course, had to stay at work while Stalin was in his study, and on the next day everyone had to come to the office by 9 a.m.
In the tighter situations were executives and other office employees in the regions, particularly we, Asians. There was an unwritten tradition, according to which the first or major executives in the regions and republics had to be in the office till late, waiting for a sudden call from Stalin or someone else from his office. The time difference between Moscow and Tashkent was three hours. So, they had to be in the office till two or three o’clock in the early morning and get up not later than 6 a.m. when at the sunrise the peasants used to go out on the fields. That was a compulsory work style. When I worked as First secretary of the Namangan and then Tashkent regional party committees, neither Stalin nor someone else from his office called me. Nonetheless, all of us had to strictly follow that completely abnormal order of work day.
The new party leadership immediately changed that style. The common civil rules came into force, returned executives and office employees to normal lifestyle, and undoubtedly raised work effectiveness.
Before, the Politburo, Secretariat and overall Kremlin’s activities were hidden under a veil of mystery. But now some publicity appeared as to the Kremlin’s activities, which were widely covered and discussed in mass media. That certainly heightened interest in work.
There was a personal moment too. Stalin seldom visited regions and never visited Central Asia. People used to see his portraits or his snapshots from newsreels. When being the chairman of the Council of Ministers for more than four years, often attending meetings of the union government, I only saw him twice as the chairman of the meetings.
Khrushchev, who replaced Stalin, was his opposite in this respect. He immediately started visiting the republics and regions, informally talked to villagers and workers, discussing vital issues and consulting with them. He held conferences on various issues, invited to attend them both high-ranking functionaries and ordinary skilful experts. Such an approach raised people’s trust and respect to Nikita Sergeevich in the regions.
He also made amendments in the USSR foreign policy. W. Churchill introduced the term “the iron curtain”, which meant the closedness of the Soviet Union, limitations of its contacts with other countries. An active, dynamic openness of Khrushchev in the foreign policy started gaining positive results.
For example, during his visit to Yugoslavia, having arrived at the airport, Nikita Sergeevich immediately admitted in public that first of all the then Soviet leadership was responsible for the serious disagreements between the two countries. In those years Soviet people noticeably made more frequent trips abroad and, vice versa, foreign high-ranking executives visited the USSR.
At the peak of the ‘cold war’ the slogan of ‘peaceful coexistence of the two systems’ was pronounced quite strongly and attracted attention of not only politicians, but also ordinary people.
However, in the sanctum sanctorum - the core of the Soviet power, the USSR itself and the CC CPSU Presidium, the situation became critical. The stumbling block was naturally the issue of Stalin’s personal responsibility for the mass repressions and the necessity of the victims’ exoneration.
As to exoneration and rehabilitation of the innocent victims of the mass repressions, we in Uzbekistan as well as all the Soviet people were basically supporting Khrushchev’s standpoint. But when the speech was about Stalin and his personal responsibility for committed illegalities, serious mistakes in the beginning of the war and in other spheres, our standpoints were different. It seemed to us it would be unfair to show all the achievements of the Soviet people in the war, prewar and postwar years in the bleakest light and cross out the personal role of Stalin in those country achievements.
In addition, I have to admit, personally, I didn’t clearly comprehend to full extent some traits of Stalin’s personality. For instance, why, being General Secretary, he didn’t make a report on the CC activities at the 19th party congress by himself, though he was present there. Instead, he told one of the CC secretaries to make. During the congress he often went out of the conference hall, and during the meetings he often stood up and walked in the lobby. When he made speeches, he only spoke for about fifteen minutes essentially about the world communist, labor and national liberation movements and literally never said a word about our country, the Soviet people and the party. At last, at the plenum he asked twice not to elect him as the first secretary; instead, he proposed a multistage structure of the party hierarchy unprecedented in its history.
Only later when he was ill, I realized, due to the treating him doctors’ reports, how seriously he was sick. He often stood up and walked during the congress sittings because of the high blood pressure and rheumatic pains. Indeed, requesting the congress not to elect him as the CC first secretary, he didn’t give up the other responsibilities. Therefore, it would be hardly right to think him just pretending to be ‘modest’.
At the beginning of 1956, during my regular stay in Moscow, I visited Pospelov who smiling and having a sigh of relief told me that Khrushchev got himself involved in the study of the repressions cases. As to himself, he was only helping Khrushchev in materials gathering. I didn’t attend the Presidium sittings in 1954-1955, but I was told that the more Nikita Sergeevich focused on repressions cases, the deeper were his emotions and, accordingly, the atmosphere in the higher echelon of power became more strenuous; and acute debates and disagreements sharply arose.
Originally, it was supposed that Pospelov would inform the 20th congress on that matter. Thereupon, it was told that a member of the CC Presidium would make statements. Afterwards, it was asserted that the report would be made by Suslov. In the long run, Nikita Sergeevich himself spoke at the congress…
People expected much from the congress, hoping it would bring substantial, essential changes in all industries and other spheres of spiritual life.
The congress agenda brought about the deep interest and was briskly discussed. It included as follows:
- The CC CPSU report;
- The Central auditing committee report;
- The CPSU 20thcongress Directives on the 6th five-year plan of the USSR economy development for 1956 -1960 years;
- On the CPSU program preparation;
- Some amendments in the CPSU Regulations;
- The party management bodies elections.
As usual, shortly before the congress a few CC members were invited to Moscow to meet and see off foreign delegations. I was summoned seven days before the congress commencement. At first, I was summoned by Nikita Sergeevich’s assistants. They, referring to their boss, told me to get familiarized with the texts of his reports at the congress: ‘The CC Report’ and ‘The Stalin’s Personality Cult’. I was told beforehand that he was absorbed zealously in writing them at the moment and those texts weren’t final and there might be some alterations in them. The both documents would be considered at the CC Presidium in three days.
In a separate room, I was reading the documents almost all day long. After reading them I spoke my point of view. They promised to inform Nikita Sergeevich of my comments.
The next day I was invited to the international relations department. There I was informed of arrival of 55 brotherly communist and labor parties delegations. They were to be met by the Presidium members and candidates to the membership. I was asked to take part in meeting and seeing-off the delegations from Hungary, Korea, Vietnam, Morocco, Uruguay and two illegal parties that were working underground in their countries.
I was told about who would keep me duly informed when to meet and see off the guests. Next, they said that besides the meetings and seeing offs in the general group, I would be personally attached for the permanent work till the end of the congress to the following delegations: the Vietnamese delegation headed by Chyong Tin, the Korean Labor Party delegation headed by Tsoi En Gen, the Indonesian Communist Party delegation headed by Aidit, the Communist Party delegation from Uruguay headed by Arismendi.
In the department of organizational and personnel work I was asked in advance to think about speeches. It was said that it would be desirable that I would speak about the CC report and S. Kamalov, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, would speak about the five-year plan directives.
The days before the congress were the busiest because I had to arrange meeting the foreign delegations at the request of the CC foreign relations department and to prepare a speech on the CC report as requested in the organizational work department. The nominees from Uzbekistan for the CC and auditing commission membership were preliminarily chosen and agreed upon. I wondered about the department propositions. They said:
‘It seems to us it would be better to nominate you for the CC CPSU membership, to nominate A.A. Luchinskii - the commander of Turkestan military district, R.E. Melnikov - the second secretary of the CC CP of Uzbekistan, and S.R Rashidov - the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of Uzbekistan, for the candidates for the CC membership, and to nominate S. Kamalov for the Central auditing commission membership.’
When I gathered all the members of the CC CP bureau of Uzbekistan and the first secretaries of the party regional committees of the party, I informed them about preliminary propositions of the department of the CC CPSU. Neither questions nor comments were made.
During discussion of the candidacies at the Politburo it was admitted that it would be reasonable to include in the nominees list for the CC membership Y.S. Nasriddinova, who was at that time the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of Uzbekistan. (It should be noted, by the way, that all the nominees from Uzbekistan were elected.)
Now, about the most complex matter. As it was mentioned above, it was really hard for the CC Presidium to prepare and preliminarily discuss the materials about the Stalin’s personality cult. The “Stalin’s guard” representatives objected the presented draft report. They claimed it could cause an undesirable feedback inside the party and overseas. They suggested that the speaker should be someone from the CC secretaries but not the first one. Nikita Sergeevich insisted that the report text should be kept in full; and he wanted to make a report by himself. The opponents persistently continued objecting. So, Khrushchev displayed his character, claiming, ‘At this rate I will be fully responsible for making the report and announcing the repressions materials, which will affect some attendees here.’
Realizing, naturally, what kind of materials and who is being spoken about, Malenkov said, ‘We can also announce the documents relating to you.’
After a short break there was another discussion. Eventually we came to an agreement about the following. Nikita Sergeevich, making concessions for the basic consent, proposed, ‘Let’s demonstrate at the congress the Presidium collegiality and the leadership unity. For this purpose, we will re-elect all the present here CC Presidium members, who were elected at the joint sitting on March 4-6th, 1953. The report on the Stalin’s personality cult will be made at the last sitting of the congress; and this sitting will be a closed meeting without foreign guests and visitors.’
All agreed. Then we decided the report on the Stalin’s personality cult wouldn’t be discussed. We might well take a brief decision and later adopt it as the CC CPSU resolution.
The CC members, who worked with foreign delegations, were instructed to meet them directly after the sitting and to inform them of the main points of the report about The Stalin’s personality cult and of the measures taken thereby. In that way, the last part of the congress preparation was completed relatively well.
All the congress agenda points, including elections, passed smoothly, as usual, without any complications.
The day of February 25th finally came. It was the day of the closed sitting. The chairman, Bulganin, announcing the report topic ‘About the Personality Cult and its Consequences’, gave the floor to Khrushchev. Immediately, the silence fell in the conference hall.
Nikita Sergeevich came up to the tribune and started speaking with confidence. Voroshilov and Molotov were sitting in the first row on the left of Bulganin; and Zhukov and I were sitting right behind them in the second row. Georgii Konstantinovich bent towards the colleagues sitting in the first row, and they in whisper were commenting every digression from the preliminary discussed and approved report text. As for me, I focused on keeping an eye open on the audience feedback and, of course, was listening attentively and emotionally to the report.
At first the delegates were listening to Khrushchev in a strained silence. But gradually here or there in the conference hall were heard some voices exclaiming support, approval or indignation, sometimes, to the rapturous applause. Nikita Sergeevich diverged from the main text many times and spoke confidently and sincerely for himself. It was those moments that brought about the strongest emotions in the audience. At last he finished his speech; and the audience who were literally shocked at the beginning of the report now were applauding him vehemently. We agreed that now it would be unreasonable to discuss and adopted the document ‘The resolution of the XX congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the report by comrade N.S. Khrushchev ‘About the Personality Cult and its Consequences’ (adopted unanimously on February 25th, 1956).
Having listened to the report by comrade N.S. Khrushchev about the personality cult and its consequences, the XX congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has approved the provisions of the report of the Central Committee and has assigned the CC CPSU to implement sequentially activities ensuring complete overcoming the extraneous to Marxism-Leninism personality cult, liquidation of its consequences in all spheres of the party, government and ideological work, the strict fulfillment of the party life norms and the principles of collectiveness of the party leadership, elaborated by great Lenin.’
On February 26th from the morning we all were busy with meeting the foreign delegations in order to inform them of Khrushchev’s report and the adopted resolution on the personality cult.
I happened to meet the delegations from Hungary, Vietnam and also the representatives of one illegal party. Of course, I spoke with every delegation separately. I must say that for them it was a great surprise. They attentively listened to me, at the same time asking a few questions. Actually, they had only one question: ‘Why was the procedure in that way? We weren’t even invited to a hearing. The extraordinarily important issue was examined there, which concerns not only the CPSU, but also the world’s communist movement!’ They asked me, ‘Will the brotherly parties be informed officially?’ I answered that they would highly likely be informed as soon as the detailed resolution of the CC CPSU on the personality cult was adopted and published. They asked if Khrushchev’s report would be published in press. I answered it wasn’t supposed so, because all the positions of the report would be included in the information sent to the brotherly parties.
All the conversations could be summarized as follows: the CPSU had committed quite a lot of breaches of the regulations and laws in the repressions days. People should have known the truth. Apparently, Khrushchev’s report was intended for that. Therewith, the report turned to be completely unexpected as well as the very form of consideration of that matter. It might provoke different false rumors, unfortunately for the friends and fortunately for the enemies, who would hurry to use that for detriment of the international communist movement and our country. All the communist parties overseas would also have complications. Now it was necessary to thoroughly think over how to overcome possible attacks, save prestige and authority of the party, to prevent the communists from disappointments.
To finalize the given subject, I will say the following: ‘The 20th congress became the important forum in the life of the country and party. All the matters raised there, especially those related to the personality cult, despite all the losses and negative moments, had historical significance. Not only Stalin's image in life, but also his post-mortem spirit was hovering over the 20th congress and in the further years over the party, the country, and the world. Yet, it was vitally important to disperse fears engendered in souls, minds, and speeches! And how difficult it was to do that, particularly when too short time had elapsed and the 20th congress resolutions were on the verge of cancellation…’
After having seen off the guests, the delegates went back to their republics, districts and regions, Nikita Sergeevich suggested the new staff of the Presidium and Secretariat to gather together. I don’t remember exactly the date, but we gathered together in the Presidium room on the 28th or 29th February. It wasn’t an official sitting, but a regular meeting. He congratulated everyone with election, expressed satisfaction with the congress effectiveness. We had done our utmost to implement everything planned. Now the main objective was to put into life all the commitments undertaken, to ensure implementing them in due time and steadily, with the decisive role of the CC, the government, the Supreme Soviet Presidium as well as the union and local authorities.
Further he said, ‘All the Presidium members have occupied the certain positions. The responsibilities will be shared among the CC secretaries later, but these days we’d better focus on the following. Comrade Suslov, you will prepare, as we’ve already agreed, the draft CC resolution on the overcoming the negative consequences of the Stalin’s personality cult. Do involve comrades Pospelov and Mukhitdinov in preparation of this document. They are aware of this matter. Comrade Aristov, you will be responsible for studying the whole complex of the issues related to the repressions and will make concrete proposals about realization while preparing the materials. Comrade Belyaev, you with the comrades from Kazakhstan and the virgin lands of Russia will study the work about the virgin lands development and define the support required for them. I think, though a lot has been done for the past two years, we need to provide the virgin lands with techniques, machines, and people to create the quality conditions for their migration, to allocate the required funds and material technical resources. Besides, as Kunaev was right to say at the congress, we need a new approach to and put on a wide scale the work for a dramatic increase of the livestock and sheep breeding output, which will enable the virgin lands to effectively produce grains and meat.’
He was about to finish his speech when he was suddenly interrupted by Voroshilov, sharply worsening the situation. He said addressing Khrushchev, ‘Nikita, you are forgetting or don’t know Russia. Take a look at the conditions in which the indigenously Russian regions are! They are in a disastrous state! Whole villages and farms are neglected; there are no roads at all. People can’t afford clothes and shoes! Many are jobless, have no quality life conditions. Despite this, you want to bury a lot of the state funds in the sands of Kazakhstan!’
Nikita Sergeevich grew purple and was out of temper. He could hardly control himself, saying, ‘Klim, you live on the full government provision. Therefore, long time ago you separated yourself from the common people and their lives! As to me, I want to provide all people, including Russians, children, and families with enough bread, meat, houses, and jobs.’
Molotov told him, ‘You will break your neck in the virgin lands.’
To which he heard a firm and convinced reply, ‘Remember, Vyacheslav, whatever hardships and drawbacks we’ll face, we will reach our goals!’
A complete silence came. All of a sudden, L.M. Kaganovich said, ‘We agreed in the Presidium that the report about the personality cult would not be published. However, overseas it has already been published almost fully. Who arranged this? Whose ‘merit’ is it?’
Everyone was silent. Zhukov asked, ‘Where and in what newspapers was it published?’
‘I was told it was published in Poland, Italy, and other countries.’
At that moment the serious debates about Khrushchev’s report started, accusing him that he self-willed and deliberately gave the new examples, thus diverting from the original approved report, gave personal assessments of the basic matters contradicting the affirmed policy.
Khrushchev didn’t give up, ‘I warned you about my opinion. I read the approved report, but also, I spoke out my standpoints in some cases. Nobody can forbid me! I have the right like anyone else! As to the publications, let’s think about how to find a way out and sort a problem out.’
Bulganin said, ‘We need to investigate how it could happen that the CC documents appeared in the overseas press and became worldwide known just a few days after the congress. We need to assign Serov to investigate it and inform us.’
Someone asked, ‘What should we do now?’ To which Suslov replied, ‘Just ignore for now.’
Khrushchev said, ‘In this situation we need to urgently inform the local party organizations in order to make ordinary communists aware of the personality cult materials. Secretariat is assigned to urgently prepare the materials. And you, comrade Suslov, must take measures to ensure adoption and publication within 15-20 days of the draft resolution on the Stalin’s personality cult. Hereby we will prevent possible complications.’
Malenkov farsightedly added, ‘We’d better familiarize the Presidium members with all the documents (the information and the draft resolution) in advance.’
Khrushchev retorted, ‘Now the most important thing is to make communists, our people and people abroad feel that all the congress resolutions will be put into life and we are determined to do this. The 1930s victims’ exoneration is of particular importance for us. The resolutions publication about the rehabilitation will be apprehended in the country and overseas as the new party and government strategy, as the evidence of the turn in the policy, started at the 20th congress, towards democracy, justice and defense of people’s rights.’
On that we parted.
The next day I came to see Belyaev. We knew each other in those years when he worked in Kazakhstan and visited Tashkent. I told him, ‘In the Central Asian territory of the three republics, including Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, there is the huge Barren area. Once it used to be a blossoming area of irrigated cropping. Just 200 thousand hectares have been restored. Sometime I told Stalin about it and he supported me. We’d like to raise this question again.’
He answered, ‘I remember. You are right. We will definitely have bread, as to clothes and everyday life, we certainly won’t do without your cotton. I think you will get support if you raise this issue.’
Then I came to see Aristov. (He occupied the next-door room.) Averkii Borisovich met me as an old friend, offered some tea, then he said, ‘You see what a burden I was entrusted. I have never done such work, but now I have to deal with the work seriously. It’s a human, noble deed. I know you took part in preparation of these materials. I hope you will help me with that too.’
I clarified, ‘We are eager to work directly on the cases of the repressed victims in Uzbekistan. First of all, on the former leaders’ cases. When I told Nikita Sergeevich about it, he agreed with my attitude, but recommended me to raise this question after the congress.’
‘On this matter I will support you. But wait, I need to examine it and find out how to organize it.’
I went to the state planning committee to see Saburov to raise a question about the Barren region. In response I heard, ‘You know what difficulties we face in dealing with the virgin lands. We are short of funds and material resources. As for the irrigated cropping, I remember being assigned to study this matter in 1952. Some basic data should apparently be in the state planning committee administration.’
I could no longer stop myself as it had been worrying me for a long time. So, I said, ‘We are eager to be engaged in tackling not only the Barren region, but also the whole water industry construction in the republic. It is necessary to find out the water resource reserves and specify more precisely the area for the land irrigation expansion. With all these tasks done, Uzbekistan together with the other republics would be able to increase production of cotton, vegetables and fruit, to seriously deal with the livestock sector, especially its productivity… The water industry construction program can’t be limited with a year or a five-year plan.’
‘You’ve got the right approach,’ Saburov supported, ‘This is the weakest point in planning. We aren’t really skillful at it.’
‘Nikita Sergeevich,’ I continued, ‘talking about the virgin lands I emphasized: grains and meat. But we in Central Asia can produce basing on the formula: cotton and meat. Until we overcome the monocultural economic development and secure the integrated agriculture development, we will suffer further and won’t be able to shift from the current extensive to intensive production.’
He noted, ‘This isn’t, my dear, a problem of Uzbekistan only. In fact, many regions and districts are in the same situation, but with other crops.’
We agreed we would submit our notes on water industry construction to the state planning committee for consideration in a month.
On the third day in the morning, before the departure, I asked Nikita Sergeevich to receive me. He received me by the end of the day and immediately began a conversation:
‘Now you are an employee of not only Uzbekistan, but also the Soviet Union. You will actively take part in all spheres and we will involve you in them. I will tell Malin to always invite you to the presidium meetings. You should bravely take part in its work. You passed your ‘first trial’ at the recent presidium meeting. So, you’ve got an idea of the situation. For the sake of successful holding the congress we made a certain compromise by avoiding acute points. We would like to save the leadership integrity. However, I feel some complications may arise, even some conflict situations. Because some of our colleagues, having been the closest people to Stalin for the past time, used to grovel and fawn before him in order to prevent his discontent with them and to hold their positions at power. They used to live in a permanent fear of being removed by him at any moment. That’s why they desperately hated him with all their hearts, but expressively pronounced their love and loyalty to him by word. At the bottom of the heart they are delighted that Stalin doesn’t exist any longer, but now I’m afraid, they will prostitute his name against us, against all our efforts to correct and essentially change party and government activities. Thus, our positions might well be completely different, which will create difficulties for the CC presidium activities and for the country in general.’
Before parting Nikita Sergeevich asked, ‘When are you going to fly to Tashkent?’
‘Tomorrow,’ I answered and again started speaking about the things which seemed to me the most important then, ‘I would like to return to the two matters I told you the other day, i.e., about the exoneration and rehabilitation of the former leaders of Uzbekistan and about expanding irrigation lands.’
‘You see how they are attacking and accusing me because of the virgin lands? However, we won’t let them drawback our endeavor. As to you, you should prepare proposals on your matters and advise with the organizations concerned in Moscow and the CC departments. Then submit them.’
Nikita Sergeevich's words about forthcoming difficulties, his emphasized use of the pronouns ‘they’ and ‘we’ were truly prophetic. Though he didn’t mention any last name, after a while all his words came into life. Everyone remembers the struggle with ‘the anti-party group’ which didn’t result in Khrushchev’s removal from the position of the first secretary as it had been plotted. Instead, seven of the eleven members were removed from the CC and the Presidium established at the 20th congress.
Upon arrival in Tashkent, we called a meeting of the activists where we told about the work and summaries of the 20th congress of the CPSU and the five-year plan objectives. We agreed to hold the CC plenum in March, with the main matters on the agenda would be implementing the objectives set at the 20th congress and making preliminary outlines of the 6th five-year plan of the Uzbek SSR.
At the CC bureau attended by the first secretaries of the regional committees and the chairmen of the regional executive committees, I briefly told about my personal conversations with Khrushchev, the other CC secretaries and with Saburov.
We agreed to begin immediately preparation of the materials about A. Ikramov, F. Khodjaev and the others’ rehabilitation. I was assigned to lead the team, preparing the documents for exoneration of the Stalin’s terror victims. The team included the chairman of the KGB, the prosecutor of the republic, the minister of internal affairs and the CC representatives. We thoroughly studied the documents for each person and discussed particular arguable matters at the CC bureau.
The Council of Ministers, the CC departments and the state planning committee were assigned to summarize all available calculations for preparation of the big water irrigation construction program, in particular the virgin lands of the Barren areas: the Mirzachul and Karshi steppes.
I have already written that we intensively started preparing proposals about water industry construction from 1951. In the early 1952 the essence of the matter was shortly told to Stalin, but because of his death the consideration of the plan was pulled up. However, now having got the consent, we were studying in detail every aspect of the developed complex as to the kinds, terms and scope of work, and so on.
Back in October, 1955 the decision was made on establishment of a rice production farm in Kara-Kalpak on the area of 120 thousand hectares, and the fund of 90 million rubles was allocated for that purpose. Besides, a major melioration-irrigation program was approved in 1953 in order to drain marshes and irrigate new lands on the largest massif in Central Fergana. This time we decided to prepare, besides a general program, concrete proposals on the two subjects: development of 300 thousand hectares in Mirzachul (the Barren steppe) and implementation of the water industry construction for development of the Karshi and Bukhara steppes as the second priority works. When the materials were ready, on a prior agreement, we arrived in Alma-Ata with some specialists.
In the CC of the Communist party of Kazakhstan, in D.A. Kunaev’s office, with participation of the leaders of the republic, ministries and departments, we discussed in detail the matter and agreed that the proposals would specify the development for five years of 300 thousand hectares in the Barren steppe, including 200 thousand hectares would be on the territory of Uzbekistan and 100 thousand hectares would be in Kazakhstan, but it would be as a single massif under the united leadership.
Then we arrived in Stalinabad. There in the office of the CC first secretary, B. Gafurov, with participation of the other parties concerned, we agreed on work expansion for finishing construction and commencing running the Kairakkumskii water reservoir and the based on it hydro power station, which had been being built since 1953 in the Leninabad region in Tajikistan, and also on power supply to some Barren steppes areas which belonged to particular regions of Tajikistan.
We accorded all the work aspects with the republics, specified again the amount of possible costs and again we attentively considered those matters at the meeting of the Council of Ministers and the CC bureau. After all that I made a phone call to Saburov who was in Moscow, and we agreed that our specialists would arrive in the capital in May.
The team who flew to Moscow included: R. Alimov – the minister of water industry, the academicians A.B. Askochenskii and B.V. Poslavskii, V. Babkov – the head of the CC agriculture department, the executives of the Council of Ministers, the agriculture ministry, the state planning committee, the finance ministry, and other specialists. Approximately half a month later R. Alimov called me and in a sick fatigue voice (he must have been ‘exhausted to death’ by the bureaucratic carousel) said, ‘Basically, we have achieved mutual understanding. The leadership of the state planning committee of the Soviet Union requires that all the matters agreed on should be considered in Tashkent and officially submitted on behalf of the CC and the Council of Ministers of the republic.’
Upon their return, we gave them three days off so that they could recover. Then at the open meeting of the CC bureau we listened to their report. The memorandum addressed to the CC CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR was signed by Kamalov and me.
Another team of fewer people flew to Moscow again. After ten days Alimov called, ‘We've already got all the documents endorsed and brought them to the chairman of the state planning committee for endorsement.’
In a week Saburov called, ‘Here they are, all the papers about the water on my desk. If you don’t mind I can endorse them and send to the Presidium.’
I thanked him, of course.
VIII
INTELLIGENTSIA
OLD PROBLEMS – NEW IDEAS
One day being in Moscow, I visited the CC where I was received by Khrushchev. Pulling myself together I said, ‘We would like to hold a congress of intelligentsia in October.’
He raised his head and looked at me. I immediately felt he wasn’t really interested in it, for his quite unintelligent attitude to intelligentsia was well known. However, he replied, ‘Ok, go ahead.’
‘We’ve got, Nikita Sergeevich, some essential ideas, on which we need your advice and assistance. We specified the congress theme as follows: ‘The 20th Congress of the CPSU and the Objectives Set for the Republic Intelligentsia’.’
‘Right.’
‘We would like to put as the major matter in the congress agenda the issue of rehabilitation and exoneration of the people repressed in the 1930s and in the next years, most of whom were intellectuals in literature, fine arts, sciences and the state. We have agreed with Rudenko, prepared all the available materials, then we will specify the names and jointly plan our joint steps in this direction.
Besides, as you know, of course, that 11 thousand industrial union enterprises were formally given to the republics last year. Now the most important objective for us is to increase the labor effectiveness and to improve the quality, which depends dramatically on engineers and technicians.’
I also tried to emphasize that a serious study of the national history, its popularization at the time was one of the most important ideological tasks. Apart from the value of such work, that would be an appropriate answer to active western sovietologists regarding the ‘supposedly’ (as I thought at the time) mass russification of the Muslim population in the USSR. I highlighted that the intelligentsia played a significant role at the time when relationships with the eastern and western countries expanded so much.
Many guests of the USSR, after staying in Moscow for a while, visited Uzbekistan. Due to the coming congress of the intelligentsia we verified the information: it turned out that during 1955 and the first half of 1956 year, i.e., for a year and a half Uzbekistan was visited by guests of the USSR, including members of different delegations from China, India, Syria, Indonesia, Norway, Holland, GDR, Czechoslovakia, the USA, England, Uruguay, Argentina, Egypt, and other countries.
The Uzbek SSR was visited by parliamentary delegations of Sweden, Iran, GDR, Denmark, Pakistan, Norway, the Korean National Democratic Republic as well as some prominent state figures, including Jawaharlal Nehru with his daughter Indira Gandhi, Sukarno, U Nu, Sarvapali Radhakrishnan, Shahinshah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
In turn, a considerable number of specialists, scientists and government members of Uzbekistan participated in international conferences, visited within different Soviet delegations 30 foreign countries, including the USA, England, France, Italy, FRG, China, Egypt, Burma, Afghanistan and other western and eastern countries.
All that required serious particular attention to preparation of the regional cadres required for fulfillment of such new for us foreign-policy activities.
‘These, as a matter of fact, are the main objectives of the intelligentsia congress. All these matters will be included in the report, discussions, and resolutions,’ I said.
I felt that my message appeared too long and verbose. Nikita Sergeevich was listening to me at first sluggishly, but then he became interested and in the end said, ‘You are doing right.’
‘We would like to invite delegations from all the Soviet republics as well as from a number of foreign countries, especially the young ones.’
‘That’s right,’ he supported.
‘And we hope that the comrades from Moscow will arrive in advance to take part in arranging and holding the congress. Also, we are planning to hold before the congress the general meeting of the Academy of sciences of Uzbekistan, where we will discuss the objectives of the first scientists on implementing the resolutions of the 20th party congress.’
Khrushchev pressed a bell-button and told his personal assistant, ‘Will you invite comrades Polikarpov and Kirillin?’
Polikarpov, the head of the culture department, entered the room.
‘Comrade Mukhitdinov is telling some interesting plans. They want to hold a congress of the republic intelligentsia in October in order to discuss the objectives on implementation of the 20th party congress resolutions. We should help them. Listen to him and specify the guests from the republics and other countries, fix the time and the order of sending out invitations. We should advise them that the delegations should be led by the CC secretaries of the communist parties of the Soviet republics responsible for propaganda and the deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers responsible for culture. They will tell about their experience. We will send a delegation from Moscow too. You will go there earlier to assist in the preparation of the necessary documents. All these must be covered widely in mass media.’
Khrushchev let Polikarpov go. The personal assistant reported that Kirillin was in the Academy. Talking to me N.S. Khrushchev said, ‘I will tell him. But you will meet him in order to be surely assisted by the CC and the Union Academy.’
Feeling that Nikita Sergeevich could listen to me just a little bit more, I asked, ‘May I ask you one more, the last, question?’
‘Sure, go on.'
‘Is it possible to reward Uzbekistan and its foremost people with the orders and medals?’
‘On what occasion?’
‘For their achievements.’
‘What do you mean?’
‘In the postwar period a lot of endeavors in all spheres were made.’
‘When were people last awarded?’
‘In 1939 on occasion of the 15th anniversary of the Uzbek SSR establishment, the nominees were awarded with the Lenin order, and on the occasion of the 25th anniversary just a few activists were rewarded.’
‘You know there must be a serious reason for that. For example, are you sure that this year the output figures in cotton and other fields of agriculture and in industry will be considerably better than before? Will the plans be over-fulfilled?’
‘We are striving for it.’
‘Let’s not decide beforehand. You should return and advise with the specialists about the current and long-term forecasts for the crops output. You should do the same in the industries as well. In short, you should sort all the economic spheres out to find out if we can consider this year as a turning crucial point for the republic economy. If you are sure about it, then raise this matter. We will discuss it at the Presidium.’
On the same day I met Kirillin. We discussed a number of matters related to our Academy of Sciences. We, in Uzbekistan, decided to elect Khabib Abdullayev, a famous geologist and academician, as the president of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences.
Kirillin immediately made a phone call to the president of the Soviet Union Academy of Sciences, A.N. Nesmeyanov, ‘In Uzbekistan they would like to hold a meeting of the Academy of Sciences and to raise some important issues. We need to assist them with this, according to Nikita Sergeevich’s instructions. I’ll be at your place by 11 o’clock tomorrow morning.’ Then he told me, ‘Tomorrow I’ll talk to the president to find out who and how will assist in this in particular. Come to see me at the end of the day and I’ll tell you.’
In the evening I came back to the republic permanent office. Khadicha Sulaimanova and Makhmud Musayev were waiting for me there. They brought the materials prepared by us on the rehabilitation of not only A. Ikramov and F. Khodjayev. The meeting was held in the office of the Prosecutor-General of the country, Rudenko, at 11 o’clock in the morning of the next day.
So, we entered his office. Greeted each other and I introduced him Sulaimanova who was an eminent scientist, specialist in the criminal law, professor, and minister of justice. We sat down at a round table and began discussions. I will tell about that meeting in detail because it reflected quite vividly the situation of the years related to the cult of Stalin.
Rudenko said, ‘I have preliminarily looked through these documents. Basically, I agree with separating Ikramov and Khodjayev’s cases from the general group of Bukharin, which will enable to make a decision on their rehabilitation now. However, we can’t single out V. Ivanov and I. Zelenskii’ s cases as you insist because, being the envoys from Moscow, they left Uzbekistan long time ago and were convicted for their activities in the Center. In general, we won’t raise a question about Bukharin’s group.’
Addressing to me he added, ‘You have studied the case documents, haven't you? I still can’t comprehend what was the connection between your Ikramov and Bukharin. They were completely different people. Despite that, for a short time Bukharin visited Ikramov and Khodjayev in Tashkent three times, even he spent his holiday staying in their apartment. It’s incomprehensible and, of course, caused suspicions. That was exactly that made a bad impression on Stalin. That’s why he turned away from Ikramov.
As for Faizulla Khodjayev, according to the documents, he was a very rich man’s son, allegedly a distant relative of the emir. Also, he was the leader of the nationalistic organization in Bukhara. Besides, some comrades have told me that not all the members of your CC bureau agree with his rehabilitation.’
Having listened to him, I said, ‘Roman Andreevich, everything you’ve said is true. You’re right to say this. But how can we pronounce those people who had established the Soviet power and the communist party in the region, who had been leaders of the republic for many years and done so much to make Uzbekistan an integral part of the Soviet Union as the people’s enemies and criminals?’
I glanced at Khadicha Sulaimanova, and she immediately joined our conversation. On each point she gave well-reasoned arguments as if dispelled many doubts.
Roman Andreevich said, ‘Okay, you’ve convinced me. Let’s prepare, endorse and send the documents.’
In the materials of the 1937 Plenum, there was an issue on ‘Comrade Bukharin and Rykov’s Case’. So, I couldn’t help asking him the question, to which I returned repeatedly later, pondering over those years’ events.
'Where did the name ‘anti-Soviet right-wing Trotskyist block’ and a big membership of the ‘group’ originate?’
He answered smiling, ‘In fact there was no block at all. Besides, they had neither platform nor program. So Vyshinskii and Yezhov had to invent all that stuff after the plenum. When such people are in search of something, they always find what they want. They did their utmost to fabricate the existence of the so-called anti-Soviet and right-wing Trotskyites block. That’s it. In addition, they included in that case all the people who had contacted the convicted, their friends and those who had talked to them, exchanged views with them, even those who had had different opinions and sometimes completely opposite views on different matters.’
Again, Khadicha Sulaimanova joined a conversation blaming them for criminal fabricating the so-called ‘block cases’, torturing and slaying people.
Rudenko supported, ‘You’re right. Now we are doing our best to restore the truth.’
I asked, ‘Can I familiarize myself with the interrogations transcripts?’
To which he replied, ‘I haven’t read them myself because the transcripts of the interrogations of Bukharin, Rykov and the members of their group haven’t been found yet. But we’ll definitely find them. In addition, as I have already told you, this case won’t be reviewed in the next years.’
It should be noted in advance, it is known that those transcripts were discovered only in 1961. It turned out that they had been hidden in the deep archive caches. As for Bukharin, Rykov and the others, they were rehabilitated only in February, 1988. As I’ve already mentioned, A. Ikramov and F. Khodjayev’s cases were separated from the general one, and they were rehabilitated in August-September, 1956, i.e., 32 years before the other members of the ‘block’ were exonerated.
And then in a conversation with Rudenko we agreed that soon we would raise the issue on the CC Presidium agenda so that the Supreme Court could reconsider the military tribunal’s decision. As to the other leaders of Uzbekistan, their arrests, investigations and trials, we would decide by ourselves. He would assign the republic prosecutor with the commitment. As to those who had been sentenced in Moscow, we would provide the relative materials for urgent consideration. Our comrades led by Kh. Sulaimanova would take direct part in it.
We agreed that Roman Andreevich would surely visit Uzbekistan in September. And soon he actually visited us for the first time.
At the end of September, 1956, I was summoned to Moscow for a meeting of the CC Presidium. I didn't stay in a hotel. I was given an apartment in the building located in Kutuzov Avenue, on the same floor as Brezhnev’s apartment was on. It was a comfortable, cozy, spacious apartment. Cleaners and cooks were diligent, friendly employees.
This time I went to see A.F. Gorkin, the secretary of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. I decided to consult with him before introducing people to the awards.
Gorkin inquired me about the population number (about 8 million people), about the volume of the annual gross national product (24 billion rubles) …
He asked, ‘How are you going to put your question?’
‘I don’t know as it is customary. But we would like to award the republic and a few regions with the Lenin orders, the foremost people of economy, i.e., twenty thousand people – with the orders and medals. In our opinion, three hundred people deserve the title of the Socialist Labor Hero, four-five people – the title of the twice Hero and one… So, in general, also we would like to award one of them with the third medal of the Hero.’ I told his name: Khamrakul Tursunkulov.
‘I don’t know. Actually, in our country there are no three-time Heroes among agricultural workers.'
Then we agreed that we would send two-three comrades to study in detail the procedure and rules of arranging documents.
Aristov told me that the exoneration and rehabilitation procedure of the people repressed in Uzbekistan was intensively moving on. Yet, I had another matter to talk to Aristov…
‘In the last years of the war a few peoples from the Caucasus and Crimea were transmigrated to Uzbekistan as well as the other Central Asian republics. In due time, they were settled and gradually adjusted themselves to unaccustomed labor. Nevertheless, they still feel extremely pinched and strained, and they are eager to return to their native lands. Particularly now, when we are sorting out and correcting the aberrations caused by the personality cult policy.’
And in the end, I said, ‘I would like to raise this issue at the CC Presidium to ensure that the CC and the government of Uzbekistan will foster and solicit for their exoneration.’
Averkii Borisovich said, ‘Yes, it’s a serious case. I’m not familiar with this issue. I don’t know what decision will be taken, but the very issue raise can attract attention to these unfairly exiled peoples. As to the Crimean tartars, I remember us attending the solemn event in the Kremlin, which was devoted to the 300th anniversary of reunion of the Ukraine with Russia. As far as I remember, the Crimean republic was transformed into an autonomous region, and at the same time a historic act of its separation from Russia and transfer to the Ukraine took place.’
‘Yes,’ I confirmed, ‘I was there and even spoke.’
‘I doubt that after such a short period all that will be reviewed. As for the other peoples, we should think, of course, about them. Do raise the issue for discussion.’
One day before the Presidium meeting I requested Nikita Sergeevich for reception. I asked him if I could raise such matters after the meeting. He said we might well exchange our views beforehand without including them in the agenda.
At the meeting after consideration of the agenda points, Khrushchev said. ‘The Uzbek comrades have got some questions. Let’s listen to them in brief.’
I told them about the transmigrated peoples, their situation, moods, their repeated persistent requests for letting them return to their native lands. I was asked a few questions and I replied to them. In the result it was concluded as follows: so far, we can’t promise anything, but we shall thoroughly study their moods. We need to study the migration history of each people, to look into all the documents and to consult with the law enforcement agencies. We’ll send there some specialists from Moscow if it’s necessary. After that we’ll be able to discuss this matter again to decide how to settle this issue. Perhaps, the CC and the government of Uzbekistan will have to bring the matter for consideration at the union-level, followed by the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Soviet Union... (I had an impression at that moment it would take a really long time to take a particular decision that might be put into life. Unfortunately, I was right.)
Ignatov wondered, ‘How much cotton are you expecting to produce?’
‘We’re striving for 3 million tons.’
Khrushchev asked, ‘Can you produce 3 million tons?’
‘We are sure.’
‘How about the industry?’
‘There are no work disruptions. We’ll definitely fulfill the plans.’
‘Well, then we’ll give our consent to the Uzbeks’ proposal to raise this issue. Have you got any particular suggestions?’
‘The republic and some districts should be awarded with the Lenin orders.’
Someone wondered when Uzbekistan was last awarded.
Kaganovich immediately answered, ‘In 1939, in connection with the 15th anniversary of the republic. I personally went there to award the orders.’
Khrushchev asked about awarding foremost people. I told him the figures I had spoken to Gorkin. Most attendees exclaimed with a surprise, but Brezhnev said, ‘Too many!’
Khrushchev agreed with him, ‘This number should be reduced to: 15-16 thousand people to be awarded with the orders and medals, 200-220 for the title of the Socialist Labor Heroes, 2-3 people for twice Heroes. And who will be awarded with the title of the three-time Hero?’
‘Khamrakul Tursunkulov.’
He instantly remembered, ‘Yeah, he is an academician in cotton growing. I know him well.’
Kaganovich joined, ‘He is an excellent worker. I befriended with him and was over at his place. He deserves.’
Khrushchev summarized, ‘Ok. We won’t write it in the protocol. You should consult with the Supreme Soviet. Raise the issue taking into account the following: the decision will be taken in December and the resolutions will be formalized according to the yearly results in early January.’
He smiled saying in conclusion, ‘We’ll see the results. Maybe, we won’t have to award them. So, don’t make a show of it.’
I was satisfied to hear from Kirillin that Nesmeyanov didn’t have any objections against the candidacy of Khabib Abdullayev for the post of the president of the Academy of Sciences.
I came back to Tashkent in a good mood.
The meeting of the Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan was a significant event in the republic culture life. Scientists, cultural workers, representatives of the party, Soviet and social organizations, institutions, universities, ministries, authorities and journalists participated in it.
The participants in the meeting highly appreciated indisputable achievements, though at the same time they analyzed the shortcomings in the work of the academy presidium and its institutions and mentioned backlogs of a number of the crucial scientific fields.
In particular, G.N. Cherdantsev, a corresponding member of the AS of UzSSR, emphasized the necessity of paying a close attention to the matters of economics development; A.S. Sadykov, a corresponding member of the AS mentioned some backlogs in the essential theory and substantial practice development in the agriculture science; academician Gafur Gulyam criticized the backlogs in the literature and language researches; academician V.S. Uklonskii spoke about the crucial objectives in the Barren lands development; academician Kh. Rakhmatulin extremely precisely formulated the academy’s objectives in the agriculture complex mechanization, particularly of cotton-picking; the speech of V.V. Yakhontov, PhD in biology, was devoted to the agricultural pests’ abolition problems, and a corresponding member of the AS of UzSSR, R.A. Alimov spoke about irrigation and the workers training in this field.
It was amazing that there were 130 nominees for just 22 vacancies of academicians and corresponding members, which, obviously, to my mind, showed a big potential reserve of the national science.
The meeting introduced and adopted some amendments and supplements to the academy regulations. By secret ballot voting we elected honorable academicians, including academician I.V. Kurchatov.
All the electees were honorable, prominent scientists. Particularly, I would like to tell about academician I.V. Kurchatov, for the destiny presented me a few unforgettable meetings with him.
I remember being the chairperson at the USSR Supreme Soviet session in 1954, announcing academician I.V. Kurchatov as the next speaker. A light excitement wave passed over the audience in the hall. It was felt in the lodges full of the diplomats, journalists and guests. Everybody had heard or read about him, but no one had seen him in person yet. Igor Vasilievich, who was handsome, tall, slender, wearing a perfectly sewed, fashionable suit, quickly came up to the tribune. His chest was decorated with three sparkling golden stars, four medals of the laureate of Lenin and State’s awards and a deputy badge. He had a long spade-shaped beard, the spiritual face and the big eyes. He emphatically told about the country’s achievements in the sphere of atomic armament and atomic energetics, about the importance and perspectives of scientific technological progress. He finished his speech with the words: ‘The Soviet people have armed their army with all the required types of the atomic and thermonuclear weapons. Anyone who dares to raise an atomic sword against our country will be slain with the same atomic sword.’
All the participants, besides some western diplomats and journalists, stood up and greeted him with the rapturous applause.
During the break I came up to Igor Vasilievich, introduced myself and told him that I would like to visit him. He immediately invited me to his institute. After the session I went there.
Worldwide people were talking about the atomic power engineering, different bombs, and uranium was being looked for in all parts of Earth. In the period of such an atomic ‘race’ I found myself in the office of the first Soviet, most prominent atomic scientist in the world.
It is well known that Igor Vasilievich was also a talented manager and an excellent orator. In our conversation I found out another his remarkable quality – the ability to seize an attention and mind of an interlocutor and to inspire his thoughts.
I don’t know what hypnosis is, and I have never experienced it, but Kurchatov’s influence on an interlocutor may be compared with hypnotism. He was vividly talking, vigorously gesticulating. I was continuously exposed to the information inflow which was steadily increasing, streaming from simple to more complicated. I could hardly breathe, being afraid to interrupt his thoughts. He, like a magician from a fairy tale, holding my hand was bringing me to the kingdom which was sparkling with bright light, felt with warmth and energy.
Igor Vasilievich showed me the institute. He was very interested in the republic. So, I invited him to visit Uzbekistan. He promised to do so.
We met for the second time at the 20th CPSU congress where he in his speech recounted the program of atomic science and technologies development in the USSR. Seeing me, he apologized that he couldn’t come to Uzbekistan and gave his word to visit us soon. Indeed, after a short while he arrived in Tashkent together with Yurii Khariton who was also a famous atomic scientist, his devoted companion-in-arms, who had outstanding achievements in the Soviet atomic power engineering.
We met them at the railway station and together went to the country house. They were delighted with the Uzbek food. In the next morning we arrived at the CC of the communist party of the republic, where we together made a program of their stay in the republic. From there we went to the academy of sciences. Later telling about his impressions, Igor Vasilievich highly appreciated the republic scientific researchers and their achievements.
At that time in the republic the atomic power started to be used for scientific goals. So, it was used in the Central Asian state university, the Uzbek state university in Samarkand, the institute of physics and technology of the AS of UzSSR, the polytechnic and medicine institutes. However, the scale of usage of atomic power in research work was very limited, and the technical basis was really poor.
The intensive development of the industry and sciences in Central Asia put on the agenda the establishment of a large atomic institute. Kurchatov supported that idea. So, with Kurchatov and Khariton’s help we drew up the Memorandum of the republic CC of the CP and government to the Soviet Union authorities. In Moscow, we with the scientists from Uzbekistan - physicists U.A. Arifov and S.A. Azimov - came to see M.G. Pervukhin. At first, he doubted, referring to high expenditures and the experts lack required for that plan. But our scientists proved that all the required conditions were available.
Thus, in early 1956 the Council of Ministers of the USSR finally adopted the special resolution on establishment of the Nuclear Physics Institute in Tashkent. This institute was designed to study into fundamental nuclear physics problems and the matters of wide usage of radioactive isotopes and radiation in physics, chemistry, different industries, geology, biology and medicine.
The chosen construction site was approximately 30 kilometers from Tashkent, nearby a village of Kibrai, not far from the Boz Su river.
It was decided that not only scientists from Uzbekistan but also from other the Central Asian republics would work there. It was planned that in the future the institute would employ and run training courses for scientists and engineers from other friendly Eastern countries.
Upon arrival in Moscow, Kurchatov helped us in making the program, furnishing the institute with the equipment and training the first team of its employees.
When Igor Vasilievich and Yu. Khariton arrived in Tashkent, the oriental national robes, waistbands and skullcaps were presented to them. They immediately put them on joyfully, and Kurchatov looked like a true national patriarch.
A well-known physicist, academician Ubai Arifovich Arifov was appointed as the director of the first in the East nuclear institute established with the invaluable assistance of Kurchatov.
I would like to tell about another eminent scientist, who was elected as an honorable academician at the Academy meeting.
Once in 1950 a middle-aged man entered my room: his hair was getting thin, he was wearing a Russian shirt, shabby pants and worn out sandals. He had in his both hands some small bags, pouches and something else wrapped in a newspaper. It was F.N. Rusanov, the director of the Botanic garden of the republic AS.
He put everything on the table and sat down. According to the eastern custom, I invited him to start a conversation. He said that the Botanic garden of the academy was created in 1944, and was located on the inadaptable territory in the ‘old city’ (at present there is a park named after Gagarin). There were no basic facilities and conditions for normal plants growing and doing scientific researches. Then he told me about his trip to the USA and showed me the sorts of seeds he had brought from there facing incredible hardships on his way back.
It seemed he wasn’t used to sitting in the armchair for a long time. While narrating his story, he sharply stood up from time to time, coming up to the exhibits, showing them and describing each one excitedly and expertly. However, he didn't come to see me to give a lecture. The main topic of his talk was problem number one, i.e., providing the garden with a new area.
On the new territory, where the director asked to transfer the Botanic garden, there were fruit and grape plantations of the ‘Surat’ collective farm, located between the two canals Ak-Kurgan and Salar. There was a vast valley beyond the canals, entirely covered with fruit and grape plantations and farther there were the green slopes and the snow-white mountain ridges of Chatkal.
As a result of consideration by the local authorities, the Ordjonikidze district executive committee formalized providing the garden with that area, the academy of sciences prepared the feasibility report for designing, and on its basis, the local department ‘Uzgosproject’ made the general project plan for the Botanic garden development.
The year of 1951 was formally considered as the foundation date of the arboretum park in Tashkent. In fact, during the period between the autumn in 1950 and spring in 1951, the arboretum park employees laid the first area, i.e., the North American part. It occupied 9 hectares where about 500 trees, bushes and grass were planted. After that in 1952 another four hectares were laid out for the European-Caucasian part where 180 sorts of trees and bushes and 160 sorts of grass were planted. In 1953 another 4 hectares were laid out for the Far East part. In the same year they started laying out the Central Asian part of the garden on 14 hectares, including 6 hectares covered with mountain-valley trees and bushes and 4 hectares of the riparian forest.
The tireless scientist and organizer decided to lay out another area of the garden, i.e., the Eastern Asian part, for which he asked for a new territory, but the local authorities were reluctant, because those fields could be used for growing cotton, fruit, vegetables, grapes and get good crops. Their attitude was obvious, for they couldn’t benefit directly from the Botanic garden in implementing their annual agricultural plans. Nevertheless, realizing the vast scientific and practical significance of the garden, they took the positive decision soon.
In total the Botanic garden occupied 80 hectares, of which 45 hectares were occupied by the arboretum park.
There were also some theme areas: a biological one - when you walked about it, you remembered botanic and geography lessons at school; a water one - there in the five water bodies that made a single complex of water ponds, you could see a wide range of different plants from ancient rarely met to modern endangered species, including tropical, subtropical as well as continental and sultry zone ones. Those plants were amazing and unique in their appearance, forms and shapes, sizes and colors.
Naturally, the local authorities didn’t limit their assistance by just providing the garden with the supplementary area. They did their best to render assistance in the facilities improvement, in the social sphere, and so on.
With the time lapse the Uzbek Botanic garden transformed into the large scientific research, production and enlightening center.
This garden has got one peculiarity. It doesn't seem impressive and picturesque at the first glance at all. In fact, in the Tashkent garden all the plants are as if in the natural conditions: the forest, riparian forest, steppes, water ponds and foothill areas, etc., i.e., there are big trees, grass, bushes, wild berries growing all together in the same place. The Tashkent garden is the only one in the country where the plants get cultivated and grow in the natural conditions as if they grew in a comfortable appropriate nature zone.
A few doctors of science and twenty candidates of science worked in the garden. Afterwards on the basis of their practice, a lot of scientific dissertations were done. They launched postgraduate courses. Regional, all-union and international scientific theoretical conferences and symposia were held there. The garden sent its delegations to foreign countries and in turn received foreign guests.
At that time the arboretum was already visited by tourists for whom special tours were arranged. The route started from the central water body surrounded by slim tall evergreen cypresses (the Uzbek word for ‘cypress’ is ‘sanobar’).
The garden employees actively participated in work of the Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy (EANE) of the USSR, international exhibitions of flowers and a lot of exploring expeditions to different regions of Central Asia.
The garden founder and manager, a talented scientist-naturalist, doctor of biological science, professor Fedor Nikolayevich Rusanov was elected as a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences in October at the mentioned above AS general meeting. In 1958 he became an academician.
His spouse - a senior scientist, doctor of biological science, Z.N. Pechentseva - published an interesting paper called ‘About Central Asian Tulips’. Their son, Nikolai Fedorovich Rusanov, a candidate of biological science, works as a scientist at this garden.
After F.N. Rusanov’s death in 1978, a prominent scientist, doctor of biological science, professor Akhmad Usmanovich Usmanov became the director of the garden-institute. He together with F.N. Rusanov created this garden and worked arm in arm with him throughout the whole period.
The garden-institute was deservedly named after its founder - academician Rusanov.
Among the other problems sorting out of which was sped up at the AS meeting should be particularly noted a dramatic turn to social support to the scientists: more attention was paid to their work and life qualities, including accommodation conditions. The cutting edge, modern scientific equipment was purchased, the work areas of major research centers were expanded in particular at the Central Asian state university, Tashkent medical institute, and the observatory. We decided to build special premises for storage of the valuable eastern manuscripts, using a concept of a similar complex of Matenadaran in Yerevan.
We also focused on young scientists training. With the concurrence of the Soviet Union academy of sciences, over 200 people from Uzbekistan were sent to Moscow and Leningrad in 1953-1955 to do postgraduate courses. Later many of them became doctors of sciences, professors, and members of the Academy.
Moreover, the department of foreign languages was established under the postgraduate courses in the AS UzSSR. One-year postgraduate courses under the republic AS also prepared many talented scientists from employees-practitioners in numerous science fields.
Only within 1956-1958, 6 new institutes were established on the AS base of Uzbekistan.
Here are a few figures: the number of scientific institutions in the republic increased up to 117 in 1957 vs. 97 in 1950.
To finalize this part, I’ll tell a story about two academicians and a new president of the Academy of Sciences.
I’ve mentioned above M. Aibek: in 1952 at the CC Plenum he was seriously criticized, was accused of ‘praising the feudal past of the region and the figures of that epoch.’ His novel ‘Navoi’, for which he was awarded the Stalin prize in 1947, 3-4 years later was subject to severe censure and was called conservative and nationalistic. A number of his other papers, including fiction and nonfiction literature, suffered from the same fate. In the result, he got a stroke. However, that outstanding man got over the illness courageously, pulling his willpower.
In order to rehabilitate him politically and socially, to praise his contribution in literature, art, all culture, to inspire him for new creative success, and finally, to express elementary human attitude to him, we unanimously elected him not only an academician but also a member of the Academy Presidium.
There is another example. M. Urazbayev wrote valuable papers related to theoretical and applied mechanics, especially its usage in concrete conditions in different spheres of the republic national economy. He founded and was the head of the first polytechnic institute in the region.
However, in the late 1940s, he was also accused of nationalism for when being on his overseas trip, he sometimes spoke allegedly wrong things. In this way, he just didn’t meet the assigned requirements imposed by a special agent accompanying him, i.e., he didn’t pay tribute to the official ruling ideology of proletarian internationalism. In 1956 at the academy meeting, M. Urazbayev was elected an academician.
Khadicha Sulaimanova who was an eminent lawyer, scientist and teacher, who had done so much for the terror victims’ rehabilitation was elected to the Academy Presidium as well.
I’d like to say a few words about the Academy president, Khabib Abdullayev. He was from the Aravinskii district in Kyrgyzstan. He was born to a poor family of peasants in 1912. Khabib studied in Tashkent and then in Moscow, devoting himself to geology. After successful graduation from the institute in 1940 and PhD dissertation defense, he returned to Tashkent where he was involved in the state and party work.
During the Great Patriotic War (World War II) in different times he was the chairman of the State planning committee, the head of the CC department and the deputy chairman of the Council of National Commissioners. It was he who led organizational works and placement of ninety-five large factories and their employees who were evacuated from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus during the war. Particular attention was paid to 200 thousand children-orphans. All the suggestions related to those matters were prepared by the expert team led by Kh. Abdullayev, approved by the CC and the government and implemented successfully.
Under such conditions when he had to work for 16-17 hours a day and to have a nap right in the office putting books beneath his head instead of a pillow he never stopped his scientific research. In 1947 he defended his PhD dissertation highly estimated in the Soviet Union and overseas. However, it was that work for which he was blamed soon: for his personal interests, disregard of the state nationwide interests, his admiration with bourgeois science, his suspicious relations and contacts with some western scientists at the conferences in France, England, and other countries. After three discussions at the CC Secretariat and the Bureau we managed to remove the notorious political accusations from him. In the end, Abdullayev was unanimously elected as the president of the Academy in establishment of which he personally participated in 1943.
In 1958 K. Abdullayev was elected as a corresponding member of the AS of the USSR and in 1960 he became a member of the Committee of Lenin prizes in science and technology under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Also, he became a member of the French geology society and the mineralogy society of Great Britain.
When we (my family and I) already lived in Moscow, he often visited us while attending the Supreme Soviet sessions, all-union meetings of the Academy or on his way abroad via Moscow. I’d like to tell about our two meetings.
In the summer of 1959 once on Friday, Nikita Sergeevich made a phone call to me to say, ‘All the women at home are attacking me saying I often visit Uzbekistan, eat pilau and shish kebab, but they have never tasted them yet. I’d like to visit your house with all my family.’
I replied we were pleased to welcome our guests.
‘Ok, then tomorrow afternoon we’ll arrive at your place by a motor boat,’ he answered.
In the evening Kh. Abdullayev called me to say, ‘I’ve just arrived in Moscow and would like to visit you.’ I suggested him to come in the next morning. Anyway, in the following evening the four of us -Mukarram (my wife), Sanobar (the elder daughter), K. Abdullayev and I - met the Khrushchevs at the pier. There I immediately introduced Khabib Abdullayev to Nikita Sergeevich. Khrushchev immediately assigned duties: the women were responsible for preparing salads and snacks in a dining room while the men, the three of us, were cooking pilau in the kitchen. The pilau tasted delicious, the dinner was perfect and we had a really good time.
We, the men, settled ourselves at the porch for a cup of green tea. Nikita Sergeevich asked Abdullayev about natural resources of Uzbekistan and Central Asia. Their conversation lasted long. Then he said that this young scientist discovered him Central Asia by telling him in detail and brilliantly about the ground and, particularly, underground rich natural resources.
In 1961 Khabib Abdullayev was 49 years old. On his way abroad, he visited me in Moscow. We spoke about his birthday. I personally talked to Kirillin, told about him and asked, ‘Maybe we should celebrate his 50th anniversary simultaneously in Uzbekistan, Moscow, and the other cities?’ He heartily supported me and promised to talk to Keldysh. Then they both came to inform me that they decided to celebrate K. Abdullayev’s anniversary at the general meeting of the Union Academy of Sciences in Leningrad with the wide mass media coverage. M. Keldysh promised to speak to the colleagues in Ukraine, France and England; perhaps they would like to celebrate this date as well.
Once a few of us, the CC Presidium members, had lunch in the Kremlin as usual. During the lunch, I talked about the forthcoming 50th anniversary of Khabib Abdullayev. Nikita Sergeevich recalled, ‘He’s the president of your academy, isn’t he?’
‘Yes, he is.’
‘He’s a very smart competent person.’
I found it suitable to ask, ‘Maybe he deserves a title of Socialist Labor Hero, doesn’t he?’
After getting a positive answer, I talked to Kirillin and Keldysh. Rashidov in Tashkent supported too…
Everything was going on fine. All of a sudden, the terrible news came from Tashkent: on June 20th Kh. Abdullayev instantly passed away, just 7 months before his 50th anniversary.
The first congress of the intelligentsia of Uzbekistan was opened on 10th October, 1956 in Tashkent and lasted four days. Readers remember the serious motives of such a forum convocation mentioned in my extensive information addressed to N.S. Khrushchev. First of all, what our intelligentsia was like at that time? With the republic population of 8 million people, the intelligentsia included intellectuals involved in the following spheres: the union of painters included 80 members and 25 candidate members, the composers’ union had 26 members, the writers’ union had over 100 writers, poets and dramatists. Technical intellectuals reached evident prominent achievements. They included at the time 125 thousand technical specialists who had higher and specialized secondary education. Thus, the intelligentsia of Uzbekistan represented a solid army, including over 25 thousand engineers and technicians, 10 thousand agronomists, livestock experts, irrigation experts, 24 thousand medicine doctors, over 60 thousand teachers and a few thousand creative masters of culture and fine arts.
Employees of creative institutions, enterprises, scientific research institutes, institutes of higher education, technical secondary schools, schools, machine-tractor stations, state farms and collective farms elected 1,200 delegates to attend the congress.
The intelligentsia delegations from Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Armenia arrived at the congress. They were led by the government leaders of these republics. The delegations from China, India, North Korea and Egypt also attended the congress. A great assistance in arranging and holding the congress was rendered by D.A. Polikarpov, N.A. Mikhailov, A.N. Rumyantsev (an academician, the chief editor of the journal ‘The Communist’), the executive of the CC CPSU K.S. Kuznetsov, professor M.P. Kim, writer G. Gulia, and the other comrades who had arrived in advance.
On the congress agenda there was the only matter to be discussed: ‘The results of the 20th congress of the CPSU and the objectives of the intelligentsia of Uzbekistan’. Over 40 speakers made speeches. The detailed resolution and the address to the intelligentsia and all the people of the republic were adopted.
Now I would like to tell about the difficulties we faced in arranging the congress, particularly in preparing a report. Because the results of the 20th congress were already discussed in the republic in March. How should the intelligentsia forum differ from the communists’ congress in discussing the same theme?
Attitude to Stalin’s personality cult, deep understanding of its consequences, the population awareness of the victims’ rehabilitation were the main matters which caused serious arguments and debates at the meetings of the CC CP Bureau of the republic. Debates and disagreements on those matters occurred in the other republics, too. And they undoubtedly were the reflection of the things happening in the Kremlin. I have to remind that Khrushchev spoke about the matter at the closed sitting of the 20th congress on 25th February, 1956; and the resolution of the 30th June, 1956 (the Kremlin leaders ‘tried to work the text out’ for four months; in fact, it was a severe fight between different standpoints!) ‘On the Overcome of the Personality Cult and its Consequences’ was adopted. Besides, quite brief information of general content was given to party lower organizations.
If you compare N.S. Khrushchev’s repot with its publication overseas, the information given to Soviet communists and the resolution on repression victims’ rehabilitation, you can easily see essential discrepancies in the texts. Even the very resolution was saying ‘on the personality cult’ in general instead of ‘on Stalin’s personality cult’ in particular. There was a little mass media coverage about the repression victims’ rehabilitation. Instead, there were sometimes some short messages in press. We were the first in the USSR who decided to tell about it loudly at the congress of the intelligentsia. That’s when the republic CC Bureau members had different opinions.
After listening to the full text of my report at the republic CC Bureau, the second secretary of the CC Melnikov proposed to cross out the names of the rehabilitated people and the paragraph describing the rehabilitation procedure at all and just to include general statements in the resolution of June 30th, 1956. His proposal was supported by a few members. Despite this, we managed to save the text in general. But instantly some proposed not to mention A. Ikramov and F. Khodjayev, claiming that this might allegedly trigger a violent unrest and even complicate political situation in the republic. I didn’t agree with that. Rashidov proposed a compromise to tell in general about Ikramov and not to mention Khodjayev at all. A few Bureau members supported him, but the others agreed with my draft report.
In the final version, the report said about rehabilitation as follows: ‘Under submission by the CC of the Communist party of Uzbekistan the following people who had been groundlessly accused have been recently rehabilitated: Baltabayev – the former secretary of the CC of the communist party, Islamov – the former national commissioner of finance, Artykov – the former first secretary of the CC of the Lenin communist union of youth (LCUY) of Uzbekistan, Israilov – the former secretary of the Khorezm district committee of the party, Baltayev – the former secretary of the Kara-Kalpak regional committee of the party, Usmanov – the former head of the department of the CC of the Communist party of Uzbekistan, Khasanov – the former chief editor of the newspaper ‘Pravda Vostoka’, Manjara – the former deputy chairman of the central executive commission (CEC) of the UzSSR, Shadiyeva – the former secretary of the regional committee of the party.
The case of A. Ikramov – the former first secretary of the CC of the communist party – is currently being reviewed’.
It was said in the report about the rehabilitation of the famous writers and poets – Abdulla Kodyri, Cholpan, Fitrat, and the other innocently convicted in the 1930s. In addition, I found it necessary to tell how the victims of the terror – outstanding scientists and talented writers of the republic - were exonerated and returned from exile. After returning from the camps and exile, Shukrullo, Shukhrat, Khamid Sulaimanov and the others were attending the congress, and Maksud Sheikh-zade even made an eloquent speech. Also, I told about those repressions which occurred in Uzbekistan in the first postwar years, especially related to the culture sphere. Besides, I told about the sixty prominent scientists, poets and writers who were suspected and accused of being ‘nationalists’ and ‘anti-Soviet’. I couldn't help telling about how I succeeded in annulling that list and saving those people’s lives.
When I told the names of those who had thought up all these so-called ‘cases’, sticking standard labels of indictments on the talented people, rushing to show them as enemies united in groups, the audience burst into rapturous applause.
Moreover, I told the agitated moved audience about hardships we had faced in search of our wrongfully convicted country fellows, about their return home to Uzbekistan and their current situation. I also spoke about those who were present in the conference hall: Sulaiman Azimov - the former CC secretary on ideology, fully exonerated and later appointed the first deputy minister of culture; Mukhamedjan Yuldashev - the former first secretary of Tashkent regional committee of the party, later appointed as the director of the institute of the communist party history. I spoke about the others as well.
Then I told the congress how we looked for and found survived members of the repressed families, about the assistance rendered to them, how the political accusations were annulled and their rights were returned to them.
During the discussion of the report at the CC bureau, as we see, we managed to only pronounce ten names, but there were hundreds and thousands of people. As to Akmal Ikramov, they said his case was currently being reviewed again, but in fact, his issue had already been solved. I didn’t have a chance at all to talk about Fayzulla Khodjayev, though he was rehabilitated together with A. Ikramov in the result of our meetings with Rudenko.
What caused such a ‘peculiar’ attitude to him?
The matter of fact was that the CC Bureau members who were the first to speak against Khodjayev’s rehabilitation argued that his father was a rich merchant, a person close to Bukhara Emir. Apart from that, in youth Fayzulla joined the movement of ‘mladobukhartsi’ and ‘djadidi’, and later he became its leader. Besides, in 1924 he didn’t approve the policy of the state territory demarcation in Central Asia. And of course, they didn’t forget about his friendly contacts with Bukharin and Rykov.
The rehabilitation and exoneration process of the groundlessly repressed people continued after the congress mentioned above. Overall in Uzbekistan about forty thousand people, dead or alive, were rehabilitated. It was really important for us, and that was exactly in the focus of the report, that the justice was restored, the truth triumphed and the honest names of the terror victims came back to the history. And undoubtedly, it was extremely important for their relatives, who survived!
The 20th party congress and Khrushchev’s ‘thaw’ policy made people to some extent believe in justice. However, in turn it caused a lot of serious problems. Some were out-of-date ones, others appeared again; before they had been ignored as if they didn’t exist at all. In particular, the issue of interethnic discord. In the past they didn’t pay proper attention to specific national, ethnic and religious peculiarities of the country outskirts. All life aspects were leveled by the great-power policy and the party authority.
In the East for many thousands of years, there was a tradition of strict respect to and admiration to the elderly. Moreover, the word ‘Muslim’ means ‘obedience’. So how could such mentality be combined with the struggle against the personality cult? On the other hand, overcoming negative consequences of the personality cult wasn’t supposed to reduce responsibility, legality, and order. It was necessary to maintain respect to the elderly and memories about those who passed away. Thus, it was really important for us to comprehend the basic distinction between the personality cult and the personality role.
Anyway, I’d like to say about another thing. When Usman Usupov, the first secretary of the CC of the communist party of Uzbekistan, was dispensed from party responsibilities in 1950, one of the main accusations to him was ‘distraction of force and means assigned for cotton growing in favor of solution of local tasks.’ That resolution of the CC CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR was based on the evident contraposition of the state national and local interests, with the state national interests dominating obviously over the local ones. In the new conditions when the first steps were made for expansion of the republics’ rights, a lot of Soviet Union’s enterprises and organizations were given to the republics, which might become one of the most serious problems. Therefore, our objective was to explain, patiently and benevolently, that only a correct combination of the republican and national interests could bring benefits to both a republic and the Soviet Union as a whole.
‘National’ and ‘nationalistic’: the verge between these two words is so fragile that if you will, any move of nationalistic character could be interpreted as a national achievement and vice versa, any patriotic action could be seen as nationalistic. These problems couldn’t be solved momentarily.
At last, 'national' and 'international': 'international' seemed to be considered as the main thing whereas 'national' as the secondary one. A necessity appeared to precisely define interconnection and interdependence of these notions.
As to the relationships between Central Asia and Russia, afterward the October revolution, a united monolithic state - the USSR - was established. And what was before it? Some people in whisper called their region ‘colony’, so did others, only in an intimate circle. They talked about usurpation or conquest, whereas the rest of the people talked about annexation or voluntary affiliation into and integration with Russia. Nowadays, people are looking for the truth, pronouncing their quest loudly. They cited V.I. Lenin’s words that the Russian empire was a prison for the peoples, that the national policy pursued by tsarism was the worst colonial oppression form.
It should be mentioned that the delegates from the Soviet Union republics and foreign guests spoke at the congress of the intelligentsia. In different ways these thoughts were reflected in their speeches. The words that the British army conquered India, and the Russian army - Central Asia simultaneously by the middle of the 20th century with the same purpose of establishment of a colony were pronounced. The question if there was a basic difference between the Russian and British colonial policies was raised, and if there was a difference, then what it was.
During the discussion of this matter I remembered my participating in the celebration of the 300th anniversary of Russia and Ukraine reunion, my direct participating in the reunion of West Ukraine with the Ukrainian SSR and West Belarus with the Belarus SSR… Nowadays, I am thinking about it, sitting at home in Uzbekistan in Central Asia. Definition of the precise distinction between great-power chauvinism and national politics acquired an important value, moreover, not only in the past, but also when the Soviet power.
The rehabilitation of the victims naturally favored the self-consciousness growth. And certainly, the most important objective was a true policy of national self-consciousness development. But was it easy to define the measure of its growth and development lest in zealous eagerness not to lose those good things that had appeared in the outskirts of Russia since 1917?
In a new way we started approaching the assessment of each nation history, its recent past and current situation. It was necessary to resolutely protest against unfounded wholesale defaming and even ignoring the nations’ past in Central Asia (as well as others’) which had a thousand-year history, original culture, had been one of the cradles of human civilization, which had given the world hundreds of thinkers, scientists, poets, writers, statesmen, great military commanders, and other prominent personalities. Everything had to be studied. It was necessary to restore and return the deserved place in the mankind history to historic figures, to rebuilt pretty destroyed foundation on which the national pride was based… By holding such a forum, we achieved our goal in general: we focused our attention on a reasonable combination in practice of many aspects of the most important problems, the solution of which seemed to be possible then, after the 20th CPSU congress.
My report to that congress was published by mass circulation in Moscow, in the state political publishing house, and the full shorthand record of the congress was published in Tashkent in the Uzbek and Russian languages. Those materials were prepared for publishing by M. Musayev, Z. Rakhimbabayeva, and M. Yuldashev.
A few days later after the intelligentsia congress finished, we - with the CC secretaries, Melnikov and Abdurazakov, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Kamalov, his deputies, a few ministers, the supervisors from the state planning and the state procurement institutions - went by bus to the old city. We were interested in the Chimbai area on the bank of the Damaryk river.
The matter of fact was that the output volume in the republic was increasing in large scales, more external connections were being established and life itself necessitated the construction of a comprehensive informative exhibition.
We inspected the area; soon the specialists successfully made the feasibility report and designing. That’s why we went there to see the construction site, the location of asphalt roads, tram and trolleybus lines, the placement of exhibition halls, hotels, cafeterias, administration and production premises. We were interested in beautification, landscape gardening, supply with gas, water, sewage and power. Everybody had a positive impression; so, we got an approval for a wide scale fast construction, which promptly started.
Besides economy, the exhibition complex construction was of political significance. Tashkent city, with its two-thousand-year history, had always been a united, compact and monolith city, which was wonderfully located between the high mountains and the boundless steppes in the center of the Great Silk Road. This amazingly beautiful city had a colossal strategic, trade and political significance.
However, the city happened to be artificially split in two halves – the ‘old’ and ‘new’ cities in the middle of the 19th century. The construction and beautification basically took place in the new part, whereas the old one developed less intensively, which of course, caused its residents dissatisfaction. Therefore, by deciding to set up the exhibition complex of the national economy achievements in the old city, we hoped to dramatically alter the old city’s appearance and essentially improve the residents’ life conditions. Alas! Those plans were never implemented. In the middle of the 1960s (I already worked in Moscow), I don’t know the reason, the construction was halted, the designed plan was refused and a part of Victory park in the new city was given for the exhibition of the national economy achievements (ENEA)…
On November 5th, 1956, the day before the 39th anniversary of the October Revolution, the first in the Soviet East TV center was officially opened in Tashkent. We made a decision to establish it in 1955. We sent the feasibility report to Moscow for approval by the state planning committee, the ministry of communications and culture of the USSR. Basically, they approved it, though making a few remarks and taking the remarks into account, they approved the project and its budget and allocated 62 million rubles.
The TV center broadcasting radius was originally 70 kilometers. Its programs were broadcasted over the areas of Chirchik, Angren, Almalyk, South Kazakhstan, and suburban rural areas. The ministry of communications of the USSR rendered a huge assistance in its construction.
A big consignment of TV-sets was brought to distribution network to be sold to the population. In big building No10 on Navoi avenue, a TV repair shop was opened. It rendered assistance in TV installations and usage; and within six months after the purchase they repaired them free of charge.
M. Miragzamov was the first director of the Tashkent TV studio.
In the middle of November, I was invited to the CC Presidium meeting. In Moscow I was received by Nikita Sergeevich. Since he was in a hurry, a conversation was short. I was glad to inform that not only the plans, but additional obligations would be accomplished in all spheres of agriculture, thanked him for the forthcoming awarding the republic and asked him for advice about two matters: migrants and awarding the other republics. I reminded him about the Crimean tartars, Karachais, Ingushes, Chechens, Balkars and others who had been transmigrated to Uzbekistan in the past war years. Now when we already prepared, as we had agreed before, the Memorandum on behalf of the CC and the government, it seemed to me I could raise that issue officially.
Further I said that Uzbekistan was getting awarded with the second Lenin order, whereas the neighboring republics, which were also engaged in cotton growing and other spheres of irrigated cropping, didn’t get awarded although their indicators weren’t worse than in Uzbekistan. And their nations had many-century history and original culture as well.
‘You should tell the same at the Presidium,’ Khrushchev agreed.
At the meeting after the discussion of the agenda he said, ‘Comrade Mukhitdinov has a few questions. Let’s listen to him. At first tell us about what is going on.’
I retold what I had told him before. Saburov noted, ‘The intelligentsia congress was held quite well. We read in the newspapers.’
Khrushchev supported him, ‘Yes, the important issues were raised at the congress as Polikarpov told me. Comrade Suslov, you should summarize the materials, advise to the other republics to focus the attention to the intelligentsia so that they could take part in implementing the 20th party congress resolutions.’
Then I raised an issue of migrants. Kirichenko claimed instantaneously, ‘We shouldn’t discuss the issue of the Crimean tartars at all. They’ve relatively recently joined the Ukrainian SSR. So we shouldn’t rake over the past.’
N.M. Shvernik remarked, ‘A lot of materials have been sent by them to all relative government departments.’
To which Voroshilov added, ‘I read a few letters where they asked me to receive them.’
It was decided ‘to agree with the proposal of the CC of the Communist party of Uzbekistan’, and Aristov, together with the ministries and departments concerned, was assigned to study that issue thoroughly and report about findings within a fortnight. A few questions were asked, and Nikita Sergeevich concluded returning to what I had said, ‘That’s right. More attention should be paid to all the republics. They should be morally supported, because all of them suffered during Stalin’s time.’
Organizational human resources department together with the Secretariat of the Supreme Soviet Presidium was assigned to prepare well-grounded materials and a draft Decree for each republic.
After a few days some specialists from the CC and Supreme Soviet arrived in Tashkent. And it took them about a month to make up a list of the candidates and to prepare the documents for awarding them. After the discussion at the CC bureau and the Supreme Soviet Presidium of Uzbekistan, taking into account some clarifications, they took away the materials to prepare the Decrees.
On December 6th, 1956 at 10 o’clock in the morning, the third session of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR was opened. It was attended by the deputies as well as the members of the CC, government, leaders of regions, cities, districts and republican VIPs. The hall of the Navoi Theater was overcrowded. The session was opened by Rashidov who gave me the floor to deliver a speech. I announced the Decree of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the USSR about awarding the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic with the Lenin order.
Everybody stood up with the rapturous applause. Standing at the tribune, I had to make a pause. Then I announced the address of the CC CPSU and Council of Ministers of the USSR to the CC of the Communist party of Uzbekistan and Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR.
Many speakers spoke at the session. In the end, the address to the CC CPSU, Supreme Soviet and the government of the USSR was adopted.
In my final speech, it seemed to me it was an appropriate time to do this, I stated the main objectives of the republic and informed in general without mentioning the exact number – as there were many - of the most effective workers to be awarded. I called the attendees to do their best to fulfill the plan within the remaining 24 days till the end of the year and to collect the cotton with the outcome of 3 million tons as it was known that part of the cotton was still in the fields.
In that way the year ended. On the first days of January the Decrees on awarding the neighboring republics with Lenin orders were published. On January 9th I received a package with the following Decrees of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the USSR: ‘On turning the Kabardian ASSR into the Kabardian-Balkar ASSR’, ‘On turning the Cherkessian autonomous region into the Karachai-Cherkessian autonomous region’, ‘On formation of the Kalmyk autonomous region as a part of the RSFSR’, ‘On restoration of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR as a part of the RSFSR.’
All the rights, including political, administrative, territorial and so on, of the Chechens, Ingushes, Balkars, Karachais, Kalmyks, and the other people of different nationalities in the Caucasus and the other regions of the country were restored. They were allowed to come back to their previous residencies, restore their statehood, social life and labor activities.
A little bit earlier in 1956, the Decree on removing restrictions in legal status of the Crimean Tatars was issued, but all the rest of their problems had to be solved later.
Having got those decrees and resolutions, we invited representatives of the migrants to the CC CP of Uzbekistan. They expressed their gratitude and acknowledgement to the party and the government for care of their destiny.
A few republic commissions were established to assist migrants in their return to their native lands. We saw them off with a formal ceremony and tried to provide them with all vital necessities which could be helpful on their way back and for settlement at a ‘new’ place.
The representatives of transmigrated nationalities who wished to stay on continued living and working in the same place as they did before, including work at the leading party and government positions.
At the very beginning of January, we sent invitations to the governing bodies of all the Soviet republics as well as of Moscow, Leningrad, the other regions and districts of the RSFSR to participate in the joint meeting of the CC and the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan, which was appointed on January 13th, at which Khrushchev was supposed to award the republic with the Lenin order. That date was coordinated with him beforehand. At the same time, I also suggested, if it was possible, that the Decree on awarding the republic foremost people with orders and medals, the ceremony of which was supposed to be held in Tashkent, should be published in advance, and that the ceremony of awarding with the golden stars of Heroes should be held in the Kremlin, in Moscow.
At first Nikita Sergeevich expressed a doubt if it was worth distracting so many people, but I tried to convince him saying that cotton growers of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were first received in the Kremlin by Stalin and the Politburo members in 1935; since then, they had never been there again. He agreed and checking his calendar said, ‘Let’s do this in the following way: on the 11th of January the Decrees will be published; on the same day I will arrive in Tashkent; on the 13th the awarding ceremony will be held; then I’ll leave you for Kirgizstan.’
Then I told him that on the 14th of January in the morning we were holding the 12th kurultai of the best rural workers.
‘What’s that?’ Khrushchev wondered.
I explained that yearly we held the so-called assembly or gathering of the best agriculture workers, where we summarized the outcomes and set up objectives for the future.
‘Okay,’ he said, ‘Then I’ll leave Tashkent for Frunze on the 15th in the morning.’
At the same time, I agreed with A.F. Gorkin that all the orders and medals with certificates would be urgently sent to Tashkent with their employee, but the golden stars and Lenin orders to be presented to 202 republic heroes would be kept in Moscow till the early February when they would be presented in the Kremlin.
On January 13th in the morning in the Navoi Theater, the solemn joint congress of the CC CP of Uzbekistan and the Supreme Soviet of the UzSSR started. The CC Bureau and the Supreme Soviet Presidium members, the republic delegations’ leaders and foreign guests were sitting at the work table. Rashidov opened the congress and gave Khrushchev the floor. Nikita Sergeevich read out the Decree of December 5th; all of a sudden, we had a ‘misfire’ - in a bustle of excitement the republic banner to which the award was supposed to be attached wasn’t available. The three of us - S. Rashidov, S. Kamalov and I - came up and received the Lenin order. Nikita Sergeevich announced the number of the awarded people and said that the orders and medals would be presented here in Tashkent, but the Heroes would be awarded in the Kremlin in Moscow. The Supreme Soviet Presidium secretary of the USSR read out a few last names of the people (including me) who were awarded with the orders by N.S. Khrushchev personally.
‘The rest,’ he said, ‘will be awarded today or within the next few days.’
Nikita Sergeevich delivered a long speech. After Khrushchev a few people and the republic delegations’ leaders spoke.
On the same day in the hall of the district officers house, we had a great reception dinner. At the time it was the largest hall in the city. By that time the invited people had already been awarded with the orders and medals. So, they arrived excited with their awards in a joyful mood. Khrushchev, all the CC Bureau and the government members and the delegations’ leaders took the seats at the central festive table. Toasts, merriments, music and songs were heard in the festive hall.
At that moment a famous dancer and deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan, Mukarram Turgunbayeva, came up to me and quietly noted that at the end of the table in the corner Khamrakul-aka was sitting in an upset mood. Right away I called Ziyamov, the CC managing director and told him to invite Khamrakul-aka. The latter approached me and I introduced him to Nikita Sergeevich who stood up, warmly shook hands with him and kissed him. We gave Khamrakul-aka a seat at the main table.
After a while I told Khrushchev in a low voice, ‘We wanted him to be awarded with the order of the 3-time Socialist Labor Hero. At first everybody approved, but later they refused explaining that there was no agricultural worker in the country who was awarded three times with the S. L. Hero order. We insisted saying he had well deserved it. In response they said the matter would be discussed, but in the result his name was omitted in the list of the awarded at all. It would be great if he could be awarded with this title.’
Nikita Sergeevich pondered for a bit while everyone around was raising toasts in an exhilarated mood.
‘Is here a phone so I could contact Moscow?’ he asked.
It turned out there was no government phone in the building, but the Defense Ministry could connect him with Moscow. I invited the military district commander A.A. Luchinskii.
Khrushchev told him, ‘You will contact the ministry and tell them to find Bulganin, Suslov or Kirichenko. If anyone of them is available, tell him to call me back here.’
After approximately half an hour I was informed that Suslov was on the phone. We together entered the room where there was the phone, but during Khrushchev’s conversation I left the room with the military commander and a duty officer. That’s why what Khrushchev was talking about I can’t tell. When he was out of the room, he announced that the next day the Decree on awarding Khamrakul Tursunkulov with the title of the three-time Socialist Labor Hero would be published and suggested me to announce that news in the hall, where there was the reception dinner. I told him if he did that by himself that would be much better. At that moment all in the hall were celebrating and nobody knew why we were away for a bit.
Soon Khrushchev stood up and said, ‘For some technical reasons somewhere at some stage in Tashkent or in Moscow, I don’t know exactly, my friend wasn’t in the list of the awarded people. But he is a respectable person, a famous cotton grower, a distinguished man not only here but also in the USSR. Now the Decree on awarding Khamrakul Tursunkulov with the three-time Socialist Labor Hero by presenting him the third Lenin order and the third ‘Golden Star’ medal has been approved. Let me congratulate him!’
They hugged and kissed each other. Khamrakul-aka’s eyes were full of tears, and the hall was full of joyful noise and congratulations.
Then the toasts were raised to each delegation. So, we had a good time.
On January 14th in the morning, the 12th kurultai (national assembly) opened. There were a lot of people many of whom were wearing their awards proudly and happily.
On January 15th we saw off Khrushchev who left for Frunze to award the order to the SSR of Kyrgyzstan.
The awarding all the prominent republic workers with the orders and medals was finished within five days.
And at the end of January two hundred and three Socialist Labor Heroes together with the republic and regional leaders arrived in Moscow. At the railway station they were warmly met, then accommodated in the hotel ‘Moscow’. The next morning, we went to the V. I. Lenin Mausoleum and laid a wreath on it. In the afternoon in the Kremlin, a meeting of the CC Presidium members with the workers of Uzbekistan took place. After that in the Catherine and George Halls in the Faceted Chamber, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Shvernik, and the other leaders of the CC CPSU and the Soviet state presented the Lenin orders and the ‘Golden Star’ medals to the invited workers of Uzbekistan.
In the evening the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Soviet Union had a reception dinner for their honor in the George Hall, where were all the members and candidacies to the membership, the CC secretaries, the Supreme Soviet Presidium members, ministers and the culture organizations leaders. The festive table looked like a masterpiece of art. Of course, the Uzbeks always arrived with something delicious in their hands and brought fruit, grapes, different kinds of vegetables and oriental sweets. The photos taken in that evening are still kept at my home. How picturesque looked Molotov, Khrushchev, Voroshilov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Bulganin! Nevertheless, the five heroes from that group on the photo will be removed from the CC Presidium membership and discharged from their positions after half a year…
There are two more photos from my archives. In one of them Stalin was awarding an order to a well-known cotton grower, Mamlakat Nakhangova, in 1935; in the other one Stalin and Voroshilov, wearing the Uzbek oriental robes, with my daughter Sanobar standing between them, in 1935 too. The story was as follows.
At that time a small group of foremost cotton growers of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan was invited to the Kremlin. The list of the visitors from Tashkent and Ashkhabad was submitted in advance; also, the list of the speakers was specified beforehand. Showing those documents and the meeting procedure the CC secretary Andreev and the people’s commissar of agriculture of the USSR Chernov got an approval of Stalin and drew his attention to one of the speakers, Sanobar Kyrgyzbaeva, who was the secretary of the party organization of a collective farm named after Lenin in the Kuvinskii district of Uzbekistan.
‘We will listen to her,’ Stalin agreed interested.
However, soon A. Ikramov called from Tashkent and informed that Sanobar wouldn’t be able to come because she had recently given a birth to her son. Andreev and Chernov were confused: what should they do? Stalin did want to listen to her speech. They phoned to Ikramov to find out if it was possible to send her together with her baby and an accompanying doctor to Moscow by train in a special carriage. So, they did. Thus, Sanobar was sitting in the front row among the guests invited to the meeting. She was asked to make a speech. An Uzbek woman from a far village of the Fergana valley, who at that time became a party leader in a collective farm, made a speech in good Russian and then presented oriental robes, belts and skullcaps to Stalin and Voroshilov and even helped them to put them on. That's the moment we see all of them in the photo.
‘What’s your son’s name?’ Stalin asked.
‘Pulat,’ Sanobar answered.
‘What does it mean?’
‘We gave him your name.’
Stalin smiled in perplexity.
‘Pulat,’ Sanobar explained, ‘in Uzbek means ‘steel’.’
Pulat Kirgizbayevich Khabibullayev became afterwards an eminent scientist, director of the research institute, doctor of sciences, head of the CC department, president of the academy of sciences and chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Uzbek SSR. Nowadays, he is the chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet Committee on international affairs.
By the way, these two photos played an important role: by showing them to Khrushchev we could convince him in a usefulness of the convocation of the First All-union congress of cotton growers exactly in the Kremlin.
The idea of creation of the academy of agricultural sciences arose at the general meeting of the academy of sciences of the republic. The scientists persuaded that we needed an academy of agricultural sciences because agriculture especially in growing cotton and other technical crops played a dominating role in the economy of Uzbekistan.
It took one year to get that idea discussed in Moscow in different ministries, authority bodies, *LAUAAS, departments of the union government and the CC CPSU, by rejecting doubts and objections, convincing them to give their approval. (*Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences.)
On June 6th, 1957 a special meeting of the CC Bureau of the communist party of Uzbekistan was fully devoted to the discussion of that matter. Unanimously we stated a fact that the available republic agricultural scientific organizations, subordinating to different ministries and authority bodies, didn’t have a single scientific research leadership, which caused duplication at work. A lot of related issues were sorted out then at the meeting of the CC Bureau.
At last on June 15th at the meeting of the CC Bureau, the decree of the CC CP and the Ministers Council of the UzSSR ‘On Establishment of the Uzbek Academy of Agricultural Sciences’ was approved in its final version. Then it was published in press.
In July took place the first constituent assembly where the decision on establishing that Academy was supported and its Presidium was elected. The first president of the Academy of agricultural sciences was academician Kadyr Zakirovich Zakirov who was an eminent scientist-botanist. The vice presidents, the academician - secretary and departmental heads were elected. The Academy’s regulations and the development program were approved. The republic government approved the personnel list of the central administration, including 93 employees and the budget of 1,141 thousand rubles for the rest of the year.
That’s a short history of the establishment of the largest center of science and education in the key economic spheres and life, cotton growing and all irrigated cropping in Uzbekistan.
That year was also remarkable for us because a considerable attention was paid to the industry, research and scientific construction bureaus’ work, different factories and enterprises.
Here are a few examples. It is known that more than half a labor costs in cotton growing is absorbed by extremely intensive labor consuming process of picking up raw cotton. By 1948 our scientists and constructors succeeded in creating the first cotton collecting machine SKhM-48. It received in general a positive appraisal, though at the same time a number of serious remarks and recommendations were made. By 1950 scientist-specialists had removed the defects, launched proposed innovations and suggested to start production line of that machine. The decision on its serial production was taken. It happened after numerous expert examinations, consultations with practitioners and scientists. The work on the machine improvement and development of new models of cotton collecting machines was going on.
In 1957, summarizing the running those machines, over two hundred workers were awarded with orders and medals. They included mechanical engineers of cotton harvesting machines: Tursunoi Akhunova, Valentin Tyupko, and the others became Socialist Labor Heroes.
The team of aircraft constructors of the aircraft plant named after Chkalov made us happy as well. This enterprise, evacuated to Tashkent in 1941, literally in the same year began producing the famous battle transport aircrafts ‘Li-2’, which showed a good job at the war fronts. After the war they started restructuring the enterprise. In 1953 the republic leaders were invited to visit the plant, where the workers proudly demonstrated us the assembled by them the first transport aircrafts ‘IL-14’. That was a commencement of the serial production of transport and passenger aircrafts known as ‘iljushinskiis’.
The importance for Uzbekistan of technical rigging of hydro-economic and road making was obvious. It was good that for a short time the Tashkent excavator plant mastered and started manufacturing a few models of excavators. And in 1956 the plant ‘Andijanirmash’ began producing bulldozers, scrapers, trench diggers, water pumps and other irrigational equipment and machines.
In 1952 the commencement ceremony of the Tashkent porcelain factory, the first in Central Asia, which manufactured about thirty kinds of porcelain articles, took place.
Thus, the late 1956 and early 1957 were marked by those achievements. That year was full of important events: both good and quite complicated, sometimes even unpleasant ones.
A scandal between me and the then deputy chairman of the Ministers Council of the USSR, A. F. Zasyadko, triggered the convocation of the all-union science conference on cotton growing. He submitted to the CC CPSU a memorandum wherein he suggested not to increase irrigated cropping lands and to decrease cotton production. I claimed his suggestion harmful, damaging directly the state and the people both. Our disagreements were disputed a few times at the highest level of the power.
What did we argue about and what did we arrive at?
In summer, 1957 I got a red package. There were the documents in it, prepared and sent by Zasyadko to the CC CPSU Presidium. Nowadays, not many people remember him, but Alexander Fedorovich was one of the prominent state and management figures, a good expert and an industry manager in coal mining, but not in agriculture, though.
As a capable manager and a skillful specialist, after some time, he was transferred to Moscow where he became a deputy chairman of the Ministers Council and supervised coal, oil, gas and other sectors of energy resources. Actually, he was an interesting personality with miner’s tenacity and manners, capable to solve serious issues and undertake responsibility for his decisions. We were on close friendly terms with him, often frankly shared our thoughts and views…
The memorandum I am talking about had a title: ‘On a Serious Backlog and Urgent Measures to Speed up the Chemistry Industry Development.’ In it the matters of exceptionally state importance were raised. It emphasized a particular attention paid to the chemical industry development in highly developed countries, whereas we were lagging behind them in that sphere.
The following statistics were given in it. Production of synthetic materials increased over nine times for the period of 1940-1956 in five large capitalist countries, and in 1956 rayon was produced: in the USA – 709 thousand tons, Japan – 411 thousand tons, the FRG – 243 th. tons, England – 229 th. tons, Italy – 152 th. tons, whereas in the USSR – only 129 thousand tons. Well-reasoned, relying on convincing examples, it proved exceptional benefit from the sharp production increase of artificial, synthetic fibers, polyethylene and mineral fertilizers; the calculation of its implementing in years and volumes was attached.
In the section that focused on funding and material sources for such a dramatic growth of all chemistry industries Zasyadko categorically affirmed that chemical fibers by quality, cost and appearance were immeasurably better and cheaper than natural ones and suggested to reduce increasing irrigated cropping lands and cotton production, and instead, to channel the saved remaining funds to establishing chemical enterprises. In particular, according to him, 1-1.5 billion rubles could be withdrawn from the funds, recently allocated for the purchase prices increase for cotton, silk and sheep fur. Also, the costs for the Barren regions development, stipulated in the resolution of the CC CPSU and the Ministers Council of the USSR of August 6th, 1956 could be reduced by 2 billion rubles. All that saved money could be used for chemical fertilizers and artificial fibers production.
I phoned him up in Moscow. After appraising his initiative in the chemistry industry development, I reproached him for an attempt to cut the funds allocated for irrigation and cotton growing.
He asked, ‘Then where can I get the funds from?’
‘That’s why you’re sitting in the Kremlin - to think and find solutions. We together have recently discussed and approved the budget. Why don’t you check channeling of billions of rubles? That’s where you can find real, reasonable fund sources.’
‘I don’t know. You are a member of the CC Presidium. Discuss it and let it be as you decide.’
‘You have already persuaded all the members against cotton growing and irrigation, haven’t you?’
‘It’s not a secret many in the leadership agree with my suggestion.’
‘Alexander Fedorovich, I must tell you so far in a friendly manner that this part of your suggestion can be considered as an anti-state case. I can prove it with the available figures and confirm of what I said.’
‘What are you blaming me for? I can confidentially tell you I’ve accomplished an assignment.’ (He didn’t mention the name directly, but hinted speaking about Khrushchev.)
‘You are giving interesting examples and data about the artificial fiber production. Do you know how much we are lagging behind in natural fiber, including cotton, production?’
‘This is not my specialization.’
‘Then why are you prying into an unknown for you sphere?’
‘No, dear, we won't be able to arrive at a consensus on the phone. We should have a talk in person to debate and comprehend each other.’
‘You know, I’d like to warn you in a friendly way that it’s not only harmful but also it is dangerous to contrast these directions. In both spheres we are lagging behind; however, if they develop simultaneously, that’s when we are able to succeed. In general, I support your Memorandum, but as for cotton growing and irrigation, I will strongly object.’
‘Okay. Let’s think it over together. Will you invite me over to your place or come to Moscow?’
‘It’s you who should properly think about it. As to us in Uzbekistan, we are always ready to receive guests.’
After a few days, having invited all our specialists and scientists - chemists, agricultural technicians, irrigation experts and others – without mentioning A.F. Zasyadko’s memorandum, I raised a matter about correlation in artificial and natural fiber production and about perspectives of those two spheres development. The discussion was interesting and useful. Then we sent our Memorandum to Moscow. Without mentioning Zasyadko’s suggestions, I asked for permission to hold the all-union scientific conference on cotton growing with the invitation of the president of the LAUAAS (Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences) academician P.P. Lobanov, leaders of the Ministers Councils and the ministers of agriculture of the cotton growing republics. The goal of the conference was to discuss possibilities, the reserves of the cotton growing development to implement the resolutions adopted at the 20th party congress and the preliminary plans of the 6th five-year plan.
By that time, we had already used comparative numeric data. Thus, we indicated that in 1956 the the raw cotton production per capita was as follows: in our country – 7.5 kg, in the USA – 17.2 kg; as to cotton cloth: in the USSR – 21.3 m, in the USA – 56.1 m. Also, we showed other convincing numbers.
After having on the phone approval by the CC of holding such a conference, we immediately sent the invitations to all the cotton growing republics and to some foreign countries, which were engaged in cotton production. All of them responded and took part in the conference. In addition to the Soviet scientists, scientists from China, Bulgaria, Korea, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Burma, France and Egypt arrived.
Before the conference started, I invited the delegations’ leaders and Lobanov for a cup of tea, and again without referring to Zasyadko’s memorandum, I told them that the goal of the conference was, as we had informed the CC CPSU, to find ways of the production development of natural fiber – cotton, silk, fur, and so on to determine their approximate volume. So, we needed to specify what to do in the next 5-7 years in each republic and in the country in general and what was required for it. Thus, the objective of the conference was to exchange ideas and attitudes to unrealized opportunities for the cotton growing development.
The reports and speeches of scientists and practitioners were devoted to concrete problems in the cotton growing.
I found it necessary to name the main, as it seemed to me, dangers threatening the cotton growing: opposition of artificial and natural fiber; monoculture economic orientation; pursuit to the autarchy. I emphasized the economic weakness of collective and state farms, the lack of required recommendations, guideline techniques and instructing manuals and arising from this situation low labor productivity, facts of poor management and waste running land, water and human resources.
To confirm the above, I cited a few numbers: collecting 100 kg of raw cotton in the USA took 4-5 hours of human labor, whereas in our country it took 30-35 hours; irrigating 1 hectare of area consumed 11-12 thousand cubic meters of water in our country, whereas in African (!) countries - 5-6 thousand cubic meters of water. In conclusion I drew a particular attention to the vital necessity of improving substantially material welfare and cultural level of cotton growers, livestock breeders and gardeners.
The conference adopted the address to all scientists and specialists as well as leaders, collective farmers, state farm workers, in which it appealed to improve irrigated cropping and cotton growing culture by specifying recommendations on each sector. We made a brief Memorandum to the CC CPSU and the all-union government, and we sent the full shorthand record of the conference to the CC, the Ministers Council, the State Planning Committee and the Ministers Councils of the cotton growing republics.
As for Zasyadko’s memorandum, it was widely discussed at the meeting of the CC CPSU Presidium. A big commission (including me) was established and assigned to comprehensively study and prepare concrete proposals to be discussed at the CC Plenum.
It took at least a year to thoroughly study the issue. There were debates, arguments, disagreements, discussions and comparison of standpoints. Eventually, we managed to draw up a program of concrete measures to establish chemical industry enterprises, to plan their production volume and to specify material sources for their development. The draft resolution was drawn up and discussed at the CC Plenum on May 6-7th, 1958 in Moscow, where Khrushchev made a report.
After a two-day discussion the resolution was adopted, in which the Plenum approved of the program made by the CC CPSU Presidium and the Ministers Council on the fast development of chemical industry and especially the output increase of artificial and synthetic fiber, plastic mass, and other derivative materials and articles.
At the same time our standpoint was fully taken into consideration, i.e., the material technical aid to irrigated cropping and cotton growing wasn’t reduced at all. On the contrary, in the preamble and the text of the resolution it was clearly said about a necessity of the combination of artificial and natural fiber production.
As we see, debates and standing our points of view gave a positive result. For all those events, A.F. Zasyadko severely ‘punished’ me. After a while, I was getting a medical treatment in Barvikha where one of small cottages was allotted to me and my spouse. Having heard that I had got in a car wreck and been seriously injured, Mikhail Porfirievich Georgadze visited me. We befriended when he was the second secretary of the CC of the Communist party of Georgia. (Later he became the secretary of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the USSR.) He brought with himself two small carton boxes full of citrus fruit, including lemons, oranges, persimmons and also Georgian wines and cognacs. We firmly hugged and kissed each other. The boxes were left in a dining room. After a cordial conversation he left us, promising to visit me again.
On the same day in the late afternoon, Alexander Fedorovich Zasyadko visited me. He expressed his sincere sorry and sympathy because of the accidence I’d had. We had some tea. Then I took out from those boxes a bottle of cognac and some lemons and put them on the table. He drank a little bit, then my wife and I saw him off and went to the movies.
Upon return from the movies, we were met by a cottage mistress, called Natasha, who said she had fulfilled my assignment. In perplexity I looked at her and she explained, ‘After you had left, your friend Zasyadko came back and told me he was ready to meet your request - to take the box of wines and cognacs to your apartment. So, he did…'
The next evening Alexander Fedorovich Zasyadko called me and merrily said, ‘Nuritdin! We together with friends are drinking your cognac. What a wonderful drink, what a delicate aroma and flavor! We sincerely wish you recovery!’
IX
‘YEAR OF INDIA’
BANDUNG CONFERENCE
As I have written above, in the post-Stalin years the leadership of the country started to involve the republics in establishing contacts with foreign countries. In particular, for us in Uzbekistan the year of 1955 became so-called ‘The Year of India’. In July the prime-minister of India Djavakharlal Neru with his daughter Indira Gandhi visited the Soviet Union; and after having important negotiations in the Kremlin and signing a few agreements, he spent three days in Uzbekistan.
In November of the same year the Soviet government delegation led by the chairman of the Ministers Council, N.A. Bulganin, and the member of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, on the way to India stopped in Tashkent, and in mid-December on their return from India they spent two days in the republic capital again.
During Neru and his daughter’s visit, we together with the first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union, V.V. Kuznetsov, were accompanying them everywhere and afterwards saw them off. Naturally, I had an opportunity to talk to Neru repeatedly and in detail. Communication with the wise politician of a world scale deeply impressed me. In many aspects he ‘revealed’ to me Asia and Africa.
I will tell about my communication with Neru.
In Samarkand we were welcomed very warmly. At least half a million of people gathered at Registan square. He was the first foreign guest for them, particularly of such a high rank. Besides, he was the leader of the great Indian nation. The dinner was arranged in a big garden in the afternoon. The weather was hot. However, as the garden was rich with flourishing green plants, the heat wasn’t felt. The table was wonderfully decorated and laid with various cold snacks, hot dishes, desserts and drinks; of course, there was no alcohol on the table. The hosts were so zealous doing their best in serving the guests that a toastmaster, standing up to raise a next toast and being very nervous, accidently pushed with his elbow a plate with marinated fish. The plate fell upside-down straight over the lap of Indira Gandhi and stained her sari at which she slightly smiled and pretended that nothing had happened. However, the toastmaster was absolutely embarrassed and confused, but she slightly stroked his shoulder to encourage him.
Our women sitting at the table showed tact as well. Yadgar Nasriddinova, the deputy chairman of the Ministers Council, and Zukhra Rakhimbabaeva, the first deputy minister of culture, approached Indira quietly and took her and the local women away. In about twenty minutes the attendees gave her a standing ovation when Indira accompanied by Yadgar and Zukhra came back wearing a lovely traditional Uzbek silk dress.
After a short rest, at Neru’s initiative we together (of course, with the help of an interpreter) were talking for a long time in the garden. During our visiting other cities and districts, we also often talked with participation of V.V. Kuznetsov. Without mentioning details and particulars, I’d like to convey the essence, the gist of his statements. He was satisfied with his visiting Moscow, with the signed agreements and the attention to India. He expressed confidence that the young Indian government could rely on a support and assistance of the Soviet state.
‘We,’ he said, ‘like all emancipated from colonialism countries revolutionized and achieved our goal. But the transition from the colonial dependence to the sovereignty and independence is a great historic endeavor. I see it as a golden bridge going over which and getting the other river bank, we find ourselves in the liberated country faced, naturally, with serious hardships, a lot of arising political, economical, cultural, psychological, moral, national, religious and other problems.
The country has been ruined and the people have been living in poverty. Under such circumstances, we, leaders of the eastern countries, don’t have practical experience, well-tested management mechanism, skillful workers, more or less appropriate conception, program of actions, material, technical and financial resources.
On the wave of national liberation struggle, using a favorable for us situation in the world and political support of other countries, we achieved the independence. Now we need to unite, mobilize people and try to consolidate all political and religious streams. In order to establish an independent state, starting literally from zero, just revolutionary enthusiasm and patriotism are not enough. We have to thoroughly and comprehensively think over, develop and pursuit domestic and external policies.
In achieving the independence of colonial nations, the crucial role was played by the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition at war, the firm position of the Soviet Union on the international arena directed against colonialism, racism apartheid and other forms of oppressions. The steadfast support of the USSR to the national liberation movement of the Eastern nations, the recognition of their sovereignty - all these are really important. At the same time, I would like to emphasize that every liberated country, first of all, takes care about itself, focuses its force and funds on solving domestic problems. That’s why it’s really important for the Soviet country to pay a particularly close attention to newly born states, taking into consideration the peculiarities of each of them, to strengthen namely bilateral cooperation, obviously, on a mutually beneficial basis.
Therewith nowadays, young leaders and state bodies of the independent countries are noticeably aspiring to establish contacts and cooperation among themselves on the regional basis. Such a tendency has got, first of all, two aspects. As they all have been in about the same situation before becoming independent, thus, now they together are aspiring to find prospective forms of assistance to each other.
In external policy there are two evidently opposite camps - the western and socialist ones. Each of them is powerful economically, politically and militarily. There are no guarantees that this antagonism won’t cause complications. Each side is obviously doing their utmost and by all means is trying to make friends, confederate and involve in their union not only various politicians, but also whole nations and states. Therefore, under such circumstances we shouldn’t, it’s even dangerous, join this antagonism, take an either side, or become an apple of discord between them.
That’s why we with Chjou Enlai, Sukarno, Naser and Tito after a preliminary and comprehensive study decided to establish the Movement of non-aligned states which are sometimes called ‘developing countries’. In April this year, after the appropriate preparation in an Indonesian city of Bandung we held the first Foundation conference of this movement, adopted its Declaration and enunciated the principles of ‘Pancha-sheela’ (the five principles of peaceful coexistence).
In the whole East this new movement has been highly appraised by all the peoples. It’s expanding and strengthening its positions. In the West many news agencies, state bodies and a few famous figures are negative to it, criticizing and blaming us for deliberate splitting up the world community, for aspiring to oppose to the western world. They are even reproaching us for allegedly attempting to play a leading role in the future world. For that reason, we are clarifying, or rebutting if it’s necessary.
As for the Soviet Union, it’s good there have been no critical remarks on this matter, but unfortunately, no accurate appraisal of our movement has been promulgated by them so far.
It’s true in some articles positive assessments sometimes appear, but they probably reflect opinions of the authors, journalists or political scientists. I believe it will be beneficial for our movement, for the Soviet Union and its friends to pursue the policy of deepening mutual understanding and consolidating cooperation on bilateral and multilateral basis with the members of our movement in particular. You will, naturally, keep your own political and ideological views, pursuing the policy of non-interference in other countries’ affairs.
I would like to talk about all these matters with Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Bulganin, but the program has been so compact and we worked so intensively that I decided not to bother them.
Now in a friendly way, I would like to express a few wishes related to my contacts here. I’ve got a pretty good impression. However, there are some moments to which some relevant authorities should pay attention. For example, in some speeches and articles related to our visit they have written that this is my first arrival, which is of great significance and opens a new era in the cooperation between our countries. Perhaps, these authors just don’t know that in 1929 my father and I visited the Soviet Union. We were here only for a few days and talked to the then leaders. My father and I, to some extent, thoroughly studied the experience of organizing the October Revolution, the Soviet Power establishment, the state and public bodies' activities. It was important for my father to comprehend your legislation as he was a lawyer and the head of the Lawyers Union. My grandfather was a mayor of Delhi city. My father and I obtained a lot of knowledge from our first visit and used it in our activities.
Furthermore, the wise old concept of ‘non-resistance to evil’ which is the basis of our national liberation movement is wrongly interpreted in your country. Though in the past there was a mutual understanding of it, which was reflected in the correspondence between the father of our nation, Mahatma Gandhi, and the great Russian writer, Leo Tolstoy. Its gist is well-known: being active instead of being passive; the struggle method for human freedom and independence, nation and state should be without weapons, wars, power seizure, but with peaceful means, political instruments such as people’s consciousness and awareness growth, labor activity and morality increase.
It seems to me that some of your scientists are not aware of it. Or if we take ‘Pancha-sheela’ (five principles of peaceful coexistence), for instance. Once I read the information wherein some authors almost claimed that we contrasted this doctrine against the Marxist-Leninist theory and the communist world outlook. This is not true. According to our principles we never criticize others. Moreover, we never contrast ourselves against others; instead, we explain our own world outlook, political concepts, our own moral principles on the basis of which we aspire to create the state and society.
As for Uzbekistan, certainly, I can’t talk about everything, but I’ve got an impression that not enough attention is paid to the study of the past history, relationships of the Uzbeks and the other Central Asian nations with India. Particular speakers claimed that the genuine friendship and cooperation arose after the independence declaration of India in 1947-1950. Of course, such a flattery is pleasant to ears, as I realize it was a compliment to me as well. But in fact, a great experience of good neighborhood, friendship and fraternity accumulated between the nations of India and Central Asia in the past. Not knowing or ignoring it means to undercut the roots and make our great ancestors’ achievements fall into oblivion.
Do you know Kashmir, from where my family is, 4300 years ago people from Central Asia arrived in and began cultivating the lands, developing husbandry, constructing irrigation system, introducing culture and bringing the treasures of the high civilization? Furthermore, when Alexander from Makedonia invaded India and captured a few provinces 2300 years ago, the people led by Ashoka rose in rebellion and forced Alexander to retreat and then to leave India with his army. He went further to conquer Babylon. Then and in subsequent period the Indians had support of the nations and major countries of Central Asia. It’s suffice to remember the ancient Kushan kingdom on the banks of the Amu-Darya river.
Or we may take your famous fellow-countryman Babur. He, forced to leave his native land at the age of 23 years old with approximately two hundred relatives and friends, crossed the Amu-Darya river, having only staff with him. Then he lived in Afghanistan for twenty years and created a state there. After that he moved to India where he created his own state and proclaimed himself the Shakh. However, he ruled the country for five years only, controlled about 30 provinces out of over 100 ones. By the way, his country and his army consisted of the Muslims only. Nevertheless, we highly appreciate and honor him, the people esteem his memory. I wrote about him as a smart, farsighted, well-educated ruler who having captured a part of India, established his state there and later left it to the Indian people instead of joining it to Central Asia.
Of the six generations of the Baburids who ruled in India Babur’s grandson, called Akbar, has been loved and highly esteemed by our people. He, unlike his grandfather and father, Khumayun, reigned in our country for 50 years of his 63-year life. He united all the provinces and peacefully created the powerful nation. In large countries like yours and ours, two factors - religious and national feelings of people – are of exceptional significance. In India there are a lot of nations and nationalities, different ethnic groups who speak their own languages. Akbar didn’t ignore, but on the contrary, respectfully treated religious and national feelings, found ways to consolidate the peoples in a nation-wide scale.
Moreover, Babur got married five times: once - in Tashkent and four times - in Afghanistan; and out of his eighteen children 16 were born in Afghanistan and all of them were Muslims. As for Akbar, he had three wives: Sultan Tagi – an Uzbek Muslim, Joe Dova - an Indian Hindu woman, and Maria - a Christian. In that way, having got married, he became a ‘son-in-law’ of all the Indian population: for the mainstream religions in India are Hinduism, Islam and Christianity. Of course, we have other powerful religions, including Buddhism, Brahmanism, and Jainism. But in this particular case I mean another point, i.e., Akbar’s wisdom and foresight.
If we recollect the new and newest history, we can bring many facts of good neighborhood, mutual understanding and cooperation between our nations. Of course, the English supremacy used to limit by all means the Indian peoples’ relationships with their neighboring and friendly countries. Despite these circumstances and conditions, different people - scientists, traders, intelligentsia - found ways to make friends. I believe for the present and coming generations’ sake, we need to study thoroughly and know the history of our peoples from ancient times, as well as the ways of establishing their closeness and cooperation with other peoples…’
After seeing off Neru, I retold Vasilii Vasilievich Kuznetsov in detail about what Neru had said and my responses. He agreed that the guest had raised the issues of definite importance for our country.
‘I,’ he assured, ‘on returning to Moscow, will surely inform the appropriate bodies about the good reception of the Indian guests by Uzbekistan. However, as to the subject spoken to you in private, you’d better send the information on a party line. In addition, I wasn’t present at your conversation with him. So, I don’t know all nuances and details. By the way, the other republics act in the same way when official guests arrive.’
Summarizing the mentioned above, I wrote down our conversation in a few theses and made a phone to the center in Moscow. Khrushchev’s assistant, Shevchenko, answered the call. Having informed him in brief of Neru’s visit, I said, ‘I would like to come and personally inform Nikita Sergeevich about many urgent matters concerning the republic and the conversations with Neru.’
He answered he would call me back. After nine or ten days he informed me on the phone that I could come to Moscow.
I arrived and on the second day was received by Nikita Sergeevich. He took an interest in the republic, the people’s mood and the progress of husbanding the agriculture.
Then he asked, ‘Well, what did Neru say?’
I read him the content of a few our conversations I wrote down before. Having listened to me he said, ‘Well, it’s good that he left in such a mood, believing in our sincere attitude to India and to him. We can’t disagree with his statements about the East, about former colonial peoples and the current situation in the world. We, certainly, pursue our own policy and strategy. Nevertheless, we should take into account statements of such persons.
Our problem is that here in Moscow among us there are no representatives of the East, such people who know well problems of Asia and Africa, who attentively keep up with the current events. And overall, if we take a look at the party history, all its leaders starting with Plekhanov and Lenin had Europe-oriented mind; they were born and lived in Europe; the most important thing for them was a proletarian revolution and the proletariat dictatorship. As to the East, it has always been a far, unknown, incomprehensible area.
In the first years of the Soviet power in the Center, a few well-educated Asians appeared. But soon they were removed and accused of nationalism. The second generation of the national republics representatives, including your motherland, was liquidated in the 1930s. And nowadays, when the East is seething, when the great events are occurring on one hand, and on the other hand, our state reputation is really high, they are hoping to seriously rely on us, they highly appreciate our material, military and political support. Nowadays, as Neru said, we need to pursue a new eastern policy, taking into account the perspectives.
That’s what you will have to do - to examine materials available in the CC, the ministry of foreign affairs, the government and scientific institutions related to the East. You must choose all we need, think over the read material so that we have a clear idea of the situation in these countries. Our attitude to them is unselfish and sincere. However, the point is how we can make millions of people of the East be aware of it. Simultaneously, it might be beneficial for our country as well in terms of reputation, influence, material and diplomatic aspects etc. In this way, the long-term relationships might well be established.
Check availability at our disposal of the specialists - scientists, diplomats and economists, the overall methods we apply in studying the East in the ministries and departments, how they meet the current requirements and how they can be improved and become more effective. To make a long story short, you, as an eastern person, an Asian man and a Muslim’s son, have to look into all these matters and think over our eastern policy. Then we’ll meet again and you’ll tell me the results. It would be good if you do this before the congress.’ (At that time, we were preparing for the 20th congress of the CPSU. - N.M.)
In this conversation Nikita Sergeevich said that Neru had invited him and Bulganin to visit India.
‘We’ve accepted his invitation, but the date of our visit hasn’t been fixed yet. I don’t know how to find time.’
‘Delay for a long time,’ I replied, ‘is hardly reasonable as the time factor is really important.’
‘I don’t know. Next year is likely to be really busy. At the beginning of the year we have to hold the party congress, then party committees’ plenums, communists’ meetings on the congress results. As to date it’s high time to start sowing campaign. In the summer we need to finish preparation of the documents about agriculture and industry reforms which we already discussed at the meeting. A few foreign guests are going to visit us. Also, we are planning to make some trips abroad.’
‘Don’t you have an opportunity to visit them at the end of the year?’
‘Besides India, it would be reasonable to make a return visit to Burma and Afghanistan because we have received the invitations from U Nu and Zakhir-Shakh whom we here and you, the Uzbeks, welcomed. All this is likely to take ten or twelve days.’
‘Why don’t you fly abroad at the end of November and start with India?’
‘It sounds good. Let’s consult about it at the Presidium and make a decision there.’
‘At any rate it’s good to arrive in Tashkent for a day, to have some rest and after having acclimated, to arrive in Delhi next morning.’
‘I think so.’
On November 17th, 1955 in the afternoon, Bulganin and Khrushchev arrived in Tashkent. They were accompanied by the minister of culture of the USSR, Mikhailov, the army general, Serov, the first deputy minister of foreign affairs, Gromyko, the deputy minister of agriculture of the USSR, Rasulov, and the deputy minister of foreign commerce of the USSR, Kumykin.
In the country house where the members of the delegation and the CC Bureau of the communist party of Uzbekistan gathered Khrushchev addressed to me with the words, ‘You are also included in the delegation. Get ready to leave tomorrow morning.’
Niyazov, Rashidov, and I were sitting next to each other. I took a look at Amin Irmatovich, and he in response to my silent question said, ‘The conference of livestock breeders is to be held on the day after tomorrow. You are a speaker there.’
Therefore, thanking Nikita Sergeevich, I replied, ‘It would be really interesting to visit India, Burma and Afghanistan together with you. What’s more, for the first time. However, on the day after tomorrow we are holding a conference of livestock sector. So, the representatives of regions and districts, collective and state farms are currently arriving. In addition, I’m expected to speak there. It probably won’t be polite to postpone it, will it?’
‘Ok, it’s up to you. You are right to tackle the livestock sector development.’
‘Maybe,’ I continued, ‘comrade Rashidov will be included in the delegation instead of me? He is the chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium.’
Bulganin asked, ‘Where is he?’ In reply Khrushchev pointed out a finger at Rashidov and said, ‘I don’t mind.’
I remarked, ‘Last summer Indira Ghandi together with her father visited us. She made a good impression on us, and she herself was probably satisfied with what she saw and heard. She was accompanied by Zukhra Rakhimbabaeva who is the first deputy minister of culture in the republic now. She graduated from the academy of social sciences, defended the dissertation on history. Also, she is an expert in the Indian culture and is fluent in English. It might be helpful if she accompanies you, taking into consideration the fact that the nomination of women for managing positions has been recently emphasized in India. For example, the mayor of Delhi is Mrs. Ali.’
Nikita Sergeevich answered, ‘You’ve convinced me. That’s a good suggestion. We accept it. Where is she? Invite her.’
We went for lunch, after which we specified the program. Khrushchev inquired Gromyko, ‘What is the itinerary of our visit?’
Gromyko explained that they would stay in India for 10-12 days, then for 3-4 days in Burma and Afghanistan in each one, and would return to Tashkent on December 7-8th.
After consulting we decided to hold a citywide meeting in Tashkent with their participation on their way back from India. Nikita Sergeevich listened to it and said, ‘That’s interesting. It’s always useful to communicate with people. We will tell them about our trip, communicate to Tashkent citizens, hear their feedback and assessment of your work here.’
We agreed that upon arrival in Delhi after final specifying the itinerary, Gromyko would send us via the ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) a wire about the date of the delegation arrival in Tashkent. We asked them to arrive before the noon so that we could start a citywide meeting in the afternoon.
In the morning we saw off the guests. Right away the Tashkent authority leaders started arranging the meeting: found out the weather forecast, specified the number of people to be invited from the regions, the procedures of their accommodation and holding the meeting, security measures and so on.
We got a wire from Gromyko that the delegation would return to Tashkent on December 10th before the noon. We gathered in the CC to listen to the reports of the heads of the city and districts, relevant ministries and authorities about the preparation for the meeting. We specified in detail its procedure, namely, who would open it, who would go to the tribune and speak. From the messages we were aware that the people were waiting for our leaders with high interest. We agreed that we would go straight from the airport to the country house, where we would have a short rest, then dinner and afterwards would go to the meeting.
We received another wire saying the arrival was postponed on a different date, i.e., on December 15th. On December 14th all of a sudden, Gromyko phoned up from Tajikistan and said, ‘Our airplane left Delhi this morning, but failed to land in the capital of Afghanistan, Kabul, because of the bad weather. So, we’ve just arrived in Stalinabad. We’re hoping to return to Afghanistan tomorrow morning. Thus, we’ll arrive in Tashkent in the morning of the 18th or the 19th.’
Everyone was urgently informed of the latest news, and we explained them that the meeting would be postponed for another date which would be fixed later. At last, after contacting Kabul, we started calling people to come at 4 p.m. on December 19th.
After being for a while in Afghanistan, at about 3 p.m. on December 19th Soviet aircraft number 1 ‘IL-14’ with high-ranking guests on board took off from the Kabul airport to fly to Tashkent.
We all were waiting at the airport. The airplane arrived at about 5 o’clock in the afternoon. A manhole was opened. Khrushchev, Bulganin, and the others walked down the boarding ramp. Roughly speaking, their pale faces were distorted with exhaustion. They looked tired and fatigue. It turned out when they were flying over the Hindu-Kush mountains, they got into a serious turbulence, and to outlive such a severe, dangerous ordeal, they had some alcohol drinks.
Nikita Sergeevich sluggishly reacted to our greetings. We suggested that they should directly go from the airport to the meeting.
He exclaimed, ‘What meeting are you talking about?!’
To which we replied, ‘About the one we agreed on before your departure. At the square there are a few hundreds of thousands of people, eagerly and cheerfully waiting for the meeting with you.’
‘Why have you arranged this? Can you hold it without us? We’d rather go to the country house instead!’
‘But we’ve already postponed the meeting dates twice. People are eager to hear you.’
‘How can I speak in such a condition? Ok, then. As you have gathered people, then Bulganin will speak.’
Bulganin, ‘Oh, no, no! I’m not ready at all and even I'm not able to do it now!’
Nikita Sergeevich, ‘You are the delegation leader, aren’t you? Then you’ll have to work now. You are fond of posing in front of mass media reporters and journalists when you are overseas. Now it’s time to work in front of ordinary people. Do deliver a speech!’
We got into the cars and went to the square. Thousands of people were standing along the streets, waving flags and flowers. Seeing them, Nikita Sergeevich and Nikolai Alexandrovich recovered themselves. Finally, we arrived at the square. There were over three hundred thousand people, many of whom had banners and portraits. Welcoming greetings to honor Nikita Sergeevich, the guests, the party and the state were heard everywhere. The exclamation: ‘You are welcome, Nikita Sergeevich!’ was heard from all sides.
When Khrushchev saw all that, he said, ‘No, my friends, I will speak. I can’t be wordless before such remarkable people. As for you, Alexander Nikolaevich, you should have a rest. You seem to be tired.’
We together with a delegation and those who arrived in Tashkent for the meeting, including Brezhnev - the first secretary of the CC CP of Kazakhstan, T. Uldjabaev – the chairman of the Ministers Council of Tajikistan, and B. Ovezov – the chairman of the Ministers Council of Turkmenistan, went up to the tribune.
S.N. Nurutdinov, the first secretary of the Tashkent party committee, opened the meeting with a welcoming speech. He introduced Nikita Sergeevich, Nikolai Alexandrovich and the others. There was a sudden burst of a thunderous exclamation ‘Hurrah!’. At the meeting the short speeches were made by academician A.S. Sadykov, by I. Verevkin – a foreman in the factory ‘Kaganovich’, Kh. Tursunkulov – the chairman of the collective farm ‘Shark Ulduzi’, the twice Socialist Labor Hero, and Dilbar Ismailova - a schoolgirl of the fifth grade of school No 43. Then Khrushchev was given a floor to deliver a speech. He moved the microphone towards himself and began speaking, ‘Good afternoon, my dear people of Tajikistan! We have brought you the warm-hearted greetings from the peoples of India, Burma, Afghanistan and your neighbors. We were perfectly received by them. The negotiations were successful and we signed the truly historical agreements.’
Then suddenly he said, ‘You, the Tajiks, are good at work, for you’ve done a great job to pick up cotton in huge volumes! However, your neighbors, the Uzbeks, are not as successful as you. First of all, some of their leaders are anti-mechanization oriented…’
We were dumbfounded. Right away I told N.A. Bulganin, ‘Will you remind him you are in Uzbekistan at the moment. So, he’s speaking to the Uzbeks!’
To which the latter said, ‘Do it yourself.’
I quietly came up to Khrushchev and wanted to tell him about it, but he seemed overenthusiastic and didn’t pay a single attention to me. In a couple of minutes, I again approached him and quietly told him, ‘Nikita Sergeevich, you are speaking to the residents of Tashkent and Uzbekistan who are listening to you with a great interest.’
He sharply turned his head towards me, ‘What have you said?’
I repeated, ‘The Uzbeks are listening to you.’
To which he responded, ‘Why didn’t you tell me about it before?! And immediately turning to the microphone continued his speech, ‘Dear residents of Tashkent and Uzbekistan! I decided to test you: publicly criticized you to see your reaction. And you, dear citizens of Tashkent, have understood my joke in a right way and listened to me attentively. Thank you for that!’
After warm friendly applause, Khrushchev spoke in general about the achievements of Uzbekistan, great opportunities of the republic and the diligence of the Uzbek people.
Finally, he concluded, ‘As for the slow introduction of the up-to-date agricultural technologies and the manifested sometimes anti-mechanization policy, I am sure you will draw appropriate conclusions from my critical remarks to improve the situation. Will you agree with this?’
Everyone in the conference hall chanted in chorus, ‘We agree!’
‘I wish you, my dear friends, and all the Uzbek people good health and great success!’
Then they exclaimed ‘Hurrah!’ to the rapturous applause and enthusiastic ovation.
Khrushchev stepped aside from the microphone and quietly said, ‘Now let’s go to the country house.’
I was supposed to deliver a reply speech at the end of the meeting, but after his command: ‘Let’s go!’ I said to the chairperson, ‘Will you thank the people, Nikita Sergeevich, Nikolai Alexandrovich and the other members of the delegation, please.’
So, he did.
We arrived at the country house and after 15-20 minutes of having a rest outdoors and walking in the alley, we sat at the dinner table. Both the guests and the hosts appraised the pilau with quails, shish kebab and meat pies. The next day the guests attended (and Khrushchev made a speech) at the republican conference of the foremost workers in agriculture.
On December 21st in the morning we saw off the high-ranked guests to Moscow.
I would like to come back to the event Neru told me about in Samarkand in July, 1955.
The Bandung conference seemed to be really one of the most important events of that time. I will tell a prehistory.
At the end of 1954 Vyacheslav Mikhailovich made a phone call to me to Tashkent (by that time I had been restored to my previous job and again appointed the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR) and informed of the meeting of the prime-ministers of India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan and Ceylon, which had taken place in Colombo in April, and where the decision on the convocation of the conference of young independent countries of Asia and Africa had been taken.
‘The forthcoming in Bandung conference of the eastern countries is essentially the first in the history. It will be of great importance,’ said Molotov. ‘In the MFA the materials have been prepared and will be sent to you. Study them, then we’ll discuss what position we should take.’
Having got the documents from Moscow, I thoroughly familiarized myself with them. Simultaneously I gathered all the available in Tashkent materials relevant to the non-alignment Movement. Then I invited the officers of the republican MFA, scientist-orientalists, employees of different concerned authorities to comprehensively exchange of opinions and standpoints.
Our point of view focused on the active support to the Movement and, if necessary, on rendering a versatile assistance to each participant basing on bilateral relations as well as to the whole Movement.
We realized that the Soviet Union couldn’t participate in that Movement on a par term because of being a Euro-Asian country and the leader of the socialist system. However, we considered it undoubtedly helpful to delegate the soviet delegation as the guests or observers to the forthcoming forum. Naturally, it was necessary to prepare a warm greeting on behalf of our country to be addressed to the congress or conference convened.
I phoned up Vyacheslav Mikhailovich and shortly informed him of our opinion. In response I heard, ‘A few our comrades consider this initiative skeptically and even some of them are negative to it. Their concerns are based on the arguments that when an official international non-alignment- oriented body is established, it will find itself between the two systems of imperialism and socialism. And since all the former colonial newly-born countries are still dependent in many decisive spheres on their metropolises in particular and on the West in general, then such a situation will continue for a long time. Thus, the western powers can benefit from it to win over to their side and use them against the socialist system.'
Then I brought into his notice that among the initiators of the non-alignment Movement there were some socialist countries such as China and Yugoslavia. But he said besides them there were roughly forty or fifty countries which should be taken into account and couldn’t be ignored. Every state, of course, was guided, first of all, by its national interests. So, we could hardly expect them to take a generally right position.
‘Negative moments are quite possible,’ I continued, ‘but we should benefit from it and it’s in our behoof not to miss the opportunity, and instead of isolating ourselves from the East we should approach it through this organization by speaking out our standpoint, giving advice, recommendations and rendering assistance. It would be good for our delegation to attend it in any status.’
‘In what form do you think it’s possible?’ Molotov asked.
‘For obvious reasons the USSR can’t become an on a par-term participant in the Movement, but the Soviet delegation, as a guest or observer, might well attend it. We'll take for granted that we should send greetings on behalf of the Soviet government.’
V.M. Molotov listened and said that all that would be discussed. At the very beginning of 1955 Vyacheslav Mikhailovich phoned me up again to inform, ‘The CC Presidium members have exchanged opinions and found it reasonable to support the non-alignment Movement, which should be covered widely in mass media, and to find acceptable forms of our participation in it. And after the constituent forum occurring, which is likely to happen very soon, the Soviet delegation led by you may go there in any status. These days you will get a draft greeting speech. Will you look it through and, if you have any remarks, let me know.’ The conversation was ended on that point.
The representatives of the twenty-nine emancipated from colonial yoke independent countries gathered on April 18-24th, 1955 in the Indonesian city of Bandung where the second Constituent conference was held at a high rank level of the state leaders and governments of those countries. The conference was guided by Chjou Enlai, Djavaharlal Neru, Josip Broz Tito, and Akhmed Sukarno. Despite the attempts undertaken via undercover diplomatic channels, the Soviet Union didn’t receive an invitation to send its representatives either as officials or guests or as observers. We only managed to send a greeting wire message. Such an attitude, of course, was unpleasant since the Soviet Union’s position and clearly spoken out support were sincere.
What actually happened? Presumably, that was the consequence of the burden of the past years...
All that arose, first of all, as a result of worsening relationships in our leadership. It wasn’t clear for the overseas authorities in which direction the Soviet domestic and particularly foreign policies would be pursued after Stalin’s death. The absence of the first leader of the party and thus, the country for a half a year was worrying and alerting them. It wasn’t a secret that in those months some convicted people were released from prisons and camps, whereas others - of course, in much less numbers! - were convicted, put into prison, or sentenced to capital punishment. It was also well known that uncovered evident intrigues, rivalries, struggle for power of different groups in the Kremlin took place. All those events didn’t seem, of course, peaceful and secure for statesmen of foreign countries including in the East.
And another point should be mentioned as well. It was in those days and months when the western anti-Soviet forces launched a wide propagandistic campaign trying to prove that the Soviet Union wasn’t the Asian power. They didn’t shun with the claims that the Soviet leadership, when the United Nations was established in 1944-1945, agreed with it and in the result only two European republics – the Ukraine and Belarus – joined the Soviet Union.
In order to object the claims that the Soviet Union was the Euro-Asian country whose territory from the Urals to the Caucasus was lying on the demarcation line between Europe and Asia they had a ready answer: the Asian republics of the Union and their peoples had been conquered by Russia and had become the colonies deprived of the sovereignty and independence. However, the representatives of only independent, enjoying full rights, sovereign states were gathering in Bandung. Therefore, the Soviet Asian republics would be able to take part in similar Asian forums only when they became independent and sovereign.
In spite of active diplomatic efforts of the USSR, the West succeeded to some extent in influencing some participants in the conference. For that reason, the USSR wasn’t represented at that important Asian-African conference. Naturally, my trip to Bandung didn’t happen either.
The Bandung conference was a crucial landmark in the national liberation movement of the East. The Declaration adopted there emphasized and called to foster the overall peace and cooperation of countries based on the five ‘Panch-sheel’ principles which were generally similar to the five principles of peaceful coexistence. They were to expand economic and cultural cooperation of countries, to strengthen the struggle for disarmament and prohibition of production, trials and use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, to settle all arguments with peaceful means, to contribute to strengthening of national self-consciousness of the peoples of Asia and Africa and to support the further growth of the national liberation movement.
In the final communiqué the participants in the conference made a statement requesting the UN Security Council to let Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, and the United Vietnam join the UN membership. They explicitly expressed their wish the UN Security Council to be fair and apply geographical criterion regarding Asian and African countries representatives while distributing positions of the non-permanent members of the Security Council.
On the day before the conference commencement I was summoned to Moscow. We kept a close watch on its work, studied and summarized incoming information and the press coverage.
The leadership concluded that even though the USSR wasn’t represented at the conference, nevertheless, it was necessary to highly appreciate its positive results, to support the communiqué and Declaration and to expand by all means the cooperation with all the countries-participants in the non-alignment Movement.
…That was what had happened before Neru told me a lot during his visit to the USSR in our three-hour conversation after dinner in the country house of the Samarkand regional executive committee…
Then I happened to be twice in Bandung. Over there I delivered speeches at the famous universities of Djokjakarta and Bandung and got familiarized myself with the conference original materials, including its protocols.
A few words about another meeting with Neru when I was lucky to be his personal guest for a few days during my trip to India.
Neru immediately received me. I with the Soviet ambassador Benediktov visited him.
After finishing our conversation, I thanked him for his reception and was about to bid a farewell. Suddenly Neru stopped me and said, ‘I am inviting you to be my personal guest for two-three days. Let Mr. Benediktov inform Moscow of my request.'
I stayed at J. Neru’s residence. His daughter, Indira Gandhi, cooked national Indian meals for us. Once we, the four, were having dinner. Neru and Indira were eating with their fingers, so Benediktov and I, naturally, were doing the same. Neru said, ‘We, Indians and Uzbeks, have got much in common. I noticed it’s common for the Uzbeks to eat with fingers as well. We, like you, can use forks and spoons. The utensils were made thousands of years ago, even golden and silver ones. Do you know the origin of the tradition to eat with fingers?’
Benediktov and I were waiting for the answer with great interest. Neru mysteriously smiled and continued, ‘People here explain this as follows: it’s impossible to express your feelings to your beloved woman with the help of a middleman as well as to feel the true taste of the meal with a spoon.’
The next day Neru and I arrived in Bombay by his airplane for the commencement ceremony of the Technological Institute built with the help of the USSR. Thousands of people gathered there to warmly greet Djavaharlal Neru. The meeting was opened by the governor. He introduced us and gave the floor to Neru. He was speaking quietly. Nevertheless, people were listening to him attentively in an absolute silence. He heartily spoke about the Soviet Union, told about his first trip to the USSR, then about his visit in 1955 and about important decisions made then, which resulted in establishing this institute in Bombay. He told about his unforgettable impressions of his visit to Uzbekistan and his meetings in Tashkent and Samarkand.
Then he spoke about international affairs, about the policy pursued by the Soviet Union for peace, disarmament and peaceful coexistence and finished his speech with the following words, ‘Our intentions are the same and we act jointly. Mr. Mukhitdinov arrived with the mission assigned by the Soviet Union's prime-minister Khrushchev in order to discuss significant political issues and to come to an agreement on the joint acts on the international arena.’
After the meeting Neru suggested me, ‘You are for the first time in Bombay. Why don't you stay here for a while, take a look about the city, go sightseeing and then fly to Calcutta which is the motherland of Rabindranath Tagore? He was on friendly terms with Leo Tolstoy. They both had much in common in the world outlook. They corresponded with each other. As for me, I need to return to Delhi. My deputy, Svaram Singkh, will accompany you.’
So, I was lucky to stay longer in Bombay. Since that delay wasn’t planned beforehand, I didn’t take with me my personal things, supposing to return to Delhi that evening. I didn’t have a shaving razor either. I asked my bodyguard Abdullaev to find out where I could get shaved the next morning. One of the Indians who accompanied us assured us, ‘Don’t worry, everything will be alright.’
The next morning, we were in the garden which was full of colorful fragrant flowers and fruit trees. I sat down on the swimming pool edge. Suddenly a thin young man aged in his thirties came up to me. By raising his both hands to his face he greeted me in an Indian traditional way. I responded to him. He shaved my face fast, did a facial and head massage, which lasted just a few minutes, but I remembered it for the rest of my life. Since the war, when I was shell-shocked, I had been suffering from splitting headaches, sometimes I felt giddy. For that reason, I often had my head massaged. But what that masseur-expert did was so amazing. I felt as if my eyes were widely re-opened and my head became extremely light and fresh.
I asked him, ‘What’s your secret? Where did you get such an unsurpassed skill? Where did you learn how to do it?’
He answered, ‘I’m illiterate. I can neither read nor write. But all my ancestors were barbers. The head and facial massage is our family know-how. My grandfather passed on this secret to my father and my father passed it on to me. We know all the areas of facial and head nerves, on which we press and stroke with fingers…’
Upon return to Delhi, I visited Neru, thanked him for his cordial reception and flew away to my country.
X
THE SUEZ CRISIS
Ten months later after Bandung, a seriously dangerous military political crisis on the Suez Canal arose due to the joint Anglo-French-Israel aggression against Egypt.
In those days I was invited to the CC meeting to discuss that issue. Having analyzed the situation, perspectives, we decided to start active political diplomatic activities against triple aggression in order to support Egypt and its sovereignty over the Suez Canal.
After the meeting I had to stay in Moscow to directly participate in the work of the special created group, who studied, edited and prepared draft messages and proposals, received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense and KGB for the consideration and discussion by the CC leadership.
I will cite in excerpts from some of them to give you an idea of what it was about.
‘THE STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ABOUT MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST EGYPT
Egypt has become a victim of the aggression. The Israeli troops invaded the territory of Egypt and an impendence of the Anglo-French troops landing arose.
On the night of October 29-30th the Israeli troops passed the Egyptian border and started hostilities moving along the Sinai Peninsula towards the Suez Canal.
The Israeli government actions are in fact an armed aggression and therefore, an evident violation of the United Nations Regulations. According to the obvious facts, the Israeli troops invasion was deliberately aimed to be used as an excuse for the western powers, first of all England and France, to let their military troops invade the territories of the Arabic countries, particularly the Suez Canal area. The western powers justify their aggressive actions with references to the colonial declaration of the USA, England, and France dated of 1950 which was unanimously rejected by all the Arabic countries. Acting as an instrument of the capitalist circles who seek for the colonial oppression regime restoration in the East, the Israeli government has challenged all the Arabic countries and all the eastern peoples who are crusading against colonialism. The path, undertaken by the ruling extremist circles of Israel, is criminal and dangerous, first of all, for Israel itself and its future…
…The government of the Soviet Union resolutely denounces the aggressive actions of the governments of England, France, and Israel in respect of Egypt…
The Soviet government considers it necessary for the UN Security Council for the sake of the peace maintenance in the Middle East region to take immediate measures in order to stop aggressive actions of England, France, and Israel in respect of Egypt and to immediately withdraw the intervening troops from the territory of Egypt…’
This statement of the Soviet government was issued on October 31st, 1956.
We prepared the special program to urgently submit that issue for consideration to the UN Security Council, then to the extraordinary session of the UN General Assembly. We edited and approved of the text of the address to friendly countries on the essence of that provocation and expressed our hope that those governments would join us in the support of the rightful cause of Egypt.
On October 30th at the Presidium meeting, we agreed that all the Soviet republics would make the similar Statements. On the night of October 31st, I flew to Tashkent. Upon arrival I went directly to the CC and invited the chairman of the Council of Ministers, S. Kamalov, his deputy, the minister of foreign affairs, G. Sultanov, the editors in chief of the major republican newspapers Kizil Uzbekiston, I. Rakhim, and Pravda Vostoka, S. Chernik, the heads of the relevant CC departments and journalists. We all together, till late night, were preparing a number of the documents, specifying the position of Uzbekistan concerning the Suez crisis. On November 2nd the Statement of our government was published in all the republican newspapers. The next day the same newspapers published the leading article ‘Hands Off Egypt!’ written at the same night.
Having finished preparation of the necessary materials on the Suez crisis, I immediately flew to Moscow. There, in the CC international department, they were working long hours, I’d say round-the-clock time. As per the directives from the Center, the USSR representative A.A. Sobolev got an urgent convocation of the Security Council and then the extraordinary session of the UN General Assembly. While those forums were taking place, the continuous wireless communication between the permanent diplomatic office of the USSR in New-York, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Smolensk Square and the CC CPSU on Staraya Square was being held on.
The information coming from New-York to the MFA was directly sent to the CC, namely, to Khrushchev personally. On each telegram the MFA employees simultaneously prepared and reported their opinions and proposals to the special mentioned above group. The materials coming from all sources were being read there. The conclusions, standpoints and recommendations were being made to be directly reported to Khrushchev. In his office, the final decision was being made with participation of Suslov, Ponomaryov and sometimes the other CC Presidium members, as well as the leadership of the MFA and the MD (Ministry of Defense), which was immediately sent to New-York via the MFA communication channel.
An intensive work was going on in other directions as well. The feedback of all the world’s countries to the USSR’s proposals was being thoroughly analyzed. The material on literally each country was being gathered from any sources, including the mass media coverage and the speeches delivered by its representative at the UN Security Council and General Assembly. If it was necessary, we were preparing relevant directives to the ambassadors and the consuls, representing the USSR in the host country, with our assessment of the relevant country's position and the recommendations attached.
Besides, the work of the information agencies of the Soviet Union took much attention and time: an urgent media coverage of the current events was quite necessary; what’s more, it had to be precise. Under those circumstances the slightest misinterpretation of a word, even a comma inserted, might have cost a lot not only to the writer, but, first of all, to the cause outcomes.
At the request of the USSR plenipotentiary in the UN on October 30th, the Security Council was convened for the matter discussion ‘About the measures for the urgent cessation of the military hostilities of Israel against Egypt.’ The Security Council failed to do anything for two days. Due to that, on November 1st in the evening (at 1:33 a.m. by Moscow time on November 2nd) the extraordinary session of the UN General Assembly commenced.
At the same time, in the capitals of many countries, the Soviet ambassadors promptly visited the first leaders of the states (or the governments) of the relevant countries and handed them over the urgent messages of the Soviet government. The Arabic countries highly expressed solidarity. The whole world, as the saying goes, resolutely rose.
What really happened? What was the history and the real cause of the conflict? What results were achieved?
The shipping lockless sea Suez Canal is located in the north-east of Egypt and connects the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea, thus being the shortest way between the ports of the Indian and Atlantic oceans. The Canal zone is considered a conditional geographical border between Asia and Africa. It was officially opened for navigation on November 17th, 1869. It’s about 161 kilometers long, 45-60 meters wide at the bottom, 120-150 meters wide on the water surface and 12.5-13 meters deep. It’s located in the center of the sea communications, connecting the oil-producing region of the Middle East with Western Europe and providing the latter's connections with Asia, Australia, and Eastern Africa.
Although the Suez Canal General Company established for the Canal construction and exploitation legally was considered as an Egyptian enterprise, 53% of its stocks was held by France, whereas Egypt got only 15% of its profit. Major works at the Canal were done by fellahs (local workers), thousands of whom perished because of backbreaking toils and epidemics. Excessive expenses for construction worsened the economic situation of Egypt. Therefore, it had to sell its stocks to the British government and its right to share in profits to the French Bank. The company practically became the Anglo-French enterprise, and afterwards it became the main British military strategic base in the Middle East as well.
Since the 1920s the Egyptian people had fought against the British occupation of the Suez Canal which especially strengthened after World War II. On July 26th, 1956 the Egyptian government nationalized the Suez Canal company, having paid indemnities to the stockholders and undertaken commitment to respect the free navigation in accordance with the international convention.
The ruling circles of England, France, and the USA tried to force Egypt, using diplomacy and other kinds of pressure, to make the Canal ‘international’. When the UN Security Council recognized the sovereign rights of Egypt, they organized the economic blockade and recalled all their navy pilots. The specialists from the USSR, Yugoslavia, Poland and other countries helped the Egyptian administration to provide the navigation on the Canal. Then at the end of October, 1956 Great Britain and France with participation of Israel launched the direct military intervention.
How did the events develop? On October 29th the Israeli troops invaded the Sinai Peninsula – the territory of Egypt, and moved forward for a considerable distance. Furious fighting was going on there. The next day the UN Security Council was convened. At that time the governments of England and France stated that they would occupy the key positions in the Canal area unless Israel and Egypt ceased hostilities within twelve hours.
The plenipotentiary of the USSR, speaking at the Security Council session, urged that the urgent measures should be taken to suppress the aggression, and warned that no government had the right to exploit the occurred serious situation for its benefit.
The plenipotentiary of Egypt, Lutfi, demanded that Israel should be announced as the aggressor and excluded from the UN membership. The Council’s indignation was caused by a message that the Israeli authorities had ousted the UN observers from the demilitarized area and had mined the area. The officials of England and France stated about their intentions of bringing their troops into the Suez Canal area regardless of whether their ultimatum would be accepted by Israel and Egypt. The plenipotentiary of the USSR emphasized that that unprecedented decision was aimed at creating an excuse for an illegal seizure of the Suez Canal, which contradicted the UN Regulations and degraded the reputation of that international organization.
Most members of the Security Council condemned the Israeli aggression and actions of England and France. However, the Council couldn’t make any decisions because England and France being its permanent members used their ‘veto’ right. Then at the suggestion of Yugoslavia it was decided by a majority of votes to convene urgently the extraordinary session of the UN General Assembly.
Meanwhile the events were developing in the Middle East in a dangerous direction. Israel agreed to accept the ultimatum of England and France. However, Egypt strongly rejected to this ultimatum and didn’t fairly want to withdraw its troops from the Canal area located on its own territory. On October 31st the English and French troops started bombing Egypt from the air and the sea.
President Naser, being the military governor-general of Egypt, declared the martial law in the country, urged the people to support the army and spoke on the national radio: ‘England, France and Israel have neglected the UN principles and trampled on the UN Regulations. Their military air forces are attacking Cairo and the Canal zone to make the Egyptian people panic. But they are wrong in their assessment of the patriotic behavior of our people who are zealously guarding their independence.
Under these crucial circumstances, we have made a decision based on honor and dignity. Colonialists have never thought about our happiness and now they are attacking us to prevent us from implementing our program of rebirth and economic development for the benefit of the Egyptian people and for the sake of their liberation.
Their aggressions don’t have any excuses. They pushed Israel to attack putting it in a confusing situation about which Israel will bitterly regret afterwards. We are confident that with our patience and belief we will endure all ordeals. We will fight and we will never lay down arms.’
The Egyptians courageously faced the danger impended over their motherland. Workers, students, fellahs, and soldiers rose up with arms to defend Port-Said.
The world-wide public spoke in favor of the lawful rights of Egypt. The government of the Chinese People’s Republic published its statement with a sharp censure of the aggressors. The statement ended with the following words: ‘If the English and French colonialists persist in pursuing their policy of aggression and war, then they will definitely reap a storm.’ The government of Jordan declared a full mobilization of the country. The prime-minister of India, D. Neru, addressed to the UN Secretary General, D. Khammarsheld, with the special message stating that ‘the UN procedure must be quicker than the procedure of invasion and aggression.’
The Egyptian government received numerous wires from political and public organizations of the Asian countries (Indonesia, Burma, India, Pakistan, Iran and others) that expressed solidarity with Egypt and expressed readiness to support its people with comprehensive versatile assistance and support in its fair struggle against the aggression. A number of countries and organizations of Africa made the Statement saying that ‘the actions of England and France are aimed at maintaining their domination in Africa and the Middle East.’
The issue of the aggression was considered a few times at the UN extraordinary and the 11th General Assembly sessions where the resolutions of November 2nd, 7th and 24th demanding the cease-fire and withdrawal of the English-French-Israeli military troops from Egypt were adopted.
On November 5th the government of the USSR in its messages addressed to England, France, and Israel warned the leaders of those countries that the USSR was determined even to use its force to overwhelm the aggressors and restore peace in the East.
On night of November 7th the English-French-Israeli troops were forced to cease hostilities. However, at the same time they intended to consolidate their positions on the occupied territory of Port-Said and Sinai Peninsula. However, they failed then.
On November 11th the TASU (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) stated that according to the ruling circles of the USSR, the relevant Soviet authority bodies would not hinder departures of Soviet citizens-volunteers who were willing to take part in the struggle of the Egyptian people for independence if England, France, and Israel did not cease the aggression and withdraw their military troops from Egypt. The great number of volunteers from Indonesia and many other countries of the East expressed readiness to go to Egypt.
On November 15th the government of the USSR officially sent some new messages related to the issue to the governments of England, France, and Israel.
Courageous struggle of the Egyptian people, the firm resistance to the aggression on the part of international peaceful forces with the active participation of the Soviet Union, the failure of the attempts of the three powers to use the known events in Hungary (in October-November, 1956) aimed at weakening support to Egypt by the socialist countries – all these made England and France by December 22nd, 1956 and Israel by March 8th, 1957 withdraw their military troops from Egypt.
It was a strong punch to the colonial system and the triumph of the former colonial peoples in defense of their liberty, independence, and national dignity.
XI
MOLOTOV OR KHRUSHCHEV?
Once in the middle of June, 1957 Kozlov called me and said, ‘Soon the great celebration of the 250th anniversary of the Leningrad city foundation will take place in Leningrad. It will probably occur on June 23rd. The active preparation is going on. The members and candidacies for the CC Presidium membership led by Nikita Sergeevich have been invited. You’ve also been invited. You as well as the others will get a personal souvenir.’
I thanked him for the invitation, and then it occurred to me that we also had to prepare gifts for the residents of Leningrad …
…Suddenly at the dawn of June 18th Malin, the head of the CC general department, called me to inform that I was urgently summoned to Moscow and the airplane for an additional flight was already in Tashkent. My assistant checked that the airplane was really ready. Supposing that the speech was about the celebration in Leningrad, I instructed the administrator to load the gifts to the airplane.
I arrived. The persons meeting me told me to go directly to the Kremlin. It wasn’t quite clear for me, but I decided to refrain from asking for clarification. I just requested to take gifts for Leningrad to the CC administration department. Then I got into the car and went to the Kremlin.
I entered the Presidium office and saw Bulganin sitting at the chairperson’s table instead of Khrushchev. Nikita Sergeevich was sitting in the common row on the right. Nobody responded to my greetings. I took a free seat at the long table, looked around and saw there was none except for the Presidium members, candidates to the Presidium membership and the CC secretaries. There was nobody else, even stenographers in the room.
When I entered the room, Malenkov was speaking. He accused personally Khrushchev of different sins. He blamed him for perverting and discrediting the party policy, ignoring the government, unwarranted meddling in the work, unethically behaving in public including overseas, and so on. Then Saburov took the floor, accusing Khrushchev of the same misdeeds, but in the policies of planning, financing and economy development.
In general, there were no thought-out, coherently expressed speeches. It sounded rather like a skirmish, mutual swearing but, of course, supported with the argumentative facts. Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich were continuously attacking Khrushchev. According to them, his sins included ‘distribution of the wealth to the republics’ as well. Their supporters were saying ditto, adding something else to it.
Then Brezhnev took the floor. At first, he tried to defend Khrushchev, spoke about the virgin lands development, the improvement in the agriculture and about a better supply to the population… At that moment Kaganovich abruptly, even rudely interrupted him, ‘Why are you lauding and fawning upon him, exaggerating the events which have never happened? You together with him are discrediting the party and the government!’ And Brezhnev, without objecting to it, stopped his speech.
Next, we had a break. M.G. Pervukhin invited me to his office. He was an old acquaintance of mine who had assisted us in establishing our nuclear institute and in other matters. So, we kept in touch. He explained it became just insufferable: the government was paralyzed, Khrushchev took decisions on all matters on his own, during his trips he allowed himself to make irresponsible claims, gave unrealizable and groundless promises, roughly and tactlessly behaved overseas. That’s why they decided to dismiss him from the First secretary position and to promote Molotov for that post. Then he asked me about my attitude to that matter.
In fact, I didn’t directly answer and just reminded that I had no idea what was going on in the Kremlin. But I said that Khrushchev had gained a high authority and respect in the republic. He thoroughly considered matters, had good people skills, shared his thoughts and lent attentive ear to people. A number of matters accumulated for the past years had been solved under his supervision. And he traveled around the country, which was good because the previous leaders had never done that before and the people had known them mainly by their pictures and speeches. In addition, it wasn’t the right time for such crucial changes in the leadership, and we’d better focus on concrete matters. Another shake-up wouldn’t be acceptable not only in the country but also abroad.
‘Why are you dramatizing?’ Pervukhin objected, ‘We are only talking about Khrushchev’s replacement.’
‘It would be better to discuss it in a different manner. Of course, Nikita Sergeevich has got some shortcomings, he has made some mistakes which are obvious for people. But you can tell him about them, and he, in his turn, may have enough will to draw the correct conclusion.’
‘Okay. See you at the Presidium,’ Pervukhin said reservedly.
After the dinner there was again a meeting. Zhukov spoke sharply and in essence finalizing his speech with the following words: ‘The army will not support the displacement of the CC leadership.’ Everybody exchanged glances because it sounded like a threat. Then I took the floor. Actually, I spoke twice. Therefore, I’m summarizing my both speeches. Of course, it’s not a shorthand record, but I am recalling what I said from my memory.
‘To my mind, there are no reasons for dismissal of Nikita Sergeevich from the position of the First secretary of the CC. I’m judging it by our republic. After Stalin’s death, first of all, in the provinces Khrushchev’s name is associated with all new, I’d say, progressive occurring in the party and the country. Particularly his trips over the republics and regions, open communication with ordinary people and zest for life have produced a favorable impression; he has shown an interest in labor of the Soviet people of all nationalities, his approaches to solving accumulated painful problems, especially the rehabilitation of innocently victimized party and Soviet people and intelligentsia. That’s why people are unlikely to understand the decision that is currently being proposed here.
Comrade Malenkov, you have been in the party leadership for a long time and you were one of the closest to Stalin people. People in Uzbekistan remember gratefully how at the beginning of 1952 after submission of our Memorandum by your order the eight draft decrees and resolutions of the government were prepared in the CC departments and the ministries within three days. On February 7th they were considered by the Organizational Bureau where you were the chairman. At your suggestion, those documents were approved of, though with some changes in terms and volumes. Now you are replacing Stalin at the post of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Speaking frankly, we in the regions have noticed that the government has been working worse, the administration discipline and communication with the republics have weakened, some high-ranking executives don’t take responsibility for problem solving as they are afraid of responsibility. At the end of 1954 we submitted the concrete proposals related to the very painful vital matter for Uzbekistan in particular and the Soviet Union in general about changes in the agricultural products pricing. After two months we could hardly find our Memorandum in the departments of the Council of Ministers. When I called you, you promised to verify and sort out the issue. However, afterward nothing changed. Our executives were visiting many offices of the ministry and the Council of Ministers. Alas, nothing was accomplished. At the end of 1955 I requested Bulganin to consider our documents. Only after that the instructions were given and the orders to the ministries and authority bodies were prepared. Nevertheless, the government’s resolution was never approved. We agreed. In the approved documents some items were amended, and we agreed with that as well. Such a work style of the Center is not highly esteemed and appraised by executives in the regions.’
Addressing to Molotov I said, ‘Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, we all respect you as you have many merits and enormous authority. You have just spoken about deficiencies in the party organizations work, in the CC in particular. It sounds fair. Of course, we should work better. But you are the eldest party member who was in the Politburo even at Lenin’s time. You used to work with him and have been in the party and government leadership since then. Of course, you are better at noticing vices, weaknesses and deficiencies in the party work. But if it’s so, how have you failed to personally correct Nikita Sergeevich? Why haven’t you raised this issue for discussion at the Presidium and Secretariat? I’m sure your recommendations and suggestions might have been heard. Being a schoolboy, I was happy and proud of carrying your portrait at the demonstrations, though you have never visited Uzbekistan and the other republics during your membership in the Soviet leadership. I don’t think your attitude is compatible with our party traditions. We, the young executives, believe that if an organization makes some slips and mistakes, then the overall responsibility, of course, must be taken by not only the CEO, but also by all the administration and management. They are not free from the responsibility and must correct the situation all together.’
Addressing directly to Kaganovich, I spoke out everything I was thinking about at that moment, ‘Lazar Moiseevich, you visited Uzbekistan in the first years of the Soviet power, worked in Tashkent. Therefore, the old bolsheviks still remember you. However, since then, you have only visited us once in 5-7 years to get elected either as a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet or a delegate to the party congress from Uzbekistan. Upon arrival, you only visit the enterprises under the plan. Listening to your speeches and remarks, people don’t feel you are really concerned or worried about the needs and life of the republic. Your current reputation failure in the regions is a result of the mentioned above. Now you are accusing Nikita Sergeevich of free granting plants and factories to the republics, which is weakening the state. However, we consider it as one of the largest reforms which has been welcomed gratefully by the republics. Indeed, according to this law, our enterprises are being free granted not to foreigners but to the Soviet republics, which increases the motivation and responsibility of the republics for their work. Isn’t it clear that the stronger the republic is, the more powerful is our Soviet state? We shouldn’t hamper this process. Instead, we need to do our utmost to complete it fully.’
In conclusion I said about Nikita Sergeevich, ‘There is a grain of truth in the expressed before remarks. For example, you, Nikita Sergeevich, as I said before, are respected and trusted by people for your new style of work, first of all, and for good communication people skills. Of an enormous significance is the rehabilitation of the slain and ruined sons and daughters of the people in the years of the cult. But sometimes, after visiting one or another place for a few hours, you immediately recommend to break existing for centuries traditions, often suggesting template recommendations or solutions, without considering the peculiarity distinctive for each republic, region and even a particular collective farm or a plant. People like your artlessness in communication with collective farmers, workers, your sense of humor and ability to joke and encourage them. But sometimes your jokes and witty remarks aren’t understandable for local people. (At that moment I remembered his famous phrase ‘kuzkina mat’ – how to translate it into the Uzbek language - but I abstained from the examples.) From all spoken about here, it should be useful to draw a conclusion for both our common cause and for myself personally. I, in particular, will do my best so that people in Uzbekistan will never forget about self-critical analysis of what they are doing.’
Finally, I finished my speech as follows, ‘It would be right if Nikita Sergeevich remains at his current position of the First secretary of the CC. Whether it needs a special decision, I don’t know, but it’s quite possible to come to an agreement about it and finalize the discussion within the framework of the Presidium.’
Further Molotov took the floor. He was attacking Khrushchev accusing him of intolerable behavior at the meetings with foreigners in the country and overseas, of drinking alcohol in public and pronouncing irresponsible statements. He said that Khrushchev was incompetent in the foreign policy, didn’t study it and, obviously, couldn’t comprehend it. He was speaking in a clear, precise manner peculiar for him.
Nikita Sergeevich tried to parry the accusations, but in fact, they didn’t give him a chance to speak.
Mikoyan, Suslov, and Kirichenko spoke to support Khrushchev. But it was getting late. So, the chairman, Bulganin, proposed, ‘Let’s take a decision. Are there any proposals?’
Kaganovich: ‘It has already been proposed to dismiss him from the position of the First secretary of the CC.’
Bulganin: ‘But how?’ (Some voices: ‘That’s right. That’s right.’) ‘Then let’s find out: who is voting in favor of this proposal?’
Thus, we voted: some by raising hands, the others by words. The result of the vote was seven out of ten ‘voted for the proposal’. The remaining three people, including Suslov, Mikoyan and Kirichenko didn’t vote at all, nor did they strongly mind, expressing their disagreement just by silence.
Khrushchev hit the table with his hand in a protest and exclaimed, ‘You don’t have the right to make such decisions! They weren't you who elected me. I was elected by the Plenum of the congress. I’m strongly against your decision!’
Malenkov: ‘Yes, you’re right. The Plenum elected you, but after establishing the current Presidium, the Plenum authorized the Presidium to supervise all the party matters. The decision taken right now will certainly be submitted to the Plenum for approval.’
Bulganin: ‘Surely, Khrushchev won’t remain jobless. He might well be appointed a minister of agriculture. He is familiar with this sphere of work, is experienced in and likes this job. Well, what shall we do then?’
Khrushchev: ‘I demand that you listen to me at the Presidium! All of you have spoken here, without giving me a chance to reply.’
Kirichenko: ‘Yeah, we need to listen to him.’
Mukhitdinov: ‘It'll be useful.’
Bulganin: ‘Then let’s prepare the draft resolution of the Presidium about what we have talked today. Tomorrow we will discuss it.’
We called it a day. Brezhnev was absent from the after-dinner meeting. Coming out to the lobby I found myself standing close to Suslov. He quietly told me, ‘Nikita Sergeevich is inviting you. Could you go to see him now?’
I went to Khrushchev’s office in Old Square. When I entered his room, I saw Suslov, Zhukov, and Furtseva there.
Khrushchev: ‘Well, now I’m nobody… (Pause.) I wouldn’t like to leave my post with such accusations, such a resolution. I’m sure we are on the right track; we started not badly. The causes of their offences and dissatisfaction with me, you know very well. They are acting in this way because they are scared of their future. Let’s come to an agreement on whether I should leave the CC or we will find a solution.’
Zhukov: ‘You shouldn’t leave the post of the First secretary. I will arrest them all. Everything is ready.’
Furtseva: ‘That’s right. They must be liquidated.’
Suslov: ‘Why shall they be arrested? In addition, what crimes can they be charged with?’
Mukhitdinov: ‘Mikhail Andreevich is right. We shouldn’t raise a matter about their arrest. All the matters must be sorted out either at the Presidium or at the Plenum. As for the Plenum, they will definitely support you, Nikita Sergeevich.’
Khrushchev: ‘Well, thank you all for your frank friendly words. I highly appreciate your moral-political support. Actually, the most reliable way is to convene the Plenum and intercept the initiative from them. Within the framework of the Presidium, as we see, they are in the majority and the candidates to the Presidium membership are not entitled to vote. But at the Plenum we will have the majority of the votes.’
Thus, it was decided to convene the CC Plenum.
Khrushchev: ‘The attitude of everyone was evident at the Presidium. Brezhnev behaved outrageously there. He is a cowardly unprincipled man. When Kaganovich sharply told him off, he immediately stepped aside and now he may well take their side. It would be good to find out if he is really sick. I’m sure he is feigning and wants to wait and see to be on the safe side for his own sake… Let’s speed up the Plenum convocation before they do this. The further discussion at the Presidium is pointless although it can help to gain time for gathering the CC members. Perhaps, we should convene the Plenum on the day after tomorrow? And tomorrow we should gather here the members and candidates to the CC membership and the auditing committee members …’
He continued, ‘You, comrade Zhukov, together with Serov must make sure of the arrival of comrades from the regions. Comrade Suslov, you shall invite Churaev (from the CC organizational department) and Mylarshikov (from the CC bureau department of the RSFSR) and try to inform all of them so that people could arrive tomorrow. Comrade Furtseva, you shall deal with Moscow so that all the invited people have arrived, and think over the wording to orient them properly. You, comrade Mukhitdinov, must find an opportunity when the CC members from the Asian republics arrive to talk to them in person. Let’s convene the Plenum at 11 o’clock.’
Everybody agreed and broke up. Coming out from the room I was going downstairs when I saw Serov who was heading for Khrushchev. On the next morning we gathered again in the Presidium board room to continue our discussion.
Kirichenko told his point of view, then D.T. Shepilov did the same. At the beginning he seemed to support Khrushchev, but after Molotov’s speech he clearly defected. He began criticizing, saying that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs usually prepared serious documents for each Khrushchev’s meeting with foreigners and provided him with a special folder, which he usually ignored and even didn’t read the materials in it. Instead, he often spoke his own words, and as a result, it was impossible to correct them anymore. Thus, it often turned out that everybody was faced with the fact accomplished. As to foreigners, they surely made relevant conclusions.
I took the floor. In fact, I made a speech for the second time. I could hardly finish it when the secretary entered the room to inform emotionally of arrival of a group of the CC members at the reception room who wanted to join the meeting.
Bulganin: ‘Who gave them permission? They mustn’t!’
Khrushchev: ‘Why mustn’t they? They are the CC members!’
Their wrangle was interrupted because 15-20 people entered the board room. I glanced at them: they were responsible executives of the CC and mostly the KGB, MIA* and military officers. (Ministry of Internal Affairs*). Serov was heading them. On behalf of the comers he started abruptly talking that for the past three days something strange had been going on.
‘We all, the CC members, rendered confidence to all of you by electing you to the Presidium. But you are having a closed meeting so that we don’t know what you are talking about. The people and the party remain unaware of what is going on. So, a lot of rumors arise. There are resonating rumors abroad as well. As to the work, it’s been neglected. That’s why we demand that you explain what’s matter, what’s going on. None of the matters related to the Plenum competence can be decided on here. We won’t leave until we get a clear answer!’
Bulganin (hitting the table with his fist): ‘How dare you?! Everybody knows who and at whose initiative has gathered this group. We’ll explain everything not to you but to the Plenum. Now leave us alone and don’t disturb us!’
Konev (supporting Serov): ‘We are the CC members, aren’t we? The people must know the truth!’
Bulganin: ‘I’m saying again, ‘Leave the room!’’
Malenkov: ‘Let us not heighten tension. Let’s ask comrade Voroshilov to go to the reception room and explain them the objective of the Presidium meeting.’
Bulganin: ‘That’s right. Come on, Kliment, go out and explain to the comrades.’
Khrushchev: ‘I won’t let anybody to misinform the CC members! I will go out too and tell them all the truth about who and what are doing here so that the party and people should know everything!’ His face was ablaze with emotion, he was shivering and even staggering. Voroshilov and Khrushchev headed for the doors. Standing at the threshold Khrushchev said, ‘You all, keep sitting, go on. But I will talk to the people and the CC members. We’ll be back.’
Malenkov was the first to be frightened: ‘Let’s stop discussing it. Everything can be settled now. The point is that we shouldn’t victimize anyone. Let Nikita Sergeevich work further.’
Kaganovich: ‘You are right. We should finalize this case.’
Meanwhile the conversation was going on in the reception room. We were quietly sitting in silence, without looking at each other. We were sitting in that way for at least an hour or so. At last Voroshilov and Khrushchev came back. Scarcely had the attendees uttered a word when Khrushchev informed: ‘We’ve told them the truth. So, Kliment Efremovich had to make excuses to the CC members. Everything that has happened is neither lawful, nor is under the party Regulations. We’ll tell about everything at the Plenum. They are insisting on its convocation tomorrow. What do you all think?’
We supported that proposal, ‘That’s right. The Plenum should be convened as soon as possible to continue our discussion there.’
At that moment it was clear that Bulganin wasn’t happy with the role of the chairman he had taken before. He was sitting silently. The initiative moved to Khrushchev who said to Voroshilov, ‘Kliment, let’s go out and tell them that the Plenum is to be tomorrow.’
Some attendees loudly, some quietly supported him, ‘Okay. Sure.’
It was announced to the CC members that the Plenum was to be held the next day. So, they left. Bulganin took his previous seat.
Khrushchev: ‘Your point of view is clear. Perhaps, you’ve already prepared a resolution, haven’t you?’
Malenkov: ‘We haven’t written any resolution.’
Khrushchev: ‘I’m the First secretary of the CC and will inform the Plenum about what has happened here. You will also tell your standpoints. The comrades will listen to everybody and then make a decision.’
At the moment the assistant gave Khrushchev some letter. The latter put his glasses on, read and said, ‘This is from Brezhnev. Here’s what he’s written…’ (By the letter, Leonid Ilich was apologizing for being sick. He was fully supporting Nikita Sergeevich in his endeavor to keep his position as the First secretary. Also, he was condemning the conspirators’ behavior, suggesting to dismiss them from the Presidium and to strictly punish them.)
No one said anything. But I think all of them as though saw again the true face of the writer. His awareness of the situation up to the last hours amazed me. But this timely support again changed Khrushchev’s attitude to Brezhnev who again got an open road upwards.
The next morning the Plenum opened. Khrushchev made a report about the situation in the party and told in detail about the three-day meeting of the CC Presidium, namely: about the subject matter discussed, who and how had behaved there, what decision they had wanted to take and how they had been finally repulsed. After him Molotov took the floor. He shortly informed of the standpoint of the ‘seven’ group.
Then we moved on to the discussion. All the participants who supported Khrushchev told their opinions. Voroshilov, Saburov, Bulganin, and Pervukhin spoke on behalf of the opposition. Having told about their yesterday’s standpoint, today they admitted it wrong. The CC members, one by one, basically almost all of them, when speaking out called them conspirators, careerists who had attempted to make a coup d’état. Eventually, later Malenkov was nearly the last to admit his mistake, speaking self-criticizing.
On the 29th at the morning meeting of the Plenum, the actions of the ‘seven’ group were judged and the resolution pronounced by Suslov was made. All the participants in the Plenum, including the six members of the ‘seven’ group, voted for that resolution. Only one person, Molotov, abstained from voting.
What was written in the paper?
In the preamble it was said that Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov had established the anti-party group and the essence of their standpoint was explained. At the Plenum it was decided to abstain from mentioning Voroshilov, Bulganin, and the others as the ‘group’ members, taking into account that Voroshilov was Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and Bulganin was Chairman of the Ministers Council of the country. Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov were removed from the Presidium and the CC. Saburov was removed from the Presidium, but remained as a CC member and kept his position; Pervukhin was redeployed from the Presidium membership to a member candidate position.
It was admitted reasonable to increase the CC Presidium membership up to 15 members and elected to the Presidium as follows:
A.B. Aristov, N.I. Belyaev, L.I. Brezhnev, N.A. Bulganin, K.E. Voroshilov, G.K. Zhukov, N.G. Ignatov, A.I. Kirichenko, F.R. Kozlov, O.V. Kuusinen, A.I. Mikoyan, M.A. Suslov, E.A. Furtseva, N.S. Khrushchev, N.M. Shvernik;
Candidates to the Presidium membership as follows:
Y.E. Kaliberzin, A.P. Kirilenko, D.S. Korotchenko, A.N. Kosygin, D.T. Mazurov, V.P. Mjavanadze, N.A. Mukhitdinov, M.G. Pervukhin, P.N. Pospelov.
On that part the Plenum ended. However, it took four more days to finally edit and approve on June 4th the decree published in press later. We departed. Khrushchev with a group of the Presidium members went to Leningrad to participate in the anniversary celebrations where he delivered a long speech, telling basically about everything.
Gradually all the members of the ‘seven’ group were removed from their positions and sent to work in different parts of the country. In September Bulganin was removed from the CC Presidium and in the same year Voroshilov was removed from the position of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the USSR. Molotov was sent to work in Mongolia as the ambassador. Malenkov went to Kazakhstan where he worked as the director of the power plant, Kaganovich became the director of the potassium complex in the Urals and Shepilov became the chancellor of an institute in Kyrgizstan.
Kaganovich and Malenkov were excluded from the party membership at their last jobs. Thus, they passed away later being non-party. Molotov’s party career was different. At the meeting of the primary organization of the Council of Ministers where he was registered, he was excluded from the party membership. To which he told the attending communists: ‘I understand your position because you couldn’t do otherwise. However, I will remain a communist.’ Then he bade them farewells and went away. They say he continued to regularly pay the party fees by post.
After a few years, A.Ya. Pelshe, the chairman of the CPC* (Committee of the Party Control*) invited him and said, ‘Vyacheslav Mikhailovich! If you write an appeal for your restoration in the party membership, we might favorably consider it.’
In response Molotov said, ‘You were at the Plenum when our matter was considered and remember my objecting the taken decision. Who and how forced the primary organization to exclude me from the party membership is quite clear. So, there is nothing I can write about and ask for in my appeal.’
Nevertheless, some years later, K.U. Chernenko – ‘a caliph for an hour’ - appeared in the Kremlin Olympus. For 13 months he was the Secretary General of the CC CPSU, the party and the country leader. The old-timers of Old Square said the only useful thing he had done was when he invited Molotov to inform him of his restoration in the party membership. That’s when an interesting ‘conversation’ occurred.
Chernenko, smiling and looking at Molotov, was waiting for his gratitude words. Instead, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich gloomily stared at him expecting him apologizing. On that they bade farewells.
A lot of articles, feature stories, recollections, etc. about the ‘anti-party’ group were published. In general authors described the events correctly. However, since they didn’t attend all those meetings in person and the shorthand records weren’t carried on, then it’s obvious that much information was picked up from somebody else’s stories. I was an eyewitness of the three-day confrontation and, therefore, decided to describe those events in detail.
XII
KHRUSHCHEV VERSUS ZHUKOV
For a while it seemed that the work would be going on normally. But it didn’t happen like that. Only three months passed before ‘Zhukov’s case’ was opened. Georgii Konstantinovich was dismissed from the position of the defense minister of the USSR, removed from the Presidium and CC membership and at the age of 62 he had to get retired, i.e., he became a retiree. What actually happened?
Khrushchev, having become the First CC secretary, immediately remembered Zhukov who in 1946 was removed from the group of the CC membership candidates and sent as commander-in-chief to the Urals in the so-called ‘honorable exile’ as they used to say at that time. Khrushchev returned him to Moscow to appoint him at first as the first deputy minister of defense, Bulganin. Later Zhukov became the defense minister.
Of course, Nikita Sergeevich needed Georgii Konstantinovich’s enormous authority, his indomitable will, firm character and exceptional popularity. That’s why in spite of a few negative moments in their relationships in the past during the war, N. S. stepped over his personal attitude to G.K. Zh., politically rehabilitated him and brought the marshal closer to himself. At the 20th congress Zhukov was elected a CC member and at the first Plenum on February 27th he became a membership candidate to the CC Presidium. Three months later on June 29th, 1957 he was elected the Presidium member and exactly after four months on October 29th, he was removed from the Presidium membership and dismissed from all his positions.
Literally at all Plenums in 1957 Zhukov was climbing up the party hierarchy, getting higher positions in the top party echelon. What was the reason for that? It was caused by the dramatic events of those months. Zhukov fully supported Khrushchev then in dismissing and liquidating Beria and later in dismissing Malenkov from the post of Chairman of the Ministers Council. Thus, at the 20th congress he became a membership candidate to the CC Presidium. Next there was a cleavage inside the Presidium, the speeches of the seven members against Khrushchev. At that moment Zhukov was firmly supporting Khrushchev. As a result, he became the Presidium member.
Thus, with the support and participation of Zhukov, the direct and potential Khrushchev’s enemies were removed from the party leadership. However, after all… Zhukov’s turn came. Having got rid of Beria and the most eminent members of the top leadership, without fear of any threats from their parts, having taken benefit from Zhukov’s authority and assistance, Khrushchev suddenly sharply changed his attitude to Zhukov, being guided, as I understood, by his personal feelings, first of all, being afraid of rivalry, and because of jealousy.
Knowing that it wasn’t quite easy to remove Zhukov, Khrushchev with his new close people thoroughly and in detail was preparing this operation. In late October of the same year Kirichenko phoned me to Tashkent and asked me to urgently arrive in Moscow. He warned me we would go to his native land, Ukraine. At first, I thought he was joking, but it was true. He said he was flying to Kiev soon where he would meet us.
Upon arrival in Moscow, I went directly to the CC to see Kozlov who had already become the Presidium member. He confidentially told me that Nikita Sergeevich together with a few Presidium members was flying to Kiev in a couple of days.
‘You will fly with them as well,’ he said. ‘The Kiev special military district division is having training maneuvers there.’
I asked him what kind of a role I would have there.
‘Hold your tongue. You will know there.’ That was the response.
Those days the defense minister Zhukov was visiting Yugoslavia at the Marshal Tito’s personal invitation. He wasn’t expected to return earlier from his trip. He was supposed to be back by the end of October.
We arrived in Kiev. I noticed that at the airport there were many military officers among the greeters. There were almost all the Marshals there. We were accommodated in the luxurious apartments and served a magnificent dinner. Afterwards everybody was invited to a large hall where the highest-rank military leaders had already been there.
After we had taken seats, Khrushchev spoke to Malinovskii, ‘Rodion Yakovlevich, will you inform us how the maneuvers are going to be carried on, who are participating, the operation plan, how and when it’s going to finish.’ Talking to us he added, ‘Comrade Zhukov is visiting Yugoslavia as a guest. Therefore, Marshal Malinovskii shall lead the maneuvers.’
Rodion Yakovlevich reported on the main points of the operation, named the participants from the both parties, the commanders, showed on the map how everything was going to take place and the location of the main command post. The maneuvers were supposed to last a day and a half.
Khrushchev asked, ‘What do you think about our participation?’
Malinovskii answered in detail that at the beginning of the operation the members and the candidates to the Presidium membership would be at the main command post. Further everybody would have their routes so that they could watch hostilities and fighting actions on the field.
Khrushchev asked who else was taking part in the maneuvers besides the Kiev military district division and the representatives of the General Headquarters. The marshal answered, ‘As we reported to you in Moscow, the commanders of the military districts and branches have been invited. They are here already.’
After that Khrushchev let the military officers go and when we were left alone, he asked, ‘Well, is the task clear for you now?’
Everybody nodded. He continued, ‘It's just what's on the surface. But the main task is to talk to the generals, find out their moods and attitudes, whether military officers are satisfied with their situation, the Headquarters’ work and the defense minister's job, namely, his management style, whether he does his job well, his attitude to the subordinating marshals and generals.’
Frankly speaking, I didn’t understand why he was doing all that, but when summarizing the maneuvers results, it became clear for me as well.
On the next morning, Khrushchev gathered us to say that somehow the decision about the maneuvers had reached Zhukov in Belgrade. Since the latter thought himself to be responsible for the maneuvers, i.e., he was meant to be there, he made a request to interrupt his visit to Yugoslavia. However, he got a response that it wasn’t reasonable to break off such an important trip. He sent his wire again. In the reply he was informed that the Chairman of the Defense Council of the country (Khrushchev) was attending the maneuvers, to which Zhukov said nothing.
All together we arrived at the command post of Malinovskii where we were for a while before he allocated each of us to the troops. Khrushchev stayed with him. I found myself with the two generals, one of whom was the commander of the offensive division. Torrential rain was pouring. Thus, warm general's uniforms (without shoulder straps) and waterproof cape-tents were given us. Since I had participated in the war from the first to the very last day, I wasn’t amazed with what I saw at all. Indeed, training maneuvers are still maneuvers, and however the troops were trying to do their best, they could hardly remind of the real warfare field.
On the next morning, we talked with the high-rank military officers. The conversation was very interesting. Nikita Sergeevich started recollecting the war battles and was happy to be still remembered by people since the war. In the afternoon Malinovskii summarized the results, then the generals who had supervised the maneuvers made speeches. Khrushchev asked them to speak in detail about shortcomings of the military troops training. They caught his idea, so the conversation was going on in a new direction.
In the evening all the army generals were sitting at the dinner table. The tables were generously, lavishly laid with various kinds of food, including caviars, salmon, ham and almost all kinds of drinks and so on. Khrushchev was encouraging, setting the tone. There was such an atmosphere that everyone drank and ate to their hearts’ content, without being shy, and the conversations were getting livelier and franker.
Some were claiming that the army leadership had allegedly made many blunders, the battle training was at low level and the political educational work in the army had been ignored. Some commanders of the military districts and branches were speaking in the same way. We were seated so that each of us was surrounded by the military officers. That’s where the discourses became casually free and open. They directly talked about soldiers and officers’ discontent and complaints. The toasts and dithyrambs to Khrushchev as the great commander-in-chief and party leader sounded louder and oftener.
At the end of the dinner Nikita Sergeevich very warmly bade farewell to the generals, and they in turn wished him strong health and success. Everybody, starting from Malinovskii, assured that the army would firmly support the wise political strategy of the party leadership.
After parting we went to our accommodations.
‘Well, it seems clear,’ said Khrushchev, ‘the army is with us and won’t let me down. I’m going to bed and you can have a walk.’
Kirichenko invited us to a so-called small drawing room. Kirichenko, Kozlov, Aristov, Brezhnev, Podgorny, and I were sitting around the table. We stayed up till the late night.
In the morning Nikita Sergeevich said he would like to talk to the Defense Council members, meanwhile Podgorny would show us his native city. Brezhnev stayed with Khrushchev (he was in charge of the army and defense manufacturing industry). Apparently, it wasn’t an official meeting of the Defense Council. In fact, it was just a confidential talk. We saw the sights of the city and in the afternoon returned to Moscow.
The Presidium meeting was appointed to be on the day of Zhukov’s return. When everybody gathered, Khrushchev suddenly said, ‘Zhukov is arriving in Moscow right now. He shall be invited to come directly here. I’d like to frankly share the information and my impressions with you. He is plotting to seize the power in the country and is carrying out the serious work in this direction; we have already come to know something about it. I’m an elderly man and I’m not afraid for myself. But it’s a great pity if our policy fails, our successful endeavors are foiled, if we let him establish a military dictatorship. This is dangerous and can lead to the civil war and bloodshed. All of you will find yourselves far from here. We need to talk to Zhukov seriously and make a decision. At the Secretariat we agreed that tomorrow we are holding the Plenum where we’ll finally solve the issue related to Zhukov.’
We were sitting, listening to him. There was neither a protocol, nor shorthand records, nor an extraneous person. Evidently, everything had been arranged thoroughly. Soon Zhukov entered the room and took his seat at the long table.
He apparently felt already that something very unusual, unexpected was going on. He sat down without uttering a word. Then Khrushchev said, ‘We’ve gathered the Presidium here to discuss your behavior, comrade Zhukov. We are getting signals witnessing your arrogance, your willful acting, completely ignoring the party and its leadership. Dissatisfaction in the army and especially in the high-ranking commanding staff has increased because you ignore and even sometimes insult them. We would like to hear your clarifications about these. We’ve trusted you by writing off your old sins for which in due time you were removed from the CC. But you instead of justifying our trust to you are acting in such a way, opposing to the CC and turning the army against the party.’
Zhukov stood up and said, ‘I really don’t understand what’s going on, what you are talking about. First of all, comrade Khrushchev, you signed all the documents according to which I was responsible for commanding the maneuvers at the fixed time. Then you sent me to Yugoslavia. At the same time the scheduled time for maneuvers was postponed, at which they were actually accomplished. It wasn’t supposed to be done like that. Why did you send me overseas if you had claims to me and complaints about me? And if you wanted to carry out the maneuvers without me, why didn’t you reschedule them for another term at once?
As for the gist. I don’t know what kind of information you've got, but I’ve served honestly and never turned anyone against the party and its leadership. On the contrary, I’ve done my utmost to consolidate the army around the party. Of course, there are some shortcomings and neglects in the army, but it wasn’t me who caused them. Moreover, I’ve been trying to do my best to eliminate them. So, if you have concrete remarks to me, I’m ready to listen to you, to take into consideration and correct them.’
Brezhnev took the floor. He was strongly criticizing Zhukov. For that time, he was speaking confidently, dogmatically, even with an aplomb. It wasn’t the same Brezhnev who had quite recently, in June, been silenced instantly and had surrendered before the ‘anti-party group.’
Zhukov was watching silently the speakers. Kirichenko was sharply talking about Zhukov’s bad attitude to the commanders, his poor management of the districts and turning them against the party organizations. Then Malinovskii made a speech, noting that Zhukov wasn’t involved in the Headquarters’ work; instead, he got involved in politics, actually ignoring his direct job. Therefore, he failed to properly fulfill responsibilities of the defense minister, which meant he didn’t justify the confidence and trust to him as a Presidium member. Apart from them, Kozlov and Furtseva spoke sharply against Zhukov as well.
I also took the floor to mention that due to my job, I’d had a chance to participate in the meetings of the Military Council of the district. Some positive changes were quite noticeable, though, of course, there were still many shortcomings, in particular in the poor political work among soldiers and officers, there were some facts of the military service regulation violations, especially in the guard duties, which was really dangerous. The frontiers had recently arrested a few trespassers of the national boundary. Besides, there were some incidents of hooliganism and manhandling by military officers. Fortunately, those lacks were timely revealed and the appropriate measures were taken.
The isolation of military servicemen from the party organizations actually existed. But the situation was improving. The military servicemen started communicating to us, visiting the municipal and regional committees and the CC. Many of the army representatives were elected to the local Soviet party organizations. Comrade Zhukov had recently made a stopover in Tashkent on his trip from India to talk to people.
Khrushchev was listening to me without looking at me, leaning against his elbows and embracing his head with his hands. Kirichenko suddenly interrupted me, ‘You should talk about the main point!’
I responded I was speaking on the gist and just expressed my standpoint.
Khrushchev raised his head, ‘Have you finished your speech?’
I answered, ‘Yes.’ And I took my seat.
Aristov and Suslov spoke after me and afterwards Zhukov took the floor. He said, ‘Yeah, comrades, I understand the situation. I can’t argue with each speaker now, but I see the direction in general: the speech is about the organizational conclusions related to me.
I’m repeating again: I’m an honest man, I have been working honestly. I’m desperately eager in the post-Stalin period to achieve a turning crucial point for the better in all the spheres, including the army. Someone has said here about its weakness before an enemy. I’m resolutely objecting it! Our army is able to fight off any enemy and to respond to any provocation!’
Khrushchev: ‘You, comrade Zhukov, have apparently overestimated your merits in the cleansing of the government and the CC from the unscrupulous figures. However, it has been done by all the leadership members. Why are you opposing yourself them? Once you were reproached with Bonapartism; now again you are behaving in the same manner.’
Zhukov: ‘It has never happened and will never happen.’
Khrushchev: ‘Explain then to the Presidium members why you have secretly created special forces units. In order to seize the power?’
Zhukov: ‘I haven’t created any special units and have never thought of any objectives like that. That’s a slander!’
Khrushchev pulled a paper out of the folder and read it aloud. The text clearly said that in the army the secret subversive units had been created in order to seize the power in the country. It described the procedure of selecting people and their absolutely secret training. Those people were armed with all the necessary equipment to implement diversions and coup d’états with the further liquidation of undesirable elements.
Zhukov: ‘These units are not secret subversive groups but just regular units similar, by the way, to the American ones where the army includes military sub-units of specially trained officers for reconnaissance and destruction of missile installations. That’s why our specialists offered me to create such a group for actions against enemy missile forces.’
‘Is it a big group?’
‘It’s less than a division.’
‘Have you reported to the CC about the creation of such a special division?’
‘No. But I didn’t expect it to be so important. This is usual for the army life improvement of combat readiness.’
Khrushchev: ‘But we've got other details. They have been trained in Moscow and they are evidently well oriented inside the Kremlin, its halls, corridors and rooms, and so on.’
Zhukov: ‘What you have just said isn’t true. I only admit that before the creation of these groups I should have consulted with you.’
Instantly most attendees started blaming him.
Brezhnev: ‘After such actions of comrade Zhukov how can we trust him? How can we work with him now particularly in the higher echelon of the party and the state? He must be dismissed from the position of the defense minister and the CC Presidium member.’
Voices: ‘That’s right! It sounds right!’
Zhukov was sitting silently.
Khrushchev: ‘Any other suggestions?’
Voices: ‘No! No!’
‘Comrade Zhukov, do you want to say anything?’
‘No, I don’t, Nikita Sergeevich.’
’Then let’s do it that way: comrades Suslov and Brezhnev, will you prepare the necessary information and the draft resolution. There is a suggestion to convoke the CC Plenum tomorrow. You, comrade Zhukov, will have an opportunity to tell the CC members about all that. Do you agree?’
‘Yes, I do.’
‘Then you are free to go for now. You have just arrived, haven’t you? So, have some rest. Tomorrow we will meet at the Plenum.’
‘At what time?’
Suslov: ‘At 11 o’clock in the Swerdlow hall.’
Zhukov left the room. Khrushchev suggested to have a ten-minute break. Some smoked, some had tea. Then we gathered again.
Khrushchev (showing the folder): ‘Here are the materials about Zhukov’s behavior overseas. It was unworthy: showed himself off, a self-conceited poseur. As if he was the only person in the Soviet Union who defeated Germany and won the war on his own. This is dangerous. Here is the detailed information about his special military division that is ready to make a coup d’état and seize the power. Now his home and phone shall be under surveillance to find out who he talks to and what about. Comrade Brezhnev, you will arrange this, order to Serov and involve the relative agency.’
Brezhnev: ‘Yes, Nikita Sergeevich.’
Khrushchev: ‘Here are the reports about his adventures in all the countries he’s been to. Anyone who wants to get familiarized with them can have it. The final opinion will be apparently like that: Zhukov shall be excluded from the Presidium membership and dismissed from the position of the defense minister. Suslov shall be the speaker. Are there any objections?’
‘No objections.’
Khrushchev reminded, ‘Mikhail Andreevich, you shall prepare with Brezhnev the report and the draft resolution… Now, as to the minister, whom shall we appoint the defense minister? Maybe, comrade Malinovskii? He is an experienced commander, a specialist and distinguished himself in the warfare. Do you agree? (Everyone voted for him.) We will also inform the Plenum about it. Comrade Suslov, you’ll be responsible for the attendance.’
‘Yes. Almost everybody has already arrived.’
‘Check them again.’
In the morning Khrushchev opened the Plenum and informed that the subject matter of the discussion would be the issue about Zhukov and gave the floor to Suslov. Being a master in such things, the latter was speaking firmly and strikingly, shaping the things spoken about at the Presidium in crushing wording. When he reached the information about the secret subversive groups which he dramatically brightly described a noise arose in the hall…
Then Zhukov was given the floor. He started his speech with describing his biography, his service in the army. However, he was abruptly interrupted.
Some comments came from the attendees: ‘Do make a long story short! All these things are well known. We all were at war!’ Then he said he had learnt a lesson from the criticism, but he had always served honestly. Someone from Presidium objected to his claim, ‘Are you honest? You've got promoted to such a high post, we've trusted you, but what have you repaid us? You can't join us!’
For the first time I saw Zhukov so upset, with the eyes full of tears he seemed to swallow. With a strained trembling voice but firmly he said, ‘I’m a soldier and will accept any decision. But before the party and the people I’m clean. I’ve never committed any crimes in deeds or thoughts and I will never ever do.’
Two days before the Plenum, Kozlov (he was temporarily acting as the second secretary) warned me that I would have to speak before the Presidium and the Plenum as well. However, at nine o’clock in the morning just before the Plenum, I was invited by Kozlov who asked me, ‘What did you speak about at the Presidium?’
‘About what I’d known and seen. Also, I spoke about the lacks and shortcomings.’
‘Anyway,’ he interrupted, ‘the boss is disappointed. I’d recommend you not to speak at the Plenum.’
After the final debates Khrushchev, in his closing speech, couldn’t help attacking Zhukov again. Then he moved on to the general objectives: we all had to make an inference from that case, unite the people, consolidate the army around the party and prevent adventurers and careerists from actions.
The draft resolution on G.K. Zhukov was approved without any remarks, and it was published in press as the Plenum resolution ‘On the Improvement of Party Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy.’
The new minister of defense, R.Y. Malinovskii, always emphasized his respect to marshal G.K. Zhukov and highly estimated his talents. However, at the next party congress he stated (I’m citing): ‘The former minister of defense Zhukov has shown adventurism and an aspiration for Bonapartism to seizure power single-handedly. In the army he has propagated his personality cult and pursued a policy of curtailing the party-political work and its disparaging.’
In that way G.K. Zhukov was excluded from the party membership and the military leadership. He spent his last 16 years at home. Nevertheless, having retired, he didn’t lose his strength of will and vigor working on his memoirs.
I have recounted a factual side of that usual scandal at the highest power echelon. I would like to analyze why after such a prompt career promotion Zhukov was so quickly politically ruined. I have already mentioned about arising Khrushchev’s fears of and jealousies towards Zhukov. What really caused them?
Let’s start the analysis with the war time. Zhukov brilliantly led the military operations on smashing up the fascists near Moscow. Next, he led the breaking the Leningrad blockade and destroying the hostile troops. Besides, he directly participated in the troops preparation for the Stalingrad battle which ensured a crucial turning point in the war, as well as the Kursk battle followed by the victorious attack by the Soviet armies along all the frontlines. Moreover, he commanded the troops on a few frontlines where he achieved crushing success. Also, he led the Berlin seizure which finished by hoisting the Soviet banner above the Reichstag. Then, on May 8th, 1945 he accepted the unconditional surrender of the German army. Thus, the act of surrender - the historic document confirming the German army surrender – was signed by four representatives of the anti-Hitler coalition, of whom G.K. Zhukov’s signature was the first. Finally, riding a white horse, he took from another famous Soviet marshal K.K. Rokossovsky reporting him over the Victory Parade in Red Square in Moscow on June 24th, 1945.
As for Khrushchev, although he participated in the war from the beginning till the end, he only got promoted to the position of a War Council member of some frontlines. And now in the 1950s, he was Chairman of the Supreme State Defense Council, whereas Zhukov was his deputy. If one takes a detached view, then there is something to think about.
Dwight Eisenhower, who participated in the war against the German fascism, was Supreme Commander of the allied military forces. He sympathized with Zhukov and appreciated his outstanding military talent; and when the war finished, he attached the highest order of the USA to Zhukov’s chest. Then he visited Moscow as a guest of Georgii Konstantinovich Zhukov. Having become President of the USA, he kept his friendly terms with Zhukov. They exchanged congratulations. At the same time, it is well known that there were some unpleasant complications in the relationships between Eisenhower as the US President and the Soviet leadership at Khrushchev’s time.
At the personal invitation by Djavaharlal Neru, Zhukov visited India soon after the visits by Bulganin and Khrushchev. The multi-million population and the leaders of this country literally arranged a nationwide reception at the top leadership level of the country. Citizens excitedly revealed their sincere respect and love to him as if he was their legendary hero descending from the pages of the famous, popular epos of ‘Makhabkharata’ and ‘Ramayana.’ The reception given to him was incomparably warmer than the one given to our official government delegation. He made a stopover in Tashkent on his way to India. Even though we didn’t arrange a special meeting with people, they, having found out from newspapers and radio about his arrival, went out to passionately greet him.
When at the personal invitation by marshal Joseph Broz Tito, Zhukov visited Yugoslavia, he was welcomed there as a national hero. Tito accompanied him everywhere, fraternally hugged and kissed him in public. Shortly before this visit, the Soviet government delegation led by Khrushchev and Bulganin was officially received there strictly under the protocol.
Apparently, those kinds of examples are too many to recount them all.
As to Khrushchev’s fears: Georgii Konstantinovich never worked in the party, Soviet and economic organizations. Sometimes it was evident from his speeches and actions. Those who wanted to get benefit from and advantage out of this artfully used those facts to arouse Khrushchev’s suspicions of his aspiration to allegedly take over the power like his friends, Eisenhower and Tito, had done.
Undoubtedly, Khrushchev and his close surrounding people didn’t forget a firm, threatening behavior of Zhukov at the CC Presidium during discussions of the ‘anti-party group’s’ actions, his statements about the army which according to him would never make a step without his direct order, as well as his statement in Khrushchev’s office that everything had been ready for conspirators’ arrest. They could scarcely forget that Zhukov was well informed about the details of Beria’s dethronement and even personally controlled the operation. And now there was the information about the special military division which could allegedly be used for the power seizure…
It should be noted that, as it turned out, every Zhukov’s step, his every word uttered in the country and overseas was recorded and the reports were carefully put on Khrushchev’s desk. Due to only this fact, it’s obviously easy to make certain conclusions. Just four months elapsed between the moment he became the CC Presidium member and his removal from its membership. For that period no negative changes occurred in the army. However, for the same period the sufficient materials were accumulated to shortly put an end to the marshal.
My first meeting with Georgii Konstantinovich wasn’t at the war time but during peaceful time. We first met in October, 1952 at the 19th party congress when we both became the CC CPSU members (he became a candidate to the CC membership). During the break we got into a conversation. I told him about Uzbekistan and he talked about military affairs. In this way we got acquainted and later made friends. At plenums and meetings, we tried to have seats next to each other. Although at the USSR Supreme Soviet sessions deputies were seated by the territorial sign, we managed to see each other and have a talk.
When my family and I domiciled in Moscow, we were given a country cottage which was next to Zhukov’s one. However, unfortunately, our neighborhood didn’t last long.
Zhukov was 21 years older than me and for me he set an example in adherence to his principles, allegiance to Motherland, will and determination. In our first conversations he wondered about my birthplace, my parents and in turn, he told about himself. He was born in a village of Strelkovka in Kaluga province. His father was a shoemaker and his mother, called Ustinya Artemyevna, was an illiterate peasant. To support the family, she worked as a carter for rich citizens. His sister, called Masha, grew up in the village and his brother, Alesha, lived less than a year. They were his only family. He early became an orphan. So, he was adopted when a child by a childless widow, called Annushka Zhukova. Hence the origin of his surname.
I first heard of him in the autumn of 1939 in Bukhara. At the time the Japanese army invaded the territory of the friendly Mongolian Republic in the area of Khalkhin-Gol. The Soviet and Mongolian armies led by the generals Zhukov and Choibolsan defeated the Japanese army.
Afterwards, many years later I visited Mongolia. After negotiations and signing the protocol on the cooperation in the spheres of culture, science, arts, education and sports, I visited a museum in Ulan-Bator. The history of Mongolia was well presented there. The central place of the museum was occupied by the display of the modern time and Mongolian-Soviet friendship. In the main hall in the entrance there were the portraits of Lenin, Sukhe-Bator, Stalin, and Choibolsan. The special big hall was dedicated to the Khalkhin-Gol battle, and in almost all numerous displays and documents I saw a portrait of G.K. Zhukov.
The Mongolian comrades respectfully met my request for visiting Khalkhin-Gol. It was located really far and was hard to reach.
How hard it was to fight there, to fetch shells and supply provisions in that back year of 1939!
When he became the defense minister of the USSR, Georgii Konstantinovich rendered assistance to Uzbekistan a few times. I’ll tell you about two facts.
In the autumn of 1955 it often rained in Uzbekistan, which hindered seriously cotton picking up. The transport shortage threatened to spoil the picked cotton. Due to this fact, the commander of the Turkestan military district, general I.I. Fedyuninsky, was invited to the CC and requested to provide trucks and soldiers for 4-5 days to transfer the picked cotton. He said he wasn’t authorized to solve that issue by himself. So, I called Zhukov, the defense minister of the USSR, and told him about the problem. Then I asked him if he could help with the transport and soldiers for rescuing the cotton. He immediately laconically responded, ‘You may take as many as you need.’
The conversation happened at about 8 o’clock in the evening. I went home in a good mood. I was about to have dinner when I got a phone call. Fedyuninsky was on the line. He asked me to receive him. I was ready for it and he quickly came to my house. I invited him for dinner. After having a meal together, I said, ‘I’m listening to you, Ivan Ivanovich.’
He stood up and informed, ‘The defense minister of the USSR, marshal of the Soviet Union Georgii Konstantinovich Zhukov ordered me to take part in the transportation of the picked cotton and provide as many trucks and soldiers as you need.’
In the early morning Fedyuninsky made a phone call to my office and reported, ‘The order is under implementing by the military units, the trucks and soldiers led by the officers are going to the collective farms.’
Thus, the picked cotton was rescued with the military mates’ help.
The CC of the Communist party of Uzbekistan was located in Gogol Street in the old building. In 1956 they decided to build a new building. Having examined all the city areas, the specialists chose Turpakkurgan. It was a small hill in the city center right on the riverside nearby the central square where the government and the Supreme Soviet worked. Here in 1865, general Chernyaev established a military fortress and was appointed by the Russian tsar as the first governor-general of the Turkestan region. In the following years the depots and logistics services were located there.
I requested the military district commander to give that territory for the construction of the CC’s premises. He responded he might do this only under the defense minister’s order. So, I called Zhukov who after clarifying details just pronounced, ‘Take it.’ After a while, general A.A. Luchinsky (Fedyuninsky had already worked in the Leningrad military district) informed me that he had got instructions from the defense minister to leave Turpakkurgan and give it over to the CC. The deal was quickly completed de jure and financially. Upon arrival in Moscow in the same autumn, I raised the matter on the construction before the CC CPSU leadership. Unfortunately, I didn’t get their approval. And only after some time the permission was given and the construction was completed promptly.
Hence, I’m glad to admit that it was marshal Zhukov who rendered timely assistance in the CC premises construction.
We often met and talked as the friendly neighbors staying in the country cottages. Georgii Konstantinovich suffered from the facial neuralgia – his cheek and jaw sometimes winced. Once I told him about a drug 'moomiyo' and an expert, called A.S. Shakirov, who knew how to use it. His attending doctor confirmed a high efficiency of this mountain balsam. Zhukov became interested in it.
Soon at my request, professor Shakirov arrived in Moscow. He stayed at my house and I told him to meet marshal Zhukov the next day. After dinner we had a rest. The next morning after breakfast I didn’t recognize him: he was wearing an officer uniform with the shoulder straps of lieutenant colonel of the military medical services and many orders, medals and tabs on his chest. We both passed through the cottage gates and saw Georgii Konstantinovich sitting on the bench, waiting for us in the garden.
The marshal firmly hugged and kissed the doctor-lieutenant colonel three times. He invited him to sit down next to him and, being sincerely happy with meeting him, started asking him about his service in the army. He was attentively listening to his story about a war front-line surgeon, professor Shakirov’s participation in releasing the Caucasus, Kuban, Ukraine, Poland, and Czechoslovakia where he completed his military service. He performed surgeries on hundreds of warriors ranging from rank-and-file soldiers to generals.
Zhukov asked, ‘Have we met before?’
Shakirov smiling asked the marshal to show his fingers and said, ‘I performed surgeries on these two fingers and dressed the wounds during the Reichstag storm in Berlin.’
The marshal hugged him again. He was deeply, almost to tears touched.
The moomiyo eased the marshal’s illness. During the last Shakirov’s arrival in Moscow, Georgii Konstantinovich presented him as a token of his acknowledgement his memoir book ‘My Recollections and Reflections,’ with the lines handwritten on the cover page saying: ‘To a true soldier and Master of his great work. Zhukov.’
Adyl Shakirov’s family - his widow, sons, and daughters - still cherish this book as the family heirloom.
XIII
NEW APPOINTMENT
MOVING TO MOSCOW
On December 16-17th, 1957 the CC CPSU Plenum took place in Moscow. The agenda was announced beforehand:
1. About the results of the Conference of the communist and labor parties’ representatives (speaker - M.A. Suslov).
2. About the USSR trade unions activities (speaker - V.V. Grishin).
At the first session we heard the report, followed by its discussion.
At the after-lunch session we were supposed to hear Grishin’s report. Ten minutes before it when all the Presidium members and candidates to the membership gathered as usual in a side room Nikita Sergeevich suddenly said, ‘Let’s propose to the Plenum to elect Mukhitdinov as a member of the Presidium and secretary of the CC CPSU and to elect Ignatov and Kirichenko as the CC secretaries.’
I was about to raise my hand to thank and refuse a proposal, but Kosygin sitting next to me quietly said, ‘Don’t do it. Your matter has already been decided.’
So, we went to the Plenum sitting.
After the report about the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions work and its discussion, the sitting closed to be continued in the next morning. I went to the reception room of Nikita Sergeevich where I was waiting for him for a while. When he showed up, I asked him to spare me a few minutes.
‘OK. Let’s go then,’ he said. When we entered his office, I immediately asked him not to promote me to the Presidium and Secretariat membership.
‘Why?’
‘I don’t have any experience in that. Besides, I’m too young for such a work.’
‘Are you? It’s not a problem. After some time, you’ll become matured. As to experience… After working here you’ll get experience.’
‘I’ve worked as the CC CP secretary of Uzbekistan just for two years,’ I continued. ‘A lot of things have been launched and much is to be done. Besides, the work with my colleagues is well coordinated. I’d like to finish what I’ve started.’
‘Indeed, a lot of exciting events are going on in Uzbekistan. You are well known even in Moscow. Nevertheless, other things should be taken into account. You should think it over. A number of initiative events have been implemented with participation of the other republics and the union executives. However, some people say that Tashkent is about to become the second capital of the whole country. It’s impossible and dangerous. A few resolutions under your proposal have been approved, which will consume billions of rubles from the union budget. The economy in Uzbekistan has dramatically grown and now is a lot higher than in the other republics. Even your neighbors are jealous of it. We can’t help taking all these facts into consideration as we must ensure that all the republics are developing equally and we should treat them equally…
Now you are here in the CC. So, you’ll monitor this matter.
We are currently carrying out serious reforms and correcting Stalin’s overlaps in many life spheres, which is really important for the republics and different peoples.
Finally, we have talked many times about a necessity of the review and change of our foreign policy in the East and about the current circumstances and situations there. However, in the CC there are no Asians, nor are there any experts specialized in the oriental history and culture. You are an Uzbek, Asian, and Muslim, which means that you are aware of and understand their current issues better. Who else can be better than you at the Eastern policy?
It’s really important for us to actively promote representatives of different nationalities to top positions in the Center. Do you remember how resolute Lenin was in this matter? At his time the executive top positions in the country were given to Narimanov, Galiev, Shaumyan, Ordjonikidze, Rudzutak, and some people from your republic (Turar Ryskulov – N.M.’s note) and representatives of the other nationalities. After Lenin, during Stalin’s time a few of them were executed by shooting while the others were driven to commit suicide and the rest of them were dismissed from political activities. As for Stalin himself, being at the power for many years, he ‘let’ only few people in the Center, including Beria, Mikoyan, Baghirov, and Tevosyan. And none from the Central Asia was there. Thus, now you will help us to choose cadres for the party, state, trade unions, and the youth communist organization so that representatives of the national republics will be in the country leadership.
Apart from that, it’s high time to rejuvenate the leadership including the Presidium membership. Formed back in the 1920-1930s, the Presidium and its members have been older since then. They have spent their lives in hypocritically flattering and fawning upon Stalin. How they have ended up we all know. Now it’s crucially important to have in authority bodies much younger, literate, energetic people who are not spoiled by a thirst for a career or fame. They will definitely make prominent, eminent figures. Take for example you. You are forty years old, aren’t you? We’ll certainly promote people like you. I hope Plenum will support and vote for you. Hence beforehand, I congratulate you with a new position and job.'
Here on, our conversation was finished.
At the Plenum Khrushchev made a proposal promoting me and giving me a warm testimonial. No questions or remarks were made. Thus, I was elected.
Rashidov, Melnikov, Nasretdinova, and Kamalov were waiting for me in the hall. They suggested to go to the republic representative office to celebrate the event. But I invited them to my apartment in Kutuzov Avenue. My wife cooked a good dinner. So, we had a good time till late.
The next morning the employees of the CC and KGB administrative department took me to a new mansion in Vorobyevskii Highway, situated right over and opposite the Luzhniki Stadium. A wonderful two-storey house had all conveniences and a garden. I asked about the neighbors around. It turned out that on the right there was Kozlov’s house and Voroshilov lived on the opposite side of the street. From there we went to the country house. It was situated not far from Barvikha, right on the river bank. There were big fruit and lemon trees in the orchard, a lot of colorful flowers in the garden. Also, there was a volleyball pitch, a tennis court, a billiard room, and a home movie room. At home there were two spacious rooms and bathrooms and a sauna. We walked down to the river. On the river bank there were a boat and a small motor boat. In the neighborhood, Zhukov’s cottage was on the right and Suslov’s - on the left. The next day at three o’clock in the afternoon, the CC Presidium sitting took place. Having opened the sitting, before the discussion of the agenda Nikita Sergeevich congratulated me again and said, ‘You should go to Uzbekistan to assist in forming the leadership and elect a new First secretary. Then return to Moscow with your family for a permanent residence.’
After the meeting Voroshilov stopped me in the corridor and said, ‘You’ll show your inexperience and rashness if you go to Tashkent now. You shouldn’t go to Tashkent to elect the First secretary to replace you. Let someone else from the CC secretaries go there. Just imagine you have suggested your successor. If he shows himself in a good way, no one will thank you for that, but if he fails to do his job properly, then you’ll be responsible for him. Moreover, there as well as here, a lot of people would like to be in the leadership. If you promote one of the five candidates to this position, then the remaining four will have a grudge against you either for a long time or for the rest of their lives. I know it by my own experience.’
‘Should I go to see Nikita Sergeevich and refuse the trip?’ I asked perplexedly.
‘No, you shouldn’t. Now you can’t refuse and should fly there. But I’d advise you not to take initiative. Let them elect anyone they’d like to.’
Upon arrival at home I was pondering over my new appointment all the evening. I couldn't fall asleep at night overwhelmed with controversial feelings:
‘On one hand, at the destiny will I happened to be the first person from the Soviet East to get promoted to such a high level of the leadership. Of course, there is honor, respect, fame, and all kinds of creature comforts, and so on. On the other hand, I remember the destinies of many other previous members of the Presidium and CC secretaries. Who knows If I have the same fate as they had…? When I studied in Moscow, I knew that after graduating I would return home. At the war frontline it was clear for me as well: if I don’t die, then I’ll return home. What now? What will happen if I lose my job?
The CC Presidium membership is strictly regimented. Vertically, on top of the hierarchy there’s Secretary General, i.e., Tsar, above you. Horizontally, all the Presidium members and Secretaries are equal. Any redeployment down the career ladder is considered as a punishment and the grounds will be always found.’
Also, I thought about the term of being there. I remembered that A.S. Sherbakov when he was the secretary of the Moscow city and regional committee and CC AUCP(b) died suddenly at the age of 45. A.A. Kuznetsov when he worked as the first secretary of the Leningrad city and regional committee of the party manifested outstanding management skills and was promoted to the post of the head of the HR and secretary of the CC AUCP(b) in 1946. However, four years later he was executed by shooting. S.D. Ignatyev was appointed a secretary of the CC CPSU in March, 1953 and after one month in April he was dismissed after becoming a victim of slanders…
Of course, there were long-lived people in the Presidium. Some of them achieved this by their abilities and honest work, whereas the others would manage to keep their positions by unscrupulous flattery, hypocrisy and treachery. For the career they would willfully betray the closest friends and colleagues – their would-be competitors, pinning labels on them, elbowing their ways and literally striding over corpses. I’m sure life like that when one is always trying to be afloat by all means is awful. It’s inhuman. It’s disgusting. God forbid having such a destiny!...
Oh yes, it was a crucially challenging situation. But I’m not an old man yet. As the saying goes ‘not from the fair, but to the fair!’
In the morning I went with my bodyguards to Izmailov Park where I was walking for almost all the day. What lovely birches and pine groves! There is no such a wonderful forest as in the Moscow suburban in the world. We had a snack right in the park in the afternoon. In this way I spent the whole day wandering in the forest. (My bodyguards behaved tactfully and stood off in accordance with the regulations.)
Fresh air, silence, dry frost – such an environment seemed to influence me. Pondering over the past and future I pulled myself together and perked up with enthusiasm. Mentally I acknowledged all of them who had helped and supported me and I gave my word to justify their confidence.
Upon arrival in Tashkent on December 22nd right at the airport I agreed with the Bureau members to meet in the CC the next afternoon and to talk about our current work. I went directly to the old city to see my father. My wife, Mukarram, with children also came there and we stayed for a night at my father’s house. The next day in the CC I asked to dismiss me from the post of the Bureau member and secretary. Then I suggested them to think about a new First secretary. Personally, I didn’t propose anyone. We agreed to meet again after two days. Those 2 days I spent at my father’s. Certainly, my friends, relatives and companions in the army came there to see and congratulate me.
After two days we gathered for a bureau meeting at full strength. Four candidates were nominated for a position of the First secretary. Having discussed each one personally, it was unanimously decided to elect Sabir Kamalov. In this connection we had to think about who would replace him on the post of Chairman of the Ministers Council. There were a few candidates. It was decided to appoint M.Z. Mirza-Akhmedov who worked as the first deputy Chairman of the Ministers Council.
On December 29th the CC Plenum took place. Melnikov who was the chairperson opened it. I was removed from the post of the First secretary and member of the CC Bureau. On behalf of the Bureau M. Abdurazakov proposed S. Kamalov for a position of the First secretary of the CC. There were no objections and he was elected unanimously. M.Z. Mirza-Akhmedov was approved for a new position without any objections as well. A.A. Alimov, R.G. Gulamov, T.K. Kambarov, and S.N. Nuritdinov were elected as the members of the CC Bureau. Thus, the Plenum closed.
Before my departure on December 30th the new air terminal, which is one of the largest in the country, was commenced with a formal ceremony in Tashkent.
We decided with my family to leave for Moscow on December 31st. We informed the Center in Moscow of when and how we were going. In the early morning Mukarram and I visited our relatives to bid farewell. We went to the cemetery to pay our last respects to my mother, grandparents, and Mukarram’s parents. In the afternoon the CC and government executives gave a formal party devoted to the end of the year.
After the party my wife and I went to the old city to visit my father. Meanwhile my brother Ziyautdin looked after my children at home. When we finally arrived at a railroad station, on the platform there were a lot of people many of whom arrived from the remote areas. As usual, there was merriment, pleasant conversations, jokes, and recollections. The head of the Central Asian railway Aziz Kadirov who was a prominent specialist, an experienced, energetic, smart person with good reputation and well-known in the republic and in Moscow (he befriended with the minister of communication lines of the USSR B.P. Beshev) came up to us and said that a special coach prepared for us was attached to the train.
It was announced it was time for the passengers to get on the train. At this moment my father who was holding my left hand like in my childhood said, ‘You are leaving me again. You spent your adolescence studying in Moscow, then your youth serving in the army at the war front. I’m getting older and I don’t know when I see you again. It seems to be your destiny. Before your departure I would like to tell you something: remember there in Moscow where you are going to work you aren’t the first and the last employee; people worked there before you and they will work after you. Use your time to do your utmost at work thoroughly and honestly. The most important thing, I know it from my own experience when I was a chairman of the neighborhood committee, a leader must stand for the truth, equity and fairness and mustn’t abuse and insult people, but protect them.
The most dangerous thing is your position abuse. Be modest with people, particularly with your subordinates, treat them as your mates, be able to lend an attentive ear to them so that they would come to you with interest and go out being satisfied. Make sure that whenever you change your job, the people who have worked with you always remember you as a wise and good man.
I will pray for you,’ my father continued, ‘God bless you. Be sure to return to Tashkent when you finish your work there. Here we buried your mother; your grandparents and all your ancestors were buried here as well. Be worthy of their memories and never do anything that could bother their souls. I believe you will secure and augment good traditions of our ancestry. When I pass away, will you bury me next to your mother, please.’
I felt upset; tears instantaneously welled up in my eyes. My father began to cry. So, we were standing, firmly hugging. At that moment my brothers brought my children. From far away they noisily greeted us, but when they saw their father and grandfather crying, they were stunned and became quieter.
The railway station director came up to me and said it was time to get on the train. I thanked everybody for their joint work, congratulated with the New Year, invited them to my house in Moscow, wished them health, many happy returns and peace in the new coming year.
The last signal sounded. We entered the coach and the train started moving bound from Tashkent to Moscow.
It was the first and last time all my family celebrated the New Year’s Eve in a moving train coach.
As though eternity was ahead...
The Tashkent-Moscow train arrived at the Kazanskii railway station at 3 o’clock in the afternoon on January 3rd, 1958. On the platform near the coach we were met by employees of the CC different departments and administration, the permanent representative Buri Adilov, his deputy, my future assistant, and others. The meeting was warm and joyful. Mukarram was given a bundle of flowers. There were handshakes and hugs. Frankly speaking, at those moments our doubts allayed for a while.
We were driven to a mansion. At the threshold we greeted two housekeepers Anna and Zina, two cooks Alexander and Peter, the security officers, bodyguards, and a gardener. The children were very joyful and immediately started exploring their new house and the garden.
A couple of hours later, the wives of a few CC Presidium members with their children who lived nearby in the neighborhood visited us. It took the children a few minutes to not only get acquainted but also make friends. Mukarram was about to cook pilau, but the women dissuaded her from doing it as it was late. So, we decided to gather the next day at one o’clock in the afternoon. They were coming over not only for lunch but also were going to learn how to cook this delicious national dish.
A little bit later Julia Nikitichna, Khrushchev’s elder daughter, a charming intelligent warm-hearted woman joined us. Very soon she became like our family member, helping Mukarram a lot to adapt to the new circumstances. Our children were signed up for the school literally within two days and after winter holidays they went to school. The next day I went to work. Meanwhile Mukarram visited Nina Petrovna, Nikita Sergeevich’s wife. In the evening she told me how warmly she had been welcomed.
On the day of our arrival while the women and the children were busy with conversations and their deals, I went outside and unexpectedly met Voroshilov who, as I said afore, actually lived on the opposite side of the street and habitually went for a walk. He firmly shook my hand, wondered about my moving house. Saying, ‘Let me have a look at your new house,’ he entered the house, greeted everybody, even the children by shaking hands with them and looked around. He refused to stay for a dinner as he was in a hurry, but invited us to his house for a dinner on the next day. When we were sitting in his house, he noticed me uninterruptedly thinking about something and asked, ‘What are you thinking about?’
I answered, ‘How to start work.’
Then he told me about his three principles which were allegedly helpful to be guided with at work and in personal life. I asked him to clarify them and he expounded me. I think a reader would like to find out about them as well.
'First of all, one should never be surprised at anything. Instead, one should take everything for granted, trying to apprehend it as if it was supposed to have occurred and should simultaneously calmly comprehend and ponder over any fact or information. Secondly, even in the most strenuous situation, one should never lose self-control, nor should be the first to attack. Instead, one should estimate the situation, and in this way ‘disarm’ a foe to finally beat him. Thirdly, in case of failure or success, one should analyze the reasons, trying to comprehend one’s role in those events and learn a lesson from it. Finally, the most important,' he repeated, 'is that in any case one should remain at the height of one’s human qualities and maintain one’s dignity.'
I thanked him for his valuable advice and jokingly asked him, ‘What about you, Clement Efremovich? Do you manage to comply with these principles?’
He laughed, ‘To full extent, I haven't. Yet I’m trying.’
Having spent good time that evening, we bade farewell to each other. The children were happy to see Voroshilov in person whose portrait we had at home, and now he suggested them to call him ‘grandfather Klim.’
Thus, on the second day after my arrival in Moscow at 9 o’clock in the morning I was at work. I was met at the first entrance of the CC premises in Old Square and was shown to my office on the fourth floor. It was next to Brezhnev’s office; thus, we had the common reception room.
Entering my office, I remembered my father’s words that I’m not the first and the last one here, so I gave my word to myself again to comply with and bear in my mind his advice.
There was a folder on my desk. Showing it to me my assistant B.V. Larin said, ‘Here are the materials about you.’ I looked at him wary and didn’t say anything. Immediately a thought occurred to me: ‘I haven’t started work yet, but they have already started compiling my ‘personal case’...'
I opened the folder and saw a lot of press cuttings from foreign newspapers and magazines (with translation), comments about my new appointment at the December CC CPSU Plenum. For a mere fortnight this fact seemed to arouse a wide response overseas, particularly in the East. Also, there were such phrases: ‘How will Mukhitdinov, being an Uzbek and Muslim, combine his national and religious believes with the Marxist atheism and proletarian internationalism?’ ‘…Khrushchev is taking benefit from playing around the oppressed Soviet peoples and with Mukhitdinov’s help is seeking to pave the way to former colonial countries…’ ‘The first Muslim in the history of the Communist party who is also the Politburo member and the CC CPSU secretary…’ ‘The new CC secretary is likely to become a kind of a bridge between the Soviet Power and the Muslim world…’ ‘A man from an Asian village has become a member of the Soviet party and state leadership. How long will this experiment last?’ I have cited just a few quotes from many ones.
Having read thoroughly articles in newspapers, I realized to find myself in a completely new for me world where any hasty word or even a gesture could be used not only against me, but also could bring damage to the party and state image and reputation.
All of a sudden, my reflections were interrupted by a phone call. I was informed: ‘Nikita Sergeevich has already arrived. You may come and see him.’
After mutual greetings Nikita Sergeevich at first displayed interest in with whom I had arrived in Moscow and how we had settled. He asked me about the current situation in Uzbekistan. Afterwards there was a long conversation about my new responsibilities. A lot of things spoken about in our previous conversation with Khrushchev before the CC Plenum when I was elected the Presidium member were told again. Themes and measures for resolving painful problems didn’t relate to my personally. They are interesting, in my opinion, because they characterize Khrushchev as a person, as well as they give a complete idea of the CC activities in those years. Therefore, I’d like to retell this conversation:
‘In December we talked about your possible responsibilities. You should familiarize yourself with them and gradually start work. You should study the last materials of the CC Presidium and Secretariat. Talk to the other CC secretaries, the departmental heads and the other executives.
At the next meeting we’ll specify the scope and spheres of your work. I’ll recommend the Presidium members to involve you, according to your skills and knowledge, in the work with the Central Asian and Caucasus republics and foreign East… You’ll have to focus basically on the new strategy and policies as their colonial system collapse has launched a new stage of our relationships with these countries. So, you’ll have to focus on that as well.
Nowadays, at the post-Stalin time, we are implementing reforms in all spheres to correct mistakes made in the past and ensure a new economic growth. The same should be done in the national policy. All these missions and objectives are clearer and more comprehensible for you than to the other members of the current leadership.
Ideological work in all aspects should be seriously changed. You were the secretary of the CC of the Communist party of Uzbekistan on propaganda and you have the political work experience in the army. We are going to establish the CC Ideology commission you’ll be involved in as well.
We have a desire to appreciably increase the efficiency of the Soviet agencies and first of all the Supreme Soviet. As a deputy you’ll be able also to take part in it.
Like the others,’ continued Nikita Sergeevich, ‘perhaps you’ve noticed the elderly members dominate in the state and party leadership many of whom have been occupying their posts for a long time. Besides, there are scarcely any representatives of the major nations. Therefore, we need on the one hand to skillfully carry out some sort of the leadership rejuvenation, on the other hand to diversify the national composition by promoting representatives of the republics. You know people in the republics. That’s why you’ll be directly involved in choosing and promoting them.
However, of course, there will be other assignments during your daily work. Let’s use at most your knowledge, experience, and youth,’ N.S. Khrushchev concluded. On that we bade farewell.
Three days later the CC Presidium meeting took place. Nikita Sergeevich suggested to assign the new secretaries with the following responsibilities: Kirichenko was responsible for internal party and organizational work, Ignatov supervised agriculture, and I was responsible for the matters Khrushchev had already mentioned in our conversation before.
Everybody agreed.
Then Khrushchev justified the necessity to pay a particular attention to ideological work and suggested to establish a special CC CPSU Ideology commission. He suggested to appoint Suslov the chairman of the commission and Mukhitdinov as his deputy. The commission members included the CC CPSU secretary Kuusinen, O. V., the CC CPSU secretary Pospelov, P. N., and the others.
There were no questions or objections. Thus, the decision was made.
On March 27th, 1958 the first sitting of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR took place where a number of issues were solved. The first sitting of the Union Council was held separately.
I would like to note the difference of those meetings from many others. Thus, the Union Council formed the Commission for foreign affairs led by Suslov, M.A., whereas the Council of Nationalities, at the suggestion of the deputy K.I. Satpaev (who was the president of the Science Academy of Kazakhstan SSR), introduced on behalf of the Elderly Council and of the deputies of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia SSRs, elected the Commission for foreign affairs of the Council of Nationalities the chairman of which I was appointed.
From the most remarkable decisions made at the joint meeting of the Union Council and the Council of Nationalities, I would like to emphasize that on March 27th, 1958 was announced N.A. Bulganin’s statement about the resignation of the government and the adoption of the resolution on Khrushchev’s appointment as the Chairman of the USSR Ministers Council.
In a few days after I started work, the chief accountant of the CC administrative department came to me and submitted the payroll. There were the surnames of the CC secretaries and their salaries. My surname was added too, but the salary figure wasn’t shown. Puzzled, I looked at the chief accountant. He prompted, ‘Could you write down your salary rate, please?’
I perplexedly noticed that I had held different posts, but I had never fixed a salary for myself. I used to be always paid in concordance with the staff salary table.
He smiled and tactfully explained, ‘We also have staff salary table on the basis of which the payrolls are made. But Presidium is the highest body. That’s why none can ascertain the salary rate for its members. Therefore, we conform it with every comrade personally.’
When I wrote down next to my surname a salary rate that was a little bit higher than the one I earned in the republic, the chief accountant decided to continue his explanation: ‘The CC Secretaries are formally grouped in a few ‘categories’ as follows: First secretary; secretaries-Presidium members; secretaries-candidates to the Presidium membership; secretaries-heads of the departments; ordinary secretaries with standard responsibilities. You belong to the second category.’
I noticed that the secretaries-Presidium members Suslov, Kozlov, and the others had salaries by 10-15% less than the salary of the First secretary. And so on down the party hierarchy. The salary rate I fixed for myself was considerably less.
The chief accountant, still waiting, said, ‘Nuritdin Akramovich, you have a large family. You are a newcomer in Moscow. Your relatives and guests will visit you. The rate you’ve fixed for yourself is too low; it won’t be enough for living.’
‘But when I worked as the First secretary of the CC CP of Uzbekistan I had about the same salary.’
‘Living in Tashkent is one situation, but living in Moscow is quite different.’
And then crossing out what I previously had written I took down a little bit higher rate. Yet it was still considerably lower than the rates of the other secretaries-Presidium members.
Within a few days we literally became ‘native’ Muscovites. We had a large Maison in the city center, a country house on the Moscow river bank, two cars, several attendants, security and bodyguards, two drivers and a family doctor. There were a tennis court and a volleyball pitch in the yard, a movie theater, a billiard room and a sauna in the house. I was provided with a comfortable spacious office in the CC premises in Old Square by the CC Presidium and Supreme Soviet’s decision; my responsibilities were specified. The children went to school and Mukarram continued studying at the medical institute.
In short, quite favorable conditions were created to enable me to devote myself entirely to work.
I got acquainted with some instructors and departmental heads who were experienced specialists in different fields. Also, I visited every CC secretary and had long conversations with them. They told me about their work, activity prospective, current order, and regulations.
It was nice that for a short time basically they accepted and let me join their community. Though at the beginning some of them looked closely at me wondering what that Asian man, a Muslim from a distant village was like. The others, thinking that Khrushchev’s ‘protégé’ wasn’t familiar with the work in the state and government bodies, sometimes bantered when they saw my slips and oversights inevitable at the beginning.
However, in a quite short time the relationships became even. It seemed to me that a mutual respect appeared, and the required strictness didn’t irritate me any longer. Having brushed my doubts and diffidence away, I plunged into my work.
Literally unforeseen, unusual situations began to emerge in the very first steps of my work.
In about a month after I started my work, my assistant informed me about the letter sent by the USSR transport lines minister B.P. Beshev to the leadership with a request to allocate additional funds (I don’t remember exactly 700 or 800 thousand rubles) for costs to fulfill the recently approved resolution of the CC related to the railways. To that letter was attached the letter-objection by the USSR finance minister A.G. Zverev who affirmed that such a small amount might be easily found in the many-million-ruble budget of the relative ministry.
I respected both Arsenii Grigorjevich Zverev and Boris Pavlovich Beshev as my elder comrades and experienced, competent leaders. What should I do? I invited them both. I felt embarrassed when an argument which developed into a wrangle flared up between them. I made a ‘Solomon decision’ to allocate half of the requested amount. The ministers agreed.
That month the leader of a foreign country was expected to arrive in Moscow. The municipal party committee made a phone call with an instruction: ‘a group of children must be taken to the airport for handing flowers to the high-rank guest and his spouse,' but the school principal refused arguing that it was cold; besides, the airplane would arrive too late. That’s why they asked for an advice.
I promised to look into it and talk to Molochkov who was the head of the protocol department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He patiently explained me when preparing to meet leaders of foreign countries or governments, the procedure of reception, meeting, farewell, and ceremonial protocol events were developed beforehand. In that case under the protocol, schoolchildren were supposed to hand the guests flowers.
Having expressed his understanding of the ‘complex’ current situation, he added he couldn’t change the decision made. Then I called the municipal committee and, guided by a common sense, supported the school principal's request not to send children to the airport in the late evening in the cold weather. Afterwards I found out when the guest and his spouse walked down the boarding ramp, no flowers were handed to them at all. No one did it. Perhaps, I must have given instructions in person, for example, to two women to hand flowers to the guests. Without receiving any precise instructions, no one dared do it at one’s own risk. Or no one conjectured? In the result, the reception protocol was violated.
Or there was such a situation.
In late April the vice-rector of Moscow State University named after Lomonosov, A.V. Topchiev, phoned me up to inform that a group of Arab students from a few institutes would like to march in a May demonstration with banners written in their native language. He asked for an advice on the issue. I inquired him if that practice had ever happened before, to which he replied it was for the first time. I asked him if he had turned to the municipal party committee. It turned out he was told to turn for an advice to me. So, I advised him not to object and let the Arab students go out for the demonstration in the way they found appropriate.
On May 1st the Arab students - demonstrators came to the center of Red Square, stopped and turning to the Mausoleum started chanting some text. I was standing on the tribune near the edge. No one understood their chants and texts on the banners and I was asked to translate them. Having approached closer, I read: ‘Long live the friendship of the Arab countries and the USSR!’ and ‘Hello to the Soviet people!’ Although the students slowed down the marching, causing trouble to the demonstration organizers and security officers who were providing the order on Red Square yet that episode was apprehended positively. Thus, the Arab young people got a chance to do as they wished and the Soviet leaders standing on the tribune greeted everyone with joyful smiles.
Information message about the CC CPSU Plenums was prepared, as a rule, by the Ideology commission. At one of the Plenums sitting at the presidium during the discussion of the report, I wrote the information message about the opening and the first meeting of the Plenum. I immediately showed it to the Presidium members sitting next to me. No one objected and the text was handed over to Malin, the head of the CC general department, so that it was sent to the TASS* (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union*) to be published.
At six o’clock in the evening of the same day the message was broadcasted on radio and at eight o’clock in the evening the deputy chief editor of the Pravda newspaper called me and said that in the text the CPSU Central Auditing Commission members hadn’t been mentioned in the list of the Plenum attendees. I immediately phoned up Morgunov, the TASS director-general, and suggested to get in touch with the chief editors of the newspapers to add supplementary information message, to which he replied it was impossible unfortunately as the radio and television had already broadcasted the original message; besides, the matrixes had been sent to the peripheries; meanwhile in Moscow the newspapers had already been printed out and were being delivered to newsstands at the moment. I went back to the CC office and in spite of the late hour, I invited to my office the deputy chief editor and the head of the department (P.A. Satyukov, the chief editor of the Pravda newspaper was away from Moscow at the moment). Thus, the three of us started writing an article about the opened CC CPSU Plenum adding the required information to the original text. As the result, at late night we removed the printed page with the original written text and replaced it with the new amended one.
Indeed, that trouble might have been prevented if after having written and typed that message, I had given it to every Presidium member to be read and approved of, and only after their approval I had given it to mass media agencies. I obviously wasn’t experienced enough in organizational work.
Here is another example. Two days before the opening of the rally meeting dedicated to the celebration of the Frontier Troops Day, I was assigned to make a greeting speech before the KGB, MIA*, MD** officers and employees (Ministry of Internal Affairs*, Ministry of Defense**). I spoke for twenty minutes greeting all participants on behalf of the CC CPSU, the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the government. I told them about the international situation and the frontier officers' mission. The speech was good. But anyone could hardly know how hard it was for me to prepare that speech.
In conclusion, once we were returning from work by one car – Khrushchev, Kozlov, Ignatov, and I. In the conversation Kozlov mentioned that the Leningrad automobile plant had failed to implement the decision on inventing a new K-700 tractor. Nikita Sergeevich addressing to me said, ‘Sort the problem out and take the extraordinary measures.’
For me it was a completely unfamiliar matter… At the beginning, I had to thoroughly study the matter and then to repeatedly meet the CC and the ministry employees responsible for the industry. I went to Leningrad twice. I faced scores of unsettled issues when it was really difficult to find a person responsible for the matter - for everyone strove to fasten the blame on the others. In the long run, the matter was clarified and settled and the glorious team of the Leningrad plant named after Kirov presented a famous powerful tractor K-700 to the country. As for me personally, it was really valuable that I got a chance to talk directly to workers, engineers, technicians, and putilovtsi-workers.
I think enough examples have been given. Every case was of its peculiar nature, and I have told the readers about them to draw their attention to the fact that how I, being young, inexperienced enough, coming from a far Asian region of the country, all of a sudden found myself in the membership of the top party leadership, how I faced unfamiliar, unaccustomed situations, facts and actions, how I tried to do my best to learn with the help of my colleagues and professional experts in different occupations to make right decisions.
In order to have an idea about practices of the top party authorities, without violating the deep-seated traditions established there before, I started my work from studying the protocols, shorthand records, decisions, resolutions, and the other documents of the Presidium, Organizational Bureau and Secretariat of the CC. It was interesting to notice that the regulations of the top party and Soviet authorities had been articulately specified by Lenin. It was him who specified the functions, rights and responsibilities of the party, state and public bodies, their interrelations which could not be breached or ignored.
The everyday routine work of the Politburo (now it was called the Presidium) was organized properly and precisely. Its meetings began at 3 o’clock in the afternoon. There scores of the matters were discussed and solved, including trifle current particular matters as well as serious political, theoretical international issues related to the interests of different groups, a particular person, or the activities of the party and state in the world arena. It may seem that a great number of issues which were considered at every meeting decreased the discussion depth. However, it wasn’t like that.
Laborious and comprehensive work used to be carried out before submitting a matter to the Presidium. The CC departments, secretaries and Secretariat played an important role in the procedure. Every matter or proposal, irrespective of whoever had proposed it, was thoroughly studied in the relative departments whose employees including instructors and departmental heads were experienced skillful experts, as a rule, who obviously realized the significance of documents submitted to the Presidium.
Evidently, no spelling errors, stylistic mistakes or any other drawbacks were admissible in the text of any decision or resolution. Moreover, no political, theoretical, scientific and technical, historical inaccuracies were acceptable at all, of course. Indeed, there was no senior supervising body higher than the Politburo (the Presidium) in the party hierarchy to correct any errors. A particular emphasize was given to the clarity and briefness of a document. When writing a document, any interpretation by friends and foes, any unforeseen misunderstanding or discrepancy caused by the vague wording and inarticulate formulation were taken into consideration.
A draft resolution prepared by relative departments was discussed then by the CC secretary with participation of all persons concerned. When someone objected to or criticized the draft document, it was sent back to be reviewed and revised again (sometimes several times), which finally resulted in finding an appropriate, precise wording. The draft resolution was included in the Politburo agenda only when it represented a collective opinion of all or the majority of the parties concerned.
The Politburo members used to preliminary study the draft resolution and all its attachments before finalizing their opinion about it. Only at that stage the top collective authority body used to make a final decision.
The CC Secretariat used to gather if it was necessary, sometimes once or twice a week, and in urgent cases their meetings used to take place in the evenings or even at nights. At Nikita Khrushchev’s times at his suggestion an order was established according to which there was no chairperson in the CC Secretariat. That post was supposed to be occupied by the First secretary (by Khrushchev himself). However, since he was overloaded with work in the CC Presidium and the government, the secretaries had to chair in turn each, therefore, for two months a year.
An on-duty chairman used to study all incoming proposals, reports and assignments, specified the agenda and fixed dates of the next meeting where he was the chairman. Afterwards he used to report results to the First secretary and, if need be, he reported to the CC Presidium. In short, he managed the Secretariat work. In accordance with the established sequence, by the way, I took over Brezhnev’s ‘duties’ and handed over my ‘duties’ to Suslov.
However, after a while maintaining the sequential ‘duty’ order of the CC secretaries, at one of the Presidium meetings Khrushchev announced that Alexey Illarionovich Kirichenko would be the chairman of the secretaries as a lot of current issues were to be considered and sorted out promptly. So, everyone agreed.
Yet, I think it should be noted that many things described here regarding the style, methods, the Politburo and Secretariat procedures were related to a desired but not a real order of things. Gradually, a deviation from the traditions occurred, and the decrees and acts adopted by the congresses and plenums on the functions, responsibilities, and rights of the top executive bodies were infringed. They were getting more affected by subjective factors. Perhaps, the only stable factor remained the time of the meetings which used to take place on Thursdays at 3 o’clock in the afternoon…
Working directly in the CC CPSU, studying documents in the archives as well as the well-established style, methods of the party bodies’ activities, I couldn’t help wondering what the authority, the ‘magic’ power of the party itself and particularly its top bodies, first of all, Politburo were based on.
Gradually I realized that the famous slogans: ‘Party is mind, honor, and conscience of our epoch’ and ‘Party is the leading and guiding force of the Soviet society’ – were not accidental. They determined essentially the principles of the party activities, its place in the society relating to the government, state, particularly after liquidation of all other parties in the country followed by the mono-party structure establishment.
Lenin convincingly gave proof that a victorious proletarian revolution could occur in one country, in particular, in Russia. Literally on the second day of the revolution the proletariat dictatorship was proclaimed. According to Lenin’s initial idea, the functions of the state, government, and party were precisely specified and delimited. However, in the 1920s, especially after Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s death, the party dictatorship was actually established in the country; and in the 1930s, after liquidation of any oppositions and after mass repressions to which were subjected to great extent many leaders, dictatorship of Secretary-General Joseph Stalin was established. Perhaps, none of the kings, emperors or presidents in the world had such a truly influence, exercised absolute power like Joseph Stalin did.
Then realizing that such a situation was justified to some extent on the threshold of and during the war as well as in the early period of the national economy restoration, at the 19th CPSU congress an attempt was made to introduce some rather external democratization elements into life and party activities: namely, the party name was changed, Organizational Bureau was liquidated, Politburo was renamed as Presidium, and the post of First Secretary was introduced instead of CC Secretary-General. Not only we, the congress delegates, but also the majority of the communists of the country grasped it as a crucial turn in the internal party life and, that meant, in the whole country. What was more significant that the announced at that time refusal from the proletariat dictatorship was replaced by the proclaimed national state power.
Four and a half months later after the 19th congress, after Joseph Stalin’s death, even those external trappings of democracy were abrogated. It took a few years to find a new image of the top echelon in the party hierarchy. Some attempts were made to get rid of accumulated for decades flaws and vices. However, there was no appropriate person in the leadership.
At last at the 20th party congress, a compromise was made with proclaiming the formula: ‘collective leadership’ and ‘collective decision of all matters.’ ‘Overcoming negative consequences of personality cult’ in fact was supposed to mean liquidation of a person’s dictatorship. But the decisions approved and supported by the party and people were valid only for about a year and a half. However, at the 22nd CPSU congress, actually a sole leadership of the party top bodies was established again, and again the party started dominating over the government and the state.
In 1964 the October CC Plenum dismissed Khrushchev from the position of First secretary of the CC CPSU and appointed Brezhnev for that position. In practice it turned out to be the end of the ‘thaw’ time and beginning of the ‘stagnation’ period. Then the 23rd party congress restored Politburo and the post of CC Secretary-General.
After 18-year Brezhnev’s rule at the post of Secretary-General, he was replaced by Yu. A. Andropov. In 15 months K.U. Chernenko became Secretary-General and 13 months later M.S. Gorbachev came to power. He was fated to become the last party leader. It was during his leadership that the CPSU was dissolved and the USSR collapsed.
In late 1957 Central Asian republics leaders repeatedly expressed a desire to hold an all-union conference of cotton growers in the Kremlin. The CC CPSU leadership supported the idea. The date was fixed on February 18-19th of the next year. A preparation started, which caused a lot of worries.
In early January I submitted a program, specifying arrival of 1,500 delegates, their accommodation, meals, cultural and entertainment program arrangements and its attendance by the Presidium and Secretariat members, delegates’ meetings with workers of plants and factories of Moscow and reception in the Kremlin George Hall.
During the program discussion some expressed doubts in reasonability of such a conference. They argued that holding that conference would make representatives of other agricultural occupations feel unsatisfied and envious, which might cause a precedent so that other similar all-union conferences would have to be held. Apart from that, they emphasized that it would cost a lot to keep so many people for five days in Moscow, to pay for their journeys and their days off work for 10-15 work days. Some of them directly suggested to postpone the conference.
I presented my arguments. The delegates were chosen. A competition was launched everywhere lest all winter works relative to spring sowing were completed before the departure to Moscow. In the peripheries, additional responsibilities relating to production of cotton, other plant products and livestock were undertaken. Therefore, in short, the conference might not be postponed. Nevertheless, the decision wasn’t made. We agreed to return to the matter at the next Presidium meeting.
After a while in the result of repeated discussion the CC Presidium finally approved of the program as it had been presented originally without any amendments. I was suggested to be a speaker. I told them in my opinion it would be better for N. S. Khrushchev to commence the conference with an opening speech and the other speeches should be made by First CC secretaries of the republican communist parties, or by Chairmen of the Councils of Ministers. I was assigned to be the chairman at the conference and to manage all the concomitant events.
The day before the opening on February 17th, there was a new problem. The commandant of the Kremlin, general A.P. Vedenin, phoned me up saying, ‘In 1812 the Kremlin was set on fire by soldiers of Napoleon and now a conflagration can be made by our fellow-countrymen - Uzbeks. Can you help me stave it off, please? (I will explain: Vedenin and I had known each other for a long time. He knew Uzbekistan very well: in the 1920s he took part in hostilities in Fergana Valley.)
I immediately went to see him.
It turned out that the cooks from Tashkent with the famous chef who was a reputable master of cooking the Uzbek meals, called Ustad Orip-ota, brought with them from Uzbekistan not only foodstuffs, some sheep, but also a few large cauldrons to cook pilau that should be served simultaneously to over fifteen hundred people. The cauldrons were so large in size that they couldn’t be installed in the Kremlin kitchen.
Then the fellow-countrymen of mine chose a suitable place in the lawn and started digging pits for placing the cauldrons, going to cook the pilau in the open air. Seeing that, the commandant forbade them to do that, but they refused to comply. Then he phoned me up.
When I came there, I met our permanent representative. After a detailed conversation by joint efforts we tackled the problem. Our cooks were given at their disposal a separate place in the Kremlin kitchen and the largest available cauldrons. The national dishes cooked by them were highly appraised by all the conference guests.
What’s more, I’d like to mention another episode that seemed funny but actually was edifying. One of my acquaintances, a fellow-countryman, a master at harvesting big crops, called Sapar-ota, seeing me in the Kremlin on the eve of the conference, exclaimed, ‘What smart people built the majestic premises of the Kremlin, each one enraptures and boggles my mind. However, I wish they had conjectured to build an oriental tea room here. Sonny, you won’t work here forever. So, while you are here, you should build a good oriental tea room in the Kremlin.'
I laughed and he put his hand on my shoulder and continued, ‘I am joking, of course, but you, sonny, should have taken care of us. You know we only drink green tea. We’ve been treated here perfectly, and the meal has been delicious. But in the dining room and cafeterias they’ve served alcohol drinks that we never drink; we are not used to coffee and lemonades either, and there’s only black tea here. We are happy with the attention paid to us by the country leadership who often meet people. Apparently, you’re going to invite us furthermore to Moscow. Could you do a favor that the next time we stay in Moscow there’ll be some green tea as well, please?’
I thanked him for his fair remark. Afterwards I invited the catering employees of the Kremlin and city and retold them that conversation and we agreed that green tea would be always sold along with black tea in appropriate places.
It was decided to give a reception party after the conference in honor of cotton growers - participants in the forum. As usual, the procedure and arrangements were discussed, including: who from the leadership would attend, who should open, monitor, speak and what to speak about. During the dinner in a special room for the Presidium members next to the Swerdlow Hall, I informed that the reception party would be given in the afternoon of the following day.
Khrushchev noted, ‘Well, the time seems acceptable. What is the procedure?’
I replied, ‘It would be better if you, Nikita Sergeevich, make an opening speech.’
‘No,’ he objected, ‘let’s make it differently. Comrade Mukhitdinov is holding the conference well. So, it’s him who should open the reception party and manage everything till the end.’
Kirichenko smiling asked, ‘Are you going to hold it in the Uzbek language?’
I encouraged him kidding, ‘I will speak in the Uzbek language with great pleasure if you, Alexei Illarionovich, interpret from Uzbek into Russian.’
We all laughed.
I turned to Khrushchev again, ‘Yet, it would be better if you make a speech after the opening, Nikita Sergeevich.’
‘Well, you’re right. I will happily tell a few words to the cotton growers,’ he agreed.
I continued, ‘And it would be great if all the members, candidates to the Presidium membership and the CC secretaries attend the reception party.’
Khrushchev supported, ‘That’s right. We need to inform them. Is it OK for everybody at 5 p.m.?’
All agreed.
I continued to develop my plan, ‘Not only attend, but it would be great if each one says a few greeting words.’
Here everyone, all together, started protesting against my suggestion, but I insisted on, ‘Indeed, every participant in the conference will remember and will recount it when they come back to their native lands. All these events will be covered in mass media and ordinary people will see the attention paid by the Kremlin leaders to ordinary toilers.’
Nikita Sergeevich agreed, ‘It sounds right. I won’t be the only speaker. All of you should think over your short greeting speeches, whereas Nuritdin will recommend everyone a theme to speak about to prevent them from repetition.’
I suggested, ‘Ekaterina Alexeevna can make a speech about women because the main workload on cotton plantations at harvesting crops is done by women. All other speakers may be assigned among the republics, i.e., who will greet whom from which republic.’
So, we did. It was an unprecedented case at the Kremlin reception parties.
The conference was successful. All the planned events were implemented.
To conclude the chapter, I will tell a few words more. Why did I insist on holding the all-union conference of cotton growers? The fact of the matter is that for the first time, cotton growers were received by the party and government leadership in 1935. Then there were only about twenty people and all of them were only from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. They were received by Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Ordjonikidze, Andreev, and the other Politburo members. The conversation was very interesting. They were rewarded with orders and gifts. Every participant remembered the event to the bottom of his/her heart for the rest of the life. Now there were over fifteen hundred cotton growers. It had never happened before in the Soviet history.
On the other hand, such an event undoubtedly facilitated the crop increase of all irrigated agriculture in the country, since every irrigated hectare gave ten times more products than dry-farming land and hundred times more than steppes. However, in this respect we were lagging behind many other countries with irrigated agriculture. And that was despite the fact that our land had exceptional favorable climate conditions and opportunities for the land irrigation.
A famous and influential in his time American senator Hammond who became a multi-billionaire and was engaged in cotton growing proclaimed: ‘Cotton is a world power. Without a gun shot and unsheathing sword, we can put the whole world on its knees… What will happen if cotton supplies aren’t made within three years? No one will dare to fight against cotton which rules the world.’
In the newspaper Izvestiya on October 19th, 1920 it was written: ‘Cotton is needed to prevent the revolution from losing its manpower.’
V.I. Lenin in his letter to communists of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Dagestan, and Highland republic dated of April 14th, 1921 wrote: ‘Irrigation is needed mostly and will mostly recreate the region, restore it to life, bury the past and strengthen transition to socialism.’
Cotton…
Thousands of books, monographs, scientific studies, doctoral dissertations were written about it; scores of research centers develop scientific bases of modern cotton growing, design construction departments create new machines and mechanisms and the industry produces them. A great number of institutes and other educational institutions prepare specialists of different specializations for this sector.
We will touch upon the organizational aspect of cotton growing: what attention was paid by party and Soviet authorities to the matter in the 1950s, and, the most important, we’ll tell more about cotton growers. Thus, what is the cotton that the peoples of Central Asia call ‘pakhta’?
Due to the sort, sowing area peculiarities and other factors, vegetation period of a cotton plant lasts between 100 and 200 days and the height of the main plant stem reaches between 50 and 120 cm. Every plant has at least 10-30 and more bolls whose size is like a walnut or a little bit bigger and their shape is spherical or egg-shaped with a beak and a star.
A cotton boll is a truly storehouse of abundant natural resources; each boll has 2-10 grams of universal remedies called raw cotton.
Each boll produces 20%-40% of fiber whose length is 25-42 mm, which is used for yarn production. The oil extracted from cotton seeds is widely used as a consumer commodity. Seeds and their coats are raw materials for producing almost everything. For example, cotton cakes are forage that favors the growth, fatness increase, livestock yield and improvement of meat and milk quality; floss and down are used for the production of artificial fiber, film tapes and plastic; husks are raw materials for the production of different synthetic materials, high-quality thermo-proof polymers which can substitute metal in production of heating appliances; gossypol is extracted from cotton seeds to be used for production of heating-proof coat, varnish, dyestuff and drugs.
Cellulose, linoleum, cardboards, and insulating materials are produced from the waste products of the cotton cleaning and oil mills. Part of the cotton and floss is used for the production of cotton wool used in medicine, light and furniture industries, as well as wadding that is used in the production of lining, filters, and other technical appliances.
Cotton leaves, stems, valves and rinds are used for the production of the ‘P’ vitamin, carotene, protein yeast, antibiotic, starch, rope, cardboard, paper, different acids including 15 items of amino-acids, gum, salt, more than 10 phenol compounds, about 20 high-molecular carbohydrates, alcohols, wax, more than 100 different chemicals. In total cotton is used to produce over a thousand kinds of products, items, goods and medicaments.
An average crop capacity of the raw cotton from one hectare is 3,000 kilograms; from this amount 1,000-1,100 kilograms of fiber and 1,600-1,800 kilograms of seeds can be produced.
From 1,000 kg of fiber over 10 thousand meters of textile are produced; from 1,700 kg of seeds 330 kg of oil, 30 kg of soap, 700 kg of cotton cakes, 500 kg of husks and about 10 kg of lint are produced.
In due time I was happy to meet the chief designer of the space technologies S.M. Korolev, leading theorist of space exploring M.V. Keldysh and also Yuri Gagarin and the other astronauts of the first generation. I was attending the discussion by the higher leadership of different aspects of the space exploration. I was pleased to hear from the astronauts and their supervisors, read in the government documents about a huge role of cotton in the entire complex of space exploration.
In the vicinities of Moscow there is a Stellar town where astronauts live and work. Cotton growers would be happy to visit this remarkable town, and in the museum named after Y.A. Gagarin they could get familiarized with the spaceships, other technical facilities, uniforms, shoes, equipment of astronauts, their foodstuff in the production of which cotton was widely used. There is a section there devoted to the joint space flight of ‘Soyuz’ and ‘Apollo.’ Here one can see with one’s own eyes the enormous importance of cotton growing products not only in life and activities of astronauts, but also in the spaceship production.
I visited Baikonur spaceport twice. In everything - from grandiose launching facilities to restrooms - cotton products were widely used there.
Talking about cotton growers’ contribution to the space exploration, I want to tell about my conversation with one of the most prominent scientist and academician Vasilii Vasilievich Parin. He led the ‘army’ of highly skilled experts, including physiologists, biologists, neurologists, psychiatrists, physicians and other specialists in biology and medicine who dealt with preparation of humans and other living creatures for space flights and with support to their vital functions in the space.
Also, they thoroughly studied organisms of living creatures after their returning to Earth.
I first met him when he was an academician-secretary of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR. I consulted with him about preparation of the All-union conference relating to regional medicine. He, like the president of the Academy of Medical Sciences A.N. Bakulev and vice-president F.D. Krotov as well as the minister of health of the USSR M.A. Kovrigina and her deputy P.V. Shupik, not only gave valuable advice, but also led that conference which took place in Tashkent in 1954.
All the Soviet astronauts, including Yuri Gagarin, were trained for space flights under the supervision of Vasilii Vasilievech. Moreover, all the medical-physiological experiments and tests on board of man-made Earth satellites and spacecrafts were carried out under his supervision. Therefore, it was really nice to hear his highest appraisal, ‘We: medics, biologists, astronauts - are also cotton growers. And you, dear cotton growers, are astronauts as well.’
Now I’d like to tell about cotton growers.
Once we, a Soviet delegation of three people visiting an African country, were invited to the wedding party of an Arab fellah-cotton grower Said Ismail. His son, Khamid, was getting married to Khalima, a daughter of another cotton-grower Saif-ad-Din. The village was near to the Sahara Desert next to the savannah. Said Ismail had two hectares of land and an irrigation wheel. We, the honored guests, were accommodated at the bridegroom’s house.
A village headman, through messengers informs his colleagues in neighboring villages that on a certain date such and such person is going to give his wedding party and all the villagers are invited.
While we were enjoying the Bedouin coffee (kakhva badavi) with cinnamon, cardamom and ginger aroma and had wonderful cold drinks made of hibiscus tea, men, women, and children were continuously coming: some of them were walking, others - riding camels, horses or donkeys. A caravan of camels ridden by Bedouins stopped in the street. All of them were accommodated in the neighboring houses.
The children shouting, ‘They are coming!’ ‘They are coming!’ rushed towards the steppe. Everyone stood up and went out to welcome. A group was approaching, in the center of which there was the fiancée with her two bridesmaids sitting in a bullock cart. They were surrounded from all the sides by horsemen riding decorated horses. They were welcomed with music and loud greetings. The bridegroom and the bride came up to a big marquee which was set up in the middle of the yard. In the marquee there were an imam, the headman and four elderly residents. At the open side of the marquee Khamid and Khalima sat on the carpet. There were their parents on their right and left and their relatives and guests were standing behind them.
The imam starting the ceremony pronounced, ‘Bismilla Rakhmonu Rakhim!’ (Laudation to Allah) and a few surahs (chapters) from the Koran and then gave the Holy Book to the bridegroom and the bride. They taking it with trembling hands pronounced, ‘Loilokha volokuvvata Muhammadu Rasulovlo’ (‘There is no God except Allah and Muhammad is his prophet.’). Then the imam loudly asked them if they agreed to become a husband and a wife, if they would be faithful to each other, if they promised to live honestly and work hard, to love and listen to their parents and elders, to bring up worthy children, if they promised not to commit prohibited things and play gambles, not to offend others, to strictly follow the laws of Shariah, to bring benefits to the village, country, and so on...
In reply to each imam’s question the bridegroom and the bride in turn kissed the Koran and swore an oath to Allah and people in presence of the headman, esteemed elders, parents, and guests. Satisfied with their answers and with the consent of the attendants, the imam blessed and wished them happiness for the rest of their life. He finished the marriage ceremony with a loud exclamation ‘Ollohu Akbar!’ (‘God is Great!’). In reply everybody exclaimed ‘Amen!’ raising both hands and sliding their palms down their own faces.
The just married couple stood up and bowed to the attendees, then holding each other by the hands, they went outside. The guests were coming up to them to greet and give them gifts: money, adornments, dresses, carpets; they put bulky things on the floor, showed them animals which being held with bridles were given to their relatives. When all the gifts were received, the just married couple returned to their specially prepared honorable seats.
The repast time came. In the yard in a few large cauldrons, something was boiling or frying; apparently an ox, camel and a few sheep had been sacrificed. In all the houses on the tablecloths in front of each group of the guests, were laid bananas, oranges, mangos, pineapples, persimmons, grapefruits, cucumbers, lettuces, onions, garlic, peppers, beans, apples, papayas, candies, halva, flat cakes, peanuts, and many other sweets and fruit. Shurpa (soup) was brought in buckets and poured into kasa (bowls) for those who wanted to eat the soup. For each group in the middle of the tablecloth, an entire baked sheep surrounded by rice with pistachios was put on a big copper tray. Everyone was taking a lump of meat and putting some rice on their own plates. Airan (sour milk) was served as well. Everybody without exception was enjoying the meal with gusto and drinking all kinds of juice and tea to their hearts' content. Later the coffee was served. There were no alcohol liquors at all.
It was interesting the just married couple were sitting still, without touching the meal. The parents, relatives, and best friends didn’t drink and eat either. They were regaling the guests, and according to the custom, they weren't allowed to eat until their guests ate their fill.
We, like everyone, were sitting, growing heavy fed up with the lavish delicious treats. All of a sudden, a woman in the kitchen yelled. And the other women in the tukal (a female part of the house) supported her call. The tam-tam (the drums) began to sound. The men, sitting in the divan (a male part of the house), immediately stood up and waved their arms: some of them beat the floor with the staffs, the others drew the swords out while the omdi (the headman) was shooting with his gun. Then everyone started singing folk songs and dancing folk dances.
The men were standing in a wide circle, in the center of which there were the girls. One of the girls began dancing to a beating tambourine and the others joined her.
The most exciting folk dance is jabudi. The girls were dancing as if floating like swans: they were waving their hands, as if with swan wings, simultaneously with the head turn. Suddenly the dance rhythm changed and they started moving their bodies fast. The men stamped their feet in time with the dance and clapped their hands: two claps in a row and one clap after the pause. In the center one of the girls was singing in a nice voice. The melody was becoming more rhythmic while the singer’s voice pitch sounded higher.
When she finished singing, the female dancers grew heated, the young men joined them, dancing deliriously and joyfully, holding sparkling daggers in their hands, and a few middle-aged men were swinging their leather whips. The Bedouins, dressed in abaii (a long cloak like a raincoat), were dancing easily and vigorously! Almost all the attendees, except the sheikh and the imam, forgetting everything in the world, were participating in the overall rejoicing: dancing, singing, moving and clapping their hands in a single rhythm.
All of a sudden, a group of dervishes showed up from somewhere. I had seen them in other Muslim countries. They continuously whirled playing the flute and pronouncing religious aphorisms. Here they were dancing brilliantly and showing a number of difficult acrobatic tricks.
I’m telling about all these for the following reason: at the peak of the rejoicing after each song couplet, in a solo or in a choir, all the dancers and singers participating in the grand festive were chanting loudly: ‘Praise the good!’, ‘Sow the good!’
After each couplet they chanted again: ‘Sow the good!’, ‘Praise the good!’
Our dear cotton grower!
There I admired the ability of ordinary Arabic farmers, living in severe conditions, far from technological progress, to feel happy so joyfully and self-forgetfully with appearance of a new family. I acknowledged them for their hospitality, watched them at the beginning, joined them later in dancing, singing and chanting like everyone: ‘Praise the good!’, ‘Sow the good!’...
… And doing all these things, being in the distant African savannah, not far from the Nile river, I was thinking about you - a toiler of cotton fields of our Motherland!
‘Sow the good!’, ‘Praise the good!’ – just two phrases.
But they mean so much! There is so much humaneness, nobleness, purity, and goodness in these simple words!
A cotton grower is a sower of goodness. With his labor and intelligence, he enables people to make clothes, food, create wellbeing and comfort in their families. His substantialized labor provides many industries with raw materials and the livestock sector with nourishing fodder, which in turn increases cattle number, production of meat, wool, milk, eggs, and other products.
I bow down before cotton growers just because they exist in this world! Like everyone I glorify the goodness sown by cotton growers, our dear cotton growers.
That’s why I persisted on holding an all-union conference of cotton growers in Moscow.
As a result of the all-union conference, an agreement on substantial increase in all the sectors of irrigated cropping was achieved.
XIV
FACING THE EAST
THE FIRST ALL-UNION SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE CONCERNING ORIENTAL STUDIES
In April, 1957 we made a proposal about the gathering such a forum to the CC CPSU. This idea arose on the basis of conversations with Mao Zedong in Beijing, Kim Ir sung in Pyongyang, Jawaharlal Nehru, prince Sihanouk, Soekarno, Zahiri-shah, Shahan-shah Pahlavi in Tashkent, with delegation members from a few countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America who attended the 19th and 20th congresses of the CPSU, as well as after the study of scientific researches on the East published in Moscow, Leningrad, and Baku. We got familiarized with the training of specialists-orientalists at educational institutions and practices of new state agencies in the foreign Eastern countries.
It is well-known that since a long time Russia has been one of the world’s largest centers of oriental studies. The names of the Russian scientists who devoted their lives to studying history and culture of the peoples of the East have been mentioned with respect in all parts of the world.
They are N.Y. Bichurin, I.P. Minaev, A.V. Turaev, V.V. Radlov, V.R. Rozin, N.K. Roerich, V.V. Bartold, I.Y. Krachkovskii, F.I. Sherbatskii, B.Y. Vladimirtsev, and others.
Also, there were in the past and nowadays there are eminent scientists-orientalists in Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and the other republics where there are centers of oriental studies.
The vast majority of the eastern peoples have history arising from the earliest time and have their inherent ancient distinctive culture. However, the three-century colonial domination of European countries was aimed at creating difficult life conditions for these peoples, which resulted in their lagging behind modern civilization as well as forgetting their heroic past. Any attempt to be freed from the colonial yoke was suppressed with fire and sword.
It became obvious that the Soviet oriental science was not ready to such a turn of events. For a few decades, over a hundred independent countries were established, whereas our country still failed to determine a strategy and policies concerning them. Apparently, it wasn’t an accident that the Soviet Union wasn’t invited to participate in the famous Bandung conference even as a guest.
Joseph Stalin’s speech at the 19th congress of the CPSU incurred a definite detriment to our relationships with former colonial countries and the Soviet eastern policy as a whole. In his speech he sharply criticized national bourgeoisie who trampled a banner of a revolutionary and liberation movement in those countries. Therefore, according to him, the banner should be held by communists if they wanted to honestly serve their peoples. Based on that statement, the officious propaganda of the USSR, pseudo-scientists, and Soviet information agencies weren’t tired to blame great leaders who roused their own peoples for a struggle against colonialism, including Mahatma Gandhi, Kemal Atatürk, Sun Yat Sen, and others. The new epoch in the East, of course, necessitated comprehension of all circumstances and elaboration of a new eastern policy in all aspects – from scientific research to diplomatic relationships.
When I spoke about it at the CC Presidium, some members considered the issue skeptically, the others alleged that we were already supporting national liberation movement, rendering assistance to them, whereas a few of them expressed their concern if it was an attempt to oppose the East to the West. One of the Presidium members directly asked, ‘What do you think is the East?’
Another one was in doubt, ‘Why should we hold this conference in Tashkent? If it’s necessary, we may hold it in Moscow or Leningrad.’
I’d like to pay tribute to N. S. Khrushchev: he fully supported me and instructed Suslov and Kirillin in the Academy of Sciences and other union bodies to do their utmost in the preparation of such an unusual forum. With his blessing, the work started.
When we gathered in Mikhail Andreevich’s office, I proposed to create an organizing committee led by K.V. Ostrovityanov who was the vice-president of the Union Academy of Sciences. Everybody agreed. The organizing committee included the following members from Uzbekistan: Zukhra Rakhimbabaeva – the CC CPUz. secretary, Gani Sultanov - deputy chairman of the Ministers Council, and Ibragim Muminov – the vice-president of the Academy of Siences of Uzbekistan. I found helpful if the main reports at the conference were made by academician G.V. Zhukov and director of the Institute of Oriental Studies B.G. Gafurov. It was approved. Also, everybody agreed with our proposal to invite scientists not only from all Central Asian republics, but also from foreign countries.
The conference took place in Tashkent on June 11-13, 1957. Delegations from Moscow, Leningrad, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Dagestan, Tatarstan, and Kabardino-Balkaria participated in it. Scientists from China, Poland, The Czech Republic, North Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Romania attended and made speeches.
There was an essential, comprehensive exchange of opinions. Interesting speeches were made by such famous scientists-orientalists as Umarov, Charyev, Sumbatzade, Azimdjanova, Tsereteli, Nersesyan, Auezov, and others. A few sections relating to global directions of scientific researches, training human resource, main aspects of policies and practices of various bodies with respect to co-operation with eastern countries were established.
Some programs and topic plans were developed for scientific research institutions and higher education institutes studying the East, and especially, the coordination of their activities. According to the results, a number of concrete proposals were approved by the CC CPSU and sent to all the republics. At the end of the conference I had a chance to make a speech. A full text of my speech titled as ‘To New Success of the Soviet Oriental Studies’ was published by a state political publishing house in Moscow.
The next chapters of my memoirs are mainly devoted to a new strategy in the Soviet eastern policy and its concrete implementing overseas.
THE EAST
I have already mentioned that during discussion of our proposal on holding the first all-union scientific conference relating to oriental studies made at the CC Presidium in April, 1957, I was asked a question that could be scientifically formulated like this: ‘What do you mean by saying the ‘East’?’
I think the readers will understand me correctly if I cite my speech made at the conference as an answer to this question.
‘The peoples of the East have held and keep holding by far the most important place in the world history. They have created priceless material and spiritual values and made a valuable contribution to the treasury of the world culture and civilization as well as the peoples of the West have done.
Inquisitive minds of thinkers and scientists of China, India, Egypt, Central Asia, Iran, and other countries of the East have been paving their ways in sciences for a long time in the world history.
Even a few thousand years before a new era in many countries of the East, the farming and animal husbandry, handicrafts and construction of artificial irrigation structures were developed.
Creative thought of the peoples of Egypt, China, India, and other countries of the ancient East reached considerable success in the sphere of science and fine arts. Marvelous examples of folklore, masterpieces of literature, fine arts, architecture, and sculptures have remained up to-date.
Four thousand years ago Egyptians and later Indians successfully solved many problems of practical mathematics. Chinese scientists also contributed a lot in mathematics development. We may say with confidence that our two great neighbors – the peoples of India and China – have made unsurpassing contribution in mathematics science.
Mathematicians of Transcaucasia, Central Asia, Iran, and Arabic countries have enriched dramatically the world mathematics science. The most prominent of them were Anania Shiraki, Muḥammad al-Kharizmi, Abu Rayhan Biruni, Avicenna (Ibn Sina), Omar Khayyam, Ulugh Beg, and others. Research by Muḥammad al-Khwarizmi in algebra not only did this science give the name, but also enriched it with a new content. His fundamental works underlay in European textbooks, and the author is considered to be one of the originators of this important science. Mathematical work by Biruni titled ‘The Book about Chords’ expounding difficult problems of geometry and trigonometry became an outstanding event in the medieval history of mathematics development.
Long before Europeans, a Central-Asian scientist Abu Rayhan Biruni made a suggestion about heliocentric structure of the Universe. In 1079, an outstanding poet, philosopher, astronomer, and mathematician Omar Khayyam created a calendar, whose mathematical calculations were used for the French revolutionary calendar compilation at the end of the 18th century.
The East is a homeland of astronomy and a number of other science fields. Suffice it to say that the ‘Star Catalogue’, which in those days was an indicator of a high-level development of astronomy and allied fields of human knowledge, was first made and issued by a famous astronomer Shi Shen in China in the 4th century B.C.
Ulugh Beg school and its scientific outcomes made a remarkable landmark of the astronomy development. Ulugh Beg generalized many-century achievements in astronomy and essentially enriched it with new significant researches.
A role of the peoples of the East is great in the development of chemistry and medicine. In India and China, a few centuries before Christ, special medicine works were written, and chemical drugs which still are widely used in modern medicine were created.
An encyclopedic work by Ibn Sina (Avicenna) called ‘The Canon of Medical Science’ was the main manual and reference book for doctors in the East and the West for many centuries.
The East is the homeland for philosophy. Philosophical doctrines arisen in ancient China, Egypt, and India spread in other countries of the East and West afterwards; and thereby they favored the further development of social ideas.
For many centuries the peoples of the East have given the humanity a number of immortal images in feature literature. Progressive thinkers of China, India, Central Asia, Iran, and Transcaucasia have expressed ideas of humanism, fairness and justice, peace and friendship in their creative works. These masterpieces along with the best works of the West have been really important for development of the world literature for centuries.
Identifying the place of the East in the world history, we can’t consider particular countries severally. All the peoples have contributed in the development of production forces, sciences, fine arts, and culture, whether in the north or the south, in the east or the west, moreover, in close interconnection between each other, supporting each other, and adopting the best practices from each other.
Residents of Central Asia, for example, learnt from the Chinese how to produce paper and silk. In turn, the Chinese learnt how to grow grapes and alfalfa. Handmade goods made by Central Asian artisans were widely popular with Indians, as well as wonderful works made by Indian craftsmen aroused admiration in our country.
The East is the homeland for many outstanding inventions without which it’s impossible to imagine really significant aspects of the modern civilized world. For example, the Chinese inventions included such vital things as compass, paper, seismograph, typography, porcelain, etc.
Speaking about culture and cultural heritage of the peoples of the East, it should be emphasized that though each of them has got distinctive inherent nature, they have been developed and enriched along and together with the other cultures, being integrated naturally in the world’s culture.
Ideologists of racism and colonialism, being afraid of the truth about historical past of the East, have been doing their best trying to belittle or keep silent about a progressive role, played and still being played by the eastern peoples in the world history. In order to justify their aspirations to dominate over them, since a long time they have been involved in spreading various kinds of fabrications about the so-called ‘many-century retardations’ of the East.
The East occupies a vast territory, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean in the West to the Pacific in the East, and is inhabited by many large and small peoples who account in total for over a half of the earth’s population.
The East has got innumerable natural resources. In the Middle East there are concentrated enormous oil reserves. Eastern countries are the top producers of tin, manganese, tungsten. There are the largest deposits of uranium, thorium, gold, silver, and a number of rare and most valuable metal there.
Such countries as Indonesia and Malaya provide half of the world’s production of rubber. The East also holds an essential place in the growth of tea, cotton, and rice. India and Pakistan have overwhelming portion of the world’s production of jute and ambary, whereas Indonesia provides 80 percent of seasonings.
Industrialized countries of the West are attracted with natural resources of the East: mainly, with oil, gas, and other energy resources which make fabulous profits for monopolies. The policy of the colonial powers in this part of the earth always ‘smells of oil.’
The East is attractive, not to a lesser extent, first of all, for the USA and England as a strategic springboard to which is assigned a crucial place in the plans of the aspirants for the ‘world domination.’
Therefore, dramatic conflicts for raw material sources, market for goods supply, capital investment spheres, springboards, and cheap labor reserves are always happening in the East.
In spite of all attempts of the western powers to keep their domination in the East, the colonial system, being an extreme evil of modern times, which have stained pages of the mankind history with its barbarism and wildness, is collapsing and becoming obsolete.’
HERITAGE
Exactly in half a year after the scientific conference, I was transferred to work in the CC CPSU and was told, ‘You are expected to deal with the eastern policy along with other matters.’
Naturally, besides personal conversations with secretaries and other employees of the CC and Union bodies, I decided to get familiarized with and to look in depth into what place the eastern policy held in theoretical and practical activity of the party in general. A reason for such a motive was the fact that working in regional committees, government, and CC of the Communist party of Uzbekistan, I participated in the pursuit of the domestic policy. Therefore, I had the slightest idea of the development and principles of the foreign policy, in particular in the East. That’s why I began studying official documents and archival materials relating to the East.
Speaking frankly, the deeper I studied the materials, the more questions and ambiguities arose, which required overthinking and reflections.
Dear readers, let’s make together a short excursus in the history and browse its pages relating to national and colonial issues.
It’s generally known that Marxism was the principles of the theory, ideology, and policy of the party, which was fully based on the position of workers in Western Europe. C. Marx didn’t focus on issues of the East. So, he only mentioned them in the study of colonial policy of the Western European mother countries.
In all his works - from ‘Manifesto of the Communist Party’ to ‘Capital’ - Marx scientifically studied crucial problems of contradictions between labor and capital, between antagonistic classes, production forces and labor-management relations. He brilliantly showed the ways to get out of the deep inequalities, unfairness, exploitation, oppression of a human by another human, of the people by another people, of a state by another state. Besides, he summarized his reflections by concluding that in order to solve all these issues, it was necessary to change the social-political system, to overthrow the state of exploiters, and to establish a new fair democratic system. Moreover, he emphasized that only proletariat could and had to accomplish all those objectives.
The RSDLP (Russian Social Democratic Labor Party) (the name was later changed to the CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union) also arose from the revolutionary movement, first of all, in Europe; however, it evolved its activity in Russia. Here, the social democracy set a goal before the workers’ movement: to free proletariat from the capitalism yoke and to radically reform the society. That was obvious even by the delegate members and leading bodies elected at the 1st (in 1898) and the 2nd (in 1903) congresses: among them there were no representatives of the Asian peoples. Moreover, not only did all the leaders, eminent leading figures of the party at that time, the future Bolsheviks and Mensheviks not live in Asian countries, but also, they did not have enough knowledge about Asian history and culture. Of course, it wasn’t just a fault, but it was a real calamity.
V.I. Lenin, developing the three components of Marxism, suggested an idea of a proletarian revolution implemented by overthrowing the tsarist autocracy, the authority of landlords and capitalists, and establishing the proletariat dictatorship which would ensure the further socialism establishment.
In addition, national and colonial issues depended on implementing those objectives, i.e., only success of the proletarian revolution and the proletariat dictatorship establishment could ensure their implementation. Those problems were only approached from the class positions, considering nations, national and colonial matters as a product of the bourgeois system. Consequently, those issues could be fairly solved only after its liquidation.
The class approach, i.e., only from a position of the proletariat and their revolution, could hardly find a support of the peoples of the East where the working class currently being formed at that time accounted for a minority of the population. Apart from that, the famous C. Marx's words that a religion was opium for people couldn’t encourage sympathies of millions of Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, and followers of the other religions.
After having been in exile and in emigration for many years, V.I. Lenin returned to Petrograd in April, 1917. It won’t be an exaggeration to say that he was highly respected by the peoples of the East as well. During his early revolutionary activity, he wrote: ‘Workers oppose a new world, the world of unity of working people of all nationalities, where there is no place even for any privilege, nor for the least oppression of a human by another human, to the old world, the world of national oppression, national fights, and national isolation.’
It was due to V.I. Lenin that in the first program of the RSDLP adopted at the 2nd congress was written the principle of nations’ right to self-determination up to secession and establishment of an independent state. Being born in the center of Russia, without any experience of feeling of national oppression from his childhood, it was Lenin who called Russia ‘a prison for the peoples’ and the colonial policy pursued by the Tsarism as the worst and inhuman form of oppression of the peoples.
Yet, before 1917 V.I. Lenin expounded in detail his thoughts about a necessity of the colonialism system liquidation, about providing freedom and independence to all the peoples. It was Lenin who declared then that under the proletariat dictatorship all the secret agreements concluded by the Tsarist regime with other states regarding the colonial and other oppressed peoples would be canceled and made public.
J.V. Stalin was Georgian, born in a provincial town of Gori. His father was a shoemaker, and his mother was a housewife. He was educated in a theological seminary, and he never studied in anywhere else. In his adolescence he participated in the revolutionary liberation movement. So virtually, his universities were underground activity, conspiracy, being beaten by gendarmes, exiles, prisons, and escapes from them.
He undoubtedly knew national problems well, and his brochure titled ‘Marxism and National Issue’ was well known by revolutionists and sympathetic intellectuals not only when it was written, but also in the next few years.
The works and thoughts of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and many eminent figures of Russia, Central Asia, and the other regions, as well as the pre-revolutionary documents of the party basically predetermined sympathies of eastern peoples with the proletarian revolution.
It should be noted that already in the first Soviet government of fourteen people’s commissariats there was a special people’s commissariat for the affairs of nationalities called PCN. This, in my opinion, shows the importance of the first resolutions by the Soviet Power and the party on the national issue. What was done?
It was an announcement by the Second All-Russian congress of the Councils of the declaration that the Soviet Power ‘will provide all the nations who live in Russia with their true rights for self-determination’; ‘Decree on Peace’, ‘Decree on Land’, ‘Declaration of the Council of the People’s Commissars of the RSFSR of November 15th (23rd), 1917 ‘About the Rights of the Peoples of Russia’ specifying the main principles of the national policy of the Soviet state; an appeal by the Council of the Peoples' Commissars of the RSFSR ‘To All Working Muslims of Russia and the East.’
It was also the Declaration of the 3rd congress of the Councils (in 1918) ‘About the Rights of the Working and Exploited Peoples’; establishment of the Russian Soviet Republic as a union of the free nations in the form of the federation of the Soviet national republics.
Besides, it was the resolution of the 10th congress of the RCP(b) (Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)) on the national issue (March, 1921), which emphasized that only appropriate national policy would provide the consolidation of the union of the working class with the peasantry and working people of former oppressed nationalities.
In the congress resolution it was said that the policy of the Tsarism, landlords, and the bourgeoisie with respect to all foreign nationalities ‘was aimed at liquidating any statehood rudiments, destroying their cultures, hampering speaking their native languages, keeping them in ignorance, and finally, if possible, russifying them. Such a policy resulted unavoidably in backwardness and political retardation of those peoples.’
The congress laid down concrete measures to liquidate heavy heritage of the past: economical and cultural backwardness of the peoples oppressed in the Tsarism time. It was proclaimed that those measures were necessary to achieve the equity of the peoples in practice.
It was the establishment of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (the USSR) in 1922, which was the first in the world multinational state of workers and peasants of all the nations and ethnic groups; the proclamation in 1924 of Turkmenian SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic), Uzbek SSR, then Kazakh SSR, Kyrgiz SSR, and Tajik SSR (and later the other republics); making sure that they joined the USSR.
All those events strongly influenced the peoples of the East. Therefore, it was not accidentally that when the western states, having put aside their discords and contradictions, all together moved against Soviet Russia by sending their expeditionary forces towards the Far East, Murmansk, and Arkhangelsk, the Crimea and Ukraine, Bessarabia and Baku, simultaneously entering the alliances with domestic rebel forces, the peoples of the East, inspired with Lenin’s speeches and statements, the party and the first steps of the Soviet state, took the side of the first state of workers and peasants, condemning and crashing the intervention.
In the Damascus museum, there are still the posters and banners which were carried then by working people marching along the central avenues of the city. A slogan: ‘Hands off Soviet Russia!’ is written on them. The same event was taking place in many countries. Even at the hardest time when the destiny of the young Soviet Power was hanging by a hair, a number of the eastern countries, one by one, started recognizing it and establishing diplomatic relations and cooperation with it on the agreement basis. They included Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and Jidda (Saudi Arabia).
The Soviet republic supported by numerous nations, ethnic groups, and working people of foreign countries, having crashed domestic rebels, mutinies and foreign interventions, upheld its territorial integrity and independence, which even more attracted the peoples of the East to the young republic.
But unfortunately, literally a few years later, the attitude to the East was changed. Along with some serious errors committed by the party and the state, an essential negative impact of the new strategy of foreign enemies and emigration who, having failed to destroy the Soviet Power directly with military force, took up the path of economic and ideological expansion. Indeed, they were a great success in their plots: infringement of the concluded agreements, arrangement and management of local mutinies and disturbances based on the ethnic, national, religious, economic disagreements, and so on.
Being afraid of separation of the distant regions of the country, the Soviet Power used military forces there. Also, an essential change of the national issue policy was, to a certain extent, due to the fact that V.I. Lenin had already been bedridden, so that important state documents didn’t reach him. Thus, he was actually excluded from the managing the country and party.
Joseph Stalin after V.I. Lenin’s death, made the party the ruling force in the country; and being at the head of it, he led the state with an iron hand, steel will, having centralized everything, stepping over lives of thousands of people towards the set goal, namely, to transform Russia – RSFSR – the USSR into the mighty industrial power.
Under such circumstances, many resolutions recorded in the program documents of the pre-revolutionary period and the first years of the Soviet Power remained either not implemented, or essentially altered, or even perverted.
Let’s take as an example the mentioned above paragraph from the resolutions adopted at the 10th congress of the RCP (b). None of unprejudiced humans will deny that afterwards many things were implemented to liquidate the Tsarism national policy. Everything that was done for the development of nations and ethnic groups in spiritual, material, political, and other spheres is well known. However, it should be admitted that the most important, key points of the resolution of that congress were forgotten soon.
V.I. Lenin’s sincere statements made in the years of his underground and emigration activities literally from the first days of the Bolsheviks’ advent to power turned out to be illusive, often just wrong, which neither mirrored the situation in the country, nor corresponded to spirits of the peoples. Consequently, they couldn’t be implemented.
In a difficult military and political situation inside the country, in the circumstances of its virtual isolation, V.I. Lenin and his comrades-in-arms decided to postpone for ‘a later time’ or reconsider quite a number of important planks of the program relating to national and colonial policies. For example, People’s Commissariat of Nationalities was abolished in a few years by Stalin’s initiative, i.e., by the people’s commissar himself, because of his allegedly ‘uselessness.’ The deputies of the people’s commissar, Sultangaleev and Turar Ryskulov, were executed afterwards by shooting because of quite symptomatic for the then national policy accusations: the former one was accused of ‘Pan-Islamism’ while the latter one was accused of ‘Pan-Turkism.’
All the mentioned above resulted in dramatic weakening of relationships of the Soviet country with the foreign East. Meanwhile, the western powers were strengthening their positions there.
The intolerability of the situation was obvious particularly in the light of occurring events. After World War II the process of the colonial system’s collapse and the growth of the national liberation movement in the East was activated.
As a matter of fact, the authority and influence of the USSR in the foreign East became complicated for two more reasons apart from the other ones.
At the proposal by Joseph Stalin, the 6th congress of the Comintern (Communist international) (in 1928) staked on the leadership of national liberation movement by communist parties working both legally and undercover or in emigration because of ‘the national bourgeoisie betrayal.’
The situation became even more complicated after J.V. Stalin’s speech at the 19th congress of the party. In his short speech he underlined that ‘the bourgeoisie, the main enemy of the liberation movement, has become different, dramatically changed, become more reactionary, and lost their connections with the people.’
Further J.V. Stalin put the following thesis: ‘Before the bourgeoisie was considered as the nation leadership. They protected rights and independence of the nation putting them ‘above all’. However, no signs of the ‘national principle’ have remained. Nowadays, the bourgeoisie is selling the rights and independence of the nation for dollars. The banner of the national independence and sovereignty has been thrown overboard. There is no doubt that this banner should be picked up by you, representatives of the communist and democratic parties, and be carried on ahead if you want to be the patriots of your country, if you want to become a leading force of the nation. After all, there is no one else to pick it up.’
J.V. Stalin’s statements incurred a double harm: firstly, they caused a negative reaction of many bourgeois figures of the East who actually continued to lead their national liberation movements, or were the first leaders of newly born sovereign countries; secondly, many foreign communist and labor parties found themselves under more suspicion in their countries, which is explainable if we take into account that the USSR called them to make a coup d'état and seize the power.
Taking all these into consideration, in 1957 in the CC CPSU, it was reasonably decided to dramatically alter the strategy and policies relating to the foreign East, taking into account the committed serious mistakes and political perversions.
Such realistic ways were found at the Moscow conferences of representatives of communist and labor parties in 1957 and 1960, which were reflected in the approved documents.
In this chapter I will tell about the work of the conferences I took part in. The particular chapters, including ‘Moscow-Beijing: Love and Disagreements’, ‘Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with Albania’, are focused on disagreements arising during the conferences and their reasons.
THE BEGINNING OF THE ACTIVE EASTERN POLICY
From the middle of October, 1957, the preparation for the 40th October anniversary celebration and the following afterwards conference of representatives of communist and labor parties was put on a wide scale. Responses confirming their participation were coming from dozens of countries: most of them were with commendations and enclosed list of the delegation members.
The conference was prepared by a special team. it was planned beforehand to adopt two documents: Declaration and Manifesto. So, they prepared the draft documents, whereas the other team was involved in arrangement and practical issues.
By the 1st November, the list of the delegation members arriving from 81 countries had already been known.
Besides official visits, grand ceremonies, warm meetings that were widely covered in mass media, the unspoken laborious work on the documents and arrangement matters for the forthcoming forum was done, which, of course, wasn’t covered in press.
It was specified in detail who would meet and keep in touch with certain delegations. During the business meetings and document drafting, some arguments and discussions were arising. Returning to the CC, we were making amendments and clarifications. In that way the both documents were being literally born in the throes.
After the anniversary ceremonies, only the representatives of the communist and labor parties remained in Moscow.
The conference was opened. Actually, there were two meetings: the conference of the representatives of the communist and labor parties of the socialist countries on November 14-16th, which adopted the Declaration, and the conference of the communist and labor parties of the world on November 16-19th, which adopted the Peace Manifesto.
Talking about the documents adopted at the conferences, it should be noted that a few points are worth a particular attention.
Symptomatically, it took a few days to prepare and endorse the draft documents. Moreover, even during the conferences they were still being edited. The surnames of the attendees weren’t indicated in the documents; instead, they were indicated as ‘representatives.’ Except for the Peace Manifesto, the Declaration, and two information reports, no other documents were published. Yet, even they were made public with a great delay: the information report about the first conference and the Declaration appeared in press on November 22nd and the second report about the Peace Manifesto - on November 23rd. And only on December 16-17th, the CC CPSU discussed the results of the conferences at the Plenum. As it became known later, the foreign parties had similar discussions much later than as usual. Apart from that, serious debates concerning the adopted documents arose during those discussions.
The Peace Manifesto emphasized: ‘We, the representatives of the communist and labor parties, with full understanding of our responsibility for our peoples’ destinies declare: war is not inevitable, it can be prevented; therefore, peace can be protected and strengthened.’
In the both documents, the Manifesto and the Declaration, it was said that the Conference of the representatives of the communist and labor parties from 12 socialist and 42 other states meant the greatest ideological and political victory of the world communist and labor movement, that the results of those Conferences were a decisive blow on the intrigues of international reaction forces who were making a lot of efforts to cause splitting up and confusion in the movement ranks.
Participants in the Conferences pronounced the objective of the struggle for peace and peaceful coexistence as a vital problem of the world policy and indicated the major direction for the efforts of the international labor and communist movement.
In the adopted Declaration was summarized the experience of communist and labor parties not only in socialist countries, but also in capitalist countries, and the experience of national liberation struggle of the peoples of colonial and dependent countries.
In the speeches of the delegates as well as in the Peace Manifesto was expressed the approval of the conclusions and resolutions made at the 20th congress of the CPSU relating to the most important fundamental issues of the modern international development. The communists expressed their readiness to cooperate with all the parties, movements, and individuals who were for peace and against war.
The Declaration was also of great importance for ideological and organizational consolidation of communist parties at that time as it called for a decisive struggle against revisionism as a major danger in the ranks of the world communist movement as well as for toughening the struggle against dogmatism and sectarianism.
In addition, the Declaration included the explanations of the major principles and laws of socialist revolution and socialist building inherent to all countries which were embarking on the socialism path. It emphasized the necessity of taking into account the national peculiarities of different countries, consolidating the unity of socialist countries, and strengthening the principles of their relationships.
Undoubtedly, the both conferences were of considerable significance for our country, socialist commonwealth, and the world communist and labor movement as a whole. It was remarkable that within three weeks during the continuous meetings, individual and collective, opened and confidential, we could hear the opinions, get familiarized with the assessments by sixty-four parties, set forth them the main principles of the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet state and explain them what had happened at the 20th CPSU congress and in the subsequent period, try to smooth out the available in our relationships roughness, misunderstanding, distrust, and try to achieve mutual understanding.
However, it should not be passed over in silence that at the Conference we failed to overcome the disagreements, achieve the mutual understanding between particular parties. For that reason, not accidentally, already in 1960, an issue on holding a new Conference in Moscow arose.
The Conference was convened in three years after the previous Moscow one (in November, 1957) and almost in half a year after the Bucharest one (in June, 1960). It was caused by the fact that after J.V. Stalin’s death, in the course of the struggle against consequences of personality cult, initiated in the USSR and continued in the world, the complicated, sometimes contradictive processes were taking place in the world’s communist and labor movements and parties of Eastern Europe, which, of course, with the assistance of the West and certain forces inside those countries, set an ‘example’ for other countries. Noisy incidents about the Berlin Wall, the tense situation in the GDR in whole, Poland, especially in Hungary, rising tension with China, Yugoslavia, and Albania – all those events subjected to a serious test the very survival of the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) which were already manifesting repulsive, centrifugal trends.
At the forthcoming Conference it was planned to consult and exchange views without rush and publicity, calmly and thoroughly, to elaborate the general strategy, if it’s possible, without interferences in domestic affairs, in compliance with sovereignty of the parties and states.
By the middle of 1960, we had managed to agree with all the parties on holding the next international Conference of representatives of the communist and labor parties during the celebration of the 43rd October Revolution anniversary. It was planned to bring for a discussion the report of each party about their current situation and the implementation by them of the previous Conferences’ resolutions. I have already spoken about the arrangement procedure for such conferences. So, I am not going to say it again.
By late October the main draft documents for the next Conference had been prepared in general for the first reading; and by November 6th the list delegation members from 81 countries had been made.
The CC Presidium approved the delegation membership for the Conference as follows: the leader – N.S. Khrushchev, the members – M.A. Suslov, F.R. Kozlov, N.A. Mukhitdinov, A.V. Kuusinen, and P.N. Pospelov.
The vast majority of the foreign delegations were led by the top party leaders: secretary generals, the CC first secretaries, and the party chairpersons. However, at the head of a few delegations there were only the leading members of the state leadership. For example, from China it wasn’t Mao Zedong (who was the CP (the Communist Party) chairman of the PRC (People's Republic of China)), but it was the deputy chairman of the CC CPC (the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China), Liu Shaoqi; from DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) it wasn’t Kim Ir Sung, but it was a member of the CC WPK (the Workers' Party of Korea) Presidium, the first deputy chairman of the Ministers Cabinet, Kim Ir; from Indonesia it wasn’t Aidit, but it was the deputy chairman of the CC CPI (the Communist Party of Indonesia), M.H. Lukman; from Cuba it wasn’t Fidel Castro (who was busy then with the regional tense situation in the Caribbean sea), but it was the secretary of the National committee of the People’s socialist party, Anibal Escalante. A few more parties were represented by their high rank leaders, but not the top ones of their countries.
On November 6th, the grand ceremony dedicated to the 43rd October Revolution anniversary took place in the Moscow Palace of sports in Luzhniki. Over ten thousand people attended it, including all the delegations of brotherly parties. On November 7th was held a military parade followed by the demonstration of working people, then formal reception parties took place, after which the laborious work with overseas comrades started and lasted literally from the early morning till late night.
Every member of our delegation was meeting the delegates he/she was ‘responsible’ for. We were discussing the fundamental draft documents to be approved at the Conference, focusing on literally every paragraph, even on particular words. We were disputing, giving arguments for and against, and convincing each other. All the discussions were recorded by the CC employees and translators. Besides, each of us was responsible for giving lunches or dinners on behalf of the CC CPSU to honor the delegation he/she was in charge of.
A particular attention was paid to the parties the relationships with which were complicated. Let’s take a look at China, for instance. Its delegation arrived on November 5th. On November 6th in the morning, N.S. Khrushchev received the whole delegation (ten people) and the PRC ambassador to the USSR for mutual greetings and conversation. At the reception ceremony, there were Andrei Gromyko and Yuri Andropov on behalf of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the CC CPSU, respectively. Later a dinner in which the delegation leaders and the CC CPSU Presidium members participated was given to honor them. In the evening on the same day, the Presidium chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev, also received the party-and-government delegation of the CPC (the Communist Party of China) and the PRC (People’s Republic of China); on behalf of the Soviet part, there were an employee of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, V.G. Vysotin, and the departmental head of the CC CPSU, I.S. Sherbakov.
During the Conference we, the CPSU delegation members, were almost constantly in contact with the Chinese delegation, with the whole team, or privately with individual members, without any publicity, nor with any toasts and refreshments. We were involved in agitated disputes and discussions in search of any ways to achieve mutual understanding. As a result, at each meeting, as a rule, we managed to achieve something. Unfortunately, what was achieved wasn’t obviously enough…
On the days of the Conference and afterwards, I had a chance to receive in my office such foreign guests as an eminent political and public figure of the Iraq Republic, the chairman of the Democratic party of Kurdistan, Mustafa Mohamed al-Barzani; the first secretary of the CC of the Algerian communist party, Larbi Buhali; the secretary general of the CC of the Jordanian communist party, Fuad Nassar; the first secretary of the CC of the Communist party of Uruguay, Rodnei Arismendi (Boris N. Ponomarev who was the CC CPSU secretary, the CC international department head participated in the meeting as well).
Also, I visited a few delegations who were working undercover in their countries and were currently staying in separate mansions in Moscow. Apart from that, during the Conference we altogether had dinner in the Kremlin. Moreover, we often had to meet in the evenings for discussions.
I will recount about one such a meeting. My guest was a secretary general of the CC of the Portugal Communist party, comrade Alvaro Kunal.
The military-police regime of dictator Salazar ruled the country in those years. The communist party was declared out of law. Alvaro Kunal had to work undercover, was subjected to persecution, was arrested, then sentenced to death which was later changed for lifetime imprisonment. He was kept in a solitary confinement for a long time, was subjected to jail deprivation, suffered from insults and humiliations. Despite all these, his reputation and popularity were so high not only at home but also in the world that the Salazar regime had to free the prisoner. As a result, literally from the jail, he arrived in Moscow for the Conference.
When he entered my office, we firmly hugged and kissed each other, shook hands and I felt my eyes moistened full in tears. Alvaro wasn’t tall; he was thin, had a deep voice, was a native Portuguese and typical son of the Pyrenees. Outwardly he looked like an ordinary person. However, he was a legendary personality, an unbending fighter with an ‘iron’ personality. He never gave up his principles, nor did he betray anyone, nor did he compromise with the Salazar fascist regime!
And now he was talking to me. Answering to my questions, he told a lot about barbarian, cruel ill-treatment of political prisoners. At the end he said, ‘I’m happy that after having passed this ‘school’, now I’m in Moscow among my friends, confederates, communists, together with leaders of the communist and labor parties, visiting the CPSU and the Soviet state. I am truly grateful to the Soviet leaders, personally comrade Nikita Khrushchev, and all the Soviet people for the solidarity, assistance, and concrete support in my release!' (The Soviet country directly contributed, in accordance with the international law and protocol, in the release of Alvaro Kunal from prison. The meeting with this person made an enormous and indelible impression on me…)
Continuing a narration about the Conference, it should be noted that at the first meeting, the first thing in the morning, we agreed to work behind closed doors without participation of invited guests and without publications.
N.S. Khrushchev, as the leader of the host country, opened the Conference. The floor was given to speakers in the alphabet order in general, but sometimes, in the discussion course the order was breached. Each speaker could be asked questions, and he/she could make another speech with clarifications. After opening and exchanging views, it was decided to have the general secretariat, including a representative of each delegation, except for our delegation members, to record protocols, register written remarks of the delegates, and render other technical and organizational services. The outcomes of a day work were recorded on paper.
According to the Conference outcomes, it was decided to approve two documents, namely, the Statement and the Appeal. In order to fulfill this, a team, including a representative of each delegation, was formed. They were working on the document texts with due regard for all remarks and proposals.
At the Conference I was responsible for the matters relating to national liberation movement, struggle with colonialism, and general problems of the East.
At the Conference a number of steps were taken to make the Soviet state’s standpoint regarding issues of the East clearer and weightier. In fact, a lot had been done in that direction before the Conference. It was, first of all, a recent speech made by N.S. Khrushchev at the XV session of the UN General Assembly where he introduced a proposal to adopt the Declaration on providing independence to colonial countries and the peoples. All the participants in the session supported the Soviet initiative, which was a serious fundamental success of the USSR in its foreign policy.
International contacts were obtained with an unprecedented breadth. Only in November, 1960 the Soviet Union was visited by the following guests: the Cuban government economic mission led by Ernesto Che Guevara; the Iraqi government delegation led by the minister of education, brigadier general Ismail Ibragim Arif; the mission of friendship and goodwill of Morocco led by the famous political figure and statesman, the former prime-minister of the country, Ahmed Balafredge; the Moroccan military delegation led by corps general Mohamed Ben Mezian Bel Kasem; the Cambodian state leader , prince Norodom Sihanouk; the government delegation of the UAR (United Arab Republic) led by the vice-president of the country, marshal Abdel Hakim Amer; the party-and-government delegation of the People’s Republic of China led by Liu Shaoqi, and others.
On November 4th, before the conference, the newspaper Pravda published a leading article headlined ‘The Country of October - True Friend of the Peoples of Asia and Africa.’ Since I was directly involved in its writing, I dare to cite some paragraphs that are quite illustrative for the new strategy in the East:
‘…At the bottom of their hearts, the Soviet people, who have paid a high price by contributing heroic efforts to transform a poverty-ridden, enslaved by the foreign capital Russia into a strong socialist power, sincerely sympathize with and foster the yearnings of the peoples of Asia and Africa to establish their domestic economies and get pulled out from the tentacles of the imperialistic monopolies. Therefore, it is quite logical that it is the country of October that is the first to stretch its friendly helpful hand to the peoples of the East…
Rendering economic assistance and technical support to the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, we are not seeking for any advantages of economical, political or military character. Strictly observing the principles of non-interference, equity, and respect of other countries sovereignty, the Soviet Union pursues the only objective, i.e., to foster the progress of the Asian and African peoples, to strengthen their national independence, and improve life conditions of the peoples of these countries. This fundamentally new, unprecedented up to now in the history type of relationships between a powerful industrial country and economically under-developed countries, is coming out of the inherent nature of the socialist system…’
On the same newspaper page, there were eloquent citations from the two foreign newspaper issues.
Al-Gumkhuriya-garidat ash-Shaab (United Arab Republic): ‘The Soviet leaders have always admitted the presence of differences in principles and approaches of government between our two countries. However, these differences do not impede the cooperation between the UAR and the USSR for the sake of the better life and better future. This is the Soviet Union’s position. It is diametrically opposing to the US policy which is aimed at making us pursue a certain policy, bounding us to the American policy chariot due to the loans given us with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development the stockholder of which is the USA.’
The New-York Times Magazine (the USA): ‘Afghanistan is one of the few places where Russians and Americans are participating in the comparable economic aid programs; and the comparison, we have to admit, is not in our favor. Deficiencies of the American program in comparison with what Russians can do when they use their opportunities to the best advantage, are manifested here particularly strikingly and must be a warning relating to possible competition outcome in other countries.’
A brilliant article by an outstanding specialist, professor I.V. Komzin who was the chief expert in the construction of the Assouan high-rise dam. With a great love to the Egyptian people, he wrote: ‘For a short time of a little bit over a year, I had a chance to repeatedly visit a Egyptian village where I realized what were the hopes associated with the high-rise dam construction for millions of people.
Fellah is an Egyptian peasant, a poor man, an owner of a land plot of one fedan (0.4 hectare) size, at best, but more often he is a landless farm laborer or tenant. The fellahs account for over two thirds of the country population. In fact, they are the Egyptian people. They always tell about themselves, ‘We are like a needle which dresses others, but itself is always naked.’ The grandiose construction on the Nile River will open a new page in fellah’s life.’
I will put plain: during the Conference documents preparation, particularly the Statement, I had to literally eat ‘a bushel of salt’ not only with the foreign comrades, but also with the colleagues of mine. In particular, when discussing the inclusion in the text of the paragraph that ‘if up to now there have been only two main active forces in the world, there have been ‘two camps’ - capitalist and socialist, which basically has determined the main course of the world development, then now the third force has come into play. That is the national liberation movement that is bringing about the colonialism collapse. Not only does this force play a great role in the liberated or fighting for the independence countries, but it also essentially changes the world order picture, alignment, interactions, and conflicts of different forces.’
We had to argue, prove, and convince a lot. Many of our comrades were persistently upholding the out-of-date dogma: ‘The struggle between capitalism and socialism is going on in the world, which is the mainstream direction, while the national liberation movement and the struggle against colonialism is a minor, temporary, transitory phenomenon.’
Yet, we managed to uphold the different point of view. As a result, a separate paragraph focusing on this issue was included in the Conference Statement. It’s a pleasure to note that its inclusion was approved and welcomed by the vast majority of the Conference participants.
In the final Conference document, a considerable attention was paid to the coverage of the issues of national liberation movement, colonial peoples awakening for freedom and independence; the thesis on establishment there of the people’s democracy state was suggested; was given the assessment of different social forces who are able to participate along with labor class and peasantry in the national democratic movement. Since this part of the Statement is directly relating to the main theme of this chapter, its most important provisions will be given below.
‘National liberation revolutions have been spreading over vast areas in the world. For the past 15 postwar years in Asia and Africa, about 40 new sovereign countries have been established. The victory of the Cuban revolution has given a strong motivation to the Latin American peoples in their struggle for the national liberation. The people’s revolution in China has dealt a crushing blow to the positions of imperialism in Asia, and has fostered to a great extent the change of the world forces ratio in favor of socialism. Having given a new powerful incentive to national liberation movement, it has really influenced the peoples, especially the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. A new historic period has come into the mankind life: the liberated peoples have started actively participating in international policy…
The appearance of Asia has cardinally changed. Colonial orders are being destroyed in Africa. Communists have always admitted progressive revolutionary significance of national liberation wars and are the most active fighters for national liberation.
The peoples of the colonial countries are gaining their liberation by means of armed struggle as well as non-military ways, taking into account concrete conditions of each country. They achieve a complete victory based on strong national liberation movement. Colonial powers do not grant liberties to the colonial peoples, nor do they voluntarily leave the exploited by them countries…
The strengthening of political independence, agrarian reforming for peasants, demolishing remains and vestiges of feudalism, uprooting economical roots of the imperialism domination, limitation and exclusion of foreign monopolies from national economy, launching and developing national industry, increasing life standards of the population, democratization of social life, pursuit of independent peaceful foreign policy, developing the economical and cultural cooperation with socialist countries and other friendly states - all these nation-wide democratic objectives make the basis which enables liberated countries to really consolidate the progressive forces of the nation.
The union of the labor class and peasantry represents the most important force in the gaining and defending the national independence, substantial democratic reforming, and providing social progress.
Under the current circumstances in colonial and dependent countries, national bourgeoisie that is not connected with imperialistic circles is reasonably interested in implementation of the main objectives of anti-imperialistic and anti-feudal revolution. Therefore, it remains able to participate in the revolutionary struggle against imperialism and feudalism. In this regard, it has a progressive nature. However, it is unstable, and along with its progressiveness, is inclined to compromise with imperialism and feudalism. Due to the dual nature, national bourgeoisie of various countries participates in revolution in different ways, which depends on concrete conditions. It depends on the ratio changes of the class forces, on the conflict depth between imperialism, feudalism and the people, between imperialism, feudalism and the national bourgeoisie.
…All socialist countries and international labor and communist movement believe they should comprehensively support, morally and with funds, the peoples who are fighting for their liberation from the imperialistic and colonial yoke.’
On December 11th, was published the second final Conference document titled ‘Appeal to the Peoples of the World.’ By its essence and content, it was close to the similar document approved by the 1957 Conference and relating to the issues of the struggle for peace, the new world war prevention, prohibition of the tests, production, and usage of the nuclear weapons. A substantial difference of the 1960 ‘Appeal…’ was that a great attention was paid to the issues of the struggle for liquidation of colonialism and its hard heritage. The important amendments were introduced in the position that had been specified in the Comintern (Communist International) documents and J.V. Stalin’s speech at the 19th CPSU congress. Here, it emphasized a progressive role of national bourgeoisies in liberation movement; a necessity of the creation of the single front of all forces concerned in this movement; it pointed out that national democratic states should be established instead of proletariat dictatorship or the Soviet power in the liberated countries; it also underlined that the goal of communists was not the power seizure, but it was participation in liberation movement in alliance with all progressive, patriotic forces; national liberation movement was acknowledged as the third major force of the modernity on a par with a victory of the October Revolution and establishment of the socialist camp. I have already written that all these fundamental theses became the paragraphs in the document after having been discussed.
In this way this large-scale event was finished. Before it was planned to hold the CC CPSU Plenum in December, but at the Presidium it was found reasonable to postpone the Plenum till January. Meanwhile our delegation members at the Conference were supposed to visit different regions of the country to tell the communists and the people about the Conference resolutions.
As at that time I already worked in Moscow, I was charged to visit Uzbekistan and make a speech in front of the republic activists.
Since I had to deal with those matters, I’d like to tell about my so-to-speak study during the work at such a responsible position, without being a specialist in diplomacy and foreign policy; moreover, I had never taken a serious theoretical training and had practical experience.
Though it is true that I was involved in the foreign-policy affairs immediately after being elected as a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1948 and as the CC CPSU member at the 19th congress in October, 1952. However, I seriously faced that sphere when I was appointed the minister of foreign affairs of the republic. With gratitude and appreciation, I remember the lessons I learnt from V.M. Molotov and A.N. Kosygin.
To me, Molotov became like a teacher who had thoroughly instructed me. He told me how V.I. Lenin had been engaged in the foreign policy. Next, he familiarized me with the preparation, holding, and outcomes of the Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences of the leaders of the three great powers. Also, he told me about his meetings and conversations with Hitler before the war. Besides, he set forth the main principles and directions of the Soviet foreign policy, having shown me the achievements and failures in their implementations. Finally, he shared with me his ideas about making and pursuing the foreign policy in the post-Stalin period.
Being many times with A.N. Kosygin on the business trips and receiving foreign guests, from the conversations with him, I learnt a lot of useful knowledge not only in the domestic affairs, but also in the international relations.
I also tried to understand what I should never do in the foreign policy sphere and how it was harmful to put in oblivion and burry perspective interests of the whole country for a momentary benefit and own ambitions. In this respect, quite instructive were my observations of actions and words of Mikoyan during our visit to China and DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), and of Malinowski - to Albania. And Mikhail Suslov’s sectarianism and dogmatism in the theory and practice of the foreign policy were especially ‘instructive’ regarding the East in particular.
Apart from that, I learnt a lot of instructive knowledge from observing N.S. Khrushchev, Voroshilov, and L. Brezhnev’s activities overseas. The negative moments in their behaviors (mainly of personal nature) quite convincingly showed me how I should never behave visiting with a diplomatic mission a foreign country, and eastern countries in particular…
I’d rather put it in detail.
Having become the general secretary, J.V. Stalin didn’t make trips overseas except for his visit to Teheran during the war and Potsdam immediately after the war. N.S. Khrushchev, after having become the first secretary of the CC CPSU in 1953, was personally and directly involved in the foreign policy with inherent to him energy. Establishing actively contacts with leaders of the states and countries, he visited many countries and tried to meet almost all delegations arriving in the USSR.
However, the complexity and even delicacy of the situation was that it was hard to define the role played by N.S. Khrushchev during those contacts. After long discussions, a comparatively acceptable way was found. If it was a state delegation, then, of course, it was led by the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the USSR, Voroshilov, whereas N. S. Khrushchev was in the delegation as the Presidium member. If a meeting was held in our country or overseas at the governmental level, then N. S. Khrushchev was a member of our delegation as the Supreme Soviet Presidium member again, but the delegation was led by the chairman of the Ministers Council, Bulganin.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that due to his personality peculiarities and the party position in the country, N.S. Khrushchev, being as per the protocol just a delegation member, interfered in all matters and commanded, which, of course, could not be unnoticed and was played over many times in foreign media coverage.
Finally, the solution was found. In spite of the fact that at the 20th CPSU congress, Khrushchev publicly denounced holding simultaneously of two or more posts by one person, and as a negative example he mentioned J.V. Stalin, who had been the general secretary of the CC party and the chairman of the Ministers Council of the USSR, already two years later, at the proposal made by Mikhail Suslov and Leonid Brezhnev, Nikita Khrushchev was appointed as the chairman of the Ministers Council of the USSR. In that way, the inevitable confusion in contacts with leaders of foreign states and governments was removed partially.
Besides, there was another serious point. Immediately after the non-public report made by Khrushchev at the 20th party congress, the dethroning of J.V. Stalin personality cult, and particularly after the October CC Plenum resolution in 1956, Nikita Khrushchev’s authority and reputation in the left circles in many countries went down to a certain extent. Some stopped respecting him because of their beliefs while others were discrediting him deliberately to complicate the position of our country by manifesting their dissatisfaction, reproaches, regrets, and censures.
The matter reached the point that not all the foreign visitors arriving in Moscow expressed initiative to meet N.S. Khrushchev and negotiate with him.
In addition to practical issues inside our country and overseas, I was involved together with other comrades in dealing with major issues. In order to enable a reader to have an idea of that work, I will give a few examples about how it was happening and what lessons I have learned from them.
The Emperor of Abyssinia (Ethiopia), Haile Selassie (Negus), arrived in Moscow. He was accompanied by the prime-minister, the crown prince, a few dozens of the ministers, commanders, and businessmen. The Soviet delegation included as follows: K.E. Voroshilov (the leader), N.S. Khrushchev, N.A. Mukhitdinov, R.Y. Malinowski, A.A. Gromyko, and others.
They were received royally. The interest of the Muscovites and the leaders of our country to the Emperor and his retinue was great. This was due to the fact that Ethiopia was one of the most ancient centers of birth and formation of the mankind culture. Existing here at the beginning of our era a large country, called Axum, played an essential role in spreading Christianity in Africa. The authority of this country in the world considerably rose in 1935, when its people and the armed forces courageously resisted against the Italian occupation troops invasion. Under the active support of the USSR and the other countries in the Nations League, its partisans, who were active all over the country, succeeded in freeing Ethiopia and ousting the Italian invaders in 1941.
The relationships between Russia and Abyssinia have been established since a long time. The hospital built by Russia in Addis-Ababa in the early 20th century successfully functioned, and the Russian medical doctors enjoyed respect and trust of the locals.
The Emperor was accommodated in the Kremlin, whereas his retinue was accommodated in the mansions. The first round of the negotiations showed an aspiration of both parties to the cooperation development. The preparation of the discussed beforehand through diplomatic channels documents to be signed was completed.
The first official lunch was given in the Kremlin Faceted Chamber. We were seated in the following way: on the Emperor’s right there was Khrushchev, on his left - his interpreter, next to whom - Malinowski. On the opposite side just in front of the Emperor there was Voroshilov, on his right - the prime-minister of Abyssinia, on his left – I was seated, and so on.
Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov delivered a welcoming speech. The answering speech by the Emperor was benevolent and respectful. Having noted a century-old history of the bilateral relationships, all of a sudden, he mentioned that his compatriot Pushkin was a creator of the Russian literature language and the new Russian literature. At the end of his speech he assured that he would do his best to develop the cooperation with the great Soviet Union.
After the applauses Kliment Yefremovich bending over asked me, ‘What did he say about Pushkin?’ (His hearing was impaired due to the concussion injured in the warfare.)
I invited a sitting at the table employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who knew the Amharic language and was making records. He read us his records, confirming the interpretation correctness. Kliment Yefremovich, as if consulting with me, said he would clarify a point about Pushkin. By protocol during such welcoming top-level dinners, repeated speeches, particularly expressing objections, are not in practice. Besides, it was impossible to get consulted with Khrushchev because he was sitting on the opposite side of the table.
And so… At the end of the lunch, Kliment Yefremovich stood up and said something like this, ‘Your Majesty! I decided to thank you for the warm greetings, for a high appraisal of the success of the Soviet Union and its policy on the international arena. We highly appreciate your desire to expand the cooperation and we will do our best.
You are right to say about Pushkin’s merits in the development of the Russian language and literature. As to his origin, it is well-known. We are now sitting with you in the Moscow Kremlin, whereas Alexander Sergeevich was born in the neighboring street of the city in 1799. His father, Sergei Lvovich, was a nobleman, landowner, and a well-educated person, while his mother, Nadezhda Osipovna, was Abram’s granddaughter, who was a son of the Abyssinian duke, called Hannibal, who had been a hostage in Constantinople. Russian people saved young Hannibal from slavery, brought him to Russia where he became an orthodox. Then Tsar Peter I gave him education and made him a close person.
Pushkin was born, grew up, and was educated in Russia where he demonstrated his talent, gift, and inspiration. He studied the rich history and culture of the great country of Russia, and on its fertile ground he became a genius national Russian poet.’
Further Kliment Yefremovich cited a few lines from a poem glorifying poet’s love to Russia and its people. Having emphasized the international character of Pushkin’s philosophy, he cited emotionally Pushkin's prophetic words:
Rumors about me will pass all over great Russia,
Where I will be remembered by anyone in any tongue,
Whether it be a proud grandson of the Slavs, or a Finn,
or a wild at present Tungusman, or a friend of the steppe - Kalmyk.
And he added, ‘The Russian people are proud that immortal works by Pushkin have enriched world literature and become a heritage of the whole mankind. To Your health, Your Emperor’s Majesty!’
The Emperor just read out the speech prepared for him by his assistants, whereas Kliment Yefremovich displayed his knowledge of the Russian culture, poetry and spoke impromptu about Pushkin and his masterpieces. All of us, including Abyssinians, were under the spell listening to him, and at the end we rapturously applauded him.
The Emperor was undoubtedly an experienced statesman and diplomat, but yet, by his eyes and face expression one could notice that he was a little bit embarrassed. His milieu looked in the same way.
At the end of the dinner N.S. Khrushchev invited the honored guest and his retinue for a coffee, as per the protocol, to the winter garden which was nearby the Faceted chamber. At the round table we were seated as follows: Emperor, next to him - Khrushchev, then Voroshilov and I, and the interpreter was behind us. Here Nikita Sergeevich was mostly speaking. After Voroshilov’s eloquent speech, the Emperor’s oratory decreased, and he only nodded from time to time in reply to Khrushchev’s verbose discourses.
Kliment Yefremovich twice tried to join the active conversation, but Nikita Sergeevich stopped him showing a sign and prohibiting him to interfere. The time was elapsing. But Khrushchev continued speaking while the Emperor was listening to him silently. At last, the patience of Voroshilov was over, and he told Khrushchev quite loudly, ‘Cut the gabbing!' Nikita Sergeevich, of course, didn’t expect such a non-diplomatic interference and tried unsuccessfully to finish the conversation in a proper manner. Then Emperor who was surely informed by his interpreter about what was happening thanked for the good reception and stood up bidding farewell to us. We stood up too.
In order to face the East, many measures were taken in the country in those years.
In the 1950s, a lot of foreign young people arrived in the Soviet Union to study at Soviet universities. The social composition analysis of foreign students showed that they were mainly children of ruling governmental executives and politicians as well as springs of well-to-do families. There were very few students representing working people, peasants, the poorest strata of the intellectuals, families of craftsmen and members of truly revolutionary parties. However, it was them who couldn’t afford themselves to study in private schools and universities either in their countries or even in the West. Meanwhile, the formation of national cadres in young countries at that time was an objective of paramount importance. Therefore, our assistance should have been of the so-called social character as well.
On this basis, I told Khrushchev an idea of the reasonable establishment in Moscow of a training center for foreign students sent by foreign social political organizations. The idea was approved by the CC Presidium. As a result, the formed commission consisting of Kirillin, Elyutin, and myself was committed to prepare a resolution.
Our presented project stipulated that this new diversified higher educational institution would provide education in the volume provided by Soviet universities and would have a complex basis including educational, scientific, production functions as well as dormitories, apartments for families, cultural-elucidative, sporting, shopping, house-holding, and other supplementary services and facilities. The education was to be provided free of charge. It was supposed to grant quotas to social political organizations according to which they would send young people to Moscow.
It was planned that professors, teachers, scientific-auxiliary and administrative-maintenance employees of this educational institution would be well-paid for their jobs.
It was proposed to name this educational institution as ‘The Peoples' Friendship University.’ The resolution was adopted and published. However, already in preparing it we faced two problems: governments of a few eastern but west-oriented countries declared that citizens of their countries would be sent overseas to study only with the government permission. We, of course, decided not to interfere in domestic affairs of other countries and to send quotas directly to foreign social political organizations which would have to independently arrive at consensus with their local authorities.
Another problem which seemed to arise absolutely unexpectedly turned out to be more difficult. Everybody knew that the agents of one of the western countries had killed the leader of the Congolese people, whose name was Patrice Lumumba. That event caused the indignation in the progressive world. The foreign-policy bodies of the USSR sharply denounced that villainous action and made a suggestion to perpetuate the memory of that dead political figure.
To the project on the organization of the institute, we added the following paragraph: to name the ‘University of the Peoples' Friendship’ after Patrice Lumumba.
I endorsed the project which was approved by the CC Presidium, formalized by the government, and published in mass media. However, written objections by a few foreign students and organizations were coming soon. They wrote they deeply respected Patrice Lumumba, acknowledged his merits, and were happy to retain the memory of him. Therewith they found useful to take into consideration that every nation had their leaders. Moreover, not only did the Soviet or Congolese students study at this university, but also the students from many other countries. That’s why it would be better to keep the international status of ‘The Peoples' Friendship University’, and name any other Soviet university or institution after Patrice Lumumba. Having weighed the pros and cons, we agreed that the name ‘The Peoples' Friendship University’ was an official and single for everybody. As to the name of Patrice Lumumba, the Soviet country would keep it, and foreign students and institutions might pronounce this addition to their discretion.
Due to this as it seemed insignificant episode, I drew a conclusion that in international affairs even in minute things, one should not be guided by only personal emotions, sympathies, and antipathies. The noblest incentive, if it doesn’t take into account interests, touches prestige and dignity of all parties concerned, then will never give a desirable result. And sometimes, it can even hurt the matter.
Running ahead I will say that a grand opening of the Peoples' Friendship University was on November 17th, 1960, which was widely covered in mass media.
Let us think back to the late 1950s when the country started turning its face to the East. Research studies and training scientific manpower were developing. Young specialists in oriental studies successfully worked together with the elder generation of Soviet orientalists who were the fame and pride of the Soviet science. Along with the old centers of oriental studies in Moscow and Leningrad, the similar hearths focusing on the East studies were established in Yerevan, Tbilisi, Baku, Tashkent, Stalinabad, Ashkhabad, and Frunze.
Young scientists, who were fluent in Chinese, multi-nationality Indian languages, Arabic, Indonesian, Vietnamese, Persian, Pashto, languages of Burma and other eastern nationalities, started playing a significant role not only in diplomacy, but also in the East science development, and thereby in the friendly relationships consolidation with the Eastern peoples.
It was found out that at our schools mainly western languages were taught, which, of course, could be only encouraged. However, at the same time, eastern languages were not paid the due attention. Having invited the education ministers of the republics, we discussed that crucial issue. Taking into consideration that foreign languages should be learnt from early age, at least at primary schools, the learning some eastern languages, including Chinese, Arabic, Hindi, Urdu, and Farsi, was introduced as a school subject in some Central Asian republics. Hence, we were seriously involved in training teachers of the eastern languages.
The necessity of improving teaching the history of the East at secondary schools was obvious. Academic curriculums on the history taught at schools in the early 1950s did not focus on the East enough. At secondary schools, the academic curriculum included the ancient history: only 24 hours were assigned for the Ancient East (including 2 hours for India and 4 hours for China), whereas 65 hours were assigned for Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome. Out of 99 hours assigned for the medieval ages history, only 15 hours were dedicated to all eastern countries, including India, the Arab East, Central Asia, Mongolian invasions, and Turk conquests.
At school, the modern history of the foreign West or the foreign East were not taught. In the new-time history course, out of 124 academic hours only 5 were devoted to China; as to India, its history was covered superficially and just in connection with the English foreign policy. The history of the other eastern countries wasn’t taught at all. Such a situation was admitted inappropriate, and it was recommended to review school curriculums so that the history of the East was properly reflected.
Measures were taken to develop both oriental-studies educational institutions and other universities by inviting skilled teachers and, if need be, experts from respective countries of the East.
Resting upon orientalists from Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities, the Oriental Institute, based on the eastern faculty of the Central Asian State University named after V.I. Lenin, was established in Tashkent. It began training skilled experts in languages, literature, history, and economics of the East. It was decided to run evening classes within the institute framework to enable different specialists such as doctors, agronomists, and engineers to learn eastern languages.
Educational trips of Soviet students to eastern countries became more frequent so that there in real life of the studied country they could better comprehend and learn life and national culture. Meanwhile, educational trips of international students from eastern countries to the USSR became more frequent as well. This practice was introduced in most Soviet republics. In particular, in Uzbekistan in 1956, at 6 universities studied 110 students, postgraduates, and cadets from 7 foreign countries, including 42 students, 8 postgraduates, and 30 cadets from China, 12 students from Mongolia, 7 students from North Vietnam, as well as from North Korea, and other countries of the East.
It turned out that orientalist-economists produced very few comprehensive papers on issues faced by eastern countries. Nor were there any studies of agrarian reforms occurring in the newly-born politically sovereign countries.
In order to improve the efficiency, the Oriental Study Institute under the Science Academy of the USSR underwent restructuring and professors-and-teachers re-staffing. Also, the research themes were diversified and expanded. A branch of that institute was established in Leningrad. Completely new research institutions such as the Institute of Africa and Institute of the Far East were established.
In Moscow the specialized journals started being issued, including Sovremennii Vostok (The Modern East), Narody Azii i Afriki (The Peoples of Asia and Africa). Also, a publishing house of eastern literature was established. The first steps in that direction were being made in the union republics as well.
No valuable comprehensive scientific work about many major eastern countries such as China, India, Indonesia, and others had been issued since the 1930s. So, the latest large monograph dedicated to Indonesia was written by professor A.A. Guber in the 1930s. Now scientific research plans for the next 5 and more years were thoroughly thought over and elaborated at the oriental study institutions.
A special attention was paid to the coordination of science institution activities. The Oriental Study Institute (OSI) under the Science Academy of the USSR became the headquarters assigned to coordinate all those activities in the country.
It was found out that the Leningrad branch of the OSI, which had the largest collection of eastern manuscripts in the Soviet Union, had limited its work to publishing general descriptions of the collection in a few eastern languages. As to the manuscripts, in fact, they had never been studied at all.
Also, the richest manuscript collection at the OSI under Science Academy of Uzbekistan was of world significance. However, only 4 volumes of the catalogues that included the description of 4,000 manuscripts were published. Moreover, that work was done for 6 years. There were 75,000 manuscripts more in their collection. How long would it take to familiarize our country and the world with those manuscripts if they continued studying them at such pace?
The delayed publication of works by prominent science-and-culture figures of the medieval-century East was absolutely intolerable. It became obvious that it was necessary to make joint efforts in a thorough study of the papers written by the past scientists and thinkers, in publication of their works in the languages of the USSR peoples and foreign countries. These genius masterpieces which made eastern peoples proud should have become a heritage of the world’s peoples.
For a Soviet reader, were available insufficient materials relating to the contemporary life of people of the multi-ethnic East. So, in the journal Inostrannaya Literatura (Foreign Literature) dated in 1956, they published only one novel ‘A Tiger-Rider’ by Bhatta Charia and a few stories and verses by foreign eastern authors. Very few quality-wise translations of eastern poets and authors were published.
That was such a situation then. That was such measures that were taken for the essential improvement of scientific-theoretical and historical-political work relating to the foreign East.
It is worth mentioning, in my opinion, the story of establishing an Association of writers of Asian and African countries. The conference of Asian writers took place in the capital of India - Delhi in 1956. Poetess Zulfiya, who was an Uzbekistan delegation member, was assigned to make a proposal on holding the next conference in Tashkent. That proposal was welcomed with pleasure by the attendees.
The preparatory work started during which an idea of holding the conference of writers of the two continents - Asia and Africa - arose.
Gamal Abdel Nasser, the president of Egypt, arrived in the USSR in May, 1958. During his trip around our country, we, accompanying him, discussed that matter. He heartily supported us. The writer, Khamid Gulyam, was sent to Cairo to arrange the forum.
The first conference of writers of Asian and African countries took place in Tashkent in October, 1958. Over 200 writers, poets, and other outstanding literature figures from 37 countries of the two continents as well as the guests from 13 countries of Europe and America participated in it. They were representatives of different peoples, religions, and political beliefs. But all of them were united by a unanimous conviction in the necessity of the struggle against colonialism, social and national oppression, and fight for peace.
A big credit in the arrangement of the First Tashkent conference and in the further development of that powerful movement deserved as follows: Nazim Khikmet, Patrice Lumumba, Indian poet Makhmud Dervish, eminent Arab writer Youssef Sebai, Angolan writer Agostinho Neto, and many other literary figures of Asian and African countries. Meeting them in Tashkent and Moscow, we discussed not only literature issues; the subject of national-liberation movement and development prospects of the newly-born sovereign countries could not be avoided.
From the USSR’s part, in that great job participated directly and actively as follows: Alexander Fadeev, Alexander Korneichuk, Vanda Vasilevskaya, Mirzo Tursun-zade, Berdy Kerbabaev, Nikolai Tikhonov, Georgii Markov, Anatolii Safronov, Anuar Alimzhanov, Chingiz Aitmatov, Kaisyn Kuliev, Rasul Gamzatov, Alim Keshokov, Alexei Surkov, and others. And, of course, a lot was done for establishing contacts by writers and poets of Uzbekistan and the other Soviet Central Asian republics.
After the Tashkent conference of Asian and African writers, the second conference took place in Cairo in 1962; the third one - in Beirut in 1967; the forth one - in Delhi in 1970, the fifth one - in Alma-Ata in 1973.
In that way the fruitful cooperation of writers-patriots of the planet’s largest continents was intensified. At the same time the national and international committees of the solidarity of the peoples of Asia and Africa, as well as the Union of the Soviet societies for friendship and cultural relations with foreign countries were established.
XV
MOSCOW – BEIJING:
LOVE AND DISAGREEMENTS
In August, 1956 Malin made a phone call from Moscow to Tashkent and informed that I was included in the CPSU delegation going to the forthcoming VIII congress of the Communist party of China. At the meeting of the CC CPSU Presidium in early September, a decision package relating to that congress was passed. It included an approval of the draft letter by the leadership of the CPSU and Soviet government to Mao Zedong and his companions-in-arms, ratification of the CC CPSU’s greeting addressed to the VIII congress, which was to be published by the Soviet press on the commencement day of the congress and to be sent to China a few days before the opening ceremony. Besides, the membership of the CC CPSU delegation was ratified as follows: A.I. Mikoyan, N.A. Mukhitdinov, B.N. Ponomarev, I.V. Kapitonov, and P.A. Satyukov. In addition, some amendments in Mikoyan’s speech at the congress were made, after which the speech text was approved. Apart from that, the information and directives for P.F. Yudin, the USSR ambassador to China, were prepared. Also, the TASS (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union), all newspapers, magazines, and mass media agencies were assigned to widely cover the congress of the Chinese communists, to publish almost the full speech text by Mao Zedong, the reports by Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping in Pravda and other major newspapers. Finally, all the necessary organizational decisions were made.
Our whole delegation was gathered in Mikoyan’s office twice to discuss all the matters. We went to China in the best mood. It was the first time I visited this great country.
We flew by a new cozy and comfortable aircraft IL-18. During the flight time I was thinking about my first trip to China. I read and heard a lot about this ancient country. There was a population of 700 million people then (now there are much more than a milliard). Uzbekistan and China had been keeping in touch since the ancient time for thousands of years. It was then when the Great Silk Road was put in China. Many great Chinese scientists in many spheres are well-known in our country. The friendship between the peoples of China and Central Asia was glorified in the poetry. The Chinese porcelain and tea are valued highly in my native land.
Apparently, I was going to see and hear Mao Zedong, himself, who had such a high authority in our country and many other countries, especially in the third world, that it could be compared to only Stalin’s one. It was not an accidence that at one of the sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet V.M. Molotov declared in his report on the foreign policy that the socialist camp was led now by two great superpowers – the USSR and China.
We were warmly met at the Beijing airport, then we were comfortably accommodated: each of us had a separate room with all amenities. The next day we were driven to the Palace where our delegation was welcomed by Mao Zedong and his companions-in-arms. He listened to Khrushchev’s message pronounced by Mikoyan. Mao Zedong shortly told us about the planned procedure of the congress and, in particular, spoke about the cultural program designed to familiarize the Soviet delegation with sightseeing in China. He emphasized that there were a lot of general and bilateral issues to be thoroughly discussed. For that reason, we were suggested to meet separately during the breaks and possibly in the evenings after the sittings…On that part the conversation was over.
In the evening, the official reception ceremony for foreign delegations was held in the Palace. The guests were whispering that all the Politburo members would be present and that Mao Zedong would make a big speech. The hall was full. Everybody was stiffened waiting and immediately turned towards the doors when the leaders of China came out of those doors. The rapturous applause burst out. Right away some liquors, cold, alcohol and soft drinks were served. We all were standing. At that time Mao Zedong having a wineglass in his hand came up to a microphone. All the attendees and the presidium turned towards him to listen to his speech.
He said in a half voice, ‘To your health!’ and raised his glass and then returned to his seat. These three words were actually his welcome speech. Standing nearby academician Yudin, who was the Soviet ambassador, noted, ‘It was the shortest toast. That was right.’
After that everyone was invited for a dinner. Purely the Chinese food was served.
The congress started in the morning. We were seated in the presidium in the first row on the right side. Mao Zedong opened the congress with a short speech and then announced that a summary report of the CC would be reported by Liu Shaoqi, five-year plan would be reported by Zhou Enlai, and the party Charter would be reported by Deng Xiaoping. The congress proceeded to work.
To me, the new thing about it was that while Mao Zedong and the other speakers were speaking, all the delegates were reading the handouts without raising their heads. That was unusual. It turned out that there were essential distinctions among the different dialects of the provinces. However, all of them had the single hieroglyphic writing system.
There was another point. Before the beginning of the congress the delegates of the provinces were gathered in advance to study the documents and proposals, to discuss them and elaborate their opinions. Thus, at the meetings the delegates had already known about the approved in advance explanations and confirmations.
Mao Zedong and the other Chinese executives spoke warmly at the congress about the Soviet Union, its support to the national liberation struggle in China, and the role of the USSR in other international aspects. But for me as well as for the other delegation members, except for Mikoyan, the things we had to hear and find out during the confidential bilateral meetings with the Chinese leaders, which took place during the breaks between the congress sessions and in the evenings, were absolutely unexpected, new, and really hard.
On the Chinese part the whole CC CPC Politburo participated in the meetings while on the Soviet Union part there were all the delegation members and the USSR ambassador to China. All together there were three meetings before our departure to Korea (see below about it) and one final meeting before our departure to Moscow.
One conversation lasted six hours. What calmness, patience, equanimity, and self-control the Chinese have! Mao Zedong spoke at all the meetings, and on our part, spoke only the head of the delegation, A.I. Mikoyan. From time to time one of us answered Mao Zedong’s questions (he addressed me two questions).
The Chinese ritual ceremony of tea drinking was the most welcome during those negotiations. The strong, surprisingly fragrant, green tea with spices was served in porcelain mugs with lids. Such tea does not only quench one’s thirst and help digestion, but also tones up, heartens and helps concentrating. We were attentively listening and drinking tea while the girls were refreshing the tea every half an hour. Some Chinese comrades were smoking some aromatic cigarettes.
The conversations were serious and sharp; and the situation was strained.
So, what was happening and what were the conversations about?
Starting negotiations Mao Zedong said that the Chinese-Soviet friendship would be further consolidating and developing; however, lately the serious problems relating to the relationships of our parties, governments and world communist movement arose.
Further I’m recounting according to my memories and my records.
‘We want,’ said Mao Zedong, ‘to frankly and trustfully exchange our views with you and discuss them. Naturally, our meetings are private, and we are not going to cover them in media. The discussion will go on in the following way: I will tell you our positions, then we will listen to you, and after that we will exchange our views widely and comprehensively without time limit.’
Mikoyan expressed his consent. Mao Zedong continued, ‘You held the 20th party congress. Of course, every party and every country have the right to hold any events in the way they consider reasonable. We are not going to interfere in the purely internal matters. However, except for the CC report, adopting the five-year plan for the national economy development and the party Charter ratification, which we find positive, you held, without participation of the foreign delegations, including ours, whom you had invited, the private session where you sharply denounced Stalin’s activities and the harmful consequences of his personality cult.
Stalin was the leader of your party and country for a long time. Besides, he was indisputably the recognized leader of the international communist movement. As the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet army, he directly led the army in the warfare where the Soviet people and all the peaceful forces won a great victory. He is considered as one of the founders of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and we gratefully express our appreciation of his endeavors in rendering assistance to our country, people, army, and the party.
In view of the above, we disagree with such an attitude to the person who did so much for his own country, the socialist camp, and the communist movement.
As much it provoked indignation that the foreign delegations invited by you to the congress were sitting in the hotel while so important not only for the CPSU and the Soviet Union matters were being discussed. How ethical and comrade-like it is, judge for yourselves. The brief information provided by your representatives for the delegations did not cover enough the essence of the report and speeches made at the private session.
Furthermore, you did not give an official detailed report about those extraordinary events. As a result, we found out what had happened in detail not from you, but from western media. Even when Khrushchev’s report was published overseas, you did not give any comments on if it was true or not.
Finally, such a severe censure of your leader was widely used by all enemies of communist parties, labor movement, and socialist countries, and in that way armed all our foes of every stripe.’
Mao Zedong fell silent, showing he was waiting for Mikoyan’s reply. Stating the Soviet standpoint, A.I. Mikoyan, naturally, justified the resolutions of the 20th congress and the necessity of the private session, because it was focusing on our domestic affairs and the choice of the discussion form was also in our competence. He emphasized that the content of Khrushchev’s report reflected the standpoint of the whole party leadership, which was approved by the congress delegates. Then, Mikoyan poured over Stalin with sharp large-scale accusations. I heard some things spoken by him for the first time. They were absent from Khrushchev’s report or any other documents.
Mao Zedong began speaking again. He was justifying Stalin, estimating pros and cons in his deeds and achievements almost in percentage, in the result of which his positive outcomes immeasurably weighed over the negative ones. He was giving examples from the history of the war and the world communist movement. He was comparing Russia before Stalin and during Stalin’s time, which had made giant steps in all spheres under Stalin’s leadership and had become a truly great world power. Finally, Mao Zedong emphasized that all those achievements had come into life due to Stalin’s permanent merit.
Mikoyan, objecting, started criticizing Stalin again… Actually, the first meeting lasting a few hours ended up on that part. We agreed to continue the discussion the next day and parted.
Having returned to the hotel, I couldn’t get it over for a long time. Unintentionally, I remembered Stalin speaking at the first Plenum of the new CC membership elected at the 19th party congress where he was accusing Mikoyan of his serious mistakes in the internal and foreign policies and even of the damage done by him to the country. When Mikoyan mounted the platform to justify himself, the audience interrupted him preventing him from speaking. So, he had to come back to his seat. At that time, under Stalin’s proposal he wasn’t included in the CC Presidium membership.
I couldn’t get rid of the thought that this oldest party member whose portraits we used to carry at the demonstrations, who had worked with Stalin hand in hand for over thirty years, whom he so emotionally glorified for dozens of years, now, feeling vengeance, was humiliating the deceased by diminishing his achievements and insulting him, and what's more, in a foreign country…
The nuances of Stalin and Mao Zedong’s relationship were well-known. The Chinese couldn’t forget, of course, that general V.I. Chuikov was the advisor to Chiang Kai Shek. The general became afterwards one of the eminent commanders and the hero of the Great Patriotic War (World War II). There were also some other points which caused the tension. Nevertheless, the roles were placed paradoxically: the Chinese justified Stalin and highlighted his merits and virtues, whereas the head of our delegation accused him of his mistakes and crimes.
We had dinner in the evening and breakfast the next morning in the circle of our delegation. We were gloomy and silent. I didn’t share my thoughts and feelings with anyone, but I guess the others felt the same.
The congress continued; we all were attentively listening to the speakers and in the evening, went to the meeting again, frankly speaking, without any enthusiasm. And this time Mao Zedong was again the first to suggest us to exchange the views on our bilateral relations.
Addressing to Mikoyan he said, ‘Internal and foreign policies, as it is known, are interconnected, indivisible, being continuation of each other. Yesterday we spoke about Stalin’s mistakes in the foreign policy pursuit. How are you going to correct them? We are not going to talk about your internal policy, but your foreign policy concerns us as well.’
Mikoyan, being usually a dodger, felt confused to immediately reply. Then he said that we were focusing mainly on correcting Stalin’s mistakes in the domestic policy, which was basically the subject of the CC CPSU Plenum decree.
To which Mao Zedong objected, ‘You are one of the closest Stalin’s companion-in-arms and an experienced politician. Could you tell me, please, if it’s possible to make mistakes in the internal policy without facing any problems in the foreign policy?’
Mikoyan noted, ‘Apart from successes, of course, there were some matters we are correcting now.’
Mao Zedong continued, ‘We don’t know what you are going to do further. Naturally, we are going to cooperate in the matters of which we have the same opinion. Do you think there are still unsolved issues between us? Any positions to be reconsidered? By the way, when you last visited us, we discussed some of them and you promised to report about them to comrade Stalin personally.’
Mikoyan just gathered thoughts and was about to answer when Mao Zedong pointed out the one of the unsettled issues relating to the Soviet-Chinese border, saying that some territories which used to belong to China since the dawn of time now were annexed to the Soviet Union. Then he added, ‘No wonder they say that the Soviet Union ‘grabbed’ part of the neighboring areas after World War II.’
Further he continued the enumeration of the unsettled issues, including the work of the Soviet specialists in China, the military cooperation and economic relations, and so on and so forth. However, he didn’t touch disagreements in ideological and theoretical matters.
There was something vague and unknown for me about that I heard. Mikoyan, even being far better informed, couldn't always reply right away.
The second meeting finished. We, at least myself, had an ordeal feeling that it wouldn’t be so easy to settle all the complicated issues accumulated in the relations between our countries. In addition, the peculiar Chinese leadership’s attitude to them was often surprising. It meant serious disagreements in the bilateral relations might arise in the future as well.
Then there was the third meeting at which Mao Zedong, having told us how they planned to finish the congress, said, ‘Let’s continue our conversation. How do you see the development of the international communist and labor movement and the national liberation struggle of the peoples?’ And he attentively looked at Mikoyan. A.I. Mikoyan answered, mainly repeating what had been spoken at the 20th CPSU congress.
In response, Mao Zedong displayed a wide panorama and gave his assessment of the situation, saying again that the censure of Stalin’s activity might trigger a negative impact on that important sphere.
Then, all of a sudden, he said that in Pyongyang the situation was not good because of some serious disagreements arisen in the Korea Labor Party leadership. Further he stated that it would be useful for our parties (CPC and CPSU) to render assistance to Korean comrades.
‘With this goal,’ he continued, ‘perhaps, we will send representatives of the both parties there to support the Korean leaders in the disagreement settlement and the restoration of the solidarity and friendly work.’ Then he added, ‘Comrade Mikoyan, will you inform ‘Moscow’ of that? With the positive attitude, our party delegation may be led by Peng Dehuai (he pointed to the latter with his right hand), who in particular was the leader of the Chinese volunteers, who had assisted in defending the sovereignty and independence of Korea during the war.’
Of course, ‘Moscow’ was immediately informed. The next morning, we received the directive saying to agree with Mao Zedong’s proposal; Mikoyan, Mukhitdinov, and Ponomarev were to fly to Pyongyang; and Kapitonov and Satyukov were to continue participation in the 8th CPC congress.
Thus, three members out of our delegation flew by our aircraft, and two hours later the Chinese delegation led by Peng Dehuai flew by their aircraft to the capital of North Korea.
We were accommodated in the country house. A. I. Mikoyan immediately secluded with the CC secretary who met us. Then he told us he was going to see Kim Il-Sung for a private conversation and added, ‘Comrade Ponomarev, you will go with me. As the CC department head you may be needed.’ And addressing me he said, ‘And you may have a rest or go sightseeing about the city.’
After about twenty minutes or so, Pak Den Ai (the CC secretary who had led the Korean delegation at Stalin’s funeral) and another Politburo member came to pick me up. They showed me the sightseeing of the city. Then we made some trips by the motorboat in the lakes. What wonderful places! If Japan is called the Land of the Rising Sun, then Korea is known as the Land of the Morning Dawn and the Land of a thousand lakes.
In the motorboat cabin we had a conversation. I was told, ‘It’s good that you aren’t taking part in these issues. Right now, Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai are working on them while you are our guest. We would like to confidentially tell you that a few our CC members launched systematic and in concord attacking the country leaders including Kim Il-Sung. Using criticisms of Stalin and other difficulties in your country, they want to reorient Korea and separate it from the Soviet Union. For this purpose, they began sabotaging to overthrow the present regime. When we came to know about all these, we decided to summon the plenum in order to listen to them, together assess their standpoints and make conclusions. Having known about that, they secretly escaped.’
I assured them that I did not know about it and comrade Mikoyan would certainly clarify the Soviet Union’s attitude. After saying those words, I kept silent. In the evening we returned to the country house where I was left to have a rest. Mikoyan arrived late. I met him in the hall and after greeting told him what I came to know. Interrupting me with the words, ‘Do not listen to them,’ he entered his room.
The next morning, the plenum of the CC Labor Party of Korea started in the CC premises.
In the presidium, only the Politburo members were sitting; on the right perpendicularly, there was a table and there were four seats behind it. We took the seats there. On the opposite side, there was a table for the Chinese delegation, with Peng Dehuai sitting in the middle of the delegation. The CC members and the Labor party leaders were sitting in the hall. Here I first saw Kim Il-Sung. Speaking in a low voice, he commenced the plenum by stating that it was necessary to discuss the situation in the leadership of the party and the country: ‘You all are aware that this issue was raised before. However, for the certain reasons, we could not discuss it. Today we must review and decide it.’
Everybody agreed with this agenda.
He told the gist of the matter: ‘Winning the sovereignty of North Korea in 1953 became a historic event. For a short time with the assistance of the great friends - the Soviet Union and China - the country has achieved significant success. However, it is divided, and the enemy is by the door; inside, as a consequence of the occupation, many destructions and difficulties have still remained. A few complications have arisen in the leadership during the work, although the party and the state authority undoubtedly enjoy the people’s confidence.’
Kim Il-Sung continued, ‘The fact of the matter is that a group of our companions-in-arms have the goal to change the course of the party policy, are blaming the leadership for their wrong actions and are contrasting ones to the others. Let us make it clear today. The most important for us is the party consolidation and saving the people’s confidence. Anyone who wants to speak is welcome.’
And then one by one, oppositionists began sharply criticizing the Politburo work.
The Politburo members objected the accusations and explained. Neither the Chinese representatives nor the Soviet ones pronounced a word. They only attentively listened to the speakers and made records. Then Kim Il-Sung addressing to his opponents noted, ‘You are criticizing all of us. But how about you? Have you got any shortcomings, have you made any mistakes? You are talking about the problems in the country. Don’t you bear responsibility for what is going on together with the other leadership members?’
In reply one of the criticizing opponents evasively said, ‘Of course, we are not separating ourselves from the leadership members. But you have not allowed us to work, to show initiative, and act more courageously.’
No one else wanted to speak. Then Kim Il-Sung stood up and summed up noting that the discussion was useful.
‘The comrades seem to be busy with self-analysis and realize the extent of their responsibility. All this gives the grounds to think they can continue work as the leadership members. I hope that we, the Korean revolutionaries-patriots, will achieve consistency at work. Does anyone want to add anything?’
No one wanted.
‘Then, let us make a decision?’
The voices were heard from the hall, ‘Yes.’
‘Who are for the decision, raise your hands, please.’
Many raised the hands.
In that way the issue was settled. That plenum is known in the history of North Korea as the September (1956) Uniting Plenum of the CC of the Korean Labor Party.
After dinner A.I. Mikoyan and B. N. Ponomarev went to the embassy, apparently, to get in touch with ‘Moscow’ and report about the situation.
The next morning Kim Il-Sung arranged a breakfast ceremony to honor our delegation with participation of the whole Politburo. In compliance with the protocol, since there were many Korean comrades while there were only three of us, a Korean comrade was supposed to sit next to Mikoyan on one side and the ambassador on his other side, whereas Ponomarev and myself were supposed to sit next to Kim Il-Sung who was sitting on the opposite side, on his right and left sides. However, we were seated in such a way that I found myself almost at the end of the table, far from Mikoyan and next to me was sitting the Politburo member who together with Pak Den Ai had shown me the city sightseeing on the previous day. Only later I guessed it had been done deliberately. Thus, sitting next to each other, we were whispering in Russian for the whole breakfast.
He said he was entrusted to talk to me confidentially so that our conversation would be retold to N. S. Khrushchev personally: the Korean comrades had to adopt such a decision under a strong pressure of Peng Dehuai and Mikoyan.
He said, ‘We are firmly for the cooperation with the Soviet Union and the CPSU. You are facing temporary difficulties which you will definitely overcome, and the side-effects relating to Stalin will be settled. We will never give up our policy and strategy. But currently we are in a tight situation. We are alone. Americans are located nearby our border with South Korea as well as in Japan. Under such circumstances, our stability and success depend to the crucial extent on the moral, political, diplomatic, and other forms of support of the Soviet Union. We are sincerely hoping for this support because it makes us confident in the better future.’
I was really surprised when at the confidential meetings in Beijing Mao Zedong raised an issue about the situation in the leadership of North Korea and Korean Labor Party, and about serious disagreements, dissidence, and even split. The point is that a high-level Korean delegation led by Kim Il-Sung had visited Moscow just a few months before, to be more precise, in early June. They had negotiations, and a number of agreements on economic and trade cooperation were signed. All of a sudden, the Korean leadership ended up with the split. It was unclear for me, but it was impolite to question about it.
The picture of the situation became finally clear to me a bit later. I will make a stop here to clarify in detail. The Soviet leadership forwarded a warm invitation to ‘Pyongyang’ to visit the Soviet Union. In response Kim Il-Sung sent a telegram confirming the accept of the invitation and his readiness to arrive in Moscow in early July as the head of the government delegation.
On July 6th, 1956, after visiting eastern-European countries, the government delegation of North Korea led by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, marshal Kim Il-Sung, arrived in Moscow.
The delegation was met by the Soviet leadership members, including N.A. Bulganin, L. I. Brezhnev, D.T. Shepilov, E.A. Furtseva, B. N. Ponomarev, and the others. In the airfield Kim Il-Sung made a speech, saying in particular, ‘The Korean people see the important source of their strength and a reliable guarantee for the freedom and independence of their native land in an inviolable friendship with the peoples of the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries.
We have just visited the European countries of the people's democracy. We saw in these countries that their peoples like our people highly appreciate the friendship with the great Soviet people and aspire to consolidate it even more.’
Then the negotiations of the Korean comrades with the Soviet delegation led by N.A. Bulganin were held. Also, they had some confidential face-to-face conversations.
What was worth noticing particularly? Kim Il-Sung did not arrive at Stalin’s funeral, and the Korean delegation was led, as I mentioned before, by Pak Den Ai. Soon it was known in the Kremlin that the Korean leaders watchfully, to be more precise, negatively spoke about the events that occurred after Stalin’s death in our country. This time their delegation did not arrive in the USSR on purpose; instead, they had a transit stopover in the USSR on their home back trip from Europe. And the delegation wasn’t called party-and-government as it used to be, but a government delegation. It was led by the First secretary of the Korean Labor Party, though here he was called just the Chairman of the Ministers Cabinet. Khrushchev didn’t take part in the negotiations. Neither he was at the meetings, nor did he see them off.
In turn, Kim Il-Sung did not mention the latest events in our country and the new First secretary of the CC CPSU in his speeches.
All these were used against him by the opposition in North Korea. They claimed he did not approve the new CPSU position aimed at the struggle against the consequences of Stalin’s personality cult by ‘revising’ his activities. The oppositionists also paid attention to the fact that when visiting European countries, Kim Il-Sung called his delegation as ‘party-and-government,’ but visiting the USSR, he called it just as ‘government.’ Besides, they were spreading rumors about the CC CPSU leadership displeasure with such Kim Il-Sung’s position.
That’s why being aware of the dangerous situation, the CC CPSU leadership agreed without hesitation with Mao Zedong’s proposal. So, the Soviet and Chinese delegations were immediately sent to Pyongyang during the 8th congress of the Chinese Communist Party.
At the September Plenum of the CC Korean Labor Party, Kim Il-Sung succeeded in that stage in diminishing the confrontation in the leadership and taking a decision on the joint pursuit of the cooperation policy.
Upon my return from China at the meeting with Nikita Khrushchev, I told him about the events in Pyongyang and about confidential conversations with the Korean comrades, assessing positively the achieved agreements there. Also, I told him about the accusations addressed to Kim Il-Sung by his oppositionists who called him ‘Stalinist’ and ‘loyal follower and continuer of Stalin’s deeds in Korea.’ Besides, I emphasized only those points from my conversations with Nam Ir and Pak-Den-Ai that showed their party’s sincere attitude to the Soviet Union and their aspiration to develop the cooperation. In addition, I underlined that if the split became deeper, it might bring about quite dangerous consequences. Finally, I expressed my mind saying that the roughness and discrepancies in our relationships, misunderstanding in different matters should be prevented in due time without delay.
Nikita Khrushchev had the same opinion. Soon a number of quite essential measures were taken to extend the cooperation in party, state, and public policies. At first, the invitation to visit the Soviet Union was sent to Kim Il-Sung.
In 1958 a big delegation of North Korea officially visited the USSR again. This time it was called ‘party-and-government’ delegation and was led, according to media, by the First secretary of the CC Labor Party of North Korea and Chairman of the Ministers Cabinet, Kim Il-Sung. At the airfield, almost all the Soviet leadership led by N. S. Khrushchev was meeting the delegation. The negotiations were led by both leaders, and the documents of comprehensive cooperation were signed by N. S. Khrushchev and Kim Il-Sung.
The delegation expressed a big satisfaction with a shown attention to them and the achieved mutual understanding. Also, for the first time they expressed desire to visit the Soviet Union republics. Thus, they visited Ukraine, the Urals, and Siberia. I was assigned to accompany them on their trip. The Korean comrades were warmly welcomed everywhere, and good wishes were manifested to them.
We visited Irkutsk and the Bratsk hydro power. We floated on a motorboat on Baikal Lake. Then in a lovely birch groove, we stayed overnight in a mansion (so-called ‘palace’), which had been built intentionally for the arriving US president D. Eisenhower whose arrival was actually impeded by the incident relating to the spy aircraft Lockheed U-2 which had been aviated by Francis Gary Powers and had encroached from Pakistan upon the USSR airspace, had flown over Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and partly Siberia, and had been shot down above Sverdlovsk, which was made public on the 1st May.
As a result, the Soviet-American relationships worsened, and the arrival of D. Eisenhower was postponed for uncertain time. And now Kim Il-Sung was the first resident of that new mansion.
We had a good rest, enjoyed wonderful air and made barbecue of just caught grayling and omul. That’s when Kim Il-Sung told me in detail about the peripetias of the complicated time of the September Plenum of the CC Korean Labor Party and the roles played by each of the leaders in denouement of that conflict inside the party and the country as a whole.
Now let’s go back to Beijing where our delegation, immediately after return from Pyongyang, met Mao Zedong and the other Politburo members.
He told us that he had been informed in detail by Peng Dehuai about all the measures taken in North Korea. Then he told about the results of the 8th congress of the Communist Party of China, about the further party plans, then thanked for the delegation arrival, and expressed the hope that our countries and our parties, without wasting time, would jointly solve the accumulated issues so that to meet the interests of the both countries and parties in achieving our common goal.
One of the sessions of the Chinese communist party congress was a closed one. They seemed to discuss organizational matters, meanwhile we were going sightseeing in Beijing. We were invited to join the final session, followed by an official dinner to honor the CPSU delegation. The next morning, we flew back home.
What were the results and impressions of the trip? Not only business impressions, so to speak, but also personal ones? I was permanently thinking about them while flying from Beijing to Moscow…
…The trips to China and to Korea for a couple of days were important events in my life. Having found myself unexpectedly in the center of a top-level policy of Beijing and Pyongyang, I tried to learn lessons and draw conclusions for myself.
The 8th congress was held successfully. The great Chinese people achieved enormous success for a short time; and the Communist party led by Mao Zedong undoubtedly enjoyed a high authority in the communist parties’ camp.
However, the things spoken about at the confidential meetings made me ponder them over. In fact, those meetings revealed the issues that could cause contradictions and disagreements between the USSR and China.
Those issues included territory claims, Soviet specialists working in China, Chinese students studying in the USSR, military objects, border confrontations, and so on and so forth. None of those problems was sorted out and clarified.
I felt sincerely sorry for Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan; for the conversations and negotiations between the two leaders of the two delegations looked like a cat-and-mouse game. And it wasn't Anastas Ivanovich who played the cat’s role…
The Chinese party launched an extensive activity in the world. The peculiar thing about it was that when ‘Moscow’ was pursuing the peaceful coexistence policy, ‘Beijing’ was speaking against imperialism and international reaction organizations.
Considerable changes happened in the ideological sphere as well. The group portraits of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin-Mao Zedong were seen everywhere in China. Mao Zedong’s name and image appeared in one rank with the names and portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. The attitude to him in China was exactly the same as the attitude to Stalin in the USSR in his lifetime.
The slogan ‘Marxism-Leninism and comrade Mao Zedong’s doctrine’ written on posters and banners was the basis for the ideology, academic literature, and information propagandistic work.
Coming back to the confidential conversations, it should be noted that, of course, they were held basically due to the Chinese comrades’ patience and tactfulness. But the main impression was, of course, made by Mao Zedong’s personality.
For the first time I saw him so close, listened to him and watched him at the ‘confidential’ meetings. My overall impression: he was an undoubtedly prominent figure, a person of considerable intelligence, farsighted, a profound thinking man, experienced in political affairs and able to skillfully keep a conversation.
He was the only speaker from the Chinese side who was talking all the time; none of the Politburo members said a word. From our side, only Mikoyan was speaking. Mao Zedong demonstrated a striking art of keeping a conversation: he gradually intensified any question down to the limit and brought it to the logical end in order to set forth his point of view and find out the interlocutor’s opinion. But if he didn’t get the clear answer after bringing the conversation to the highest point of heat and felt arising nervous tension, then he immediately switched over to a completely different topic such as historical, personal… It made the opponents relax, enabled them to gather with thoughts, and after such a respite he returned to the interrupted topic. As a result, he either received a clear answer or nonplussed the interlocutor…
Members of foreign delegations of communist and labor parties said in unofficial conversations and at reception ceremonies that now the center of the world communist movement was moving to China. They explained and justified differently, but all their arguments could be approximately summarized in the following way: ‘The communist movement started in Western Europe. It was here that ‘The Manifest of the Communist Party’ was written and the certain organizational structures, the First and the Second Internationals were founded, and the scientific communism theory was developed.
Then in the early 20th century, the world communist movement center moved to Russia, which happened due, to an enormous extent, along with a number of objective factors, to G.V. Plekhanov, V.I. Lenin, and J.V. Stalin. However, after the Soviet leaders started denigrating the deeds done in the past, blaming Stalin for all sins, the USSR, to a certain extent, lost its reputation causing certain instability in the world communist movement. So, its center started moving to China. Almost half of all communists in the world were concentrated in China. The considerable success was achieved for seven post- revolution years. The Chinese People’s Republic had a principle position in the international arena and permanently kept comprehensive relations with all oppressed in the past peoples who now have gained the independence.’
In many socialist countries the sympathies to China were intensified. Moreover, the new movement of developing countries, including about a hundred states, indisputably considered China as one of the leaders. The Soviet Union was invited neither as a delegate, a guest, nor as an observer to the first Constituent conference of the Movement of non-aligned countries in Bandung, as I have already written.
…The flight to Moscow was long; and there was nobody except us and the crew on the aircraft. So, we took seats wherever we wanted. We could drowse, being absorbed inside, withdraw into ourselves, or ponder and analyze. Recalling all the occurred events, I was simultaneously thinking over another thing, i.e., the relations of the peoples of China and Central Asia.
The relations are measured by millenniums. On the territory of China, there were a number of the Turkic peoples such as Uyghurs, Uzbeks, Tatars, and Kazakhs. Also, among the Chinese there were people who accepted Islam – the Dungans. Although the population of China at that time was 700 million people, whereas in Uzbekistan there were 10 million (with the total population of Central Asia of 20 million people), this fact did not prevent our relationships from development. I was reflecting over their historic stages in my mind.
Three thousand years B.C. the Great Silk Road at over seven thousand kilometers from the Huanghe river in China to the Mediterranean Sea was built. It connected Asia, Europe, and Africa, with its center in Central Asia. Till now caravansaries, wells, and sardobas (reservoirs of drinking water) can be seen on the Silk Road route. Thereby the connections of China with countries of Europe and Africa went through Central Asia. Also, merchants, travelers, and scientists of those countries could reach China only after passing our area.
The Great Silk Road was of not only trade and economic significance, but also of a strategic one. It played an important role in cultural, religious and spiritual communication of the peoples of different countries and continents. That's why lately it has become a subject of deep study by many scientists of China, Japan, and Central Asia.
Here is another fact. 2200 years ago, a famous Chinese scientist Zhang Qian visited Central Asia, its many places where he met different people, from ordinary toilers to statesmen, and studied local cultures, everyday life of people, geography, history, state structure, etc. Basing on the deep comprehensive research, he prepared an extensive material to be submitted to the then Chinese Emperor. That’s what he wrote in his memoirs about Central Asia: ‘Central Asia is protected by the mountains and deserts from the other peoples’ invasion; and for many years Central Asia has been living happily at peace without experiencing any war calamities.
This country… lies on a long way from the country of ‘Heavenly Serenity’ (China) to the Western sea. Rich caravans with different goods uninterruptedly pass in different directions through this country. How wonderful it looks!
Residents are distinctively skillful in trades and arts. They are tall. Poor men wrap up their heads with a piece of cotton fabric, whereas rich people wrap up their heads with a piece of silk. They wear clothes made of cotton, wool, and leather fabric …
They highly respect and love women, who enjoy freedom. In every family the husband fulfils all his women’s wishes.
Half of the population is busy with the farming while the other half is busy with the trading.
There are in the country 70 cities surrounded by high treble walls. Their lands are fertile, give rich harvest, and belong to noblemen, who, for this reason, are expected to immediately come to the king on his demand, being well armed, riding horses, and accompanied by their servants; which is reasonable.
Ordinary farmers might enjoy free, careless, and untrammeled life in such a rich country. However, they have to give 4/5 of their harvest to noblemen for the permit to till their lands. Therefore, hard-working peasants, despite having bread, always starve. That's a pity! Book studies continue uninterruptedly. Books are written from right to left on tanned cow skins.
Residents normally sing the epics about the ancient times at celebrations. Very long sagas are always sung from the beginning to the end because they narrate about real folk stories, passing knowledge of heroic deeds and wise life rules.’
I should remind the reader that was the description of Central Asia, written by an eyewitness, 22 centuries ago. Indeed, afterwards, a little bit before the A.D., the then Chinese rulers tried to seize that plentifully rich land by moving there over a hundred-thousand-warrior military troop. The severe battles occurred in Dawan (the Fergana valley was called Dawan at that time). However, after having lost a considerable part of the army, the Chinese commanders had to retreat back behind the Tien Shan Mountains and Pamir Mount to return home. Some commanders committed suicides, while the others were executed for the defeat and loss of the troops.
By the way, according to that historian, all the adult population of the region took part in those battles. It turned out there was a tradition in the Dawan kingdom at the time, according to which women aged between 18 and 40, except for sick, pregnant, and mothers with babies, took part in battles. He described a few battle episodes, when young women, wearing men’s amour, armed with sabers, daggers, bows with arrows, and riding horses at night burst into the enemy’s camp, killed the taken by surprise foes, spread havoc among them and made the survived scatter.
So, that military campaign completely failed. Dawan in Central Asia upheld the liberty and independence. Although this episode existed in the history of relations between China and Central Asia, actually many-century all-round relationships between them still existed and developed.
…Sitting on the airplane, I recollected that our ancestors of genius, including great Ali-Shir Nava'i, paid a particular attention to China in their literature and scientific works, describing it in a quite respectful tone… And now I was thinking about the things I’d just heard of in Beijing about serious disagreements which if not sorted properly out, might affect negatively not only the relationships between the Soviet Union and China, but also, naturally, perniciously affect the traditional cooperation and neighborliness of China with Central Asia.
We arrived in Moscow. For the first two days we weren’t summoned to the CC Presidium, and the information reported by the delegation wasn’t discussed. I browsed the newspapers issued in the period of our being away and saw that the 8th congress of the Communist party of China had been widely and regularly covered in mass media in a friendly manner. The full texts of the CC CPSU’s greetings to the congress, the letter by the Soviet leadership to the Chinese leaders, and the further extensive information about the opening and work of the congress were published. Besides, Mao Zedong’s speech, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping’s reports were published. Moreover, everyday reporters gave information about the congress. In addition, different materials about the life of the Chinese People’s Republic were published.
On the third day I obtained permission to visit Nikita Khrushchev on the issues relating to the republic’s affairs, including preparation for the First congress of the intelligentsia and the awarding ceremony for Uzbekistan and its foremost people with orders and medals. He right away asked, ‘How was your trip?’ And immediately he added that Mikoyan had already informed him, and they had decided to listen to the report by the delegation at the next Presidium meeting.
I told in detail about my impressions, views, and assumptions, mentioning that it had been my first visit to China and I had not been aware of many disputable issues.
As to the confidential conversations with the Chinese leaders, I expressed my concern that if the disagreements and unsolved issues were not analyzed thoroughly and seriously, and the necessary measures were not taken, then the gap between these two countries would become wider and deeper. In view of the above, I told about the historic relations of the peoples of China and Central Asia, including Uzbekistan. And I added that in the current strained situation in the world, the deterioration of the relationships of the two great socialist powers might become far more dangerous.
Having listened to me, Nikita Sergeevich asked how precise our standpoint had been stated at the negotiations. I answered that every time Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan informed ‘Moscow’ by a cipher about the confidential conversations content. Of course, I didn’t read any of those telegrams, but during the negotiations I had the impression as if Mikoyan, apparently, didn’t expect a number of questions. Therefore, they were actually left opened.
‘Do you see any way out of the situation?’ Khrushchev asked.
I answered, ‘I think we should do our best, undoubtedly, keeping the prestige of the country and party and championing our interests, in order to save and develop the cooperation on the principle, mutually beneficial basis. We mustn’t waste time. On the contrary, we must take the initiative and expand the top-level contacts. The sooner you, Nikita Sergeevich, personally meet Mao Zedong, the better it would be. When and how, you know better.’
Then, referring to the conversations with statesmen and social-political figures of different countries who had visited Uzbekistan, and the conversations with the Chinese Communist Party leaders in Beijing, the confidential conversations with the Korean VIP persons, as well as to the media coverage of the events in the USSR by the world press, I told him that everywhere they expressed a deep interest, pronounced different assumptions and opinions of the foreign policy the Soviet Union would pursue after the 20th congress. They wondered whether the diplomatic and foreign policy pursued by Stalin, including signed agreements, treaties, and so on, would be still in force and valid.
‘In view of all these,’ I continued, ‘is it possible, Nikita Sergeevich, to approve and publish the official document specifying and explaining the foreign policy of our country? At the same time, it’s really important, as I see it, to emphasize the firmness of its principles developed back by V.I. Lenin. It’s also significant that the world should understand that the USSR will fulfill its commitments undertaken in terms of the cooperation with foreign countries and states, that our main goals in this sphere are the struggle for peace, peaceful coexistence, and naturally first of all, our readiness to consolidate and develop the relationships with the socialist countries, as you have recently spoken about.’
In response I heard, ‘Yes. It needs thoroughly thinking over. Certainly, we can’t let the deterioration of the Soviet-Chinese relationships. And it would be useful to publish our foreign policy principles.’
Then the conversation was switched over to the raised by me republican issues. Khrushchev positively considered our proposals and assigned the CC administration employees with the tasks. I asked for permission to leave for Tashkent, without waiting for the discussion of the trip results to China by the CC Presidium. Nikita Sergeevich agreed, but suggested that I should think further over the Soviet-Chinese relationships and international issues and let him know if any ideas and suggestions arose.
The next day I flew to Tashkent. I don’t know how the discussion of Mikoyan’s report about our delegation’s trip to Beijing was going on at the Presidium. However, later I heard that Nikita Sergeevich mentioned my opinion and excused my absence from the meeting with my rush going to Uzbekistan on urgent business.
In a few days I was summoned to Moscow. It turned out that after discussing Mikoyan’s information about the trip to China, it was decided to prepare a comprehensive program on initiating and fostering the work in that direction. In addition, with the simultaneous in-depth study of the disputable matters aimed at elaborating our position, the plan of practical measures was supposed to be developed. The ministries and authority bodies were assigned to look into the relevant matters and make suggestions to be studied and summarized in the CC departments and later to be approved by the Secretariat.
Working on the materials, I found it necessary to study Mikoyan and our ambassador Yudin’s information coming from Beijing. Reading it, I was a little bit confused, almost puzzled with the fact that though the content of every confidential conversation was telegrammed quite in detail, the overall picture finally did not fully reflect the real event. It turned out according to them that our side was allegedly giving exhaustive answers to the questions; also, all the explanations were allegedly quite well-reasoned… The personal merits of Khrushchev were particularly emphasized in doing his utmost to overcome the harmful consequences of the personality cult, in improving the well-being of the people, and restoring justice and lawfulness, etc. Finally, it was highlighted that his policies were wide-nationally supported in our country as well as by the vast majority of foreign communist parties.
At that time, I was invited by V.M. Molotov (then he was the CC CPSU Presidium member, the first deputy chairman of the Ministers Council, and the minister of the foreign affairs of the USSR). After a short conversation about Uzbekistan and the matters in the country he said it had been decided by the CC Presidium to prepare and publish the document about the main principles of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the post-Stalin period which was supposed to highlight basically the measures for the friendship and unity consolidation of the socialist countries. Besides, it should also have pointed out the direction of the actions of our state on the international arena, our attitude towards international issues, disarmament, development of the all-round cooperation with foreign countries. Finally, it was to have emphasized the strict commitment implementation by the USSR relating to the friends and allies, i.e., the implementation of the international agreements, treaties, and the United Nations regulations.
Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov asked for my opinion. I told him my considerations, a little bit more than what I told Khrushchev, stressing on the relations with the East. Having listened to me, he said, ‘The document is being currently prepared. Your considerations will be taken into account as far as possible. When we finish it, you’d better get familiarized with it. Also, you should participate in its discussion at the CC Presidium.’
In this way, an important political draft document was drawn out under Molotov’s lead. After repeated discussions at the Presidium it was approved on October 30th, 1956 under the title of ‘The Declaration of the Government of the USSR’ and stated the basic principles of the development and further consolidation of the friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the other socialist states. On the same day, the full text of the Declaration was published in all union and republic newspapers. Also, it was sent to the socialist countries and international organizations.
The next day on November 1st, the Chinese government’s statement on the Soviet Declaration was published. It said, in particular, as follows: ‘This Declaration of the Soviet Union Government is correct. It is of great importance for the correction of the mistakes made in the relationships of the socialist countries and for the unity consolidation of the socialist countries.’
Further: ‘China considers that the five principles, including the respect of the state sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in the internal affairs of each other, equality and mutual benefit, as well as peaceful coexistence, must be the foundation for the establishment and development of the mutual relationships among the countries all over the world.’
In the statement, there was also such a paragraph: ‘According to the Declaration of the Government of the Soviet Union, there have been mistakes in the relationships of the socialist countries. These mistakes have brought about misunderstanding and alienation among some socialist countries. Due to these misunderstandings and alienations, the strained situation has been established, which could be avoided otherwise. The attitude to the events in Yugoslavia in 1948-1949 and the last events in Poland illustrates such a situation to a certain extent…’
The Statement included the following thought as well: ‘In view of the ideologic unity among the socialist countries and their common goals of their struggle, it often and easily happens that some employees sometimes ignore the principle of equity of the states in their relationships. Such mistakes in essence are the mistakes of the bourgeois chauvinism… the great-power chauvinism which seriously harm the solidarity and the common endeavor of the socialist countries. Therefore, the leaders and employees of our government and all our people must be always vigilant in order to prevent the mistakes of the chauvinism nature in our relationships with the socialist and other countries.’
The Chinese side stated their positive attitude to the readiness of the USSR government to solve ‘different issues in the relationships by means of friendly negotiations with other socialist countries,’ giving it the following appraisal: ‘This important move will undoubtedly favor the removal of the alienation and misunderstanding among the socialist countries and will foster the cooperation consolidation among them.’
The other socialist countries gave the positive feedback to the Declaration as well.
Continuing the narration about the Soviet-Chinese relationships, it should be noted that based on the CC Presidium decisions, the relationships with the Chinese People’s Republic and the Communist Party of China became considerably more active at different levels. The invitations to visit the USSR at any convenient time were sent from Moscow to the Communist party of China, the State Council and the National People’s Congress (NPC).
In late November, 1956 a delegation of the National People’s Congress led by Peng Zhen who was the deputy chairman of the NPC Permanent committee, a member of the CC Politburo of the Communist party of China and mayor of Beijing. The delegation consisted of Li Jishen, the deputy head of the delegation, Chen Qian, Zhang Bojun, Hu Zi'ang, the representatives of the People’s committee of Beijing, and so on. From the Soviet side, the negotiations were held by the USSR Supreme Soviet deputies led by the chairmen of the both chambers: P.P. Lobanov (chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet) and Vilis T. Lacis (chairman of the USSR Nationalities Council).
The guests got acquainted with the sightseeing of Moscow, and a number of meetings took place. On November 30th, Lobanov and Lacis held a reception in the Big Kremlin Palace to honor the Chinese delegation. There were Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Pervukhin, Khrushchev, Zhukov, Brezhnev, Furtseva, Belyaev, the ministers and departmental heads, representatives of workers, peasants and intelligentsia. V.T. Lacis and Peng Zhen made speeches. It was noted by the both sides that the meeting of the Soviet and Chinese parliamentarians was fruitful. The guests highly appreciated the reception and attention shown by the deputies, the Soviet people and their leadership.
In mid-January, 1957 after visiting Poland and Hungary, at the Soviet leadership’s invitation, the Chinese high-level delegation led by Zhou Enlai, the prime-minister of the State council of China, and marshal Hie Lun, the deputy prime-minister, arrived in Moscow. They were met by almost all the Soviet Union leaders. Before arrival of the Chinese delegation, Khrushchev was visiting Uzbekistan, while Voroshilov was visiting Kyrgyzstan, where they awarded the foremost workers and peasants with orders and medals. On the day before the arrival of the Chinese delegation, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov and I together arrived in Moscow.
On January 17th, a meeting of the friendship between the peoples of the USSR and China took place in the Big Kremlin Palace. All the CC CPSU Presidium members and the Chinese delegation participated in it.
The Chinese comrades were greeted by N.I. Bobrovnikov, the chairman of Moscow Council Executive Committee, and the representatives of the working class and intelligentsia of the capital city. Further, Bulganin made a long speech, highly appreciating the success of China and their wise leadership led by Mao Zedong.
When the chairperson gave the floor to Zhou Enlai, all the participants stood up to greet him with the rapturous applause and ovations.
I would like to highlight the following quote from his speech: ‘The friendship and unity of the Soviet Union and China are an important factor for the unity of the socialist states. The friendship and unity of our two nations are inseparably linked with the vital interests of the eight-hundred-million people of our countries. The infringement of these interests will have an impact on their interests in other spheres as well. Therefore, the Chinese people will do their utmost to consolidate and develop the friendship and solidarity of our great countries.
Our unity is based on the Marxist-Leninist principle of the national equity and proletarian internationalism. Consequently, it is eternal, indissoluble and inviolable. There is no such a force in the world that could disunite us. All intrigues and plots of the imperialists aimed at undermining the solidarity of our two peoples are doomed to failure.’
To honor the Chinese delegation, a big reception party with participation of the country and party leadership was arranged.
The next day I flew to Tashkent. And on January 19th the Chinese delegation members arrived in the capital of Uzbekistan. They were cordially welcomed. There were many meetings and conversations. It is worth noting that during the meetings our comrades emphasized that we highly appreciated the traditional Soviet-Chinese friendship and the relationships of the peoples of Uzbekistan and China since the ancient times. The Chinese delegation members also spoke about the multi-century friendship between the Chinese and Uzbek peoples and their interest in the friendship development.
In concordance with the CC CPSU Presidium’s resolutions on the cooperation expansion with China and due to the opinions pronounced, Uzbekistan established various contacts and arranged meetings. Soon the Society branch of the Soviet-Chinese friendship was established in Tashkent.
In those years at the Uzbekistan’s invitation, arrived the Chinese delegations led by the ministers, their deputies, other government executives, and leaders of social-political organizations of China who participated in the Tashkent conferences on the regional medicine and oriental studies. They also took part in the First congress of the intelligentsia of Uzbekistan and all-union scientific conference on the cotton growing.
A big delegation of the Chinese journalists and later a scientists’ delegation visited Uzbekistan. The Chinese writers, poets, figures of the culture and art participated actively in the Tashkent meeting of writers of Asia and Africa and in the cinema industry forum of the two continents. In turn, a large group of outstanding national figures of the culture and art of Uzbekistan led by R. Gulyamov, the first deputy Chairman of the Ministers Council of Uzbekistan, visited China where they were warmly and sincerely welcomed.
Uzbekistan and China were not directly adjoined by the common borders at that time. Therefore, contacts were implemented through Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan which had the common borders with China, and most often via Moscow.
All these unconditionally demonstrated before the world the aspiration of the both countries to the friendship, solidarity, and unity. Nevertheless, during unofficial and non-public party contacts, which were continued and even expanded, a number of issues still aroused serious disagreements. Moreover, in particular cases the disagreements even deepened. It might have happened due to the forces interested in worsening the Soviet-Chinese relationships.
I should note it is not a secret that the time revealed different feedback in the world to Khrushchev’s speech at the 20th congress and the consequent policy pursued. A number of the communist and labor parties pronounced publicly their disappointment with that fact. The absence of political stability in the top echelon of the USSR power alerted many leaders overseas.
The Declaration published on October 30th related to the socialist countries. Naturally, the other brotherly parties, friendly countries, including newly-born independent states, wondered what relationships they would have with the USSR after the 20th congress. Hence, it obviously became necessary for the Soviet leadership to give the clear detailed information to the leaders of the foreign communist and labor parties. Also, they were expected to listen to them and discuss with them how to overcome arising hardships and to maintain and consolidate the cooperation in the world’s communist and labor movement.
How could it be done? That issue was discussed for a long time and considered to find the answer. It was finally decided to time the Conference of the communist and labor parties to the forthcoming 40th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution celebration and invite delegations from all the socialist countries, the communist and labor parties of other states, and the prominent figures of the world national liberation movement to participate in these ceremonies. Beforehand using unofficial channels, we carried out necessary probing and found out that such a decision would be favorably approved and effective. Then we decided to hold the Conference of the representatives of the world’s communist and labor parties in Moscow after the anniversary celebration. Thus, the preparation for that important forum started. I have already written about this and the next (in 1960) forums of the communists. Now I would like to focus on their roles in the Soviet-Chinese relationships.
On October 26th, the list of the Chinese delegation members arriving in Moscow for the anniversary celebration was published in newspapers. On November 2nd, an aircraft with the Chinese delegation led by Mao Zedong landed at the Moscow airport. All the CC CPSU Presidium members, the members of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Ministers Council of the USSR met them. (The Vietnamese delegation led by Ho Chi Minh met them as well.) Mao Zedong made a speech at the airport.
The next day he visited K. Ye. Voroshilov. Then the top-level negotiations were held.
It should be noted that on November 2nd the Pravda newspaper published a big article by Zhou Enlai titled ‘About the Influence of the October Socialist Revolution on the Whole World and China.’
On November 5th, I flew to Tashkent to take part in the grand ceremony, military parade, and people’s demonstration. On November 7th, in the evening I returned to Moscow.
The conference was closed on November 19th. And on November 20th in the Catherine Hall of the Big Kremlin Palace, there was a meeting of the Chinese delegation with the CC CPSU Presidium members and the USSR government leaders, statemen, party and public figures, representatives of science, culture, art, and literature. On the same day, the CC CPSU Presidium gave dinner to honor the Chinese delegation in an unofficial friendly atmosphere. Greeting the Soviet participants in the meeting, Mao Zedong shaking my hand said, ‘We have already met before.’ So, we shortly greeted each other.
A meeting of the Muscovites with the Conference delegates was held in the Luzhniki Sport Palace. Among the guests there was Mao Zedong who had made a long speech on the previous day at the anniversary session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. On behalf of the Chinese delegation, the writer Song Qingling greeted all the participants in the meeting in Luzhniki.
On November 20th in the evening, the Chinese delegation left Moscow for China. On November 21st, leaving our land, Mao Zedong sent from Irkutsk a farewell telegram with the best wishes to the USSR and CPSU leaders, the Soviet people, and the communists and thanked for the warm reception.
It should be noted that after the victory of the October Revolution in 1949, two and a half months later Mao Zedong arrived in Moscow, as the leader of the Chinese People’s Republic and the Chinese Communist party, where he took part in the solemn meeting dedicated to the 70th anniversary of J.V. Stalin and held in the Bolshoi Theater building. He also made a congratulating speech at the reception ceremony in the Kremlin. This arrival in 1957 for the 40th anniversary of the Great October Revolution was the second and, as it turned out, the last one.
Yet, the relationship between the CPSU and the Chinese Communist Party still remained complicated. The relationship between the both countries was also complicated because the both parties were ruling in the countries. Such a situation still remained despite the persistent laborious work to overcome serious disagreements by means of mutual consensus, despite the joint aspirations to reach mutual understanding for the common interests of the USSR and China.
It should be admitted here that during confidential conversations with the Chinese leaders at the 8th congress of the Chinese Communist party as well as during the next trips of the leaders of the both countries, outwardly everything looked quite calm and peacefully, i.e., everyone spoke and wrote about friendship, brotherhood, absence of conflicts, etc. But latently and covertly, the deepening of the contradictions was increasing. Particularly, they arose during the negotiations about a few thousand of Soviet advisors working at various enterprises of China. Finally, all of them had to leave the country. The frontier conflicts occurred more frequently. Besides, the trade turnover and economic cooperation were dramatically decreasing. All those facts and issues were worrying, growing from an incident to an incident.
It was a dramatic event when a big article, published in the Chinese newspaper The People's Daily, sharply and in detail stated all the aspects of the Chinese-Soviet relationships and accused the Soviet leadership with the help of the thoroughly chosen facts, citations, and numbers. The article and its content quickly spread all over the world and became the headline topic of publications and discussions.
Having discussed the article in detail at the CC Presidium and exchanged the views, we decided: first of all, to prepare the reply article with a comprehensive analysis of every item and setting forth the standpoint of the Soviet leadership. For this purpose, the editorial group led by Mikhail Suslov was established. It consisted of the outstanding scientists and Sinologists, in particular. The deadline of writing the article was a week.
Besides, it was decided to hold an open meeting of the Presidium, inviting the leaders of the republican, regional, party committees and union’s ministries and authorities. Its objective was to inform them of the Presidium standpoint, emphasizing that the work of all bilateral intergovernmental commissions (including economic, trade, military, territorial, scientific, cultural, and so on) had been practically curtailed. Mikhail Suslov was assigned to make a speech which was supposed to be followed by some other participants’ speeches. Then, it was planned to agree on the further actions: to convene either the CC Plenum or some other conference.
It was decided not to react emotionally, in this way aggravating the relationship lest to prevent from provoking the anti-Soviet propaganda.
When the article was written, an open Presidium session was held where the article text copies were handed out to the participants, then Mikhail Suslov made a speech. I must say his speech was sharp, well-reasoned with a detailed, comprehensive analysis of each item and aspect of the disagreements. It was decided to publish The People's Daily article in Soviet press. Of course, it was in the spotlight of all the domestic and foreign readers.
At first Suslov’s speech wasn’t supposed to be published. But it appeared so considerable that after the discussion by the Presidium, Nikita Khrushchev suggested to publish it. So, the Presidium agreed.
A new round of complications provoked a lot of assessments and comments in the world and, first of all, in China. In spite of all these, the active measures and steps were undertaken by the sides at the top level to prevent from aggravating the contradictions and, moreover, the rupture. The mutual visits continued and negotiations were being held.
In September, 1959, Nikita Khrushchev returned to Moscow after his first visiting the USA. On this occasion, a meeting was held in Luzhniki with participation of thousands of people, all the members of the CC CPSU Presidium, Supreme Soviet and Ministers Council of the USSR.
Nikita Khrushchev excitedly told about the results of the trip, about his negotiations with Eisenhower, gave a general assessment of the visit as the start of transition from the ‘cold war’ to the peaceful coexistence. Afterward, Khrushchev immediately flew to Beijing as the head of the Soviet delegation for the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Chinese Revolution. Wisecrackers then joked that Khrushchev ‘made an intercontinental flight Washington-Beijing with a stopover in Moscow.’
At the Beijing airport the Soviet delegation was met by Mao Zedong and all the Chinese leadership. The celebration ceremonies were held sumptuously. Outwardly, the Soviet delegation was welcomed with an emphasized attention. However, the confidential conversations of the leaders, as it was known later, were acute and didn’t give reasons to expect our relationships to essentially change for the better.
According to West mass media, the self-esteem and dignity of the Chinese leaders were particularly offended by a version of Khrushchev’s role who after making such an unheard-of by scales and time flight, allegedly wanted to become a negotiator for improvement of the relations between the USA and China. Of course, such an assumption could offend such prominent politicians as Eisenhower and Mao Zedong. In addition, the very relations between the USA and the USSR didn’t change and couldn’t change essentially as a result of a few conversations of the state leaders.
The photos published in press in those days showed Khrushchev in a good mood at the beginning of his visit to China (his meeting at the airport, cordial hugs and glad smiles), but in a gloomy mood at the end of his visit (the leaders’ sullen faces at the farewell ceremony and the upset expression in their eyes).
In such a complicated and quite a controversial situation, it was especially important that at the Conference of the communist and labor parties which was held in Moscow in 1960 the consolidation was achieved: all the participants, including China, signed the Statement and Appeal published in press. No wonder that the headline article published in the Pravda newspaper about the results of the Conference focused on the assertions of the friendship and unity of the standpoints of the Chinese and Soviet leaderships.
Surely, it wasn’t the end of the complications, but it was the first steps towards the gradual improvement of the Chinese-Soviet relationships in all aspects. This shift from a stalemate was positively welcomed by the USSR, China, and all the true supporters to peace. As for me, I was delighted with this event not only because of the closeness between the Uzbek and Chinese peoples, their thousand-year relations and mutual cooperation in economic, trade, cultural, and other spheres. But there was something purely personal about it.
The fact of the matter was that in those years I had to visit China with particular missions or in transit five times. Every time I was met and seen off by the CC General Secretary of the Chinese Communist party, Deng Xiaoping, and a member of the CC Politburo, first secretary of the Beijing city committee of the party, Peng Zhen. I had meetings with the members of the top leadership (except Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi). Those trips made unforgettable impressions on me.
I visited all the provinces except Tibet and Internal Mongolia. I went upstairs and walked on the Great Wall. I was at the place where the Silk Road started. I talked to the leaders of the country and provinces. I ate with gusto different traditional Chinese dishes. In short, I got a deep unforgettable impression of this ancient country.
During one of my trips, visiting the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous District, I visited the grave of the famous Uzbek poet-democrat, Zokirjon Furkat. He would be 130 years old now. Being forced to immigrate to China, he stayed in Yarkand town and soon got married for the second time to a local beauty, called Rano. At that time, he had already a grandson. Zokirjon Furkat lived in Yarkand town for 17 years and passed away there. I visited his grave to pay my tribute to his memory and met the people who used to know him. I asked the local authorities to improve the grave of the poet. At the same time, I underlined that Uzbekistan would do the best, if need be. The Chinese comrades kept their word.
I was really impressed by Shanghai. It was a wonderful city with a large population. I memorized two most memorable things.
The first one was my visit to the museum of porcelain articles. The owner kindly showed me his richest collection of a few thousand exhibits of different sizes ranging from tiny figures to large vases. And all those articles were classified as per the sort, paint, pictures, and functions. Every hall was so amazing that you did not want to go to the next one… But the next one was as amazing as the previous one. According to the museum owner, in China the oldest occupation had always been connected with clay and kaolin. Porcelain articles were carefully kept and cared about as the most precious things for a person and a whole family. They were always passed over by one generation to another.
In the evening of the same day we went to the Shanghai Opera Theatre. We considered opera as a kind of European art. But it turned out that the Chinese opera had a many-century history. The opera story line was showing some episodes from the life of the emperors and the peoples of the dynasty time who used to rule the country over two thousand years ago. We were deeply impressed by the brilliant acting of the actors and actresses.
Upon return to Beijing, we were offered to visit the University of the minor peoples. According to the statistics, 24 minor peoples in addition to the Chinese lived in the country. That’s for them that the University which prepared different specialists and managers for the regions was established. We also visited a few lecture auditoriums. I had to make a speech and answer questions during one of the lectures. We were shown spacious comfortable student canteens, a library, a sports complex, a clinic, and a dormitory.
In the clinic, we entered the movie hall where we watched a staggering documentary about a complicated surgery performed without anesthesia. At first, they showed a ward with a few patients. Then some doctors entered the ward to take one of the patients to the surgery room where they didn’t lay him on the surgical table. Instead, he was placed in a special armchair in a half-recumbent position. Four beautiful ladies took seats around him. They were nicely smiling, chatting to him while doing acupuncture, with each one healing one of his limbs. The patient was calmly chatting to those charming female healers.
Meanwhile, a surgeon separated with a scalpel the upper part of the skull, taking it off as if it were a lid of a pan. We saw him touching the brain and removing something. Then, he placed back the upper part of the skull and made some cosmetic manipulations. Finally, the surgeon took his gloves off and washed his hands. Meanwhile, the patient was still chatting to the girls and answering to the doctor’s questions about his health state and condition. I was amazed, even shocked with the seen! I had never seen or heard of anything like that!
Then, we were invited to take a look at the clinic wards. We entered one of them. Greeting the patients, I recognized some Uighurs, Tatars, Kazakhs, and Uzbeks among them. It was a great pleasure for the Uzbeks and for me to speak our mother tongue. In another ward there were two patients one of whom seemed to me familiar. Where could I see him before? I was puzzled a bit. The accompanying me Chinese people were slyly silent and smiling. What was going on here? I was trying to recollect and suddenly it occurred to me: that was the patient I had just watched in the documentary film!
I began asking him questions. It turned out he had a brain tumor and suffered from the splitting headaches. He tried different treatments, but nothing could cure him. So, he was brought here to undergo a surgery, what’s more, without anesthesia. ‘Thousand thanks,’ he said, ‘to the surgeons and the healing girls who were drifting my attention away while the surgery. Of course, I dared not show such beauties my fear. Ten days have past and the pain has dramatically decreased. I wish I could go home as soon as possible to see my family and get back to work.’
I wished him a soon recovery. Then, I requested, if it was possible, to show me a surgery room and introduce me to those amazing female healers. The Chinese comrades eagerly agreed. It happened a surgery had just finished and the patient was being taken to the ward. We went to see the healers who were in the next room which looked cozy and comfortable. There were five or six female healers in it. At first, they were confused a bit by suddenness, but afterwards they warmly greeted us. Two of them left the room for a short while and came back with some small boxes in their hands: they offered me to have an acupuncture session. I had never undergone such a treatment before. So, I was a little bit taken aback, but after a short reflection, persuading myself that they could hardly do any harm to my skull, I agreed. Surely, they were amazingly skillful. At first, I felt for a moment some pain because of the nervous tension. But soon I felt a nice relief and the headache vanished. To get a full effect of the acupuncture, I should have had a full course of a few sessions. Certainly, I didn’t have such an opportunity.
I recollected a head and facial massage skillfully done by an ordinary illiterate barber in Bombay. Since then, I have never experienced such a facial massage or an acupuncture any more, but I have always remembered them with gratitude and admiration.
Then we visited Canton. The commune manager, the party committee secretary (i.e., our former regional committee secretary), and other leaders welcomed us warmly (I was with my daughter, Sanobar). We visited the bazaar: there were a lot of rows with various vegetables and the stores of industrial goods. As we all got hungry, we were invited to have a snack somewhere in the city outskirts.
In a modern building, we were welcomed by the director and other employees. Having talked to each other, they took us to a swimming-pool surrounded by the metal net. When we approached it, instead of the water in it we saw it teeming with crawling snakes of different sizes and colors. My daughter staggered back in fear and clung to me.
The long bamboo sticks with sharp metal end were given us. Then they brought us closer to the nearby pit which was covered with a net with bigger cells and said, ‘Choose by yourselves. Spike into the one you like.’ My daughter became confused and whispered, ‘I don’t want to…’ She was about 16 years old then. I replied her in whisper, ‘You have to. Do what they told you to do.’ I chose ‘my’ snake. So, did my daughter. But when she prodded something with the stick, she closed her eyes.
We took seats at the table covered with delicious food. There were plenty of different snacks, a pile of plates, lots of cups, and very small cups with seasonings, spices and sauces. Each dish was tastier than the previous one. We were enjoying and praising the food.
Suddenly, the party committee secretary asked Sanobar, ‘It’s delicious, isn’t it?’ She sincerely agreed. Then he explained, ‘It is the snake you’ve chosen.’ The girl got stunned and didn’t know what to do: she was afraid to swallow it and it was impolite to spit it out. In a low voice in Uzbek I told her, ‘Eat it up. You have to.’
The Chinese friends told me that was the only restaurant in China (very likely in the world) where all the dishes (a few dozen of hot and cold dishes) were made of snake meat. I have to admit that the looks, aroma, and taste of the meals were awesome. Tourists from all parts of the world were eager to visit that restaurant by all means. Not only cooking was really important, although it was a true ingenious art. Indeed, the nurture of snakes became a science due to which they got pure, delicious and healthy snake meat. A person had to be experienced and skillful to become a snake catcher, to look after them and to know how to cut and cook them. Cooks got a special training. Not every ordinary cook, even the best cooks, could be excellent at cooking those dishes.
They decided to show us the kitchen, particularly after I expressed desire to thank the cooks. I was impressed with the exceptional, almost sterile cleanness: everything was in the order like in a good clinic. The chef had about 6-8 knives of different shapes and size on his belt. He somehow grabbed a snake, made it release all its venom (literally to the very last drop), cut off its head and tail end without a quiver of distaste and then in a moment, skinned it off getting its valuable skin without damaging it. They explained that lady purses, shoes, and accessories were made of snake leather. While we were talking, a beautiful purse was brought in and presented to my daughter with the words that it was made of ‘her’ snake’s leather. Of course, I doubted they had enough time to dry it out, process and make a purse while we were eating and talking… However, the true art and masterful skills of the Chinese could make us easily believe them. Maybe, it was really true what they said…
Soon I got a chance to visit the head part of the Silk Road which started from the Yellow River not far from Hangzhou city. Having driven along the most part of it, I heard for the first time from Chinese people how, when, by whom, and for what purposes this great historic road had been built. We went upstairs onto the Great Chinese Wall and walked a few kilometers with the accompanying people. Simultaneously, the scientists told me in detail the history and the assignment of that staggering structure.
…Recollecting my bright and various ‘Chinese’ impressions, I was happy that the Moscow conference in 1960 drew together not only the positions but also the relationships of these two countries.
Sadly, less than a year in October, 1961 at the 22nd CPSU congress, the situation got worsened again, which adversely affected not only the congress work but also the relationships between the USSR and China.
What exactly happened at the congress in the sphere of the Soviet-Chinese relationships?
In his report speech, Khrushchev sharply criticized the leaders of the Communist Union of Yugoslavia and the Albanian labor party. Here is a small extract from his speech relating to Yugoslavia:
‘…the leaders of the Communist Union of Yugoslavia, who are obviously suffering from the national narrow-mindedness, have left the direct Marxist-Leninist path for a curved one which has led them up into the bog of revisionism.’
As to the Albanian labor party, he said in particular, ‘…the policy of our party aimed at overcoming the harmful consequences of the personality cult, as it turned out later, was not approved appropriately by the Albanian labor party leaders. Moreover, they launched the struggle against this policy…’
At the fourth congress session when N.S. Khrushchev had finished his both speeches they were being discussed. One of the first speakers was the head of the Chinese Communist party delegation, Zhou Enlai. Having positively assessed the success of the Soviet Union and the CPSU, the preliminary outlines of the party Program, and the results of the Conference of the representatives of the communist and labor parties in November, 1960, he sharply reacted to the criticism in the speech of the Yugoslavian and Albanian communists, saying in particular, ‘Our socialist camp, consisting of the twelve brotherly countries ranging from the Korean People’s Democratic Republic to the German Democratic Republic and from the Vietnamese Democratic Republic to the Albanian People’s Republic, represents a single whole…
We believe when, unfortunately, any disputes or disagreements arise between brotherly parties and brotherly countries, they should be patiently resolved being guided by the spirit of proletarian internationalism, the principles rights equality and achieving the standpoint unity by means of consultations. An open unilateral censure addressed to any brotherly party does not foster the cohesion and an issue settlement.
An open manifestation of disagreements between brotherly parties and brotherly countries before their enemies cannot be considered as a serious Marxist-Leninist approach. Such an approach can only upset friends and make enemies happy.’
Zhou Enlai’s speech got a considerable resonance in the world. So, at the congress a few speakers, the Presidium members, and the leaders of the large party organizations and foreign delegations had to spontaneously maneuver to react to his speech. The congress focus was shifted to some extent for a certain while from the Report speech and the new draft Program.
In his closing speech, Nikita Khrushchev pointed out those matters again much more critically and vaguely: ‘The leader of the Chinese Communist party delegation, comrade Zhou Enlai, in his speech has expressed worry in connection with the raised at our congress an issue on the Albanian-Soviet relations. As far as we understand, the main point of his speech is an anxiety that our current relations with the Albanian labor party might affect the socialist camp consolidation.
We share the anxiety of our Chinese friends and appreciate their care about the unity consolidation. If the Chinese comrades wish to make their efforts to normalize the Albanian labor party’s relations with the brotherly parties, then there is hardly someone else who could foster this issue solution better than the Chinese Communist party. It could be really helpful for the Albanian labor party and would meet the interests of the whole commonwealth of the socialist countries. (Prolonged applause.)
Comrades! Our party will struggle, as it has done before, against revisionists of all types. Firmly following the principles of Declaration and Statement of the Conference of the Marxist-Leninist parties, we will unremittingly unmask revisionism which was expressed in the program of the communists Union of Yugoslavia. We will also constantly fight against dogmatism and all other deviations from the Marxism-Leninism.’ (Applause.)
All those moments at the congress which had passed in whole successfully were strongly played about overseas, without mentioning the feedback of Yugoslavia and Albania which was extremely emotional. In this connection, being an eyewitness at the congress, I would like to make a small remark. Essentially, it is directly connected with the situation in the Soviet-Chinese relations, though I am talking not only about them.
The attitude of Yugoslavia and Albania to the resolutions of the 20th CPSU congress and the International Conference was considered wrong by not only Khrushchev but the whole CC Presidium members. However, was it really necessary to talk about it so sharply and in detail before the whole world, at the congress where the important matters were discussed and the goal to achieve the standpoint unity was set up? There were different opinions in this regard. In addition, the Yugoslavian and Albanian communist delegations did not attend the congress. So, criticizing them ‘behind their backs’ was quite unethical.
I would like to emphasize that the final speech by Khrushchev wasn’t discussed at the Presidium at all, although it was discussed in a close circle by two-three people. The fact that he focused on the controversies so much made an unfavorable impression. As to his appeal to the Chinese Communist party to act as a moderator, it looked like a real squabble.
All these brought about not only worsening of our relations with Yugoslavia and Albania, but also a new tour of the Soviet-Chinese disagreements.
In this connection I can’t help remembering such a term as ‘political culture.’ It’s generally known that in politics such things as equanimity, deliberateness, consistency, and foresight are really important. Were they really manifested?
Let’s start from Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union’s relations with Yugoslavia got worsening in 1949 and later that process got more intensive and faster. The leadership of the both states were blaming each other in their public speeches. There were many of those who wanted to separate these two states, the two close nations, including in the national and religious aspects, who had recently fought and won together, shoulder-to-shoulder, in World War II.
After Stalin’s death, Lavrentiy Beria unilaterally started flirting with Tito, trying to ascribe blame for the deteriorated Soviet-Yugoslavian relations to Stalin and thereby admitting the guilt of the USSR. (By the way, it was pronounced as one of the accusations against Beria at the trial in the court which ended by his capital punishment by being shot.)
In 1955 the Soviet party-government delegation led by Khrushchev and Bulganin arrived in Yugoslavia. Making a brief greeting speech already at the airport, Khrushchev hinted that after all the guilt was the Soviet side’s, which, of course, was approved by the meeting people’s applause. The Soviet delegation continued to keep the same policy at the open and confidential meetings. The blame was, of course, ascribed to the former Soviet leadership.
Inspired with such a position, Tito being at the head of the big party-government delegation paid a return visit in early 1956. There were joyful meetings, hugs, kisses, and ceremonial affirmations. There were also new political declarations and a number of signed agreements. It was really noticeable that most members of the Yugoslavian delegation in their speeches did not undertake any responsibility. Instead, they were still playing the role of the offended and incurred side.
A month before the convocation of the 8th Chinese Communist party congress in September, 1956, the CPSU received an invitation and started forming a delegation. As a rule, the Chinese comrades used to send top-level delegations to participate in different events in the USSR. It is known that in 1949 Mao Zedong participated in the 70th J. V. Stalin’s anniversary. He also was the head of the Chinese delegation in 1957 who arrived to participate in the 40th anniversary celebration of the October Revolution and the Conference of brotherly parties. However, at the 20th and 22nd congresses of the CPSU and the Conference in 1960, the Chinese delegations were led by the second-top leaders – Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai.
The CC CPSU Presidium decided to send their delegation led by Mikoyan, who was the deputy Chairman of the Ministers Council, to participate in the 8th Chinese Communist party congress in 1957. What’s more, he was with ‘a tarnished reputation’ then, as the Chinese comrades were well informed of Stalin’s negative attitude to him in Stalin's last year. Speaking frankly and directly, we felt uncomfortable when visiting Beijing. A few dozen delegations of the Communist parties of the socialist countries, new sovereign, independent states and national liberation movements led by the leaders of the parties and the states arrived there. As to our ‘imposing presence’, it consisted of the CC secretaries, Ponomarev and Kapitonov, the CC member Satyukov, the CC Presidium member and deputy chairman of the Ministers Council, Mikoyan, and a candidate to the CC Presidium membership, Mukhitdinov, who was working in the periphery then. Obviously, it would have been more reasonable if the delegation had been led by Khrushchev.
Was that an accident that exactly in those days the headlines in the newspapers said he was having a short rest in Yugoslavia? Of course, China reacted quite unfavorably to that demonstrating step. Besides, instead of Khrushchev, the delegation then could have been led by Suslov (who was the head of the CPSU delegation to the communist parties’ congresses of a number of European countries in September-October), or Kozlov, or Bulganin, i.e., by the persons of the same rank as Zhou Enlai.
Frankly speaking, I dropped a hint, telling Nikita Khrushchev about it, but he was silent. I doubt the mentioned above fact manifested his high political culture.
Though two years later in 1959 upon return from the USA, N.S. Khrushchev immediately flew to China for the jubilee celebrations. Alas, the time had already been lost. It would have been much more useful if he had done that in 1957!
Further the heated Soviet-Chinese discussions were unfolded, and the disagreements deepened. Suddenly, at the peak of the mentioned above issues, press highlighted again that Khrushchev was having a rest in Sochi, with the headlines illustrated with some photos of him hugging Tito and his close party mates, with the Soviet leaders – Bulganin and the others - standing next to him. All that was obviously of demonstrative nature with a political tinge. Doesn't his behavior remind us of his ‘political culture’ again? As a result, so much time, efforts, means, and patience had to be contributed into settling new evolving complications, risking our country and party's reputation and authority.
Seeing Khrushchev’s almost enamored attitude, the then Yugoslavian leaders kept shifting the blame onto J.V. Stalin for all the negatives arisen between Yugoslavia and the USSR, simultaneously representing themselves as creators of new peaceful relationships.
However, the year 1961 arrived. And suddenly at the CPSU congress, the First secretary of the CC CPSU claimed severely and irreconcilably about the Yugoslavian revisionism which had been exactly noted by Stalin and Molotov. Where was his consistency and foresight? And again, where was his political culture?
As for China, in the next period it went through serious, difficult stages of its history – the time of the ‘great leap’, ‘people's communes’, ‘cultural revolution’, and so on and so forth. However, with time all those events were left in the past. The new farsighted politicians came to the power and became party leaders who, implementing contemporary economic and political reforms, even nowadays still pay tribute to Mao Zedong in the history of the country and the party. At the same time, they have completely exonerated Deng Xiaoping who was an author of many major social and economic reforms in China which are gaining strength and keeping the stability.
On August 12th, 1993 one of the oldest journalists, Vitalii Korionov, wrote about it in the Pravda newspaper: ‘The largest neighboring country led by the Communist party without ‘a shock therapy’ and without losses and shaking storms feeds and dresses the population of over a billion people. Being faithful to the socialist principles, the Chinese communists have rehabilitated the theory and practice of the communist movement, showing the whole world what the creative communism can do.’
XVI
ECHO OF ‘ANTIPARTY’
SCANDAL
After the Comintern dissolution by Stalin and after his death, the first Conference of the communist and labor parties, which was held in two stages, took place in Moscow in November, 1957. At first, only the socialist countries parties participated in the Conference; afterwards all the parties participated all together. In total, 64 parties took part in the 2nd stage of the International Conference. But before three years elapsed, the preparation for the next similar conference started, which was initiated by the CC Presidium. The main reason for that was the defeat of the so-called ‘antiparty group’ in the CC CPSU leadership, which was followed by arising different interpretations on the matter in the communist movement.
Molotov and Shepilov’s resignation from all their positions was considered by many abroad as the change of the USSR foreign policy. There was no person who had a diplomatic education or an experience in this field among the new elected members of the CC Presidium.
This circumstance undoubtedly influenced the Soviet state activities abroad. It was obvious that one of the serious directions of the state activities became naked. Indeed, no one competent and experienced in the foreign policy was found. An appointment of A.A. Gromyko as the minister of the foreign affairs instead of Shepilov was skeptically apprehended by many experienced diplomats abroad, particularly by those who actually knew the new minister’s career.
Just to give a slight idea, at least in brief, of what a significant field of the state work it was and who had led it in the previous years, I will make a short excursus in our history.
Georgi Vasílievich Chicherin was a graduate from the historical and philological department of Saint Petersburg University. After a few years of work for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs he left for abroad in 1904. He participated in the revolution preparation in Russia. Upon return to Motherland after the revolution, he signed the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty with Germany; and under Lenin’s recommendation he became a people’s commissar of the foreign affairs and worked at the position for many years until he retired in 1930 for his health reason.
It should be noted in particular that it was Chicherin who held the negotiations with the authorities of Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey and signed the friendship treaties with them in 1921. They were the first parity treaties of the Eastern countries with Soviet Russia. He also signed the neutrality treaties with Turkey in 1925 and with Iran in 1927.
After Chicherin, Maxim Maximovich Litvinov was appointed as the people’s commissar of the foreign affairs. In 1918, he on behalf of the Soviet government spoke in Stockholm making peaceful proposals to the Entente, which since then have been known in the history as Litvinov’s Declaration. In 1922 he was a deputy of Chicherin at the Genoa Conference. He also led the Soviet delegation to the Hague Conference and was the chairman at the Moscow international conference dedicated to disarmament. Being the people’s commissar of the foreign affairs, he assisted in establishing the diplomatic relations with the USA and including the USSR in the Nations League. During World War II Litvinov worked as the USSR ambassador to the USA and participated in 1943 in the Moscow Conference of the foreign affairs ministers of the USSR, the USA, and Great Britain.
In 1939, Stalin personally and the Politburo appointed Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov to an important position of the people’s commissar of foreign affairs, who had been also the Chairman of the People’s Commissars Council until 1941. He dealt with the foreign policy in the Politburo and government up to June, 1957.
It should be noted that the conferences of Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill in Teheran and later of Stalin, Truman, and Attlee in Yalta and Potsdam played a considerable role in the defeat of fascist Germany and victorious end of the Great Patriotic War and World War II. On behalf of the Soviet side, a team of the specialists led by Molotov implemented all the preparatory work in arranging those conferences, studying a large amount of the materials, and developing the discussed and supposed to be adopted draft documents.
None of the participants in those conferences had ever met and talked to Hitler except for Molotov. Molotov was the only person from the Soviet leadership who had negotiated with Germany for two and a half prewar years. On November 12th, 1940, while visiting Germany, he was received by Hitler in his imperial chancellery. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich firmly and in principle expressed the misunderstanding by the Soviet leadership the reasons, motives, and objectives of the German military troops presence in Finland and Norway. Hitler, without giving a clear answer and referring to his insufficient awareness, started sharing his plans on the establishment of the new order in Europe and the whole world.
Having noted that almost all Europe was actually subordinated to Germany, soon England would be kneeling, and America which had the complicated relationship with Japan could hardly take an active part in the European deeds, Hitler suggested the Soviet Union should participate in reconsideration of the interstate system, i.e., in the spheres of influence and presence in Europe and in the other continents. That was what Germany, Italy, and Japan were about to be busy with.
Molotov swept aside Hitler’s persuasions, insisting on getting an answer to his questions. Hitler frankly stated without embarrassment, ‘Let’s sign the alliance treaty to divide the world. You do need to make your way through to the south, to the warm seas, don’t you?’
But Molotov firmly persisted reminding that, first of all, it was really important for him to clarify the matters relating to the presence of the German troops nearby the north borders of the USSR. So, the two meetings took place in such a persistent confrontation.
At last, Hitler, having faced the firm, resolute, clearly expressed position of Molotov who rejected his plans about military alliance had to give quite unconvincing explanations regarding the German troops presence in Finland and Norway, which were moved there at the request of those states to render assistance in arranging training of their military units. And he said he would try to find out more details about it. At that point the meetings with Hitler finished and Molotov returned to Moscow.
Of course, Molotov was well known all over the world. He enjoyed a high authority and esteem by diplomats. All of a sudden, at the June CC Plenum he was dismissed from all his positions… Here I have to mention the events relating to that Plenum. The events that happened at the CC Presidium were covered in detail in the chapter ‘Molotov or Khrushchev?’. However, I have omitted something. Besides, I haven’t said anything about the Plenum itself yet. Moreover, those events could not help affecting the moods of our friends and enemies which were reflected by echoes in the near and far countries. The CC Presidium sessions and the Plenum lasted three days. I took part in those sessions from the beginning to the end and made speeches a few times, trying to be unbiased, still without having an idea of the would-be response to those events by our foreign partners in other countries.
I will remind the essence of the acute disputes occurring inside the Kremlin walls before the CC Plenum convocation. Kaganovich, Malenkov, and Molotov came to an agreement to convoke the Presidium to discuss the matter concerning Khrushchev, to force him to apply for resignation from the position of First CC secretary, to approve his request and appoint him the minister of agriculture of the USSR, and to recommend Molotov to the First CC secretary position instead of him, then to convene the Plenum so that the CC members could approve that reshuffle. So, they quickly agreed among themselves and had confidential conversations with most CC Presidium members who supported their plans. Thus, they assumed that everything would work out comparatively easy.
However, actually everything happened in a different way. At the end of the second day after the extremely sharp debates and direct blaming Khrushchev for the nearly crimes, the voters’ ratio was as follows: the seven Presidium members were for his dismissal and the three voted against. After an unexpected, but in fact very well-organized appearance in the Presidium conference room on the next morning of a large group of the CC members led by Serov and Konev who instantly supported Khrushchev and demanded an urgent Plenum convocation, the situation dramatically changed. Khrushchev again regained the chair at the Presidium session instead of Bulganin and took the initiative. At his proposal, was taken the decision to urgently convene the Plenum to enable those who were willing to speak out and set forth their views.
The Presidium session was closed and we didn’t gather any more till the Plenum. Suslov’s report, the suggestions on the reshuffles in the leadership, and the other decisions taken at the Plenum had been prepared by the three people: Khrushchev, Suslov, and Mikoyan. Indeed, it was elementary: they could (even had to!) have been considered beforehand at the Presidium or at the Secretariat by at least those members and candidates to the CC Presidium membership who had supported Nikita Sergeevich. But it was never done. After such a rapturous discussion, we, the rest of the members and candidates to the Presidium membership, felt redundant and, like all the ordinary CC members, found out about everything from Suslov’s report directly at the Plenum.
It was this ‘group of three’ who invented the term of ‘anti-party group.’ In fact, it was a ‘party group’ for they wanted after dismissing Khrushchev to promote Molotov to the party leader position. I am not going to justify this ‘group's’ activities since the party used to condemn the fractiousness and clannishness, particularly since they were among the ‘authors of conviction’ as well. However, as a matter of fact in general, it was not just the struggle for power and the leadership change. In fact, it was discontinuance of the 20th CPSU congress policy and the resolutions on the innocently convicted people rehabilitation as well as the other matters of the country’s life which had been approved and adopted at Khrushchev’s initiative.
Each of the ‘anti-party group’ members and their opponents carried personal responsibility for all that happened. Therefore, it would be unfair to shift the responsibility onto Khrushchev only. In my speeches at the CC Presidium and Plenum, I spoke about the shortcomings and blunders committed by the both sides in the past. In my opinion, in that situation it was unreasonable to take such a severe decision on the seven CC Presidium members who had recently been elected at the congress and later at the Plenum.
Nevertheless, the atmosphere was so tense that almost all the ‘anti-party group’ members started self-criticizing and repenting at the Plenum, and the participants in the Plenum actively voted for the proposed resolution. The only one who did not vote for it was Molotov. So, after that Khrushchev kept all the seven far away from the Kremlin.
My opinion that I spoke out at the Plenum (I was working in the periphery then and didn’t know much about it) was based not only on Suslov’s report and a few speeches, but also on the two behind-the-scene conversations during the CC Presidium sessions.
As I have already written, upon arrival in Moscow due to the urgent summon supposedly for the participation in the anniversary of Leningrad, without having stopped in a hotel, I found myself directly at the Presidium session. So, I couldn’t instantly get the gist of what was going on. A break was announced after a couple of hours. M.G. Pervukhin came up to me and asked, ‘Where are you going?’
‘I’d like to have a snack after journey,’ I replied.
‘Let’s go to my office,’ Pervukhin suggested and we went to his office. We had a lunch and a conversation there.
‘Do you know what it's all about?’ Mikhail Georgievich asked, nodding his head towards the Presidium conference hall.
‘I’m not really sure of what’s going on here,’ I replied.
‘The matter of fact is simple: to remove Khrushchev and to elect Molotov.’
‘What is the reason for that?’
‘You, who are working in the peripheries,’ Pervukhin explained, ‘are not aware of the real situation over here. Since the Lenin’s times and at his initiative, the top bodies of the party and the government have always been integrated and worked in complete harmony. It has been so until recently.
Now Khrushchev, being First CC secretary, ignores the government in many matters and makes decisions unilaterally, and we, the CC Presidium members, are informed of the matters as a rule after the Secretariat or he personally has already decided. Everything is going to the split up between the CC and the government. It is obvious even from the authority membership: there is no CC secretary in the government, as well as there is no Presidium member of the Ministers Council in the Secretariat, which is very harmful to the party cause. In addition, Khrushchev is planning to restore the worst forms of Stalin’s activities although he condemns him, i.e., he is eager to subordinate the CC Presidium and the Ministers Council Presidium to himself personally.
As for Molotov as a candidate, we are sure that he will consolidate the CC leadership and raise the party authority degraded dramatically by Khrushchev. Molotov worked with Lenin and was the Organizational Bureau member and the CC secretary then. He knows the style and methods of work and has experienced success and failures in both domestic and foreign policies.’
I objected doubting Pervukhin’s words, ‘We’ve just held the congress, haven’t we? We’ve got a great deal to do. Besides, Nikita Sergeevich has led the CC for four years. Of course, he's in a hurry sometimes showing rashness in his actions, but I’m sure the pursued by him policies of rehabilitation of the mass repression victims, approaching the people by the party leadership, and his visiting the republics, regions, and peripheries are warmly welcomed by the locals. If a reshuffle in the leadership takes place now, it will cause a new wave of anti-Soviet statements and false rumors overseas. Isn’t it better to tell Khrushchev frankly about everything and try to find ways to correct it?’
‘I doubt it’ll help the cause,’ Pervukhin said. ‘At least, most CC Presidium members are of the same opinion I’ve just told you.’
After the evening session, while we were walking in the corridor, Kaganovich came up and asked me, ‘Could you come to my office?’
We entered his office. Having warmly spoken about Uzbekistan where he had been elected several times as a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet and a delegate to the party congresses he said, ‘Khrushchev’s objective is to strike Stalin out from the history and cross out everything done by the people under the Soviet Power. With that he wants to link his name with Lenin’s name. We mustn’t let him do this. That is the main reason for our attitude to him. That’s why we want him to deal with the agriculture and the party will be led by Molotov. He’d better agree with that. In fact, if the Plenum is convened to tell about his past activities, his current actions and where he’s leading us to, I’m sure, the CC members will not only dismiss him, but also can exclude him from the party.’
Having listened to Kaganovich, I answered, ‘I’ve already told my point of view in my speech. To this I can only add the following: the 20th congress’s resolution - you also voted for it, didn’t you?! - must be supported by all means, the victims rehabilitation must be implemented completely, and the party bodies work must be significantly improved. And all these can be done by the current Presidium and Central Committee membership.’
Hereupon our conversation was finished and I left.
Upon the Plenum completion, it became obvious the power struggle was launched between the two groups: ‘the seven’ and ‘the three’, i.e., pro-Stalin and anti-Stalin, respectively. The anti-Stalin group led by Khrushchev gained a victory.
In the renewed CC Presidium membership there was nobody who could replace Molotov properly as the people’s commissar of the foreign affairs. Khrushchev needed his own people. So, he suggested A.A. Gromyko for that post.
A.A. Gromyko graduated from the Economics Institute, then he did a postgraduate course in the All-Union research institute of the agriculture economics, and got a PhD in economics sciences. He became the minister at the age of 56 years old. Without having a diplomatic education, he started work there on the call of the party. In the late 1930s, many diplomats were killed in the result of the mass repressions, and they were replaced by the new party workers. Neither his experience, nor his positions (the ambassador to the USA, deputy people’s commissar, the ambassador to Great Britain, and the first deputy people’s commissar of the foreign affairs) he had held before his new appointment could not make him a proper replacement of Molotov for the post of the people’s commissar of the foreign affairs.
In the renewed Presidium membership after the June Plenum, 1957, the only competent in international affairs person who had been dealing with that work for a long time was A.I. Mikoyan. However, by the time his reputation had been dramatically damaged. After Stalin’s sharp criticism and serious accusations addressed to him at the organizational CC Plenum after the 19th party congress where he wasn’t elected to the CC Presidium Bureau membership, everybody thought his days were numbered and even he could be liquidated. But Mikoyan was lucky. In four and a half months Stalin died, and Mikoyan ‘resurfaced’ again. Nevertheless, many still mistrusted him. It was on March 6th, 1953 that the government was restructured, when he was elected to the new membership and regained his post. However, he wasn’t included in the Ministers Council Presidium membership of the USSR.
It was then when the party control Committee started receiving serious signals about his past activities. What’s more, the KGB submitted to the CC the information confirming Stalin’s claims about serious Mikoyan’s mistakes in the internal and foreign affairs, in particular in the procurement of the population during the war and first postwar years. From a deep cache were taken the archival records witnessing his ambiguous role in the 26 (out of 27) Baku commissars' death, his personal extremely active participation in the repressions and death of a lot of the leading executives in Armenia and North Caucasia.
And now again arose a situation really uneasy to make a choice in. Will Khrushchev win or not? Who is reliable to lean on? Mikoyan was keeping silence at the Presidium and Plenum sessions. Sharp discussions, heated debates with mutual recriminations were going on. But he was still keeping silence. Only when the group of the CC members entered the room and severely warned the discussion participants about the inadmissibility of their undertaken mission to solve significant issues behind the CC back, only then Mikoyan, realizing that the situation had drastically changed, pronounced a few words in favor of Khrushchev and separated himself from his colleagues in the government. Practically, he was the only one out of the Ministers Council members who defected to Khrushchev’s side. And as the life showed, he did it at right time. He joined the ‘group of the three’ (Khrushchev, Suslov, and Mikoyan) who immediately started preparing a report to the Plenum and developing the draft resolution.
The participation in developing the approved by the Plenum resolution regarding Mikoyan’s colleagues and his friends with whom Mikoyan had worked in the CC and Politburo for a dozen of years, was considered by many CC members as an opportunism manifestation. That was how he became a close companion-in-arms of Khrushchev, again climbed up the authority ladder, and even became the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman for a short time. In fact, after that Plenum Mikoyan was involved in all external affairs, including not only in trade and economics but also in culture and politics.
All those June 1957 events adversely affected the international prestige of the Soviet Union. In order to get out of the time pressure and improve its role in the foreign policy, the CC Presidium decided to raise a few urgent issues on a world-wide scale. One of them was to submit to the UN the proposal on the disarmament. During the discussion of that matter some Presidium members pronounced their doubts about its real implementation. According to them, the strive for disarmament had already been on for thousands of years since its first appearance. However, each noisy campaign was followed by intensification, armament build-up, search for new types and mass destruction weapons creation. What would our proposal result in? What’s more, we had invested billions of rubles in the Military Forces and up-to-date weapons. Could we really become in practice the example of disarmament?
After debates and discussions, it was finally decided to submit the given proposal to the UN. Under the CC order, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and the KGB developed the Presidium draft Resolution, the draft Declaration, the letter addressed to the UN Secretary General, and the propaganda materials. They were discussed a few times and finally edited. It was also decided that Nikita Sergeevich, as the new head of the Soviet government, would make a speech and submit the proposal to the UN General Assembly. When the UN Secretary General, D. Hammarskjöld, was informed of that, he had positive attitude to the idea.
The preparatory work started. In order to give that action a considerable meaning and weighty character, the information was sent through the ambassadors to the people’s democratic countries so that they could send their top-level delegations to the Assembly. Besides, the information was sent to the friendly governments of some capitalist and developing states, seeking for their support. To some countries it was sent through the ambassadors, to the others the representatives of our leadership were sent with the mission. In this connection, I had a chance to visit India and a number of the neighboring countries, which was already told about in the previous chapters.
XVII
RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN CAIRO AND MOSCOW
The year of 1958 became the year of rapprochement between Moscow and Cairo. Establishing friendly relations between the USSR and the Arab East countries was included in the plan of the new leadership that came to the power after Stalin’s death. Having actively supported Egypt and Syria in the Suez conflict, Moscow expected the UAR (United Arab Republic) to completely support the USSR’s policy in the East.
In May, the UAR president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, first arrived in the USSR. He was the first distinguished foreign guest Khrushchev received, being both First CC CPSU secretary and Chairman of the USSR Ministers Council.
At the airport, all the members of the CC CPSU Presidium, the Supreme Soviet, and the Ministers Council met Nasser as a hero because he had won the battle for the Suez Canal and had defended the independence and sovereignty of his country from the armed aggression of England, France, and Israel. In the plebiscite in June, 1956 by the vast majority the people approved the Constitution of the Republic of Egypt and elected Nasser as the President.
The negotiations in Moscow from the Soviet side were led by Brezhnev. Although the basic documents had been agreed on beforehand via diplomatic channels, nevertheless, clarifications and specifications were required. So, the negotiations were held in the three rounds. In a solemn atmosphere in the Catherine Hall of the Kremlin, the friendship and cooperation treaty, as well as a number of agreements on economic, trade and military cooperation were signed at the top level. Also, the interparty relations plan was signed and the final communiqué was accorded.
Then A.N. Kosygin and I were assigned to accompany the delegation in the trip over the country. In addition to the three vice-presidents of Nasser, the delegation included the leading ministers, the Revolutionary Council members, the highest-rank military commanders - about thirty people all together.
Leningrad was the first city to visit on our trip. The guests were deeply impressed by visiting the Hermitage, the Smolny Palace, the Peterhof museums, and some other sightseeing. Everything was going great. But there was an amusing incident. The Egyptians asked if there was a mosque in the city and, having received a positive response, decided to pray. The mosque where they were going to pray had been built in St. Petersburg before 1917 Revolution by Emir of Bukhara, Alim Khan. He had built the mosque as a gratitude response to Tsar Nikolai II’s gift – the land in the Crimea granted for building Emir’s own sanatorium.
The chairman of the Leningrad Council, N.I. Smirnov, who was a nice worthy man, was playing a role of our guide. (We had known each other and been friends since the 1950s.) Accompanying the delegation everywhere, he gave clarifications by himself. When we entered the mosque, Smirnov, showing a great zeal, without getting the point in that unusual for him situation, was still walking in front of the guests. All of a sudden, he found himself in a mihrab, i.e., the place where only a mullah could stand before the praying believers and lead the ceremony. A few reporters and cameramen energetically tried to film and record such an exotic picture of the Muslims praying.
Alexei Nikolaevich Kosygin and I stepped aside, but Nikolai Ivanovich Smirnov, being for the first time in his ‘own’ mosque, got hopelessly stuck in front of the worshippers, standing next to the mullah, without knowing what to do next. In accordance with the shariah, everybody knelt down, but he kept standing. The cameramen were whispering to the city mayor who was spoiling their filming, insisting that he should leave the room. However, Nikolai Ivanovich, realizing his situation absurdity and seeing around him the worshippers almost touching their foreheads to the floor, felt absolutely embarrassed and stunned. We managed with great difficulty to drag him out of there.
The Egyptian guests were heartily welcomed by Volgograd, Tashkent, and Ukraine. Nasser was one of the wisest and most farsighted Arab leaders. Being a military officer, he, naturally, was inexperienced in the statecraft. Nevertheless, having an inquisitive mind, thirst for knowledge and strong memory, he was interested in many issues, put a lot of questions and attentively listened to his interlocutor. In the plane cabin, there were three of us and we were having conversations all the time. Kosygin was answering to his questions concerning the All-union authorities' activities. And I had a chance to tell him about the life and affairs in the republics.
Upon finishing the trip which included two days off in Sochi we returned to Moscow. Another round of the negotiations was held; afterwards Khrushchev and his milieu gave a reception to honor Nasser and the Egyptian delegation. The Egyptian President made an official invitation to Khrushchev to visit Egypt at any time with a government delegation. And as his personal guests, he invited Kosygin and me. Nikita Sergeevich immediately said he could not visit Egypt that year, but a bit later he would certainly come and meet the courageous Egyptian people. Then he added, ‘However, in a couple of months or so our Muslim, Mukhitdinov, may visit you on behalf of all of us. He will inform you about everything, what we think and are doing.’
Nasser expressed his readiness to receive me at any time. We agreed that my visit would take place in September.
On September 17th we arrived in Cairo. At the airport our delegation was met by the party leadership members, vice-premier Kamaladdin Hussein, a few ministers, some public, religious figures, politicians, and a lot of people. We were accommodated in the At-Tahir Palace.
In the afternoon, Gamal Abdel Nasser invited me to his house. We, two, were talking for about four hours. At nine o’clock in the evening, he gave a reception party to the whole delegation. There were the vice-presidents - field marshal Abdul Hakim Amer and Mahmoud Fawzi, the parliament chairman Anwar El Sadat, all the prime-minister deputies, the ministers, public figures, and politicians.
The next day from eight o’clock in the morning we familiarized ourselves with the work of the Helwan steel-smelting plant. The governor and the plant managers gave dinner to honor us. In the afternoon we visited the famous mosque-citadel. Upon arrival in Cairo, I was welcomed again at the president’s home where we continued our conversations.
Instead of the eight planned days, we spent ten days in Egypt. Only two people were accompanying me: my bodyguard and my assistant. The Soviet ambassador, E. Kiselev, was away from Cairo at the time as he was in a Moscow hospital. Therefore, we were permanently accompanied by Gerasimov who was an attorney and afterwards became an eminent diplomat.
Within ten days we met Nasser seven times. Each meeting lasted a few hours and was full with confidential talks. The itinerary of the visiting program was busy. Under the persistent president’s request, we flew to Luxor with a group of the ministers, irrigation engineers, and power engineers. There is the world-known necropolis where the most eminent people of Egypt were buried for a few centuries. The cemetery is located under the ground and was constructed in such a way that each body was placed in a particular niche. It’s amazing that the air here is always clean, fresh and the temperature is invariable, and although there is no electricity, everything is clearly visible and well-lighted.
From Luxor we went on to Aswan where we in detail got acquainted with the condition and, basically, a possibility for the construction of a large water reservoir and hydraulic technical complex.
It was interesting to visit the Military Academy and meet some high-rank commanders. Then we visited a number of industrial enterprises and the world-known bank ‘Banque Misr’. On September 19th in two days after visiting Cairo, Nasser, when we were visiting him at his house, told me that the press-conference for Arabic and foreign reporters at which the establishment of the Algerian government in emigration would be announced had been announced for the next day.
He told me in detail about the people who would lead that government and its other members, about its program and the notification form of the other countries in this connection. We were talking in detail for a long time. At the end of the conversation Nasser said, ‘The Arabic and friendly to us states will undoubtedly recognize this government. I ask you to urgently inform comrade Khrushchev and the other Soviet leaders of an exceptional importance of recognition of the Algerian government by the Soviet Union. Such a step will be positively admitted by the Eastern countries liberated from the colonial rule.’
From Nasser I directly went to the embassy and sent a ciphered ‘urgent’ telegram to Khrushchev personally, where I set forth Nasser’s request and my opinion about reasonability of recognizing the emigration Algerian government. The next day I received an ‘urgent’ response in which ‘Moscow’ expressed some doubts about the recognition rush. They also noted possible negative attitude to our step from France and the other European countries’ parts. And further, they said: ‘From your telegram it is not clear what the goals and plans of actions of this government are. Do send your opinion.’
On the same day when Nasser told me about it and I had already sent the information to Moscow, he arranged for me in the government cottage a confidential meeting with the leaders of the just established Algerian government. I was alone there accompanied by the interpreter Soloviev.
They were young, interesting, energetic and confident in their standpoint people. They showed me the list of the already approved ministers of the government. They told me about their program, plan of actions in emigration and in their Motherland. Also, they told about the possibilities available at their disposal in their country, how the liberation struggle was spreading and when approximately they expected to gain independence from France. By that time, it had been pronounced that Libya and Morocco had recognized that government.
Without delay I sent the second ‘urgent’ telegram to ‘Moscow’. In a day in the evening I received the response. It said that the Soviet government made a decision to recognize the Algerian government in emigration and the information about it would be published in mass media in a few days. That event should be covered by Arabic press after the publications in the Soviet media. As for the practical steps in establishment of the relationship and cooperation with the Algerian government, those issues would be agreed on later.
I immediately went to see Nasser to tell him about that decision. He was glad, thanked me for the good news and advised me to inform the Algerian leaders in person. The Algerian friends were, of course, delighted, and we agreed to publish it after the receipt of the resolution text of the Soviet government.
On September 21st the newspapers Al-Jumhūrīyah, Al-Akhbar, and others published articles dedicated to establishing the Algerian government, with enthusiastic comments and expressing confidence that the Arabic and friendly countries would recognize it. The Soviet Union wasn’t mentioned there. The articles had the appeal to France to take the initiative, to give up the colonial rule, to recognize the independence of Algeria and to cooperate with its government in emigration.
In a few days it became known that the Soviet Union had recognized that government, which was followed by France and western circles’ violent reaction. Meanwhile in Moscow some CC Presidium members and colleagues in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, in my absence, expressed, as I found out later, reproaches to my address: allegedly I was in a hurry and speeded up the events.
Also, I received a few reproaches, although in a mild form, as some questions put by the CC CPSU executives when I returned to Moscow. There was such an incident. In Egypt we visited a small-caliber weapons plant, the plant manufacturing heavy armament ammunition, and the nonferrous metal plant. The General managers of those military plants presented me a rifle and a short gun of the up-to-date model. The leading Egyptian newspaper Al-Akhram wrote about it. So, when I came back from the trip, one of the first questions, perhaps, was, ‘Where are the rifle and the short gun you were given in Egypt?’
Only when my bodyguard, who was a KGB agent, explained that they had been left in the embassy and we didn’t bring them with us, they calmed down.
Besides, my visit to the military Academy in Cairo was being discussed in the CC lobbies for a long time. At the meeting in that Academy, which all the generals, teachers, and officer trainees were attending, field marshal Amer made the following speech: ‘Dear Mr. Mukhitdinov! We are greeting you from the bottom of our hearts in the United Arab Republic, we are greeting you with all sincerity because you are one of our friends, because you are from the Soviet Union which supported us and rendered us a true assistance. I will never forget what I saw during my visit to the Soviet Union and I will never forget the spirit of the true friendship I felt there.
By saying this I do not mean reception ceremonies and official meetings. I mean deep and sincere feelings. We were allowed to see absolutely everything in your country. We were welcomed everywhere with enthusiasm, showing friendly attitude. Moreover, I especially felt the depth of the valuable assistance rendered us by the Soviet people and the Soviet leaders in our struggle for the freedom and independence of our country. Therefore, my visit to your country left a strong and deep trace in my heart, particularly because I am aware of numerous intensive attempts which since 1952 have been made to undermine our revolution and trample our freedom.
At the time when we had numerous enemies and just a few true friends, the Soviet Union became a leader of those friends and rendered us assistance. At the same time, it has always respected our independence and freedom, and our relationships have always developed on a mutual respect.
From the bottom of our hearts we highly appreciate your help. And I’m telling our friend Mukhitdinov that the feeling of friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic will remain strong because it has a firm foundation. I wish our friend Mukhitdinov to have a good time on his visit to the United Arab Republic, although this time is limited. I also want to express a desire to have another opportunity to see him in our country again. Here he will always meet friends, the people of the United Arab Republic, who love and respect him and who wish success to the people and army of the Soviet Union.’
Under Nasser’s recommendation and at the request of the Culture Ministry, we visited Cairo university on September 25th. After the tour at the university and private conversations, there was a meeting with participation of professors, teachers, leaders of other universities, municipal and republican clergies and students.
Since in Moscow then some opinions about that meeting were spreading among the party employees, I’ll cite the welcoming speech made by Mr. As-Said Mustafa As-Said, the chancellor of Cairo University, some particular excerpts from my speech, and a passage from the poem cited at the meeting.
Apart from that, the speeches made by marshal Amir and the university chancellor As-Said Mustafa As-Said as many others revived the period of approach between Cairo and Moscow, the time of friendly relationships and a big trust between Egypt and the USSR, which afterwards were destroyed, gone away, and sunk in sand.
Thus, as for the meeting in Cairo university, the university chancellor made a speech as follows:
‘Dear Gentlemen!
Cairo university is glad today to welcome Mr. Mukhitdinov, the chairman of the Commission for the foreign affairs of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
Mr. Mukhitdinov is one of the leaders of the Soviet Union, an eminent figure in the Uzbek Republic, and one of the prominent people bound with ties of the firm friendship with Arabs, the United Arab Republic, and its leaders.
He is famous for his good attitude to the Arab policy, their independence and freedom and their tireless struggle for the matter of peace and independence of the peoples.
Mr. Mukhitdinov is well-known as an eminent figure in the realms of culture, who has done a lot to perfect enlightenment and improve the cultural and social level in the Uzbek Republic as well as in the Soviet Union in whole.
Nowadays the entire world is a witness of the tremendous success achieved by the Soviet Union in the realms of culture and science. That is why our guest has spared his time to visit the university in spite of his short arrival in our country. His visit is another evidence of the good relations existing between the USSR and the UAR.
On behalf of the professors, students, and all the university staff, I am greeting you from the bottom of my heart and wish you to enjoy your time in our country and safe journey back to your great Motherland.’
I made a response speech at this meeting:
‘Dear friend, Minister Kamaleddin Hussein!
Dear chancellor, professors, teachers, and students of Cairo University!
Friends, brothers, sons, and daughters of the heroic Arab people! (Applause.)
Your university visitation is a final item in our trip program in your country. We have made it deliberately. We decided to do so because university is the youth, and the youth is the future, hope and support of the people. (Applause.) We sincerely want your glorious homeland, the United Arab Republic, to be always as beautiful, cheerful, energetic and prosperous as you are, the students of the university. (Applause.) Your university has a great history and worldwide fame. In December this year, the university will celebrate its 50th anniversary of its foundation. Let me personally and on behalf of students and all the youth of the Soviet Union greet you. We arrived in the UAR under the invitation of your esteemed President and our friend Gamal Abdel Nasser. (Applause.) Before our departure from your country to our Motherland, let me thank President Nasser for the invitation and an afforded to us opportunity to get widely acquainted with your country and the glorious Arab people. (Rapturous applause.)
…Your country is one of the places which are called a cradle of the world civilization. The Arab people have considerably contributed to the development of the world progress, science, and culture. The triumph of the 1952 National Revolution became a vivid page, a new stage in the many-century history of the peoples of the United Arab Republic. It opened good prospects for the growth of the economy, culture, and peaceful life of the Arab people. We are delighted that for a short time after the revolution under your government leadership, the Arab people have been a great success. (Applause.)
New, up-to-date industrial enterprises, schools, hospitals, institutes, other educational institutions, rural cooperatives, social centers, etc. have evolved. Your major achievement is a quick growth of the national intelligentsia, working class, enthusiasm, and political upsurge enveloping all the Arab people.
…With an interest we got familiarized with the plans of the economy and culture development of the United Arab Republic. Skilled, literate and highly educated manpower is needed to implement the planned assignments relating to the growth of the industry, agriculture, culture, and especially well-being of the people. We are happy to meet you because your famous university is a smithy of the national manpower. (Applause.) We are hoping that you will be worthy of your people and capable to successfully achieve objectives existing before them.
The peoples of our two countries have had close connections since the ancient time. Their friendship turned into true richness, developed and expanded especially after the victory of your national revolution. We are confident that the Arab people as well as the Soviet ones believe that our friendship and relationship do not consist of conjunctural or tactical considerations, but have their own long history and lie deep in the hearts. (Applause.)
…In the East there are over 1 billion 700 million people, and we are happy that after the victory of the Soviet people in World War II, a new wave of the growing national liberation movement in the colonial and dependent countries is going up.
We rejoice in success of this movement and congratulate all the peoples of Asia and Africa who have won the liberty and independence. (Applause.) We congratulate the glorious Iraq people, who made a national revolution, proclaimed the republic, and got rid of agents of the imperialism and colonialism on their land. We sincerely wish the Iraq people and their revolutionary government led by esteemed Abd al-Karim Qasim a new big success. (Rapturous applause.)
…We are confident that the death of the colonialism and the final victory of the national liberation movement in the East are equally inevitable. And therefore, we sincerely wish all the peoples of Asia and Africa to win liberty and national independence. (Rapturous applause.)
…The Soviet people are firmly convinced in the firmness of our friendship, and we, being here, have seen that the Arab people led by President of the United Arab Republic, Nasser, (applause) and his distinguished companion-in-arms and eminent statesman of the United Arab Republic, esteemed Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, and the others with whom we have had friendly conversations are convinced that the friendship between our peoples is unshakable and heartfelt.’ (Applause.)
After my speech the floor was given to the senior teacher of the Mohammedan Law Department, As-Sibai Ash-Shinavi, who cited a poem translated into Russian by N. Kokarev.
Mukhitdinov, you have vivified our hopes.
We are glorifying you.
My land is proud of Russia that has stopped our enemies
And was with us at a dark night of the severe great war.
That’s why our gardens are full of the victory flowers.
The best thing in the world is Gamal and Russia.
These words are the dearest for peace.
We are peaceful to those who are peaceful to us.
But we are merciless to our enemies.
Let the war flame devour the West: those who sow the evil will mow it in double.
Our peoples have one will – Peace is defended by two giants.
The next day, we together with Nasser listened to the messages of high-ranking officials and specialists about repeated but unsuccessful so far attempts to build the Aswan hydraulic technical complex and the contacts on this matter with Sweden, the USA, and other countries. On that day the president of the UAR insistently requested via me the Soviet government for rendering assistance in carrying out a feasibility study report, designing, building of the water reservoir and the hydropower station, and the vast land-reclamation for irrigational purposes.
Bidding farewell, Gamal Abdel Nasser told me, ‘Would you remind Nikita Sergeevich that we are waiting for him, please?’
We returned to Moscow on September 26th. I found out that Khrushchev had already been having a rest in Yalta for five days. I phoned up the Crimea using a special phone in his reception room in the Kremlin. Having greeted him, I told him in short about my visit trip and expressed the desire to personally inform him in detail. He asked, ‘Can you fly down here? I’ll listen to you and we’ll have a rest together.’
I agreed and on the next day I flew by a special flight to Yalta.
When I arrived at Khrushchev’s country house, I saw many guests on the sun porch. Among them there were A.N. Tupolev, other prominent scientists, and leading executives of the country. Apparently, they were having a rest nearby and at Nikita Sergeevich’s invitation came round for a lunch. I got there at the peak of the joyful party. I was seated at the table right away. Nikita Sergeevich said, ‘He arrived from Egypt yesterday where he was a guest of President Nasser.’ Then he asked me, ‘Well, what’s up have you returned with?’
In short, I told about my trip and added at the end, ‘The Arabs are waiting for you, Nikita Sergeevich.’
Having seen off the guests, Khrushchev suggested to have a rest for a bit while and then to continue the conversation.
Nikita Sergeevich treated positively to my detailed information, saying, ‘That’s good you’ve visited them. I will tell Kirichenko to arrange that at the Presidium session they will listen to you, consider the matters attentively and approve Nasser’s requests and your suggestions.’
Further our conversation touched the state policy principles, particularly in relationships with Eastern countries. I told Khrushchev it would be good to morally and politically support oppressed in the past peoples, their independence, and further development. Economic relations should be established on the mutual acceptable and beneficial foundation. At the same time, I emphasized that gift and gratis aid were, of course, accepted in the East. However, on the other hand, the belittled and robbed by colonizers peoples mistrusted quite understandably such a kind of assistance. They were inclined to see it as a trick and even humiliation.
Having won their independence, newly born states were desperately eager to establish parity external relations. Therefore, we should improve our foreign policy in that direction. They could pay for our aid in hard currency and/or by supplying goods and products. In that way, we wouldn’t have lost as well.
Nikita Sergeevich enthusiastically replied, ‘You are absolutely right! Up to now, we haven’t thought about it deeply. It goes without saying the relationships must be built on the parity basis. You have to focus on this aspect and strictly follow up its observance, and not only with Arab countries but also in whole.’
Soon after my return from Yalta, at the next CC Presidium session chaired by A.I. Kirichenko, my report on the results of my trip to Egypt was discussed. It was approved without any remarks. Apparently, it was caused by Khrushchev’s phone call from the Crimea. My suggestions were approved and soon after having been formalized with relevant decisions and instructions, started being implemented.
After a while my trip to Egypt echoed. Because of it, because of Algeria, to be precise in particular, some serious disagreements between Khrushchev and myself arose at the CC Presidium session. The events that provoked them were developing as follows.
During his visit to the USSR, the president of France Charles de Gaulle invited the country’s leaders and personally Khrushchev to visit France at any convenient time, saying he would be delighted to welcome them and show them the country. The invitation was accepted, and soon Paris was informed of the suitable arrival date. Frenchmen were engaged in the program for Khrushchev’s visit, and when it was ready, it was handed over to the Soviet embassy in France.
The embassy sent the program draft to Moscow, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted it to the CC Presidium for approval. In the program there was such an item: ‘A visit to Algeria made by N.S. Khrushchev together with Charles de Gaulle by the latter's aircraft.’
It was explained in the comments to the program that the president wanted to show to his honored guest what France had done for supporting the Algerian people in the development of their country. The embassy and Ministry of Foreign Affairs found it useful. Suslov also endorsed that draft program.
During the discussion at the Presidium, Khrushchev expressing satisfaction asked the opinion of the attendees. The feedback replies followed: ‘That’s right. Let’s approve it.’
Then I took the floor and said, ‘The visit to the French colony, Algeria, by Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev together with Charles de Gaulle will hardly be ethic and useful. The French in due time conquered, occupied and established their rule in Algeria. The Algerian people have struggled for their independence for many years. Many states, including the Soviet Union, support them in it. The time the Algerians will achieve their liberation is not far off. The emigration government with whom we have friendly relationship is working on it as well. Therefore, it would be better to refrain from this trip.’
Most participants in the session disagreed with me, having supported the draft program as a whole.
Nikita Sergeevich, having listened to different views, said, ‘Yes, of course, there is some embarrassing point about it. False rumors may arise. But we are not going to undertake any commitments when visiting Algeria. I am not going to make any speeches and praise the French. We’ll just watch, listen and fly for Paris. Thus, we’ll ‘wash our hands of an affair’.’
Some voices sounded: ‘That’s right.’
I continued insisting on my standpoint, ‘We need to think it over and weigh it again. That’s right now that we are intensively developing our cooperation with former colonial and dependent countries.’
Nobody supported my standpoint. After being silent for a bit, Nikita Sergeevich said addressing to Gromyko, ‘Prepare the response that in whole the program of my visit has been accepted.’
Thus, the discussion of that matter at the CC Presidium was over.
Soon the MFA prepared the response. When Malin was reporting, Khrushchev told him, ‘These papers as well as every document relating to the trip to France, including the trip to Algeria, must be shown to Mukhitdinov. Let him get familiarized with them and come round to me.’
In the evening we met and I confirmed my standpoint, ‘All the materials have been prepared well. However, you shouldn’t visit Algeria together with the president of France, flying on his aircraft. The very fact of your joint arrival will inevitably be apprehended as our support to France in the Algerian issue. You have never visited any Arab and African country yet. So, is it worth in such a situation starting your journey from Algeria in particular?’
Nikita Sergeevich listened and said, ‘Cross this item out.’
Having left Khrushchev, I phoned up Gromyko, ‘Andrei Andreevich, it seems to me Nikita Sergeevich should not fly to Algeria together with Charles de Gaulle. Let’s cross this item out. It would be better to accept the program without this item.’
Gromyko phoned me up in a day and said, ‘Charles de Gaulle is eager to visit Algeria together with Khrushchev. And we won’t undertake any commitments. President reminded that he had visited all the places in the USSR where we wanted him to visit. He believes France itself is promoting Algeria to its independence. That’s why he would like to fly there together with Khrushchev.’
I kept silent, disagreeing with Gromyko in my heart.
He concluded, ‘Nikita Sergeevich suggested that we both prepare the response.’
I continued insisting on my standpoint, ‘Maybe we shall do the following: we shall thank them for the invitation to visit Algeria, and referring to the busy visitation program, we shall express the desire of Nikita Sergeevich to go as many sightseeing in France as possible and to have enough time for confidential conversations with the president. Also, we shall note that Nikita Sergeevich has never been to any Arab and African countries yet, and we must think about how they will apprehend such a visit. At the end we shall express the confidence that the French side will be sympathetic to our considerations.'
Finally, Gromyko gave up, ‘It’s reasonable. There is a reason for the reply preparation. Let’s formulate it together and submit it to Nikita Sergeevich.’
Khrushchev’s visit to France was successful, but he didn’t fly to Algeria.
XVIII
KABUL: GOOD WILL VISIT
In five months after having been elected as a secretary of the CC CPSU, I was included in the state delegation for the trip to Afghanistan at the King Zahir-Shah’s invitation. The head of the delegation was Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the USSR. In addition to us, the delegation included: P.N. Firyubin, deputy minister of foreign affairs; S.U. Umarov, president of the Academy of Sciences of Tajikistan; N.N. Danilov, deputy minister of culture; D.D. Degtyar, member of the State Committee of the Foreign Economic Relations (SCFER). I, of course, flew to Afghanistan not as the CC secretary but as the chairman of the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the Nationalities Soviet of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
On a warm day in May we flew from Moscow with a short stopover in Tashkent for refueling and in a few hours landed at the Kabul airport.
The first visit to the King when all the delegation, the King’s milieu, the prime-minister, the minister of foreign affairs, and the others were present took place in an easy, friendly and warm atmosphere since the King while his recent visiting the Soviet Union had been treated cordially by Kliment Yefremovich. The important decisions were taken and signed at that time.
Addressing to me, the King remembered us both hunting in the Tiger gully not far from Kurgan-Tyube in the floodplain of the Vakhsh river, our excitement, trophies, and so on.
Voroshilov approved the suggested visit program without any remarks. We agreed that the representatives of the relevant ministries and departments in the delegation would get familiarized with the situation relating to the bilateral agreements implementation. After the program refinement, the protocol events started: formal receptions, negotiations, visiting the culture centers and going sightseeing. In response to his accommodation in the Kremlin when visiting Moscow, he gave his summer residence house at the disposal of Voroshilov.
One day of those days, we together with the leadership of Afghanistan listened to the information of the Soviet representatives and the Afghan officials about the agreements implementation course. Having summarized, five of us, including King Zahir-Shah, prime-minister Daud, Voroshilov, myself, and an interpreter remained. At the King’s request, I told about the matters in the Central Asian republics which he had recently visited. I told him about the best regards sent him by the republican leaders, then I focused on a vitally essential for us and Afghanistan issue. In detail I told him about the Kelif hydropower complex and the advantages and benefits which Afghanistan and the USSR would get after its building. The King, having expressed understanding in whole, noted that according to the experts, as a result of the water reservoir construction, 15-20 hectares of the Afghan lands, with most lands including irrigational ones, owned by individuals and the waqf (the property of religious institutions), would be flooded.
Kliment Yefremovich noted right away, ‘Right. It’s a serious matter.’
I objected to him, ‘All the landowners will get full indemnities and better lands with the guaranteed water supply.’
I told them in brief about how we had implemented such a project at home during the construction of water economic facilities, showing respect to religious feelings, customs, traditions of Muslims and other religions followers. Then I told about our preparatory work to render assistance in the construction in the Jalalabad region of a large plant producing fruit, olives, citruses, and other cultures. Showing his positive attitude, the King requested that the experts should do an additional feasibility study and submit him reasonable calculations. That was exactly the thing that our experts who had arrived here on business focused on together with their Afghan colleagues.
When the conversation was over and we were leaving the King, prime-minister Muhammad Daud told me confidentially that he would like to talk to me face-to-face. I told Kliment Yefremovich about it, and after receiving his consent, I visited Daud at his residency the next morning.
We were talking for about five hours. After exchanging our views about the bilateral relations and international issues, having listened to his information and in particular, his requests, I assured him that I would report about them to the Soviet leadership. At the end of our meeting, we started talking again about the Kelif. He more precisely expressed his support and readiness to formalize an agreement on that facility between the two governments, which was really prepared and signed afterwards.
When the conversation was over, he invited me for dinner. And then due to his assistance, I visited the tomb of Babur. Daud assigned his assistant and the court minister to accompany me. By his car we arrived at the summer residency of Babur where he, his mother Kutlik Nigor Khanum, and his sister Khonzoda Begim were buried. We laid flower wreaths on their graves.
The next day was Friday which was a day off in Kabul. Therefore, the King offered Kliment Yefremovich to have a rest together with him in his palace, to which the latter gladly agreed. The delegation members were allowed to spend time with their teammates or the Afghan colleagues. As for me, taking a chance, I asked Voroshilov for permission to travel around the country to go sightseeing, to visit Kandahar, Ghaznī, and Herat and to visit tombs and graves to pay my last respects to the Uzbek people ancestors.
‘Who close to you was buried there?’ Voroshilov asked.
I replied, ‘Emperor Mahmud of Ghazni, genious scientist Abu-Rayhan Biruni, and great poet Ali-Shir Nava'i.’
‘Oh, it’s really interesting!’ He exclaimed, ‘Will you take me with you?’
Realizing he was joking, I answered, ‘To Herat via Kandahar it’s 1,200 kilometers. We’ll have to travel over an area of the eight provinces and then the great desert.’
‘Okay,’ he sighed, ‘It’s beyond of my strength. ‘You will go on your own and upon return tell me about your travel.’
Smiling, the King assured he would give necessary instructions to make my journey exciting.
Thus, I toured around the country by car, accompanied by the minister of education Meivandval (later he became the prime-minister) and his deputy.
On the same day we found ourselves in a town of Ghazni. In the town center there was a medieval fortress with a high tower, many other monuments witnessing a bygone greatness of the town. In the 10-12th centuries, it was the capital of the large empire of Ghaznavid the founder of which was Emperor Mahmud whose ancestors had come from Tashkent. His grandfather was a farmer; his father took part in a warfare when he was captured and, according to the legend, was sold into bondage. That was where Mahmud was born. Gradually climbing up and achieving success, he became the Shah and established the state. That’s why he was called Mahmud Ghaznavi.
Mahmud’s true virtue was his personal respectful attitude to a genius thinker Abu-Rayhan Biruni who had been born in Khwarezm. There in the 10th century, he founded the first in Central Asia Academy of Sciences (Mamun’s Academy) which he personally managed and to where he used to invite many prominent scientists from Khwarezm and neighboring countries. Thanks to Al-Biruni and his students, scientific thoughts rapidly developed in the Khwarezm state at that time.
Having conquered Khwarezm, Mahmud Ghaznavi brought a large group of scientists led by Al-Biruni to Ghazni. He provided them with comfortable life conditions and paid particular attention to them to let them continue their work. Al-Biruni lived there for 17 years, and it was in Ghazni that he wrote his multi-volume historical documentary work about India and many other manuscripts. Both Mahmud Ghaznavi and Abu-Rayhan Biruni passed away and were buried in this town.
I was visiting Ghazni, going sightseeing, but I was really in a hurry to visit their tombs. At last we came to the burial place. I was a little bit excited. At first Mahmud’s tomb was shown to us. And then in a different place two graves were shown to us, and they explained that the first one was Al-Biruni’s and the second was either Al-Biruni’s student’s or his cook’s (Al-Biruni didn’t have a family). We bowed and put some flowers on the marble slabs of their graves.
We stayed overnight in Kandahar which was the center of a large rich province with high-yield agriculture and brisk trades in bazaars. Further our route passed through the boundless steppe. Everywhere there was sand, sand dunes, but the asphalt road was good, well done on both sides. From time to time we saw nomad settlements. They usually stopped nearby wells to set up temporary dwellings, something like tents, and live there for a few weeks. We were told that there were over two and a half million nomads in the country then. They were exceptionally engaged in livestock sector, roaming from a well to another well. We stopped nearby one of such settlements. We were invited inside a dwelling, something like a tent. The hosts cut a lamb, served us some homemade sour cream and camel milk.
In the late evening, we arrived in Herat by two cars. The city could be seen from a far distance. Its famous minarets, mosque domes, famous cemeteries for prominent people, statesmen and honored holy people were seen a few kilometers away from the city. It was the capital of many generations of great rulers. In the 19th century, it was the princedom center which was the object of the warfare between Afghanistan and Iran as well as between Great Britain and Iran (the so-called Herat conflicts). In 1863, it finally joined Afghanistan. Herat was one of the largest hotbeds of the eastern civilization. Its residents have their own peculiar cultural traditions. The peak of its most astounding growth was in the 15th century. Besides going sightseeing of the city, I was eager to visit the tombs of the genius thinkers such as Abd Ar-Rahmān Jāmī, the son of the Tajik people, and Ali-Shir Nava'i, the son of the Uzbek people.
In Herat, we were met by the governor and municipal and provincial officials. We were accommodated in the central hotel. On the next early morning, we visited the city monuments. The cemetery where prominent people of the country had been buried was in a good condition. The mausoleum of Abd Ar-Rahmān Jāmī left a strong impression. All the objects of the sepulchral complex were made of pure white marble.
Nearby in the same garden, there was a small shelter, something like an open terrace. In its center, there was a modest grave with a marble grave stone. An epitaph on it said: ‘His Excellency Minister of Enlightenment, poet Mir 'Ali-Shir Nava'i rests here.’ I could hardly keep my excitement that seized me in this sacred for my people place. I told the accompanying me Afghan officials about the love of his country men in his homeland - Uzbekistan to great 'Ali-Shir Nava'i. Also, I told about the reverence and profound respect he was attributed by our people who admired him, about his immortal works read and cited by our people, from children to elderly ones, all over the country. The 500th birthday anniversary of 'Ali-Shir Nava'i was celebrated as a nation-wide holiday in all parts of Central Asia, Moscow, Leningrad, the other Soviet republics, and many foreign states. If his remains had been brought to Tashkent, then all the people would have carried them as a shrine, and would have built an honored, worthy tomb for their great son.
The minister and the governor in one voice apologized that they hadn’t come there before and didn’t know about Ali-Shir Nava'i’s grave's condition. They assured that the monument would be built deserving his name and role in the history.
On the same day in the evening, we returned to Kabul by aircraft.
On the delegation departure day, the King, the government members, and community representatives arrived at the airport.
While the King was bidding farewell to Voroshilov, I told in short Prime-Minister Daud about my tour over the country and expressed my regret over an improper attitude to Ali-Shir Nava'i memory. He said he had already been informed about it and assured that the government and he personally would settle the matter and create a worthy tomb complex.
On the plane, I told Kliment Yefremovich about the condition of Ali-Shir Nava'i’s grave in Herat, about my remarks and Daud’s promise. He wondered if we could symbolically transfer Ali-Shir Nava'i’s remains to Tashkent and solemnly bury them. I explained that by Shariah Law it should not be done. Also, I told him in detail about Ali-Shir Nava'i’s life and works and about my visit to Babur’s tomb.
Marshal Voroshilov asked to show him in Tashkent the building of the Opera and Ballet Theater named after Ali-Shir Nava'i and bring him the works by Ali-Shir Nava'i and Babur in the Russian language.
‘I will surely read and keep them in my own library,’ he noted.
During my second visit to Afghanistan in 1966, when Muhammad Daud had already become the president, after visiting Jalal-Abad province and a number of sites, we signed agreements on our cooperation in medicine, culture, education, science, and sports. We were received by new Prime-Minister Minvervald who congratulated us with successful negotiations and the signed agreement, after which he recommended me to visit Herat: ‘You will personally witness the serious reconstruction of Ali-Shir Nava'i’s tomb.’
I expressed regret about being short of time to do that. I thanked the President for his good attitude to the memory of Ali-Shir Nava'i and Babur. Then I asked the Prime-Minister if I could go to Mazar-i-Sharif in Balkh, which was almost three times nearer than Herat, to visit the mausoleum of another eminent son of the Uzbek people - Boborakhim Mashrab. It turned out that he didn’t know about him. I told him about Mashrab who had been born in Namangan and been exiled from his native land for his freethinking and protection of the poor whom he glorified in his works. He wandered about different countries. When he came to Afghanistan with his followers, he preached his ideas of freedom and justice. He condemned swagger of the rich and hypocritical clergies. For that reason, he was sentenced to death by the then Balkh’s ruler and was hanged in 1711. At night his friends stole his body and buried him in a mountain gorge.
The Prime-Minister invited his secretary who instantly got in touch with somebody on the phone. After a short phone talk, it was found that unfortunately it was impossible to reach that place now. So, we agreed they would meet my request during my next arrival.
Returning home, we had a stopover in Tashkent for a couple of days. The republic leaders - S. Kamalov, Sh. Rashidov, M. Mirza-Akhmedov, and R. Melnikov - met the delegation at the airport. Kliment Yefremovich expressed his willingness to visit right away my father and my children who were in Tashkent then. My father, children, and relatives were delighted to welcome legendary Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov at home.
We showed him the city. He was deeply impressed by the building of the Academic Theater named after Ali-Shir Nava'i. Then we went to one of the suburban collective farms. After meeting, greeting, and conversations with collective farmers in the field camp, the chairman of the collective farm, A. Kuchkarov, suggested us to hunt for quails. We went with pleasure. When we got inside a cotton plantation and a nearby field of alfalfa, we saw quails fluttering out from plant patches. Kliment Yefremovich was delighted jumping from one plant patch to another. When he saw a jumping quail nearby him, he rushed after it trying to catch it. Coming up to it, he bent down to grab it and grew quiet. He carefully lifted the bird and standing up turned to us. He showed us the quail with a loop on its neck and became upset, calling us heartless.
The hunting Voroshilov saw has existed in this region for a long time. A loop is made out of a horsehair. The ends of a horsehair are attached to a clay piece, then the loop is hidden in the concealment. A handful of millet is thrown in front of it. A trap is set up in such a way that a quail can reach the millet only by passing its head through the loop. Once the quail is flying up, the loop tightens up, and the bird is caught in the trap.
Kliment Yefremovich was a participant in two wars and witnessed a lot of bloody events and deaths in his life. He was thought to be calm, strong-willed and steady. But here all of a sudden, he got out of temper seeing a small bird suffering from a human’s brutality.
Everybody lowered their heads and didn’t dare to look at his eyes. It was useless to try to calm him down. Still being indignant, he went towards my father, and they both stepped aside. After a while, they came back to the field camp. Voroshilov pulled himself together.
Fortunately, it turned out that two sorts of pilau meal were cooked for us: with quail and lamb meat. Of course, the latter meal was served to us. We ate it with gusto. I warned Kliment Yefremovich that another sort of pilau had been cooked too. I gave a sign and it was brought in. Voroshilov started eating the second one too, admiring the tender meat taste. Then I explained him that the first pilau meal had lamb meat in it while the second one had quail meat, including the quail he had caught and had in his hands. Voroshilov was stunned. He looked at us and noted, ‘It’s very delicious; yet you are brutal people…’
The next morning at my father’s invitation, we came round for a cup of tea. During the breakfast Voroshilov wondered, ‘Where is Yusupov now?’
I answered that he worked as the director of a state farm and immediately phoned up the state farm ‘Bayaut-2.’ In the afternoon, Usman Yusupov and Kliment Yefremovich firmly hugged each other. The three of us were having a rest and talking till the end of the day.
Before our departure to Moscow, I presented Voroshilov some books by and a portrait of Ali-Shir Nava'i and a ‘Babur-Name’ book. He read these works. Afterwards he repeatedly cited particular lines and strophes from them.
After our joint visit to Afghanistan, our meetings and communication with Kliment Yefremovich did not finish.
One day on holiday in Sochi, I was sitting with my family at the sun porch. We were having as the guests Zukhra Rakhimbabaeva, the CC secretary of the Communist party of Uzbekistan, and her husband Ilkhomjon, the deputy minister. On the same day suddenly Kliment Yefremovich came round to see us. The women began bustling, laying a table for lunch. But he refused explaining he came to invite us all for a dinner. He took our children out and left.
A few minutes later, our guests and I with my wife, Mukarram Makhkamovna, went to a neighboring country house to visit Voroshilov. At the big table except us, there were a few of his relatives, his assistant, his doctor, and his bodyguard. When we sat down, his adjutant having got a permission stood up, offered all of us some drinks and said that the distance the marshal had walked over till that morning was 40 thousand kilometers. Therefore, it could be considered he had walked around the Earth globe along the equator. We all congratulated Kliment Yefremovich. In response he said, ‘Since my early childhood, I've liked not only horse-riding but also walking every day. Lately I regularly walk a lot. It strengthens my health and extends my life. I’m glad to celebrate this event of my life in a close circle of my relatives and close friends.’
Even when my official position repeatedly changed, Voroshilov never and anyhow changed his attitude to me. At crucial moments I advised with him, and his advice, recommendations, sometimes sharp unbiased remarks inspired me with confidence, encouraged and heartened me.
In April, 1968 when I was appointed an ambassador of the USSR to Syria, I came to say goodbye to Kliment Yefremovich. He congratulated me with a new appointment. We were talking for a long time, remembering the time we had spent together in Moscow. Voroshilov told me about many details of his visits overseas, meetings and negotiations with foreign statesmen and military people. Paternalistically, he advised me how to live and work overseas. I sincerely thanked him for his kind attitude to me and invited him to visit Damascus. He said that it had been his old dream to visit Arab countries. But his age (he was nearly 87) and his health would not allow him to do that. Nevertheless, he would do his best to fly to Damascus. We firmly hugged and kissed each other three times…
On December 2nd, 1969 Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov passed away.
XIX
PARTICULAR MISSION
(TRIP TO INDONESIA, INDIA, AND BURMA)
In late September, 1959 Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev returned from the USA. Making a speech at the UN General Assembly on September 18th, he made a proposal about a general and full disarmament, held negotiations with the USA President D. Eisenhower, met other statesmen and people of business circles and signed a number of official interstate documents.
Upon Khrushchev’s return, the CC Presidium session was devoted to those matters. It was considered that Khrushchev had contributed a lot by his trip in the USSR’s foreign policy. But it was necessary to continue that work, to confidentially inform as many statesmen and politicians from leading countries as possible about outcomes of Khrushchev’s trip to the USA and to receive their support to his policy.
That information was sent via our ambassadors to the socialist countries' leaders. It was decided to send our country's top leaders to other countries. I was assigned to visit Indonesia. Shortly earlier, an Indonesian parliament delegation had visited Moscow. So, we requested via our Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Indonesian embassy for permission to make a return visit. The delegation was imposing. It was called as the ‘Delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR led by the chairman of the Commission for foreign affairs of the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, N.A. Mukhitdinov.’
We spent 12 days in Indonesia. Besides Jakarta, we visited Bandung, Surakarta, and Djokjakarta, then industrial enterprises, agricultural cooperatives, and University of ‘Gaddja Mada’ in Djokjakarta about which a member of our delegation, journalist Olga Chechetkina, wrote a lot in the Soviet press.
For me this time, establishing friendly parliament contacts was as always of great importance, though not of a primary dominating significance. As I mentioned above, the CC Presidium and Khrushchev assigned me to stop in Delhi to confidentially tell Prime-Minister Jawaharlal Nehru about Khrushchev’s trip to the US, and then in Indonesia to confidentially talk to the Indonesian President Sukarno. Suddenly the Prime-Minister of Burma, Ne Win, appeared, though he was not included in my program. However, I’d rather tell in the order and mainly about the collisions that arose during the meetings which were never covered and could not be covered in mass media.
I will start with Indonesia. From the first days the problems that could have negative consequences at least for the USSR and Indonesia arose. They were the subject of sharp discussions at the meetings with President Sukarno, Prime-Minister Juanda, chairman of the Supreme Consulting Council, Abdulgani. At first, I even doubted that President Sukarno would agree to have a private confidential conversation with me.
There in Jakarta, I remembered the recent trip to Egypt. President Nasser received me immediately upon my arrival. He gave a formal reception on the same day after which we had a talk for a few hours at his home. We met seven times during my ten-day visit. Before our departure from Cairo, he visited me as a guest.
Nehru received me immediately too when I last visited India. We had a long conversation and arrived at many agreements. As I’ve already told before, having let our ambassador go, he insisted on my stay in his apartment. We were served by his daughter Indira. Nehru requested Moscow via the embassy to prolong my visit for two more days. On his aircraft we together visited Bombay and took part in the grand opening of the university built with the Soviet Union’s assistance.
During this trip, when our delegation made a day stopover in Delhi on the way to Indonesia, Nehru, knowing from our ambassador that I had some information for him from Khrushchev, immediately received me. He attentively listened to me and gave exhaustive answers: he supported the proposals made by the Soviet Union in the USA, he would speak in their support and would hold a press conference where he would state that the policies of the USSR and India on these matters coincided.
On the same day the President of India, Rajendra Prasad, invited me for breakfast for very important persons which the Prime-Minister of Burma, Mr. Ne Win, attended. A meeting with Mr. Ne Win alerted me because nobody from the USSR leaders had ever met the new Burmese Prime-Minister yet.
Apart from that, I had my personal considerations. Mr. U Nu was the Prime-Minister of Burma before him. During his official visit to Moscow in October, 1955, he also visited us in Uzbekistan, and we parted as kind friends. However, soon in Burma a coup d’état happened. High-ranking army commanders delivered an ultimatum to Mr. U Nu and demanded that he should resign from all his positions and leave the country, transferring his power to Mr. Ne Win. Although it was the bloodless coup d’état, but according to our available information, some definite circles and forces located far from Burma were behind it. They convinced some high-ranking military officers that Mr. U Nu had been bribed by the Soviet Union and had been pursuing its policy.
Now in Delhi, I met the new Prime-Minister of Burma, Ne Win, who, for sure, knew about my good relationship with Mr. U Nu. What’s more, Moscow did not say anything about that meeting, even though it was accidental. And I did not have a chance to get in touch with Moscow for further instructions.
During breakfast Prasad introduced us to each other. Right away, Ne Win requested me to make a stop in Rangoon on my way back from Indonesia. Since in Moscow nobody knew about it, after breakfast I sent an ‘urgent’ telegram informing about the meeting and an offer to visit the Prime-Minister of Burma as his personal guest and I requested for further instructions.
After a few days, the Soviet embassy in Jakarta received a telegram suggesting me to accept the invitation and make a day stopover in Burma. In case Ne Win would express his willingness to have a confidential conversation with me, I should agree. However, I shouldn’t make any public statements on behalf of the Supreme Soviet and government of the USSR.
On the day our aircraft landed in Jakarta, President Sukarno was in the capital and was as fit as fiddle. In spite of the message from our ambassador about the delegation membership and the visit term as well as the fact that the delegation leader had a personal message for the President from Khrushchev, Sukarno only received us on the third day. He wished a successful stay in the country and let everyone go. Thus, four of us, including Sukarno, Abdulghani, our ambassador to Indonesia Volkov, and me, were left alone.
From the very beginning our conversation was going on in a cold formal atmosphere. When I told him, according to my mission, about Khrushchev’s trip to the USA and about our proposals relating to disarmament, Sukarno thanked me and said the following: ‘In whole I approve the foreign policy of the Soviet government and keep loyalty to the joint communiqué and bilateral documents signed in the Kremlin during my stay in the USSR. At the same time,’ he continued, ‘it’s you - the Soviet Union and the USA - that must disarm. As to us, on the contrary, we need to arm. We do not have atomic and missile weapons. If you are going to liquidate them, we will welcome this. As for conventional armament, then we extremely need it because our struggle for obtaining complete independence is not over yet, and we have to get parts of our territories back. Many other countries of Asia and Africa are in the same situation as well.’
After a few my clarifications and explanations, Sukarno took the floor again: ‘I am thanking the Soviet leadership and people of the USSR for the warm reception. In the Kremlin we signed important documents. Upon return, I told about it not only to my people but also to the whole world speaking at a press conference. Meanwhile,’ he continued, ‘many things still remain on the paper, thwarted and foiled, without being implemented. All the concluded between us agreements were prepared by your government commission led by Mikoyan. Our representatives also took part in it, but they didn’t have enough experience and competence. That’s why they were trustfully oriented to the Soviet side's proposals, including credit amounts, facilities construction, and so on. Everything was signed in a grand manner, but a considerable time has elapsed, and there is still no essential progress.’
Everything I heard appeared an unpleasant and unexpected surprise to me. They didn’t mention anything like that in Moscow when the parliament delegation whose leader had a personal assignment from Khrushchev relating to the international politics was sent to Jakarta. I glanced at Volkov questioningly. And Sukarno added, ‘I told about it to your ambassador, and we’ve conversed about it many times. Of course, he informs Moscow about it, but where are the results?’
Volkov confirmed the President’s words.
Sukarno continued, ‘So I invited Mr. Khrushchev to visit Indonesia as my personal guest. I got a response that the invitation was accepted. Let Mikoyan come with his specialists as well to follow up the fulfillment of the agreements and the faults of each side. Inform Moscow about it, please. The sooner Mikoyan arrives the better. As to Nikita Sergeevich, he can decide by himself when to visit us. We will receive him with great pleasure. Juanda will tell you in detail about the difficult situation in our bilateral trade and economic agreements.’
We parted on this.
Prime-Minister Juanda was a very competent specialist and an eminent scientist. We invited him to Moscow twice, but for some reasons he ignored our invitations. Here I found out the reason.
‘Political relations are usually more distinct and clear,’ Juanda started when we left the President and came in his office, ‘when they are all in plain view, although the reasons and objectives are not always obvious. Trade and economics are of a different specific character. For many years, we have had connections in this realm with the West and know the value of accuracy and responsibility. However, our first experience in this connection with the Soviet Union and socialist countries, speaking frankly in a friendly way, has left much to be desired so far. Moreover, a lot of things just have been foiled.’
Having opened a big folder, he started setting forth the reasons for failures relating to the construction of a stadium, roads, metallurgical plant, and many other objects as well as the items and paragraphs of the agreements and contracts.
In conclusion the Prime-Minister said, ‘I would like very much to visit your country, but such a situation in our relationship is not favorable for that. Neither the parliament nor the government will approve my visit, particularly, if I return without anything.’
My next meeting with President Sukarno took place in Bogor at his country house where I arrived with Volkov. The host, first of all, showed us his country residence, surrounded by an exceptionally picturesque landscape with a lot of flowers. Under fruit and wild trees, there were roaming peacocks, Persian gazelles; on the trees there were various parrots and different kinds of singing birds. The President’s spouse was a young and charming woman.
When we entered the hall, Sukarno said he had described to his spouse in detail his visit to our country and, in particular, a deep impression made on him by the Moscow circus. And suddenly he asked, ‘Why did the chairman of a collective farm present me a sick horse?’ Seeing my confusion, he reminded, ‘You were there too. What a beautiful horse it was! I requested to deliver it to Indonesia and dreamt of riding it every day. But in a few days after arrival, it died.’
I remembered when we showed Sukarno the collective farm ‘Kizil Uzbekiston’, its chairman, Matkabulov, presented him with a horse, a beautiful six-seven-year-old karabair. Sukarno was walking around it in excitement, admiring it; then he mounted it and galloped for a little bit. Addressing to us, he said, ‘I will ride it every day.’ He wondered how to look after it, how to feed it and requested us again, ‘I am kindly requesting you for help to deliver this precious gift to Indonesia.’ We with readiness promised him to do it.
We saw off Sukarno. Then a literally ‘purgatory’ started. It turned out to be a very hard, long-draw-out and expensive case. By that time, I had already worked in Moscow. Delivery of a horse by air or railway was too complicated. So, we decided to deliver it by sea. The collective farmers went repeatedly to Odessa to reserve a freight place on board a ship. Finally, the horse was delivered to Odessa in a special car-wagon with a fodder reserve and accompanied by two people.
A voyage on a merchant ship lasted for a few weeks: it stopped in a few ports to unload the goods. The reserved fodder was almost run out of, but the horse didn’t eat anything else. A dramatic climate change added to its hard adaptation. In such a sick condition, it was delivered to Indonesia by the exhausted accompanying it persons who recovered very soon and returned home. As to the horse, sadly, it could never adapt itself to an alien nature, climate, and even water. Very soon it died. I found out about everything only here. I criticized severely in my mind those who had advised the chairman to present such a stupid gift. Volkov did know about all that. However, to me it was completely unexpected and, of course, unpleasant.
Tea and coffee was served. Then Sukarno said, ‘Let’s talk about business. I know you are a propagandist. Why in Moscow the leaders do not take convincing countermeasures against a propaganda campaign directed against young countries of Asia and Africa? After all, the rumors that the Soviet and American leaders, Khrushchev and Eisenhower, have allegedly agreed on joint actions in the East for the sake of bilateral friendship and disarmament, are spreading. Also, there are other statements like this: their agreement was signed at the expense of the colonial dependent and recently liberated peoples. So now allegedly, the Soviet Union is changing its foreign policy in pursuit to achieve, first of all, the rapprochement with the USA and Western Europe to the detriment of interests of the East.’
I rejected all these claims and in detail explained him our policy.
He continued, ‘Last time we talked with you about serious flaws in our trade and economic cooperation. I wonder how you work in this sphere with other countries of the East.’
I tried to objectively tell him about our relations with a few countries.
After that Sukarno continued, ‘If your work with these states is going well, then why is it disrupted and foiled in our country?’
Again, we focused on review of that matter. When Volkov and I tried to defend our country’s position, he claimed that Juanda and he, himself, could tell everything concerning the projects, types, terms and work volumes, and so on. We were arguing, debating, and even there was a moment I was about to get pissed off and was really close to be off the handle (maybe, my Asian-Uzbek blood began to play?), but after all I held back my anger and pulled myself together.
Fatina, President’s wife, came in and invited us for dinner. Thus, a respite came. The table was laid perfectly and the food was delicious. However, I couldn’t stop thinking about the conversation with Sukarno which was poisoning my pleasure with the meal.
The meeting with R. Abdulghani, who afterwards became the minister of foreign affairs, was also unpleasant. He stated he was a true friend of the Soviet Union and, as a friend, would like to express opinions about some issues. I together with our ambassador listened to him attentively.
Abdulghani said, ‘President Sukarno returned from Moscow in a good mood, being inspired. Everywhere he made a good publicity for your country, its policy, and the desire of our leadership to be together with the Soviet Union. Our President’s authority is known in the East. It was him who initiated, arranged and opened the Bandung Conference which he chaired. We were involved in the preparation of its documents. However, lately he feels quite ashamed because your agreements he relied on very much have been foiled. It’s desirable for our mutual interest to correct this situation. We are worried, if not to say more, about the conclusions of the Moscow Conference of the communist and workers’ parties. We have thoroughly read the approved and adopted there documents. We’ve got an impression that now the Soviet Union is going to exceptionally rely on communist parties in its policies pursuit relating to Asian, African and Latin American countries. Meanwhile, like in many other countries in these continents, there is a democratic regime and multiparty system in Indonesia. Some media institutions in the West, and not only in the West, are cleverly propagandizing around this serious issue.'
Further he continued, ‘I’m a politics scientist and I’m vividly keen on what’s going on overseas. In Bandung there was a top-level summit conference of young developing countries, whose documents, particularly five principles (‘Pancha Sila’), were unanimously approved in the East as well as in other friendly states.
However, we don’t understand why in your public statements and theoretical articles you divide countries of the East, which are united by their common destiny, have been colonies for many years, finally got liberated and started building their new life, aspiring for consolidation, into a few categories: underdeveloped, socialist-oriented, developing, non-aligned, following the socialism path, and so on. What are the criteria? What are these definitions based on? And most important, what is the benefit from dividing our countries into 4-6-8 groups?’
I tried to explain the chairman of the Supreme Consultation Council, R. Abdulghani, our standpoint and attitude to the matter, since the detailed grouping of the Eastern, Asian and African countries came not only from us, although I realized that political ranging of liberated from colonialism countries did not reflect a real situation.
I repeatedly met the general secretary of the Communist party of Indonesia, D. Aidit. This time, he disquietingly talked about the situation in the country, ‘Clouds are gathering over Sukarno because in the society there are no changes for the better, first of all, in economy and social situation of the population. Domestic forces connected with Holland and the West in general that have become richer at the expense of this cooperation not only express dissatisfaction, but also emphasize, comparing previous partners who always were accurate and punctual with the present ones who are involving the country in unknown future.’
We were asked a lot of ‘tricky’ questions at the meeting with students and professors of the University ‘Gaddja Mada’. I made a speech there for about 40 minutes or so. Then we answered their questions for two hours. I will cite here just three questions so that the reader could realize that Indonesia of those years was aware of and understood us in its own way.
Here is a question from a professor of world economy and policy: ‘Marx created the First International. Lenin, under the Soviet Power conditions, called this international organization Communist International. Marx set the goal to overthrow the capitalist power and set up the proletariat dictatorship. Lenin oriented the Comintern to head for utmost consolidation of the Soviet Power and development of the national liberation movement and in capitalist countries the bourgeois system overthrow. What was the reason for such an incoherence?’
A question from a student of politics science: ‘Khrushchev, at the Conference of the communist parties in Moscow in November, 1957, set an objective before communist parties in all liberated from colonial yoke countries to take the power by estranging national bourgeoisie. How much is it legitimate, reasonable and, finally, humanely? It means the communists have to struggle against all of us? Does it mean we won’t have a place any longer in our liberated state, in building its new life? Or maybe, I misunderstand it?’
Here’s the question of a professor of theology: ‘We know that before in many present republics of the Soviet Union there was the widely-spread Islam religion whose activists did their best for the development of education, culture, and science and for the proliferation of the Koran, Shariah and Hadises. Nowadays, clergies many of whom have died have been exiled, and mosques have been closed. Does it mean that the Islam in your country has fully been extinct?’
On October 21st in the afternoon, our aircraft landed in the capital of Burma Rangoon. And I immediately went for a meeting with Mr. Ne Win which was held in his residence in the presence of our ambassador A.M. Ledovskii. Although I wasn’t directly assigned to do so, I told in brief Ne Win about Khrushchev’s trip to the USA and the suggestions made by him at the UN session. The Prime-Minister thanked me for the information and expressed his support to Khrushchev’s steps. He also said, ‘To me, the main thing is the economy development of Burma, the increase of the people’s well-being and my country’s role in the international arena. As to the Soviet Union, please, believe that I sincerely welcome the already laid foundation for the Burmese-Soviet cooperation, and I am not going to curl it. I will do my utmost to foster its comprehensive development. I am asking the Soviet leadership to believe my words that I will be your friend. It meets my national beliefs. I will put all my efforts for my native land prosperity as long as I’m destined to be at this post.’
On the next morning, we flew to Moscow. I came to see Nikita Sergeevich. I was telling him about my trip for an hour and a half. After lunchtime I came to see him again. I told him frankly about everything. Khrushchev attentively listened to me, put some questions, and at the end asked, ‘How can we correct the situation?’
I set forth a number of my considerations. He said, ‘We read your two telegrams from Indonesia at the Presidium, and before that - the information about your conversations with Nehru. You were right to fly to Burma. It will be clear how to prevent us from losing this country. The Presidium sitting is to be on the day after tomorrow. You will tell about everything, calmly, without dramatizing, and will emphasize how to correct the situation. You shouldn’t prepare a Memorandum, you’d better focus on practical matters.’
After my report at the CC Presidium, Nikita Sergeevich summarizing proposed as follows: ‘To approve the results of the trip of the Supreme Soviet delegation to Indonesia, India, and Burma. To consider that a useful work was done there. To oblige relevant ministries and departments to monitor and sort out the problems in the mutual obligation implementation with these countries. To take measures to correct the situation when we are behind the schedule and to inform the other side when they are behind the schedule. To assign comrade Mukhitdinov to convene in the CC the heads of ministries, departments, State Committee of Economic Relations, State Planning Committee, and other organizations in order, together with the CC departments, to examine and sort out problems as per all the obligation paragraphs, to require the explanations regarding where and which contract side is behind the schedule, and to decide how to correct the situation.’
Khrushchev slowed down his speech flow, got silent reflecting over something, then suddenly perked up and continued, ‘I find it right, since it was the parliament delegation, to assign comrade Mukhitdinov to convene a session of the Supreme Soviet Commission for the foreign affairs where the heads of the ministries and departments will give explanations. After some time, we will return to these issues and comprehensively discuss our economic activities in foreign countries.’
Further, without any transition, he said, ‘Comrade Gromyko, you will prepare the information for Nehru, Sukarno, and Ne Win. You should express the satisfaction with the reception of our delegation and the conversations that took place there. Also, you will inform Sukarno, separately, that I will use his invitation to visit Indonesia as soon as possible.’
After a few days, we gathered through the CC in the Kremlin Small Hall a meeting of the ministers, heads of the departments, experts in different spheres and discussed the problems in economic aid to Indonesia, India, and Burma. And after two more days, a meeting of the Commission of the foreign affairs took place where, taking advantage from being the chairman, I spoke sharply and unpleasantly: ‘If Soviet people knew that only to one country (I meant Indonesia) we channeled 117.5 million rubles (at the time under the current exchange rate, it amounted to 170 million US dollars), they would never understand us. Moreover, nobody has estimated precisely the budget for the projects construction, the construction term, and material and technical supplies. And most important, what will our country benefit from this? You know as much as I do living conditions of our peasants, workers, and intelligentsia, how much efforts and funds we need to raise the people’s well-being and standard of living. How many, finally, just with this money, we can build at home buildings, schools, hospitals, and children facilities. What a practice do we use? Before the country that has just been liberated from the colonial rule, where there are forces uninterested in its stability, the Soviet leaders, at the first meeting with the state or government leaders, undertake commitments to build a number of modern objects on the free basis. Millions of rubles are leaking from Soviet people’s pockets, but there is no practical benefit from such cooperation. In addition, anti-Soviet elements consider our such deeds as our bribe to foreign statesmen. So instead of our support to them, due to our carelessness, we are discrediting them.’
Everybody sat in silence and listened to me. I asked, ‘Who of you has prepared, endorsed and introduced these proposals?’
There was silence. Then I asked three-four people to stand up and explain the situation. Their responses boiled down to that they had been implementing the given tasks. As for the terms, volumes, and conditions, they had been specified by the government commission, which was responsible for final decisions.
Maybe, I went beyond my authority, but I warned the attending ministers, ‘We need to apply such a practice lest we build free-of-charge projects without preliminary and comprehensive feasibility study. In case we make a decision to build on a free-of-charge basis or grant interest-free credits, we should know for sure what material compensation or political benefits our country will gain.’
In connection with that discussion I remembered one case. When I just arrived in Moscow and started work in the CC, I accidently heard the news that the King of Yemen Ahmed asked through the economic adviser of the embassy to build the harem premises for his numerous wives. He would like to have a swimming pool with a fountain in the center of the yard and next to it a summerhouse with flowers and fruit trees around. There should be secret passages for him between the rooms of his wives. The territory should be fenced and with a place for his bodyguards and security guards.
Of course, the economic adviser immediately told the ambassador and the ambassador informed Moscow. It became known in the State Committee of the Foreign Economic Relations. People in the committee couldn’t decide, just didn’t know what to do and asked for an opinion of their representative who had certain views and suggested they should quit the matter. Soon the representative of the embassy met the King and told him the Moscow’s decision.
The King listened to it and persistently said, ‘Tell the Soviet leaders it’s my personal request.’
After that Moscow diplomats decided to consult with the top leaders. They informed one of the higher echelon leaders who eventually commanded, ‘Build this object, but it must be named differently.’
The King was happy to hear the good news. Meanwhile in Moscow at the ministry, which had already got a task and sent experts and engineers to Yemen for the urgent implementation of the ‘important’ project, they were trying again to solve a brain teaser: how to name the object they were about to build. And finally, they thought up to name it ‘Culture Center’.
Having known about it, I phoned up the minister and inquired about the construction course. He told me in short and then sent me his deputy with all the documents.
‘How could you take such a decision?’
In response I heard: ‘Based on the high policy interests, the necessity of showing respect to the traditions and customs of the Eastern people, considering the usefulness of personal contacts with the King.’
Having listened to him, I asked, ‘How was the matter discussed by the ministry board? Did they unanimously make a decision?’
‘No, they didn’t. I objected.’
I said, ‘Then inform your representative about your objections which I also support. Cancel everything that has been done, but, of course, keeping the tact, observing legality and considering the customer’s high position.’
Soon a government coup d’état occurred there. North Yemen became a republic. At the request of the new leadership, we built three schools there.
XX
VIETNAM: NOT ONLY HUNTING TIGER
The 3rd congress of the Workers Party of Vietnam and the establishment anniversary of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were forthcoming. In this connection in response to the invitation of the Vietnamese, the CC Presidium made a decision on a trip of a delegation to Hanoi with the following membership: N. A. Mukhitdinov - member of the CC CPSU Presidium, the CC secretary (head of the delegation); S.A. Tovmasyan - the CC member and CC First secretary of the Communist party of Armenia; and K.N. Grishin - a candidate for the CC membership, first secretary of the Vladimirskii regional committee of the party. As a government delegation we had to take part in the 15th anniversary celebration of the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
Almost all the party leadership welcomed our delegation in Hanoi. A few hours later, a meeting took place outdoors in the garden. We, the delegation members, took seats on one side, opposite the Vietnamese Workers Party Politburo members sitting on the opposite side. Ho Chi Minh was the chairman of the meeting. The conversation was held in a sincere and friendly atmosphere. We told them about the situation in our country. They told us about the preparation for the congress and anniversary. We agreed on the program of our delegation stay and the itinerary of our visits to the cities, industrial enterprises, rural areas, and the battle sites.
At the end of our first conversation, Ho Chi Minh noted smiling, ‘We decided not to wear ties.’
I noticed they actually were wearing shirts with short sleeves while we were wearing suits with ties. Since that moment we changed our clothes for light ones with great pleasure.
I arrived in Hanoi with my family members. Actually, it happened because at that time a trade representative in Vietnam was A. Abdurakhmanov, the former Chairman of the Ministers Council of Uzbekistan. Our families had been on friendly terms for a long time. Therefore, having met us at the airport, he invited my wife and daughter to his home.
Many guests, representing most communist and workers parties, a number of newly-born independent states and their leading parties, arrived in Hanoi for the party congress and ceremonies. Ho Chi Minh opened the congress of the Vietnamese Workers Party with a short speech. The agenda was approved. The reports, made by Le Duan about the party activities for the reporting period and by Pham Van Dong about a five-year-plan and the party Charter, were discussed for four days. I was given the floor before the discussion of the reports. And the greeting letter of the CC CPSU to the congress was published in press on its opening day. Upon finishing its work, the congress elected leading bodies. At the first organizational plenum, Ho Chi Minh was elected the Chairman of the party. Le Duan was elected the General Secretary of the CC, and Pham Van Dong was recommended for the position of the head of the government.
The next day after finishing the work of the congress, the demonstration dedicated to the 15th anniversary of the republic took place. It was a picturesque, colorful spectacle: there were plenty of flowers, dressed up people, banners, and joyful faces. On the platform, there were Ho Chi Minh, the Politburo members and leaders of a few foreign delegations.
In the evening a big reception for foreign delegations took place. Ho Chi Minh made a short speech, thanking all the parties and organizations which sent telegrams with greetings and expressing his acknowledgement to the parties and countries which deputed their delegations.
However, it was not the protocol part that I memorized during my trip to Vietnam. It was the confidential conversations with Ho Chi Minh, with participation of an interpreter, that I’ve remembered for many years. They were occurring at his home. We were usually seated in a summer house made of bamboo, in his yard nearby a small lake. There were only two small low tables standing on an eminence that was covered with mats and thin rugs. Some tea and bananas were put on the tables every time we came there. Our conversations lasted three-four hours. We had known each other for a long time. That’s why we talked frankly, particularly Ho Chi Minh did, without being constraint and awkward. A significant difference in age was not felt either, though he was 17 years older than me.
At around one o’clock in the afternoon, having interrupted the conversation, Ho Chi Minh invited me and the interpreter for lunch. We left the summerhouse and not far from it sat down at an already laid table. The lunch was frugal and simple. Ho Chi Minh was a vegetarian. To speak frankly, I was suffering a little bit from unaccustomed meal. A girl of about twenty years old, who was his distant relative and had lost her parents at war, was serving us the meal. Ho Chi Minh was single and didn’t have a family. The next day he invited my elder daughter, Sanobar. Thus, the girls spent time together and quickly made friends. After lunch we went back to the summerhouse.
Once Ho Chi Minh said, ‘You are a Presidium member, a CC secretary, deal with eastern affairs, focus on ethnic issues, and come from a nationality minority group. Have you ever thought about a scholar theoretical concept of your party regarding the East in the new conditions?’
I answered, ‘Surely, I have thought about it many times. In our Presidium we’ve had different approaches and attitudes to this issue since Lenin and Stalin’s times. We still don’t have a single standpoint on this matter because we have just started studying seriously the matter of the eastern policy.’
‘Would you like to hear my considerations on this matter?’
‘Sure. It would be really interesting for me.’
Ho Chi Minh began speaking in a low voice, ‘We support political and practical activity of the Soviet Union, the current leadership headed by comrade Khrushchev in international arena, particularly in the East. And I've put my question to you not accidentally. I’ve been thinking over that a lot and would like to share my thoughts with you. To my mind, you urgently and thoroughly need to look into this matter, then change and fundamentally improve scholar theoretical concept of not only the CPSU, but also all communist and workers parties of, first of all, socialist countries with respect to the East.’
He continued, ‘Your generation has received a rich heritage in this sphere. In addition, rapid development of events and currently changing situation in Asia and Africa lead to undeliberate pitfalls and blunders made by communist parties in a number of spheres with respect to the East, including in a theory. You did not participate in the Comintern sessions, of course. As for me, I’m a veteran, so to speak, and I can assure that Eastern peoples welcome and approve not everything in the world communist movement. In colonialism time they were for a long time under the influence of anti-Soviet and anticommunist propaganda. Enemies artfully used weak points of our teachings and practical activities in the East. I will explain in detail. Marx, as far as we know, did not focus on the East in particular. We have to admit that his conception of liberation of a society by means of proletarian revolution and establishment of proletariat dictatorship is not approved by Eastern people who do not have not only a sufficiently organized, but also, most often, a proletariat at all. Yet, according to Marx, liberation revolutions may only happen in Europe. So, what should we do then? Wait? This is an underestimation of national and revolutionary potential. Lenin, developing Marxism in new conditions, came up with an idea of an opportunity of a revolution victory in one given particular country, which happened in Russia. Pay attention to another aspect of Lenin’s conception: earlier oppressed nations can transit to socialism, missing a capitalist stage of development, with the help of triumphing proletariat. That was, by the way, the answer to the theses of Roy, the leader of the Indian communist party, which are fully dedicated to problems and objectives of national liberation movement. However, even here not everything is clear. What do ‘capitalist’ and ‘socialist’ stages mean? As to Europe, it’s clear, but what about us, former colonies? And why only with the help of triumphing proletariat? Does it mean that the people can’t fight for their liberation by themselves? They say: they can, only with the help of the Soviet Union. It sounds noble. Just think about it: underestimation and disparagement of colonial peoples' role on one hand, and on the other hand - the Soviet Union, which, having many own serious problems and tasks, undertakes commitments, taking on its shoulders the burden of monopolistic support of national liberation movements in colonies and dependent countries. As for Stalin, he went further by making our situation more complicated. In 1943 he liquidated the Comintern, and in 1952 at the 19th CPSU congress, we both attended it, he extremely tactlessly accused national bourgeoisie of betrayal of national interests and cast dirt at them. As for us, he called for communists of Eastern countries to take control over national liberation movement. That brought about a confrontation and clash between communists and numerous national bourgeoisie, as a result of which communist parties in some countries became isolated and discredited. The Conference of representatives of communist and workers parties has recently taken place in Moscow. We assess its results positively and as a big step in our movement. Although in its documents there are a few fresh ideas and thoughts about the East and liberation movement, there are also some unclear statements and mistakes, particularly, in a theory. They should be thought over seriously. The CC CPSU should undertake this mission because we follow the example of you, learn and adopt your practices.’
I briefly reminded Ho Chi Minh that that theme had been covered in the report and speeches at the congress, and what was being done in that direction. To which he replied, ‘I do remember much from it, that’s why I started this conversation. A number of points, pronounced at your congress, are not precise and realistic. My friend from the Comintern, Otto Kuusinen, in his speech made at the congress called to eradicate dogmatism and sectarianism in communist parties’ activities. But in which aspects exactly? In which countries and of which parties? In our country, in China, Indonesia, India and other parties? Of course, we’ve made serious mistakes and blunders as well. We try to overcome them, expand the base of our companions, and without isolating ourselves, to strive for cooperation with different levels of society and even with ‘contemptible’ bourgeoisie. Because we don’t practically have the proletariat. Yet the dogmatism and sectarianism syndrome came from the Comintern’s leadership and comrade Kuusinen, in particular. Therefore, speaking about sectarianism, maybe he means Finland? Because he’s never been to Asia. What's more, perhaps, you don’t know that Stalin heavily let him down in 1939 during the war between the USSR and Finland by establishing in Petrozavodsk the government of the People’s Republic of Finland and appointing Kuusinen the head of the government. When nothing came of that whole idea, the government had to be liquidated. So, my poor friend Otto Wilgelmovich Kuusinen became ‘unemployed’. After that he began working in the Comintern. Furthermore, when Stalin was smashing up national bourgeoisie in colonial and dependent countries, Kuusinen was among first people to support that ‘wise and farsighted’ judgment, and set up climbing up his career ladder. Three years later after Stalin’s death, he started criticizing dogmatism and sectarianism, i.e., his own and Stalin’s brainchild. I don’t want to reproach my friend, but his example is clearly illustrating the attitude of the Comintern, its key executives and your party leadership to peculiarities and uniqueness of political situation in the East that necessitates a theoretical comprehension.’
One day later Le Duan covertly took me to the 38th parallel, the borderline between North and South Vietnam. They showed me the condition and equipment of the border and a number of military units. Everywhere Le Duan addressed me just a ‘friend’ without specifying who and where from I was. We had lunch and dinner at local inhabitants’ houses living nearby the borderline.
One day, having known from someone that I was keen into hunting, they invited me to participate in hunting a tiger. Since I’d never dealt with such an animal before, I agreed with great pleasure. In spite of a big risk, it turned out to be quite easy.
We went into the depths of the jungle, clearing the way with axes, and found ourselves on a small glade. There a deep pitfall had already been dug; mats and poles were near it; and a calf was tethered to a tree trunk. One of the hunters jumped into the pitfall so that its depth could be clearly seen: it was equal to two human height. After he got out of the pitfall, they covered it with the poles and mats over them. Then they placed the calf on the flooring cover over the pitfall.
Century-old venerable trees of tens of meters in height were growing around. We climbed them up and thoroughly hid in their thick leaves, sitting on strong reliable branches. We were unseen from anywhere, the view was clear, and our guns were ready. Vietnamese locals were used to such a hunting, but I, of course, was not only curious, but also really excited. In our bags we had some bread, flasks of water and bananas. We were sitting and waiting.
Suddenly a huntsman below began hitting the calf which started mooing loudly. He continued doing it for ten minutes. Then the huntsman carefully crawled back and soon climbed a tree up. Later I found out that tiger smells its victim at a distance of several kilometers and can exactly find it. The same happened in our case. Moreover, in addition to the smell, it heard the calf’s ‘voice’.
After a while, something hit my shoulder. I looked around and saw my neighbor on the tree (first deputy minister of defense) throwing a banana at me to attract my attention. He was pointing out somewhere. Becoming motionless, I saw a tiger creeping noiselessly towards the calf. Having approached, it squatted on its hind legs, strained every nerve, and rushed towards the calf with a terrible roar. With a swift jump, they both fell into the masked pitfall.
The huntsman was first to climb down a tree and called the others. The hunters came up, and although the pitfall was deep, the tiger was pressed against the wall of the pitfall by the poles so that it couldn’t jump out. We climbed down too and approached the pitfall. What a terrible spectacle! One of the most dangerous predators was wounded, spiteful, enraged, seeing over it its foes. In anticipation of death, its forces a hundredfold strained and increased. It was trying to escape, ready to tear everyone apart. I had a terrible, unforgettable impression.
The Vietnamese hunters dropped metal chain into the pitfall to wrap the tiger up with it, using the poles with hooks. Then having made sure it wouldn’t be able to escape, they dragged it out of the pitfall. We were surrounded by some military men armed with rifles and bayonets. A bullock cart with a cage was brought. The tiger wrapped up with the chain was put there. At first it sounded fiercely, producing offensive roars, but after a bit while, it got either tired or was given a drug so that it grew quiet, and the buffaloes dragged the cart.
The next morning when we came to Ho Chi Minh's house for a cup of tea, the yesterday-tiger's hide was brought in. He immediately gifted it to my daughter, Sanobar, as a remembrance. Since then, several decades have elapsed, and this hide still hangs on the wall at home, reminding her of that wonderful Eastern country and me of my experienced vivid impressions.
Upon return to Moscow, I informed in detail N.S. Khrushchev about my trip, then I reported to the CC CPSU Presidium and got the approval of the delegation work. At the Presidium I didn’t speak about Ho Chi Minh’s considerations, but I told Khrushchev about them relating to theory and science aspects as the foundation of the practical activity in eastern policy with the new conditions considered. I also told him about my desire to study and summarize those issues. He was positive to my proposition and added, ‘You are right that you want to look into it. We need to develop new approaches.’
I put together many documents with the assistance of employees of the Oriental Studies Institute, Marxism-Leninism Institute, Central party archives, Lenin Foundation, etc. Secret archives of the CC, Politburo, protocols of early congresses and CC Plenums were given to me. I worked on them for a few months, including evenings and days off. I studied a lot of research materials about the East.
As a result of that work I had an impression that was not at all satisfying. Indeed, the necessity was ripe to seriously reconsider the strategy and policies in the sphere of eastern policy. I wrote a Report on the matter, with my conclusions and recommendations, and gave it to Nikita S. Khrushchev. He kept it for ten days. Then he returned it to me with a few corrections and comments. Then I gave it to Suslov, Kuusinen, and Pospelov. They also gave valuable commentaries. In that way it became an additional area of my job.
Soon after my report at the CC Presidium, military and a few civil departments employees made a trip to Hanoi, focusing on rendering assistance to Vietnam.
For the second time I visited Vietnam in 1982 as a deputy chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Although I arrived by a regular flight, I was met at the airport by the top leaders of the country. During my stay they paid me a lot of attention as if nothing had happened since our last meeting.
Visiting the Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum, I laid a wreath on his grave, and violating the procedure, was standing by it for a long time, bowing my head low. I highly appreciate not only his outstanding mind and activities for the benefit of the people, but also the wisdom he shared with me in his conversations. May eternal memory to him live forever.
This time I was able to visit the southern part of united now Vietnam. On our way the leaders of the country told me about the second stage of the revolution, namely the unification of the country. We visited Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam, renamed afterwards to HoChiMinh city. Indeed, the city looked like a marvelous window display of the West in the East. There were beautiful streets, modern houses, clean roads, a lot of different stores full of goods, as well as numerous cafeterias, restaurants, and luxury hotels everywhere. In one word, there was a huge contrast between the North and the South. Now the objective was to align those two levels. Did my friends succeed in that? I don’t know. For it was not an easy task.
At the time we signed an agreement on the trade and economic cooperation of the USSR and Vietnam. And as usual in such cases, we went to a restaurant for an official dinner. The first cold course was followed by the main fish dishes served. But what was going on? Once I tried to taste the dish properly, as it was immediately taken away and replaced with another one. And every time it was fish but cooked in a different way. The hosts noticed my surprise but kept silent. Finally, I couldn’t bear it any longer and said, ‘Oh, yes. You are very rich with fish. I’ve never seen in my life so many fish meals.’
Someone answered, ‘It’s true.’
I politely remarked, ‘And all the dishes taste delicious!’
After these words the Vietnamese friends were enlivened and began quickly talking, vying with each other and smiling. In one word, they relaxed releasing unknown to me spring. Pham Van Dong who was sitting on the central seat at the table took the floor and explained everything, ‘Thank you for the praise. That’s what we really wanted to hear from you. And now we will open you our secret. Of course, it’s not under protocol to take a plate away before a guest puts table utensils down. But as a matter of fact, we decided to arrange for you a tasting of fish dishes. I must say we have more than two hundred fish dishes. As it’s impossible to eat all of them, we decided to give you a chance to taste them. So, be ready, comrade Mukhitdinov, to taste hundred dishes today and the rest - tomorrow.’ Everyone laughed merrily. I was, certainly, able to taste just about thirty dishes after which I ‘gave up’ to the laughter of the friends.
Having thanked the organizers and cooks of the dinner, I went back to the hotel. When I came in the lobby, I suddenly saw four Uzbek people – three men and a woman. We not only shook our hands, but also hugged and kissed each other. It turned out they were graduates from Tashkent agricultural institute. After the graduation from the institute and work in their native regions, they were sent to work in South Vietnam to render assistance in growing cotton. They had already been living there for two years according to their three-year-term contract. Two of them were foremen, the third one, Salim, was a team-leader and the woman was his wife.
My fellow-countrymen told me they were going to cook pilau, inviting me for dinner.
‘I’ve just come from a restaurant,’ I refused. ‘Thank you. Moreover, it’s too late.’
‘But we’ve already prepared all ingredients: lamb, fat, onions, rice, and carrots,’ they insisted.
‘Where did you get lamb?’ I was surprised. ‘They mostly eat beef, pork, and fish over here.’
‘We heard about your arrival on a radio,’ Salim said. ‘So, we right away bought a lamb to be cooked for dinner.’
‘Where are you going to cook pilau at such a late hour?’
‘Don’t worry,’ I heard the answer. ‘While we were waiting for you, we agreed with the restaurant owner.’
To that I didn’t have anything to say. The guys cooked the wonderful pilau. Thus, we were sitting in my hotel room up to early morning. I was happy to meet my fellow countrymen so far from our homeland, on the ocean coast. Especially, it was the twentieth year since I had left Uzbekistan for my new job.
XXI
THE STRUGGLE FOR LIQUIDATION OF COLONIALISM
By the end of 1958 and the beginning of 1959 the relationships between the Soviet Union and Arab states had been successfully developing; and the tempos of cooperation were so high that any capitalist country could envy. At this time, especially at the beginning of 1959, western special services and information agencies launched a fight against that by provoking all kinds of malevolent acts and actions.
As I’ve written before, Stalin’s speech at the 19th party congress, where he sharply spoke against national bourgeoisie in colonial and dependent countries, accusing them of betrayal of nation interests and homeland, and calling for communists to lead their national liberation struggle, considerably harmed our policy in the East. The decisions of the 20th CPSU congress on overcoming the personality cult were perceived with great caution as well. Many eastern countries took a wait-and-see attitude.
For the past three years after the 20th congress, we managed to reverse the situation and for a short time to prove and show our invariably good-neighborly and disinterested attitudes to the peoples of the East and our sincere aspiration to develop cooperation with them.
The Soviet Union resolutely opposed the Anglo-French-Israel aggression during the Suez crisis, and fully supported the revolution in Iraq, which ended up at the beginning of 1958 by overthrowing the Nuri al-Said regime and coming to the power by young patriots – officers and representatives of intelligentsia. The bilateral relations of the USSR with the Eastern states were developing intensively and the connections deepened at the top level.
All those events brought about caution and hostility from the side of colonial powers. The West was strenuously using such phrases as ‘the Soviet eastward advance’ and ‘the Soviet Union laid hands on countries of Asia and Africa which obtained the independence.’ Anti-Soviet subversive activities were activated.
On January 31st, the English newspaper The News Chronicle, close to the Labor party, published a message saying that two weeks before the Yugoslavian ambassador to Cairo, Josip Djerdja, allegedly had warned the President of the United Arab Republic, Gamal Abdel Nasser, that his (Nasser’s) life was in danger because the Soviet Union had ordered Egyptian communists to liquidate him physically. After that warning the security measures were considerably strengthened in Nasser’s circle. The Yugoslavian circles didn’t hide their anxiety on the eve of President Tito’s arrival in Cairo.
Our media's reaction corresponded not only to the spirit of the time, but also hit a bull’s eye. The message in The News Chronicle, as our newspapers wrote, cast light on one of the most vicious and rude anti-Soviet provocations of late. Provocateurs, by order of imperialist circles which had lost their positions in the Middle East, were pursuing their particular policy aimed at undermining friendly relationships of the Soviet Union with the UAR and other Arab states which were selflessly repelling attempts of colonialists who were trying to restore their supremacy and to prevent a consolidation of national independence of Arab states. The Soviet Union and other peaceful countries had a firm position which helped the Egyptians to beat the Anglo-French-Israel aggressors. Equality and friendly relationships of the Soviet Union with Arab states became a kick in the throat of the ruling circles of imperialist powers which had robbed for decades riches of the Arab East and were still trying to keep the Arab peoples in the yokes of foreign monopolies. That’s why the imperialists of England, the USA, and France hatefully treated the consolidation of the Soviet-Arab friendship. In their contemptible acts they weren’t squeamish about any means. That can be proved by a published provocative message, apparently cooked up by the English reconnaissance which had been brazenly hosted in the Middle East until recently, ‘eliminating’ and ‘liquidating’ statesmen and politicians objectionable to imperialists. Having remembered their favorite methods, provocateurs decided to impute to the Soviet Union a mythical ‘order to Egyptian communists to physically liquidate’ President Nasser. A reasonable question arose: were those fabrications addressed to the Soviet Union needed in order to distract public attention from the preparation by the imperialists of new crimes against the Arab peoples, including encroachment on life of prominent political figures of the Arab East? It was peculiar that organizing a new provocation against the Soviet Union and the UAR, the imperialist circles committed it referring to Yugoslavia. Their attempts to undermine the friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the Arab countries were doomed to failure. That friendship was forged in the joint struggle against colonialists. And it was tested by the time and will be strengthened in spite of any mean maneuvers of the imperialists.
On the same days the famous Egyptian journalist and editor of the newspaper Al-Akhram, Khasanein Kheikal, wrote an article with a pretentious headline ‘Frankly! Khrushchev’s Reproach and Reproach to Khrushchev’, wherein he criticized Khrushchev’s speech at the 21st CPSU congress relating to the foreign policy part. Kheikal, in particular, dramatically criticized Khrushchev's words: ‘There are no firmer forces in the struggle against the imperialism than the forces of the communism. It is not accidental that the imperialists target their struggle at the communist movement… We are not hiding that our ideology standpoint is different from the one of a few politicians from the United Arab Republic. The differences in the ideological views should not prevent the friendly relationship development between our countries and the cause of our joint struggle against the imperialism.’
Kheikal’s article, roughly perverting the facts, emphasized ideological differences, blew up and exaggerated their meaning in the relationship between the USSR and the UAR. The Soviet Union was even accused of attempting the interference in the internal affairs of the United Arab Republic, of violating the Bandung principles. It underlined that the communism as an ideology did not fit the conditions of the Arab East.
In a day, Kheikal published in his newspaper a new article wherein he strongly criticized the Prime-Minister of the Iraq Republic, Abdel Karim Kassem, as well as the communists of Iraq. He wrote: ‘Devil will try to use Kassem as his tool to isolate Iraq by locking it in a tight blockade so that the forces of the Arab nationalism will be scattered and the Arab solidarity will be destroyed.’ From the further content of the article it was possible to make a conclusion that ‘the devil’ mentioned above was ‘the alliance of the imperialists and the communists’.
The newspaper Pravda responded to Kheikal with an article by a political observer V. Maevskii titled ‘The Attack by Khasanein Kheikal’. Here are a few lines from it: ‘Kheikal is argumenting not for making the friendship stronger for successful struggle against imperialism in the Near and Middle East, nor for unity of goals in the struggle for peace and progress, nor for putting the peaceful coexistence principles into life. With his slanderous articles he is fulfilling the assignment of those circles in the USA who are trying to pull Arab peoples back to the old yoke of colonialism…’
In another article published in the newspaper Pravda for the first anniversary of the UAR establishment, there were such words: ‘Colonialists are quite interested in not only splitting up Arab states and undermining the Arab unity, but also in driving a wedge between Arab states and the Soviet Union, and thereby, isolating and leaving them without any support. This is one of the objectives of the notorious ‘anti-communist campaign’ attempted by subversive agencies of the USA and some other western powers. Yugoslavian revisionists are noticeably supporting the imperialists in this improper cause with their attempts to addle and confuse particular political leaders of the Near and Middle East states and to misgive distrust in the policy of the USSR and other socialist countries…’
Not only a failure of aggressors in the Suez crisis and victory of the revolution in Iraq at that time, but also revealing the goals and methods of actions of the Baghdad Pact by the Soviet Union caused the deep animosity of the West.
It is well known that during ‘the cold war’ were established three military and political alliances: the NATO, the Baghdad Pact and SEATO. The NATO acted in Europe and was targeted, first of all, at the Soviet Union and socialist countries, i.e., the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The Baghdad Pact originally included England, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq, and acted in the Near and Middle East, as well as the Caucasian and Central Asian regions of the USSR. The SEATO opposed national liberation movement and development of socialist states in South-East Asia, as well as the Soviet Union in the Far East and Siberia. For the given period, those alliances dramatically strengthened their activities in all directions.
It happened that I arrived in one of the Eastern countries with a mission assigned by the USSR leaders. The negotiations were held successfully. We succeeded in intensifying our cooperation. Then I was shown the protocols and shorthand records of the just-held meetings of the Baghdad Pact two committees – economical and political.
At the first familiarizing with them, I saw how sinister were the intentions of the authors in the intended steps against some Asian and African states, as well as the USSR, naturally. I requested them to do for me the copying of those protocols. The hosts agreed. Thus, I brought those papers to Moscow. I was only accompanied by my assistant, interpreter, and bodyguard. We flew on a special aircraft. On my way back, I read those documents again.
In Moscow, specialists of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB attentively studied them. And it became clear for us the events were occurring in a dangerous direction. It was decided to speak out publicly about those issues. On the eve of an opening of the session of the Baghdad Pact Council, the ‘Statement of TASS’ (Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union) was published. It had, in particular, a few points arising from the secret protocols I had brought along with me to Moscow.
‘The session of the Council of the so-called Baghdad Pact has already been preceded by the meetings held behind closed doors of its some committees, in particular the committee for ‘the struggle against subversive activities’, wherein the USA plays quite an active role. It is not a secret that behind a smoke veil of the misty formulations about ‘the subversive activities’ and ‘the prevention of the danger of the international communism intervention’, is hidden an aspiration of aggressive circles of the USA as well as England to somehow strengthen the collapsing Baghdad Pact that was knocked down by the revolution in Iraq…
…The discussion of the issue on political situation in the Near and Middle East region, in particular in the Iraqi Republic, to be held at the Council session of the Baghdad Pact in Karachi, is an unveiled attempt to interfere in the domestic affairs of the independent states of this region. As it is obvious also from the practices of the other aggressive military alliances – NATO and SEATO – such an interference is a rule for colonial powers, although such actions evidently contradict the UN Charter.
The preparation of the Karachi session is accompanied by a noisy provocation campaign against Iraq in some states – members of the Baghdad Pact military alliance; as for Pakistan - against India and Afghanistan as well. Iranian pro-American newspapers are openly calling for an overthrow of the Iraqi government, calling it ‘a vital cause’. The newspapers ‘Djakhan’ and ‘Farman’ are impudently calling to overthrow at any cost the current regime in Iraq. Having lost a common sense and any feeling of measure and reality, they are writing about a necessitated ‘military march against Iraq’; and revealing the interests of their overseas patrons, they are calling for an annexation of the oil-rich north areas of Iraq: Mosul and Kirkuk…
…The facts prove a direct involvement of the Baghdad Pact members in the anti-republican conspiracy, unmasked at the end of the past year, which united quite various forces of imperialism and reaction. The reasons for the assault against the new Iraqi republican government by the united forces of imperialism, despotism, and reaction are well known. These reasons are that the government of Iraq resolutely broke up with the corrupt anti-national regime imposed on the state by the colonial powers during the reactionaries’ reign in Iraq.
Threats are being addressed to its neighbors by Pakistan where, as it is known, a military coup d’état has recently taken place and a military dictatorship regime has been established, not without overseas influence. The Pakistan government is obviously intending to worsen the relations with its neighbors – India and Afghanistan. The Pakistan officials are even openly calling for a war with India, which is fostered by known notorious foreign circles.
It is obvious that only forces of colonialism, which use this obsolete method for certain mercenary ends, are interested in an animosity and stirring up conflicts among Asian states and peoples. The peoples of these countries are, on the contrary, vitally interested in the consolidation of peace and mutual cooperation development.
Turkey, as an active participant in the NATO and the Baghdad Pact alliances, shows a special interest in the Karachi session, hoping apparently to take an unenviable role of a troubadour of overseas interests among Muslim states – participants in the specified session. Although the economic hardship and opposition moods have been increasing inside the country, Turkey still rattles the sabre, bearing in mind its own aggressive plans relating to the Syrian region of the UAR and Iraq…
…The organizers of the Karachi meeting do not hide that the USA are going to use this session for concluding bilateral military agreements between the USA and Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. The Soviet government has already expressed to the governments of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan its negative attitude to their plans of concluding military agreements with the USA, which are aimed at increasing international tension and preparing a new war in this region. Of course, the Soviet Union, basing on the UN principles and being guided by the interest of self-defense and keeping peace in the Near and Middle East region, cannot be indifferent to the plans of the expansion of American military bases and springboards on the territories of the specified above states nearby the Soviet borders…
…There is no doubt that by activating its activity in the Baghdad Pact and getting prepared to conclude the specified bilateral military agreements, the USA in fact is taking the leading role in this aggressive block, trying thereby also to find a substitute for the failed ‘Eisenhower Doctrine’ which has been given up by even those few Arab states that announced previously their joining this doctrine…’
Promulgation and disclosure in front of the world of the goals and intentions of the Baghdad Pact brought about many important events. So, on March 24th, 1959 the Prime-Minister of Iraq Abdel Karim Kassem stated at the press conference that Iraq decided to drop out of the Baghdad Pact and ‘this decision is to be in force from today.’
It should be noted that the people of Iraq warmly accepted that decision. Here are some extracts from the Iraqi press of those days that confirm the resoluteness of Iraq.
The newspaper Al-Akhali: ‘Iraq has officially stated about its drop out of the Baghdad Pact.’ The Saut al-Akhrar: ‘Iraq has thrown off its shackles that chained its independence and sovereignty.’ The Al-Akhbar: ‘The exit of Iraq from the ominous Baghdad Pact has allowed the Iraqi people to throw off the last shackles that impeded its independence. Today the enemies of Iraq have lost their last dirty weapon with which they threatened it for many months.’ The newspaper Ittikhad ash-Shaab published in its advanced article as follows: ‘For the first time after many-century slavery and political submission, Iraq has become an independent state which does not recognize any power except the people’s power and does not conclude any agreements which can restrict this power and harm the people’s interests.’
Such a step of Iraq made the patrons of the Baghdad Pact change the name of this military political alliance and its headquarters location.
However, the relationships of the world’s leading colonial powers were strained. The position of England got dramatically weakened because of the aggression failure against Egypt, which was one of the major reasons for the government, headed by Anthony Eden, resignation.
On January 8th, 1957 Anthony Eden, visiting the country palace Sandringham House, got an audience with the Queen. On January 9th in the morning, he returned to London and at 5 o’clock in the afternoon he summoned an extraordinary meeting of the Ministers Council. After that he again visited the Queen and at 7 o’clock in the evening it became known that Anthony Eden and the government led by him resigned.
The London newspaper The Manchester Guardian wrote in this connection: ‘The Government of England has lost trust inside the country as a result of its colonial aggression launched against Arab peoples, which has resulted in the aggressors’ shattering defeat…’
Harold Macmillan, who had been at first the minister of foreign affairs, then the minister of treasury in A. Eden’s government, became the Prime-Minister of England.
The allies of Great Britain, first of all the USA, took advantage of the failure of its eastern policy in order to be in a foremost line and become the major power. Sensational in those years ‘Eisenhower’s Doctrine’ was proclaimed and published.
The President of the USA requested the Congress to authorize him with a power to use the American armed forces in the Middle East, which brought about a frantic feedback in the Arab countries. The Arabs saw ‘Eisenhower’s Doctrine’ as an uncovered challenge to the national liberation movement and a serious threat to peace and security. The newspaper Al-Jumkhuria wrote: ‘Colonialism does not desire to take into consideration that the Middle East is not just the land which has got large oil deposits, but also it is peoples and states who want to be masters of their own destiny. We will never welcome the force which intends to make us slaves. Only we are entitled to say the first and the last word in relation to our countries.’
‘Eisenhower’s Doctrine’ was dictated from the beginning to the end by the interests of oil monopolies. Overseas propagandists did not manage to keep as a secret from the Arabic community the true aspirations of the US imperialists to fill in the so-called ‘vacuum’, i.e., to lay their hands on and take over economic and political positions, forfeited by their Anglo-French competitors as a result of the aggression failure against Egypt.
A planned armed intervention by the USA into the Middle East which Eisenhower called for was plotted as one of the methods to implement colonial plans of the American imperialism. The US military intervention was targeted not at ‘the communist threat’, but at the very Arab peoples who had recently obtained their independence, and at their growing national liberation movement.
Absurd fictions about ‘the Soviet penetration’ in Arab states were needed by the American ruling circles in order to disguise and justify their plans. The Arabs perfectly understood the genuine purposes of those primitive tales. ‘We are not such simpletons to believe in Eisenhower’s ignorance of that there is no Soviet aggression,’ wrote the famous Egyptian journalist Sharkai in the newspaper Ash-Shaab, ‘Eisenhower is aware of that it was not the Soviet Union that attacked Egypt, and it was not the USSR that is pursuing conspiratorial activity against Syria and Jordan.’
Arab press in its first responses to Eisenhower’s speech unanimously stated that the attempts of the USA to solve Middle Eastern problems with force could only lead to the tension intensification in the region and bring about a sharp repulse of the peoples.
Americans, putting a rapid activity on a wide scale, decided to replace the Baghdad Pact by bilateral military agreements with the most major members of this pact: Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan. In Moscow, before signing those agreements, were available their draft agreements, and the course of their preparation and discussion was well known. Naturally, certain measures were taken since their anti-Soviet direction was obvious and the speech was about the USA military presence in the countries which directly had boarders with the Soviet Union.
In spite of growth of public opinion opposing bilateral military agreements of the USA with Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, yet they were signed in Ankara in March, 1959 and took effect immediately after their signing. The governments of all the four countries-participants, wanting to avoid wide discussion of those agreements in the parliaments and being afraid of negative attitude to them by the public, agreed on that those documents would be in force without ratification.
In the texts of all the three agreements there was a reference to the Baghdad Pact and ‘Eisenhower’s Doctrine’, specifying the USA interference in internal affairs of the Near and Middle East states peoples.
The Soviet Union made a statement emphasizing as follows: ‘The government of the USSR cannot help considering such actions of the governments of the USA, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan as hostile in relation to the Soviet Union and hostile to the peace cause. The Soviet government, of course, will take necessary measures to provide security of the USSR borders and to keep peace.’
The anti-Soviets failed to undermine the USSR prestige and to launch a campaign to discredit it. Egypt did not change its attitude towards the Soviet Union. The revolution won in Iraq. The Baghdad Pact was not as effective as the USA expected.
It was a noticeable achievement of peace loving forces and an evidence that the Soviet policy in the foreign East was developing and had many pros. In order to strengthen our success, we decided to raise the voice of the world public against colonialism to support struggle of the peoples of the East for their liberty and independence.
During the period of consideration of measures for intensifying the USSR activities in the international arena, including via world organizations, after taking decision on submitting to the UN the proposal on overall disarmament, I came to see Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev for advice in that regard. And during our conversation I said, ‘It would be useful, along with the disarmament, to introduce a proposal about the colonial system liquidation.’ And I told him the essence of the matter.
Khrushchev was listening to me attentively, occasionally asking me some questions. Then he supported me, ‘That’s right. It’s exactly time we must undertake an initiative and pursue anti-colonial policy basing not only on bilateral basis but also in the international arena. You must tackle this matter and prepare material.’
It took several months to study and analyze all matters and to prepare all documents relating to anti-colonial policy.
The West, having been convinced that it was impossible to prevent the colonial system collapse and keep the colonies in their hands, set up feverishly looking for ways and means to save their available positions, inexhaustible wealth and income sources. In this regard western states could be virtually divided into three groups: old colonial powers, the USA and the FRG (Germany).
Although in major political and strategic matters they often acted against socialist countries and national liberation movement in whole, they had differences as well. The old colonial powers (England, France, Portugal, Spain, Holland, and Belgium) did their utmost to keep their colonies, changing their direct armed domination for economic dominion.
I have already mentioned earlier how the USA acted in new conditions. As to the FRG, it decided to take revenge for the defeat in the world war by focusing its forces and opportunities on strengthening its positions in Asian and African countries liberated from the colonial rule. It wasn’t an accident then that again they started conversing about implementing an old project of laying the longest railway in the world called ‘BBB’ – Berlin-Baghdad-Basra.
German ideologists of neocolonialism not only wanted to become the heirs of the old colonial metropolises, but also take advantage of blunders and mistakes of the new contender for world domination – the USA which persistently tried to enforce its position in the East.
One of such ideologists of German colonialism was Klaus Mehnert who was considered as ‘a prominent expert in Eastern issues.’ He published his book titled ‘Asia, Moscow, and We’ in 1958. In his book he gave recipes to his compatriots, ruling circles and businessmen on how to penetrate in Asia and Africa in the current situation. Since Asia hated ‘foreign gifts’, according to Mehnert, since such things as ‘Marshall’s Plan’ were unacceptable, the UN bodies could be a pretty good and suitable instrument to promote western capital in Asia. Mehnert persuaded Western-German businesspersons ‘not to be petty’, but instead, to invest as much money as possible in the UN foundations. ‘We should be happy that the UN has a great prestige with Asians,’ he wrote. ‘By our wide participation in these bodies which are very closely connected with the centers of Asian economy development we could simultaneously penetrate in their planning institutions, and in this way, make sure that the funds granted by us as well as people are used as effectively as possible.’
According to this expert in eastern issues, there was another way of penetration of western capital into Asia - direct agreements with local firms: ‘In a matter of western capital investment we should go on new ways. These capital investments are pointless if they annoy Asians more than are good for them. There is a lot in favor of that western firms should not insist on constructing their own plants. Instead, they should participate in firms of relevant states as it was done, for example, to the mutual consent by the firm ‘Daimler-Benz’ which has established a joint-venture - an automobile manufacturer - together with the Indian firm ‘Tata’.’ Further Mehnert recommended to restructure Western-Germany import. Taking into account needs of Asian states to sale their goods, he simultaneously advised adjusting Western Germany export to Asian needs, giving them long-term loans, widely arranging representative exhibitions of western industrial products in Asia. And all these were designed to foster the growth of not state productive forces but well-being of the people. In other words, neocolonialists needed weak Asian states so that they could easily manage them, masking their aspirations in the eyes of the people by giving them miserable pittance and abundant third-rate goods.
Klaus Mehnert pointed out that enterprises of Asian states with their existing management were ‘extremely out-of-date’ and ‘similar to a century-year-old enterprise, which obviously provided a text-book sample for The Communist Manifest.’ Therefore, he insisted on immediate launching the western exploitation system of working people in Asian countries. Mehnert was planning to implement his program of ‘remaking’ Asian peoples with the help, first of all, of ‘enterprise management’, intelligentsia, government executives who were chosen in Asian countries but brought up and educated in the West or on the west account. These people, according to the author, were expected to inspire their countries with western democracy ideals. Ruling circles were suggested to assign special people whose ‘major occupation was to take care of Asian guests.’ Their responsibility included daily communication with Asians, rendering them assistance, and attentive meeting their requests and enquiries. As another important means to increase western influence in Asian countries was propaganda, i.e., sending to Asian countries as many Western Germany reporters and teachers as possible, arranging publications of cheap books, and producing movies. ‘We must develop belief in our vital forces and our lifestyle…’ At the end of his book K. Mehnert called up Western Germany youth to leave their ‘warm nests’ and move towards ‘deserts and jungles of Pakistan, India, and Indonesia.’ As we see, actually, programs of the then colonialism ideologists were not cutting edge and original at all. The difference from the previous methods was, perhaps, that in the old times they invaded into foreign countries wearing military armor, armed with high-angle guns and carbines; however, now they were trying to penetrate into there with check-books and disguised as benefactors. I believe that till nowadays these methods are still up-to-date and not withdrawn from service… Being guided by such concepts, Western Germany ruling circles and business people dramatically increased their activities in the East.
While western ruling circles, pursuing their own goals, were acting together in global issues, the Soviet Union practically alone paid daily attention to the situation in the East, firmly and resolutely spoke out on the side of liberated and struggling for independence peoples, rendered them a direct assistance as well as attracted world public opinion, and revealed intrigues and plots of old and new colonialists. Therewith Moscow clearly realized there were many dangers and complications ahead, and the forthcoming struggle would not be easy.
On September 18th, 1959 N. S. Khrushchev made a speech at the UN General Meeting session. As it was known, the main topic of his speech was overall and complete disarmament. However, as agreed on before, it included the paragraph relating to issues of colonialism and its complete liquidation. Since it’s relating directly to the matters I have just mentioned here, I will provide a full text of this part.
‘…We should admit that not all peoples who have the right to be represented in the United Nations have their representatives here yet. The Soviet Union like all freedom-loving peoples warmly wishes success to all peoples who are still under the colonial dependence, but are persistently fighting for their national liberation from colonial oppression.
The last bastions of the obsolete colonial system are dramatically and radically collapsing, which is one of the crucial factors of our time. Take a look at the map of Asia and Africa, and you will see the picture of liberation of hundreds and hundreds of millions of people from century-old oppression by foreigners and foreign exploitation.
Future generations will highly appreciate feats of those who led the fight for independence of India and Indonesia, the United Arab Republic and Iraq, Ghana, Guinea, and other states in the same way as nowadays citizens of the United States of America highly appreciate George Washington and Thomas Jefferson who led the fight for the American people independence.
I find it necessary to state here from the platform of the United Nations that the Soviet Union treats with the sincere sympathy and deepest understanding all peoples who in different continents defend their liberty and national independence. I think our position fully corresponds to the UN Charter principles whose cornerstone is recognition of peoples’ right to free and independent existence and development.
Who, If not the United Nations, must be the first to stretch a helping hand out to liberated peoples, to take care of entitling them with their inalienable right to be masters of their own destiny and build their lives without external pressures and encroachments? And isn’t it a duty of the UN to foster in every possible way the economic growth of new states, emerging from the colonial system ruins, and help them to develop their national economy faster? It can be reached by means of rendering such countries wide economic assistance without any political or other terms. That is exactly the position of the Soviet Union in the matter of economic aid that we are rendering now and intend to in the future to many states. We believe this position completely corresponds to the United Nations Charter principles.
The Soviet Union would also be ready to take part together with other powers in rendering economic assistance to so-called underdeveloped countries by means of using a known part of those funds which would be formed in the Soviet Union and other states if we concluded an international agreement on disarmament and military budgets reduction. We have also spoken before about our readiness to undertake such a commitment, and I am authorized by our government to state it again from the platform of the General Assembly.
There is another most important source which, in our opinion, should be widely used for rendering assistance to economically underdeveloped countries. The peoples of many these countries have gained their political independence. However, they are still undergoing cruel economic exploitation from the side of foreigners. Their oil and other natural riches are being plundered and exported at almost dirt-cheap price, bringing huge profits to foreign exploiters.
We, as well as representatives of many other states, think that in rendering economic aid we should not treat in the same way those who do not participate and have never participated in exploitation of former colonial countries and those who shamelessly keep draining riches from underdeveloped countries. It would be lawful and fair if foreign exploiters returned at least part of the riches they have benefited from exploitations of the oppressed peoples, if these returned funds would be given back as the aid to underdeveloped countries and be used for developing their economy and culture, for raising standard of living of the peoples of these countries. The Soviet Union has supported and will still render true disinterested aid to underdeveloped countries. We are all for it!
What ridiculous remnants are in our days different artificial obstacles preventing from sanguineous and comprehensive development of international trade! It is high time for the whole system of trade discriminations to be buried and in addition, without any honors.
As you know, the Soviet Union sequentially favors versatile development of trade relations between states basing on equity and mutual benefit of the sides. We have a strong opinion that trade is a good foundation for a peaceful and successful development of cooperation of states, and for strengthening mutual trust among the peoples. We consider that such a position fully corresponds to the United Nations Charter which obliges all its member-states to develop friendly relations among the nations on the basis of respect of the principles of equity and peoples’ self-determination.’
In those days N.S. Khrushchev several times met the US President D. Eisenhower and had long conversations with him in the White House and the Camp David residence. According to the press-secretary of the White House, Hagerty, reporting at the press-conference, the conversations focused mainly on the matters relating Berlin, Germany as well as disarmament. The colonial issue was not mentioned at all. Moreover, the American administration’s negative attitude to it was noticeable. So, the press-secretary ignored the question of one of the journalists: whether the situation in Laos had been discussed.
On September 26th at the American President’s invitation, N.S. Khrushchev visited, along with him and his son, their farm in Gettysburg, from where they flew by a helicopter back to Camp David and continued their conversations.
The next day the both leaders returned to Washington. Dwight Eisenhower saw off Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev to his residence - Blair House, bade him farewell and wished him a good journey.
In the afternoon, in a big hall of the National club of the press, Khrushchev’s press-conference took place, which was attended by over three hundred American and foreign journalists and reporters of newspapers, journals, radio, and TV. Here the joint Soviet-American communiqué was announced. Khrushchev made a short speech about his stay in the USA and answered the questions of the journalists. In the evening he appeared on the American TV. At ten o’clock in the evening by the local time, Khrushchev and accompanying him people flew from the military airdrome Andrews nearby Washington by an aircraft ‘Tu-114’ to Moscow.
Thus, the visit was finished. The proposal, introduced by the Soviet Union to the United Nations, on overall and full disarmament was approved positively by most countries. As to the outcome of the American President and Soviet Prime-Minister’s meeting, it can be judged according to the published joint communiqué:
‘The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.S. Khrushchev and the President of the USA D. Eisenhower had a candid exchange of views in Camp David. In a few of these conversations participated the minister of foreign affairs A.A. Gromyko and the state-secretary of the USA C. Herter as well as the other officials of both countries.
The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the President have agreed that these conversations were useful for clarifying the positions of both countries relating to a number of matters. These conversations did not pursue a goal of negotiations. However, a hope is expressed that the exchange of views will contribute to a better understanding of motives and positions of each side and in this way, will foster the achievement of a fair and long peace.
The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the President of the United States have agreed that a matter of the overall disarmament is the most significant matter, faced by the world at present time. Both governments will do their utmost to arrive at a constructive solution of this issue.
During the conversations, there was an exchange of the views about the German matter, including the matter of the peaceful agreement with Germany, and the positions of both countries were stated…
The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the President of the United States have agreed that all unsettled international issues must be solved not by force but by peaceful means and negotiations…
Finally, it has been decided that the exact date of a return visit of the US President to the Soviet Union in next spring will be agreed on via the diplomatic channels.’
A year later on September 23rd, 1960, N.S. Khrushchev made a new speech at the XV session of the UN General Assembly where he introduced for consideration by the session an important document: ‘The Declaration about Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.’ Since it was published in newspapers and many journals as well as in books, I will cite just a few extracts from it.
‘The states which established the United Nations based its Charter on high humane ideals of equality and self-determination of nations and peoples.
Born in a period of victorious end of World War II, the United Nations Organization embodied hopes that together with barbarism, atrocities, and evil deeds of fascism and militarism will disappear inequity and enslavement of some nations and peoples by others. However, not all hopes and expectations of the peoples have lived up. Up to now such a vital problem of modernity as complete liberation of humanity from shameful colonial orders, inherited from the past, has not been solved yet …
The states – members of the United Nations Organization cannot be indifferent to the fact that in ancient lands of Africa and Asia, on the Oceania islands, in the Caribbean Sea area, and other places over a hundred million people are still languishing in the colonial captivity. The peoples of these countries have the right to sovereignty and national independence…
The United Nations Organization addresses to all people on the Earth and all governments not to be indifferent onlookers of colonial peoples' torments. The United Nations Organization addresses to peoples and governments, regardless of where their homeland is – in the East or West, in the North or South – to raise a question necessitated by life itself: ‘Do rotten colonial orders meet the ideals of peoples and opportunities of the current century?’...’
Boris Strelnikov, a journalist from New-York, wrote: ‘A passionate conversation about destinies of millions of people who are still languishing with fetters of colonial slavery has already been going on for a few days. And for all that time only one delegate from England, Ormsby-Gore, and a couple of his team-mates have come out to openly speak out against a noble initiative of the Soviet Union. However, the attempts of the English representative to direct the discussion towards the ‘cold war’ rails were in vain. His provocative undertaking suffered such a shattering defeat that now he just occasionally dares to appear in the premises of the General Assembly. Almost every orator considers oneself in duty bound to reproof this sally and remind defenders of colonial regime that the new time has come into life in the world and peoples do not want any more to put up with foreign yoke of imperialist enslavers.’
A representative of Saudi-Arabia, Shuqairi, eloquently told about these new current trends and striking changes occurring in the world and in the United Nations Organization. Addressing to the representatives of colonial powers, he proudly stated, ‘Many countries have achieved their independence, or to be more precise, have conquered it. They have joined the UN, or to be more precise, have opened wide the UN doors for themselves. And now they occupy the deserved seats in this organization, outnumbering their former potentates.’
Colonialism must be liquidated in all forms and displays, must be annihilated once and forever! – That was an imperative demand which was being pronounced from the platform of the international forum in those days.
Here is what we heard, for example, at yesterday’s meetings. Voices of representatives of different countries and peoples sounded angry.
Ethiopia: ‘Possession of colonies must be considered not only as a disgrace but also as a crime.’
Poland: ‘Peoples of colonies have rights to define their own future by themselves. Their claims must be fulfilled immediately as it is stipulated in the draft Soviet Declaration.’
Yugoslavia: ‘The liberation of peoples from the colonial rule is a condition of success of efforts aimed at strengthening peace in the whole world.’
Libya: ‘The UN must take measures so that the power in colonies will be given to the people.’
Bulgaria: ‘It is a high time to say to the colonial peoples that the UN will support them in their fight against the monstrous system of colonialism.’
Tunis: ‘Colonial enslavement of one people by another people has passed away. Nothing can stop the inexorable course of history.’
The UAR: ‘Colonialism must die…’
Finally, an exceptionally active discussion of the vital matter of the modernity was over. On December 14th a plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly was held for voting. Most delegations took their seats in full force.
Two draft resolutions (declarations) were submitted to vote. The draft submitted by the Soviet Union demanded that all colonial states, the countries under wardship, and other non-self-governing territories be immediately granted with full independence and freedom according to the will and desire of their peoples. The other draft submitted by 43 Afro-Asian states included a number of principle provisions specified in the Soviet draft and suggested to take urgent steps to bestow with the power peoples of the countries and territories which had not gained independence yet.
The Soviet amendments to the draft Declaration of the 43 states specified a deadline of concession of independence to colonial peoples - not later than the end of the next year of 1961, and also consideration of the implementation of the given resolution at the forthcoming XVI session of the UN General Assembly.
When voting, the draft Soviet Declaration mainly did not get a required number of votes (32-pros, 35 – cons, 30 – abstained). 29 delegations voted for the first amendment by the Soviet delegation to the draft Afro-Asian resolution, 47 – against, and 22 delegations abstained. The second amendment got most votes (41 – pros, 35 – cons, 22 – abstained). However, it was declined because it needed at least two thirds of the votes to be approved.
Then was put to the vote the draft Declaration on concession of independence to colonial countries and peoples submitted by Afro-Asian states. 89 delegations voted for it and only 9 - abstained: the USA, England, France, Australia, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, the South-African Union, and Dominican Republic. It was truly a verdict for a disgraceful system of colonialism, welcomed by the Assembly with warm applause.
While the UNGA session was on, New-York city was going through a natural disaster. Snowstorm covered the city with snowdrifts the city had never faced since 1947. Mercury column of thermometer went down to lower than minus 12 degrees by Celsius. Such a cold December had not been already for 88 years. And speaking metaphorically, if other cities could catch just a cold in such an air temperature, then New-York city was ill with pneumonia. The whole city transport collapsed. Trains got stuck on railways. Airports, schools, and churches were locked down.
The cold penetrated through walls into houses, apartments, and business premises. One of local newspapers wrote that New-York city looked like an arctic trading outpost. Another NY journalist wrote ironically that ‘the only hot place now is the hall of the UN General Assembly.’
Indeed, in the UN building in the same year, took place the events that had never occurred in this international organization for 15 years of its existence.
A discussion about immediate and full liquidation of the colonialism continued within its walls for over a fortnight. More than seventy representatives of delegations from different states spoke from the platform of the General Assembly on that important issue of the modernity. There were no dispassionate and indifferent participants and observers in that unprecedentedly grandiose and acute discussion. The very question, raised by the head of the Soviet government, N.S. Khrushchev for the consideration by the XV session of the UN General Assembly, required a precise and clear answer from the delegates to the session: ‘Are you for or against maintenance of the colonialism - this disgraceful and severe heritage of the past?’
One of the last orators who spoke during the discussion on the colonial issue was a representative of Somali. As many other delegates he stated, ‘The Soviet Union has deserved our congratulations and acknowledgement for undertaking its initiative in raising this issue for discussion at the Assembly.’
Thus, the discussion of the proposal introduced by the Soviet government was over. In this connection on December 28th, 1960 the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, made a special Statement.
In some extracts cited hereinafter, the essence of that Statement is reflected.
‘The UN Resolution as well as the introduced by the Soviet Union Declaration, has in its core one major conclusion – a necessity of the quickest and full all-round liquidation of the colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. The essence of our proposals, which from the beginning to the end are fathomed with noble ideas of liberty, equity, and friendship of nations and peoples, has found its reflection in the UN Resolution. Thereby, the Soviet Declaration can be considered as a political substantiation of the UN Resolution. Of course, the adopted Declaration contains tracks of a known compromise between standpoints of different states. However, the essence of the document is expressed quite clearly…
…Obviously, we cannot help seeing the difference between the UN General Assembly Resolution and the Declaration introduced by the Soviet government for consideration. The Soviet Union’s Declaration is distinguished by much wider breadth and thoroughness, clarity and consistency; it contains sharp and deep criticism of the modern colonialism and expresses interests of the overwhelming majority of the mankind. The Soviet government’s proposals are more precise. They are aimed at fundamental restructuring of those relationships between states and peoples which have been inherited from the previous time when imperialism dominated in the world. Therefore, we consider that the Soviet Union’s proposals completely meet the urgent demands of the time and aspirations of the peoples of colonial and dependent countries.
At the Soviet government’s insistence, a separate voting on the Declaration text introduced by the Soviet Union was held in the United Nations Organization. All the socialist countries and the majority of Afro-Asian states voted for it. On its different paragraphs, from 25 to 32 states voted for and 29-30 states abstained. In other words, the states inhabited by the overwhelming majority of the mankind voted for our draft Declaration. Thereby, the Soviet Declaration ideas meet interests of the majority of the population of Earth, having become a wide political platform in fighting against the colonialism…
The Declaration of the UN General Assembly means not a false, but a genuine liberation of all peoples from colonial yoke. Therefore, the struggle of peoples will be aimed at a real liberation, not a false one, at an actual liberty, but not its semblance. As they say in the East, a traveler needs a real water spring, but not its mirage.
The Soviet government expresses a hope that all the states that voted in the UN for the Declaration on concession of the independence to colonial countries and peoples will continue in practice supporting the measures for the struggle against colonialism. The colonialism times have elapsed. So, the demands of the peoples who are aspired to the independence, national liberty and worthy, wealthy life for all people must not be neglected…’
It’s rather interesting to know how those materials, statements and draft Declaration were prepared. The preparation of the draft Declaration, its justification, Nikita Sergeevich’s speech in the UN and his final Statement – all these were being prepared for about a year since the moment of the USSR’s initiative proposal on overall and complete disarmament, which had already mentioned the colonialism issue.
When, after repeated discussions by the leadership, the head of the Soviet government submitted the draft Declaration for consideration by the UN General Assembly, a team of skilled specialists literally ‘was on duty’ around the clock, gathering all the information bits relating to that matter, spoken in the UN premises, and covered by information agencies in other countries. All that was being analyzed, according to which our feedback form was being prepared – in the UN, in contacts with states leaders, and in mass media.
In whole soon the course of the discussion of the matter was getting positive. Simultaneously, a repulse to any anti-Soviet speeches was being prepared and implemented. When a commission of ‘43’ was established, a new direction was taken – to achieve approvals of most paragraphs of the introduced by the USSR Declaration, to parry any negative statements or actions, with the help of friends or through them to elaborate a document meeting the essence and content of the introduced proposal.
When the draft ‘Declaration of 43’ started showing up, we set up a task - to support and vote for it, with some amendments.
As for the Statement by N.S. Khrushchev dated on December 28th, 1960, upon return of the delegation headed by Khrushchev to Moscow, it was prepared for a few days and discussed twice at the CC Presidium – at first the very idea, then a final version which was approved without any remarks.
When everybody broke up after closing the Presidium meeting, Nikita Sergeevich glanced at me and said, ‘Come to my office.’
Two-three minutes later I went to see him. He energetically said, ‘We’ve done a great historical cause,’ and he firmly shook my hand. ‘Now,’ he went on, ‘our main objective is to popularize our policy and to achieve its implementation so that the East will be with us and its every resident will know our sincere attitude. You are to follow it up, and if need be, raise any issues for consideration by the Presidium and Secretariat.’ And without hiding his good mood, he added, ‘Come to my house after work. Let’s have dinner together.’
I thanked him and went out.
By the end of the work day, Khrushchev’s bodyguard had phoned me up, ‘Nikita Sergeevich is leaving in fifteen minutes. He asked you to go downstairs too and join him.’
We arrived at the Khrushchevs’ house. Nina Petrovna, his spouse, and their daughter Julia warmly welcomed us. Nikita Sergeevich, having said that we both were going to have dinner separately, smiled slyly, ‘We’ve earned to have some drink.’
We were sitting and conversing for a long time. Khrushchev easily and frankly shared his views of the future. Finally, I thanked his spouse and said goodbye.
Having come home, I turned the radio on and started listening to that Statement.
XXII
FROM MAGHREB – TO THE OCEAN
At the end of December,1959 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a message informing that the President of Liberia, William V.S. Tubman, and Vice-President of the country, William R. Tolbert, were reelected for a new term. On this occasion on January 4th, 1960 a ceremony of their inauguration would take place. The leaders of friendly states were invited to participate in the ceremonies. The letter said: ‘We would be glad to welcome here the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.’
Though Liberia and the USSR agreed on mutual recognition, neither in Moscow nor in Monrovia was there an embassy, representative office, or any other agencies interested in cooperation. The exchange of the embassies only happened in 1972.
The Republic of Liberia appeared on the world’s map in 1847. And first Europeans appeared here in Western Africa on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean back in the XV century. However, local tribes didn’t really welcome them.
In 1821 a group of Afro-Americans from the USA, with the help of an American society of colonialists aspiring to remove part of freed slaves from the country, bought from local tribes an island of Providence and part of the coast. It was here that the settlement of Monrovia was established (the future capital of the country), named after the then USA President, Monroe. Nowadays about 15 percent of the population of Liberia accounts for so-called American Liberians - descendants of Afro-American settlers from the USA. The population of Liberia is a little bit more than 2 million people.
In spite of dependence on different foreign companies, Liberia is a sovereign state, a republic with its own Constitution and president, who is elected by population for eight-year term, and in case of reelection - for four years. President William Tubman was elected for the highest state post in 1944 and then was reelected a few times till he passed away in 1971. He pursued a policy of ‘unification’ aimed at liquidation of inequity between native population and descendants of American settlers, as well as the policy of ‘open doors’ – a complex of activities intended to attract more foreign investment funds and to develop on that basis the economy of the country.
A matter of the trip was as usual discussed at the CC Presidium. Many organizations in our country were interested in establishing good business and economical connections with Liberia. So, the trip of a delegation might foster it. It took a long while to form the delegation until it was finally approved. It included as follows: Chairman of the Commission of Foreign Affairs of Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR - N.A. Mukhitdinov (head of the delegation), Deputy Minister of Culture of the USSR - A.N. Kuznetsov, and head of the department of African countries of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR - A.A. Shvedov, and also the official representative of the Ukraine SSR, secretary of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of Ukraine - A.N. Zlenko, and the official representative of the Belarus SSR, secretary of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Belarus SSR - D.A. Lukashevich.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed Monrovia about the delegation membership. The response confirming that they welcomed the visit of our delegation and would ensure a hearty welcome was received. The preparation for the visit started. All of a sudden, we faced an unknown to us problem. The MFA received a prompt that at the official ceremony in Monrovia all the guests should be dressed up according to the international protocol: ladies in evening dresses, men in tuxedos, trousers with narrow stripes and white shirts with bow-ties. Not only it was never practiced in our country, but as it turned out, such male outfit had never been sewn before. What should we do? Maybe we shouldn’t fly there at all? However, realizing the necessity and significance of that visit, we brushed our doubts away.
I turned for help to the economic management department of the CC. They found me a tailor from the Bolshoi Theater. It was an elderly experienced master, a polite and talkative man. He told me for whom of the great actors and what costumes he had sewn in his life. He took my size measures, and three days later I tried the suit on. Thus, my outfit was ready. It was packed in a cardboard box I brought home and left in the bedroom.
After dinner I quietly got dressed and showed up in front of my family. My ‘extravagant’ look made a great impression, particularly on my children. Rapturous exclamations were uttered: ‘Father is an actor! Where will you play? What will you sing?’
When I explained them the reason for my outfit, my kids were a little bit disappointed. I had to console them, promising them that in all future ceremonial occasions, in particular at their weddings, I would, for sure, wear that suit.
At last, having welcomed the New Year, on January 1st we flew from Moscow. Given a long flight distance, we made a stopover in Rabat, the capital of Morocco, for refueling the plane. The ambassador of the USSR, D.P. Pozhidaev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Morocco, and two more people met us. We were informed that his Majesty King Mohammed V would receive our delegation at 2 o’clock in the afternoon and the Prime-Minister would like to invite our delegation for dinner in the evening.
We had a rest a little bit, and in about an hour they came for us. The Moroccan head of the protocol informed us about the reception rules by the Majesty, according to which he used to welcome persons equal to him in rank in the hall center, then go towards them, whereas he greeted the other people, just standing or sitting. An audience used to take ten minutes.
I inquired if it was possible for our ambassador and interpreter to present there. I was told it was at my discretion, and they added, ‘When entering, you must bow and give your hand to the King. You must not take a seat in his presence. When leaving him, do not turn your back on him.’ Having clarified all the details, we went to see the King.
In 1912 a protectorate of France was established on the main part of the territory of Morocco. The people repeatedly came out to demonstrations for the independence, but were invariably suppressed by the force. A considerable role in the struggle was played by Sultan of Morocco - Sidi Mohammed ben Yusef who had been ruling there since 1927. In 1950 he handed the president and government of France an official memorandum with claims to provide a full sovereignty to Morocco.
The memorandum was declined. Demonstrations and strikes, followed by repressions and prohibition of the leading parties, were banned by the ruling regime. The disobedient Sultan was dethroned and exiled onto the island of Madagascar. However, the national liberation movement in the country was growing. Thus, in November 1955 Sultan regained the power. As for France, it had to recognize the independence and territorial integrity of Morocco.
In August 1957 Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Yusef took the title of King Mohammed V as he was considered the fifth generation of descendants of the Prophet.
Mohammed V was a thin man of a little bit shorter than average person’s height. He had big eyes, soft voice, and pleasant smile. He was dressed in a spruce long oriental robe, wearing a Turkish-typed skullcap. The Prime-Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs were nearby him. We shook hands. The King sat down in his armchair, but we were standing in front of him. We started a conversation and he offered everyone to take seats.
The King made an impression of a quite erudite, well-educated person. In the conversation he noted a big significance of the gained by his country independence and the changes taking place and aimed at developing the national economy.
Having supported the Soviet proposals in the United Nations Organization on the overall and full disarmament, he gave a high assessment of the international policy of our country. Having noted the necessity in expanding bilateral relations, he added that he was aware of our cooperation with many Arab countries, but with the states of Maghreb it had never started yet. He enumerated the opportunities of Morocco in this relation and handed his invitation to the Soviet leadership.
Then we bade farewell. All of a sudden, a confusion emerged: we certainly weren't going to back away to the exit bowing, but how to keep the protocol rules at the same time? The King politely got us out of our predicament by seeing us off not only to the doors, but almost up to the car.
In the morning we continued our trip. We flew over the Sahara Desert from the North to the South, then we took a sharp turn to the right towards the ocean. A monotonous, dull, tiresome landscape of sand, sand dunes, deserts with rare oases, nomad settlements and caravansaries, was seen for a long time.
We made the next stopover in Conakry to have our plane refueled. In a couple of hours, we flew on again and finally arrived in Monrovia. It was very hot; humidity was nearly 90 percent. From the airport we directly went to a hotel where we felt as if we entered a different world. A grandeur building, exceptional cleanness and air-conditioners everywhere. At every step in the rooms, corridors there were plenty of flowers and greeneries. We were accommodated really well. Out of the windows and from a balcony, there was a wonderful view. It seemed as if the hotel-skyscraper was placed in the middle of the ocean: there was nothing seen around except water space.
Juice and tropical fruit was served to us. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs told us, ‘The President will receive you for greetings at four o’clock in the afternoon. You should know it’s unacceptable for him to receive any gifts. If there are gifts, they must be given to the administration officers. Here is the head of this office who can inform the President and hand them over to him. Tomorrow,’ he continued, ‘will take place an official inauguration ceremony of the President and the Vice-President. We will accompany you. The ceremony order is as follows: the guests will gather in the major hall. Everyone must be dressed strictly by the protocol, as it was requested before. In turn each one will approach the President and his spouse, standing in the center, to greet them. Handshakes are not required. A tilt of the head is enough.
The President will make a speech to express his gratitude to the friendly states which have sent their representatives and will invite the guests to get acquainted with the country. The Doyenne of the diplomatic corps will congratulate the President, beside whom on his right and left will stand the Vice-President, Prime-Minister, Chairman of the parliament, and a few official figures.
Then the Vice-President will announce the Decree of the President about award presentation of the heads of the states, who have arrived and are present in the hall. After that every delegation will take seats at the table assigned to them in the lodge. And on January 6th, a grandeur reception ceremony will be given to the guests,’ the Deputy Minister concluded.
On January 3rd at 4 p.m., we were received by the President. I was going to hand him over the greeting letter from the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the USSR endorsed by K.E. Voroshilov. Having listened to the letter text, the President suggested its official handing over at the reception ceremony on January 6th.
‘We would appreciate if you tell a few words at the same time,’ he added. ‘The greeting from his Excellency Marshal Voroshilov and his portrait will be published in the press.’
For about fifteen minutes we were conversing about different aspects of the cooperation of our countries. He showed a great interest to that theme and suggested discussing it in detail in the afternoon on the day after the next day.
After the meeting with President Tubman, we came back to the hotel and decided to try our outfits on before the next day’s ceremony. In about fifteen minutes everyone came except one delegation member who was absent for a while. Some went for him. Suddenly he appeared, confused and holding his trousers in his hands, to be more precise, two torn halves of his trousers which looked like Africa and America. He rented a suit from a theater. While putting them on in a hurry, the trousers literally cracked at the seams! What did he have to do? He said, ‘Look mates, tomorrow you will go to the ceremony on your own, meanwhile I will have a rest here.’ I said it wouldn’t be right - we had arrived together, so together would we go there. We requested the guard to phone up the Deputy Minister. The head of the protocol department was summoned to us, who after thinking for a moment suggested me to go to the ceremony alone.
‘I can’t,’ I replied, ‘leave the other delegation members. If it’s possible, will you give us an allowance to attend this ceremony in dark suits?’ Having noted it was the protocol violation and it was unacceptable, yet he promised us to get consulted about that matter. So, we were sitting and waiting for news.
Finally, he got consulted with the President himself who understood our situation and said, ‘Let the Soviet friends come wearing comfortable for them suits.’
In short, the next day our entire delegation, wearing usual suits, went to the ceremony.
By the doors we were welcomed by the Vice-President and the Prime-Minister. Arriving guests came up to and greeted with a tilt of the head the President, his spouse and close to the President people standing beside him. Everything was going on as it was previously told by the Deputy Minister.
Then the Vice-President began reading the decrees about awarding eight or ten kings and presidents who had sent their delegations. Suddenly we heard: the name of the personal representative of the USA president - a known diplomat and billionaire Henry Cabot Lodge, then my name. With a great difficulty, of course, my last name was pronounced. The awarded persons were approaching the President who shook their hands and congratulated, then the head of the protocol office pinned the order on the right side of the chest of each awarded person. Later on, besides Soviet ones, I had a chance to receive a few more foreign awards. But that order was exceptionally picturesque: big, polyhedral, made of silver, adorned with rare precious stones, and made in a shape of the sun with lots of radiant rays.
After the official part had been over, we took seats at the assigned for us table. Various cold and hot starters and different kinds of drinks were served. Taking a sip of Scotch whisky, I was watching with interest the guests in the hall. What a strikingly colorful spectacle! Even elderly men in full-dress suits looked fit and younger, and all the women in beautiful vivid African dresses seemed charming and attractive. There were dances and merriments.
Unintentionally it occurred to me: here it is - the rebirth of Africa; that’s what they may be proud of.
Tubman’s adjutant came up to me and said, ‘President’s spouse is inviting you.’
I left the lodge, came up to and invited the first lady of the country for a dance. The President smiled. She danced easily and elegantly – a young, beautiful African-woman, wearing plainer and more modest dress with less adornments and jewelry than the others. Neither she nor I spoke an understandable for both language to communicate. Therefore, we had to overcome the language barrier with smiles, looks and facial expressions. When the music stopped, I took her to her spouse, thanking her for a dance, and came back to my seat being proud of my ‘feats’ in such an unaccustomed environment.
Later on, however, having taken a closer look at the other guests, I realized that due to my inexperience, I made some blunders: inviting the lady for a dance, I didn’t ask her spouse for permission; when taking her to her seat after the dance, I was just walking beside her, without giving her an opportunity to lean on my hand; when thanking her for the dance, I ought to have kissed the lady’s hand. That was a conclusion I made watching the others' manners.
Deeply impressed, we came back to the hotel. Then for a long time we were sitting on the balcony, admiring the ocean space and an unforgettable view of the sunset: the sun seemed to be sinking into the water while its gleaming flaming reflections were spreading across the sky.
The next day after the military parade at the appointed time, I came to see the President. I was accompanied by the head of the department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an experienced diplomat-orientalist, Shvedov. And with the President there was the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
A conversation was going on in a business manner and lasted for about forty minutes. After exchanging our opinions, we arrived at mutual understanding and decided to establish in both capitals the embassies with ambassadors at the head, as well as representative offices relating to trade-economical and navy matters.
Upon return to the hotel after the dinner in a restaurant in the middle of the ocean, in the hotel lobby I met the President of Guinea, Ahmed Sékou Touré. He was present at the solemn ceremony given by the President as well. We saw each other there from afar. He offered to go to his hotel room. We shortly exchanged our impressions of our stay in that country. Sékou Touré asked me, ‘When are you going back to Moscow?’
I answered, ‘In two days.’ He shared his plans with me and at the end said, ‘Let’s not bid farewell. I hope we’ll meet again. I’ve got a proposal for you.’
On January 6th we were at the reception ceremony given by W. Tubman for statesmen of Liberia, tribal chiefs, and representatives of local administration.
At the President’s advice I ‘violated’ the protocol and reception program and read aloud a full greeting letter from Voroshilov, after which I handed it over to the President. Then I made a short congratulation speech. Everyone, especially diplomats looked at me with a surprise, but the President applauded. Then, all the attendees followed suit.
Local newspapers noted that the Soviet government delegation was the only one who had a chance to make a speech in one of the most significant ceremonies of the feast. Of course, it was not accidental, but it was a subtle intention of the President. As an experienced politician, he gave the floor to the Soviet delegation, and in this way, showed the tribal chiefs that he was for the development of cooperation with the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, it was a kind of the demonstration before some western countries which had dominated there for a long time.
The next morning, we drove along the coast into the inland of the country. On both sides off a road there were rubber plantations, plenty of tropical and subtropical trees, grass and fruit. Having passed about one hundred kilometers, we saw a beautiful palace on the right – a summer residence of the President. We were told that the palace was his own property. It was a snow-white building with a wonderful view and full with comfort and all conveniences inside. Nearby the palace there was a pier and a beach; on the coast there were gazebos and sheds made of bamboos; inside them there were small tables with fruit and juice. There was a sauna, a swimming pool and a shower.
Our mates wanted to see the surroundings and then to swim. As for me, I didn’t join them and went to the beach to swim in the Atlantic Ocean (in the Pacific and Indian Oceans I had already swum). I undressed and entered the water. I kept walking farther and farther, but it was still shallow in water. I had already passed thirty meters, but the water was still up to my waist, so it wasn’t exciting at all. All of a sudden, I sharply sank into the water – it was a precipice! What was the depth? I just didn’t know. There was strong surf; the waves were carrying me away into the ocean, then throwing me against the rocks, like a matchbox; the bottom was not felt at all. I already hurt myself a little on the rocks; the blood appeared, but I couldn't do anything, I just couldn't cope with the waves.
Someone on the coast saw through the window that something wrong was happening to me, ran out and started shouting. People came running and rushed into the water, in their clothes, to help me. Because of the strong waves they couldn’t reach me, meanwhile my forces were in wane. Then they fastened together a few bamboo sticks and stretched them out to me. At first, I couldn’t catch them, but then straining every nerve with all my efforts, I rushed forward and caught the pole with my both hands.
They dragged me out onto the coast, set me sit and gave me something to drink. When I came to myself, they took me to a gazebo, got me in bed, bandaged my wounds and stopped my bleeds. Then they said, ‘Have a look at the ocean!’ I took a glance and couldn’t believe my eyes. At least ten sharks were floating fast towards us. I was told not to worry as there were rocks nearby and shallow water. So, the sharks would turn back soon. One Arabian explained in the Arabic language that sharks like ground predators had a strong sense of smell. So, they could smell blood from many miles away and immediately rushed to a victim. Indeed, the spectacle wasn’t pleasant. Thus, the run of the sharks didn’t find a prey and floated away. After a while some doctors and guards arrived from the capital, and later our mates came, too. We had a rest and together drove back to the city.
The next day we flew to Conakry. As soon as we landed, a counselor of our embassy went up the boarding ramp, entered the airplane and informed us that the leadership members of the country had arrived to meet us. We went out of the plane and right at the boarding ramp foot were met by Saifulla Dialo – the chairman of the parliament, and Ismail Touré – the second party leader. We greeted each other. We had met before at Moscow meetings.
All together we went to the residency of President Ahmed Sékou Touré. He warmly welcomed us. We entered the hall, and after having light refreshments, he told the counselor, ‘Comrade Mukhitdinov will be my guest for two-three days. A separate program has been made for the delegation members. I request you to inform Moscow of it.’
We started our way in the car driven by Sékou Touré himself, who was obviously perfect at driving. After a while we drew up to a helipad, where “Mi-8” helicopter was parked. A colonel, accompanied by three more officers, was sitting at the controls. We got into it and took off.
The President was showing the wide spread country beneath us. The other day I had a chance to see the Sahara Desert from under the airplane wing and now I was enjoying the view of the savanna, jungles, good roads, and industrial enterprises. We were flying for about thirty minutes, then landed at a small airdrome.
We were met by a few people including Europeans. There was a large industrial enterprise not far from there. In the car Sékou Touré said, ‘Now we will take a look at the aluminic plant which was built by an American company. The capital and profits jointly belong to us and the American company.’
Two managing directors - a Guinean man and American one - were accompanying and telling us. They told us about the production technology and product realization. There was neither ideology, nor politics. The conversation was only about business and mutually beneficial cooperation. 51 percent of profits belonged to Guinea and 49 percent belonged to Americans. The plant looked clean and tidy, everything was in order, production was organized accurately, and everybody did one’s job quietly and properly.
The President wondered about my impressions and I replied positively and wished them every success. When we entered a small hall to have some snacks, I asked about the contract time period. The American manager answered that the work was going on well without any difficulties. So, they would cooperate as long as Guinea would like to. Besides, the contributed investments had to be reimbursed and returned. Sékou Touré added that the plant was functioning pretty well. However, Kassa island was rich with bauxites deposits, the extraction and development of which Guinea would like to do by itself.
We returned to Conakry in the evening. The President offered me to stay at his place. Various national meals were served for us on an open porch. Then, having let the others go, we, accompanied by an interpreter, headed to the swimming-pool nearby which we were talking for a long time until we decided to continue our conversation on the next day. On the next morning we talked for a few hours. The President suffered from malaria, so he swallowed quinine tablets, but despite that, we finished our talk. Having bidden him farewell, I went to the Soviet embassy.
Almost till morning we worked there, preparing detailed information about the confidential conversation with Sékou Touré and his several serious claims addressed to us. Since I had to return to Moscow the next day, I suggested the attorney to provide general information, as I would be able to personally tell about everything in Moscow within the following days. But he as an experienced diplomat recommended me, ‘It would be good if you send a telegram in detail by yourself, so that by your arrival in Moscow the Presidium members will be able to get familiarized with it. In addition, the embassy should have materials about your stay, particularly as we didn’t participate in your conversations with Sékou Touré. The embassy in the future would be able to pay attention to the necessary moments and follow up the realization of the issues raised by the President.’
I agreed. Indeed, I had serious conversations with President Sukarno during my last trip, and Volkov informed of them Moscow in general; with President Nehru – Benediktov as a photographer sent materials in photos; with President Ne Vin – Ledovskii also gave an account without any explanations and comments. And on return, when I reported to Nikita Sergeevich, he recommended me not to prepare a written report, but discuss the information orally. The cipher message, endorsed by me, was sent from Conakry to Moscow on the same day. Sékou Touré expressed us his serious claims – from the bauxites development to the canning factory construction. Also, he had his opinions of a number of foreign-policy matters. I tried to explain him, but he was hardly satisfied with my explanations as all those matters weren’t included in the program of my trip, as well as the confidential conversations I had with him within two days.
At night of January 12th, our delegation returned to Moscow. The next day I went to work. My assistant, reporting to me, gave me various documents, including those from the special department. I noticed that my telegram was absent. I asked a special department employee. He assumed that the telegram hadn’t been sent yet from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I checked up again, but failed to find it.
In an hour, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ya.A. Malik, phoned me up, ‘We are glad you have safely returned from your long trip. On its results we are urgently preparing necessary materials and have sent special assignments to the relevant ministries. But we haven’t sent the entire information to the CC Presidium members. Having exchanged our views with Andrei Andreevich (Gromyko – Soviet Union Minister of Foreign Affairs), we've decided not to complicate an already strained situation and to damp their spirits. We all still remember the trip to Indonesia and Burma and its results. If now we also give this information, we will only worsen the matter and have undesirable complications.’
Having listened to him, I shortly replied, ‘You know better.’ And put a receiver. Nikita Sergeevich was away from Moscow. He arrived on the next day. When I came to him, I told him about everything. So, he became really angry and told off employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by saying, ‘These are important trade and economic matters. Let’s summon relative ministers and departmental heads.’
They were summoned. The discussion was heated. The ministers and departmental heads felt quite uncomfortable; their dissatisfaction was noticeable. It was decided that each of them would take appropriate urgent measures to correct the situation and, if need be, go there to settle those matters on the site in Guinea.
Nikita Sergeevich reproached Mikoyan, ‘You, Anastas, take a deep look into all that. Monitor and efficiently and promptly solve issues. If Mukhitdinov hadn't had a stopover in Guinea and held negotiations with Sékou Touré, we wouldn’t know about these problems.’
Addressing to Gromyko, he noted, ‘Andrei Andreevich, you should level up skills of your diplomats. They must objectively report about a situation, even if it’s unpleasant for us. We also need their recommendations as they are more aware of a real situation.’
However, he didn’t make any remarks about the telegram. Apparently, Gromyko had already agreed with him that the telegram text would not be sent to the Presidium members.
At the same time, it was decided that the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the State Committee of Foreign Economic Relations would be represented by one counselor, with the other representative responsible for the maritime affairs in Monrovia. I was assigned to write down in detail my conversation with the King of Morocco, so that the relevant ministries and departments would think up what could be done for the development of the Soviet-Moroccan relations.
After a while, in February 1961, King Mohammed V suddenly passed away during a small surgery. In western press some messages slipped out that some concerned persons allegedly ‘helped’ him to pass away to another world.
Hassan II – a handsome young man aged thirty years old, fluent in two foreign languages - became the King of Morocco. I met him during his visit to Moscow.
At that time Hassan II gave a magnificent reception for all our leadership and a great number of leaders of ministries, authorities, diplomats, literature and art figures and foreign ambassadors.
XXIII
RUPTURE OF RELATIONS WITH ALBANIA
An Albanian party-and-government delegation visited Moscow in April 1957. After finishing negotiations, where the Soviet side was represented by N.A. Bulganin, N.S. Khrushchev and the other members of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, the Albanians got split up into two groups: one headed by Enver Hoxha went to Leningrad and the other one headed by Mehmet Shehu visited Uzbekistan. It was that time I got acquainted with an eminent figure of Albania.
At that time the Albanian delegation invited our leadership for a return visit which was postponed again either because of problems arising in our leadership, which wasn’t steady after Stalin’s death, or because of complications in the Albanian-Soviet relations, or because of a busy schedule of our leadership. As a result, the return visit by the Soviet delegation was only two years later. It was headed by N.S. Khrushchev - First secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Council of Ministers. I was also included in the delegation, as it turned out later, the last time with Khrushchev as a head of the delegation. Since then he never took me with him anymore. We went with R.Ya. Malinovskii, Minister of Defense; N.P. Firyubin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; A.A. Bulgakov, Secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions; V.I. Ivanov, ambassador of the USSR to Albania; F.D. Dumbadze, Secretary of the CC Communist party of Georgia; D. Rasulov, Secretary of the CC Communist party of Tajikistan; S.A. Vezirov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan; I.T. Vinogradov, Deputy Head of the department of the CC CPSU.
So, on May 2nd, we left Moscow. For me it was the first trip to Albania.
It is a comparatively small but very interesting country. Main parts of the country area are occupied by the mountains. The country has rich and picturesque nature, subtropical climate, mountainous rivers and large and small lakes. The country is located on the shores of the Mediterranean and Ionian seas. Albanians believe that Allah awarded them with such a wonderful homeland. It has quite eventful turbulent history which is definitely connected with its geopolitical location, advantageous military-strategic and trade and economic position. Whoever just tried to conquer Albania over centuries! They included Ancient Rome, Byzantine Empire, Bulgarian kingdom, Normans, Venetians, Serbs, Greeks, and Montenegrins - for many neighbors Albania was a ‘bone of contention.’ It was under the rein of the Ottoman Empire for almost three hundred years. Having conquered the country, the Turks spread Islam there. Thus, nowadays three fourth of the population are Muslims.
Permanent struggle against numerous conquerors hardened the people and formed their national character – with its inherent patriotism, aspiration to liberty and acute sense of dignity. The Albanians call their homeland ‘the country of mountain eagles.’ A monument of a national hero of Albania, commonly known as Skanderbeg (his real name was George Castrioti), is in the central square of Tirana city. In the middle of the XV century, he became the leader of the people’s uprising, released partly the country area from the Ottoman Empire and for 25 years he repeatedly repulsed assaults of the Turkish troops. Albanians showed an unusual heroism during the years of World War II. Albanian relations with Russia, then the USSR, were always friendly and sincere. However, during the 20th party congress and after, the Albanian leaders noticeably cooled down to the Soviet politicians who replaced Stalin. Before telling the reasons for the events that happened then, I will shortly remind of the then Albanian leaders.
Enver Hoxha was one of the prominent figures of international communist and working movement. He was born in 1908, studied in Albania, France, and Belgium; but because of finance difficulties and his views, he couldn’t finish his higher education. From youth he was an active participant in revolutionary movement. In April 1939 Italian fascists occupied Albania. In November 1941 the underground communist groups were united and established the Communist party of which Enver Hoxha became the general secretary. Since then he actively fought against the fascist occupation and was sentenced to death in absentia. He became the commissar of the headquarters, the chairman of the Anti-fascist national liberation committee and then Commander-in-Chief of the People’s liberation army.
In November 1944 Albanians with the help of the Soviet Army defeated Italian and German fascists and released their country. Enver Hoxha became the Prime-Minister in an established temporary democratic government. In 1946 with an adoption of the new Constitution, again he became the head of the government and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, still remaining the leader of the party. The USSR and Albania established close friendly relations.
In June 1954 in connection with the reorganization of the party and state bodies (following the example of the CPSU and the USSR), he was released from the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers and was elected First secretary of the CC of the Albanian labor party. He was twice awarded the rank of People’s Hero of Albania.
Mehmet Shehu was a prominent state and political figure, born in 1913. After finishing his secondary education in Tirana, he entered a military school in Naples from which he was expelled and arrested for anti-fascist activities. In November 1937 he moved to France, from where he moved to Spain, where he fought as a member of international brigades. In 1942 he illegally returned to occupied Albania, joined the underground Communist party becoming in 1943 a candidate for the CC membership. He directly was the head of the organization of the partisan movement in the country, was a commander of the striking brigade and later on of a division of the People’s Liberation army and took part in releasing Tirana city.
After the victory over occupants, he became the head of the army Headquarters. In 1948 he worked as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs. Since 1954 he had been Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People’s Republic of Albania.
When we landed at the airport of Tirana city, Hoxha and Shehu, accompanied by their close people, came up to a boarding ramp.
After a very short rest, we had the first and also very short protocol meeting. In the evening we were invited for an official dinner and then to the concert.
In the morning all the delegation went to the fields to meet peasants. Khrushchev liked it very much. He conversed much with field crop growers for a long time. In the evening we had a meeting with the Albanian leaders. In his welcoming speech Hoxha introduced our delegation, after which Khrushchev took a floor to thank the Albanians for a sincere and friendly reception and for a cordial hospitality. Admiringly he spoke about the nature of the country and diligence of the people.
All of a sudden he said, ‘It’s good, of course, to grow grapes, lemons, oranges, apples and various technical crops. But it seems to me you should transfer to mass cultivation of Indian corns and to based on it development of a livestock sector. Moreover, Indian corns are not only the fodder for livestock, but also a valuable nutritious product for a human.'
Having said that, he began describing an experience of an American farmer, called Garst, from Iowa State, who became a millionaire due to corn. At the end he wondered, ‘What do you think of that?’
The Albanian Minister of Agriculture answered that the country didn’t need corns, they had enough livestock and fodder. But Nikita Sergeevich didn’t step back and went on, ‘With Indian corn you may enter foreign markets, sell corn and earn foreign currencies.’
The atmosphere was getting strained. Having asked the Agriculture Minister two-three questions about the Indian corn, M. Shehu started speaking about the traditional structure of the country agriculture and natural and climatic conditions allowing to grow appropriate and profitable crops.
‘Nevertheless, you, dear Albanians, ought to think it over,’ Khrushchev persistently advised Shehu when the latter finished his speech.
Such an obtrusiveness bordering with tactlessness made most attendees feel confused and embarrassed.
In the next afternoon we visited a large textile factory furnished with up-to-date equipment and manufacturing a wide range of goods. The female director explained us production technologies. She was accompanied by a Chinese man. It turned out that the factory had been built with the assistance of Chinese specialists who were present there. After getting acquainted with the production technology, Nikita Sergeevich exclaimed smiling, ‘What does it mean? We are rendering assistance to China while they are aiding you?’
‘We have a full mutual understanding with our Chinese comrades,’ the director replied. ‘They are aiding us in installing the production technologies and training appropriate experts.’
On one of those days, going sightseeing about the city, we entered a Historical museum. We examined displays with a great interest. At the end of our acquaintance with the museum, they brought us, as usual, the visitors' book for guests of honor. Nikita Sergeevich leafed the book through and gave it to Malinovskii, sitting next to him, so that he wrote comments down in the visitors' book on behalf of the delegation. The latter quickly wrote a few lines down and moved the book closer to Khrushchev for a signature.
Sitting next to the marshal, I noticed that his record ended with the following words: ‘Long live the friendship of the Soviet and Albanian people!’ I quietly prompted him to replace ‘the people’ with ‘the peoples.’ Malinovskii replied with displeasure, ‘Do it by yourself.’ Nikita Sergeevich attentively read the record and told him softly, ‘You have written, so you must correct it with your hand.’ Irritated, Malinovskii corrected it. An interpreter translated the record, and the Albanians friendly applauded, although a hitch was not left unnoticeable.
On May 29th, Saturday our delegation arrived in Durres city which is located on a picturesque coast of the Adriatic Sea and has been known since the VII century B.C. Three years ago, a squadron of Soviet navy ships under the flag of the commander of the Black Sea, admiral V.A. Kasatonov, spent there about a week. The squadron included a cruiser ‘Mikhail Kutuzov’, torpedo-boat destroyers ‘Bessmennii’ and ‘Bezukoriznennii.’
The municipal leaders welcoming us warmly remembered our seamen staying there. They memorized admiral Kasatonov. Vladimir Afrikanovich was notable for being a man of considerable culture and irreproachable attitude to other people.
While our delegation was visiting this city, some events occurred there about which not many people knew and which made a rift in the relations between us and Albanians, which soon turned into insurmountable precipice.
Soviet newspapers of that time wrote: ‘…Not long before the beginning of the meeting, the head of the party and government delegation of the Soviet Union, N.S. Khrushchev, passed the streets of the city in an open car. Working people enthusiastically greeted comrade N.S. Khrushchev and the other delegation members.
The meeting started. It was opened by the first secretary of Durres regional committee of the Albanian labor party, Sami Gebero. He gave the floor to the warmly greeted by participants Gogo Nushi who was the CC Politburo member of the Albanian labor party, after whom the CC CPSU Presidium member, the CC secretary, Nuriddin Mukhitdinov, made a speech at the meeting…’
Further the full texts of the two speeches were published.
During the meeting the Albanians and our delegation members, standing on the tribune and seeing neither Khrushchev, nor Hoxha, were looking at each other, wondering, ‘Where is Nikita Sergeevich? What’s happened to him?’ In fact, the following happened: we, the whole delegation, arrived in Durres city. Indeed, as newspapers informed, Khrushchev, Malinovskii, Hoxha, and Shehu drove along major streets of the city where they were enthusiastically greeted by local residents. When they made a stop in the city mayor’s office, Nikita Sergeevich said, ‘As we’ve agreed, let’s split up here. We will see other districts, and the others will take part in the meeting. You,’ he addressed to me, ‘will make a speech.’
For me, it was fully unexpected, but I found a way out. I had some time and managed to get prepared.
In the late afternoon we returned to Tirana city. Nikita Sergeevich and Malinovskii had arrived in there before us. On the same day in the evening, our delegation gave a reception ceremony to the Albanian leaders in the brigade Palace.
At the reception there were also Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic, Otto Grotewohl, who was on holiday there, and Defense Minister of the Chinese People's Republic, Peng Dehuai, who arrived in Albania with a goodwill visit.
The reception ceremony outwardly passed in an exceptionally friendly and cordial atmosphere.
Khrushchev made a very short speech there. He said, ‘Dear comrade Enver Hoxha! Dear comrade Mehmet Shehu! Dear comrade Haxhi Lleshi! Dear comrades and friends! Gentlemen! We are very pleased to meet you again and I would like to thank you for your exceptional hospitality. We are deeply excited and touched by your attention showed to us, the representatives of the Soviet Union. You have created around us such a free and friendly atmosphere that we sometimes forget that we are far away from our Homeland and feel home among you. I am short of words to express our sincere gratitude for all cordial meetings and feelings of brotherly love to the Soviet people which we feel everywhere talking to the wonderful Albanian people.
We hope that the visit of the party and government delegation of the Soviet Union to your country will further consolidate and develop friendship and brotherly cooperation between the Soviet and Albanian peoples, between peoples of all countries of great socialist camp. Friendship of the peoples of socialist countries is one of the powerful sources of their strength and invincibility. At the same time, this unbreakable friendship is one of the most important factors of the consolidation of peace in the whole world.
Let me, dear friends, to propose a toast to the heroic and assiduous Albanian people and wish them more success in the development of the Albanian People’s Republic which with confidence goes on the way of building socialism.
To the glorious Albanian labor party and its Central Committee led by comrade Enver Hoxha!
To the government of the People’s Republic of Albania led by comrade Mehmet Shehu!
To the Presidium of the People’s meeting of the People’s Republic of Albania and its Chairman - comrade Haxhi Lleshi!
To the further consolidation of friendship of the socialist camp countries!
To peace in the whole world!’
Then, also in warm but vague expressions, Mehmet Shehu spoke. With that the reception ceremony finished.
However, many issues that arose during our delegation’s visit remained unclear.
First of all, I had to speak at the city-wide meetings on May 27th in Elbasan city and on May 28th in Stalin town, the center of the Albanian oil industry. Both times all the delegation members led by Khrushchev were present there. And both times Khrushchev warned me beforehand, so that I could have enough time to prepare my speeches. That time on May 29th in Durres just a few hours before the meeting, I suddenly found out from Khrushchev that I would speak on behalf of our delegation.
In the same situation, apparently, were the first secretary of Durres district committee, Sami Gebero, and the Politburo member of the CC of Albanian labor party, Gogo Nushi. They had to correct on the run their speeches which were directly addressed to Khrushchev. The absence of Khrushchev produced an oppressive impression on many attendees.
Secondly, at our reception ceremony in the evening there were Otto Grotewohl and Peng Dehuai. However, neither Khrushchev nor Shehu mentioned them in their speeches. The Chinese representative delegation led by the Politburo member of the CC of the Communist Party of China, the Defense Minister of China, Peng Dehuai, arrived in Albania in a few days after our arrival and was in the country all that time. But our tours had different itinerary.
That event caused some people to speak, I don’t know, evil-willed or sincerely, that the arrival of such a high-ranking delegation of China after the Soviet one was no coincidence. That step of China displayed that there was a great power behind Albania which enabled Albania to feel confidently in front of the Soviet delegation.
And thirdly, let’s remember that Nikita Sergeevich always spoke confidently, with great scale and energetically. But here at the reception ceremony, he spoke a little, sluggishly and in general terms. The reception was given by First CC secretary, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR; and there were all leaders of Albania, activists, representatives of workers, peasants, intellectuals and army, and distinguished guests from China and the GDR. But a reply speech was made by Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Albania instead of First CC secretary who attended the reception, too. There were also other nuances which were noticed by not only experienced diplomats, foreign guests, but also by the Albanians. We, the delegation members, couldn’t grasp genuine reasons for what was going on, but very soon, at least for me, everything became clear.
In the morning I was informed (Khrushchev and I were accommodated in the Palace, and the other delegation members were staying in other buildings) that Khrushchev invited me. I came to see him. He said, ‘Let’s go. Obviously, there will be a serious conversation.’
Malinovskii joined us on the way. So, the three of us entered the hall of Politburo sessions where there were already Enver Hoxha, Mehmet Shehu, and Bekir Baluku – the Defense Minister of Albania. On our way to that meeting Nikita Sergeevich asked, ‘How did you spend your time yesterday?’
I shortly told him about my interesting impressions.
Having listened to me, he remarked, ‘We also had a good trip, but we’ve got issues to be discussed in a close circle. This is a proposal made by the Albanian comrades.’
Mehmet Shehu was the first to speak and he immediately ‘took the bull by the horns’: ‘We completely do not understand a suggestion by comrade Malinovskii about establishing a Soviet naval base in our port. We perceive this as a display of discrimination and infringement of our sovereignty.’
Nikita Sergeevich calmly objected, ‘We do not intend to do it. Comrade Malinovskii only expressed his standpoint as a military officer looking at a nice, suitable port.’
However, Malinovskii, instead of supporting Khrushchev, again insisted on his own way: ‘If we established here such a naval base, our ships could defend both your and our territories. The American navy is playing the master in the Mediterranean Sea while we are having here just a few ships of the Black Sea navy, without their own base in these waters.’
The Albanian Defense Minister parried in a loud bass voice, ‘Yes, this is actually a beneficial strategic position. And before you, comrade Malinovskii, there were persons interested in establishing here their bases, but we rejected them their intentions. Do you think we are a colony?! Your ships will not only defend us. Instead, they would certainly make us a target!’
Khrushchev conciliatorily said, ‘We didn’t discuss this issue in Moscow. It arose yesterday when visiting your port. We just exchanged our impressions. Of course, it’s completely your own business and you can do whatever and however you find appropriate.’
Enver Hoxha joined the conversation, ‘Almost all generations of Albanians have struggled for independence of their homeland for thousands of years. Now we are socialist countries. Communist parties are at the head of their states. Is our relationship such that some can command and others must obey? We are a small nation, but our love to our homeland is not less than any other great power’s love. I think that the very statement and the emergence of such a question is wrong.’
I didn't know that a full conversation, to be more precise, a wrangle among them had started at the port of Durres city. Nevertheless, I supported Khrushchev in our sincere attitude to Albania.
Nikita Sergeevich controlling his temper said, ‘We have all spoken out our views. Let’s stint ourselves in this pure confidential conversation, take it into consideration and close this question.’
Enver Hoxha replied to him, ‘Your arrival, comrade Khrushchev, has been a very useful support to us and the people of the country. We undoubtedly can find mutual understanding, especially taking into consideration a huge experience of cooperation available since the war. We hope that this cooperation between our parties and states will expand. And now let us go, the people are gathering for a meeting with you. Then we are having a farewell ceremony.’
The atmosphere got less tense. Everybody calmed down and drove to the municipal council. In a solemn atmosphere the city mayor read a Decree on election of N.S. Khrushchev as an honorary citizen of Tirana city. From there we went to our residence house.
Afterwards we were friendly seen off to our Homeland.
On the plane we read on the first page of the newspaper Pravda (and in the other newspapers) describing the scandal negotiations with the Albanian leaders (in the number of ‘three versus three’) as follows: ‘On May 29th the negotiations between the party and government delegations of the USSR and the People’s Republic of Albania continued.
The delegations exchanged their views on a number of issues interesting to the both sides. The negotiations passed in a warm, friendly atmosphere and showed a full unity of views of the both sides.’
In connection with that trip I will tell you about my oversight. It happened after a sharp conversation with the Albanian leaders. There was some time before the meeting. Malinovskii went to change his clothes, but Khrushchev and I decided to go out for a fresh air. He was gloomy and upset, reflecting over aloud, ‘Do you see they are fully linking up with the Chinese? They work together against us. Look at their behavior!’
Trying to calm him down I responded to Nikita Sergeevich, ‘This is a small nation. They have suffered from foreign encroachments for as long as their nation exists. Therefore, they are so punctilious, sensitive and vulnerable in everything that relates to their independence. It’s no coincidence they call their homeland ‘a country of mountain eagles’. Lenin also spoke about it…’
I was about to finish my sentence when Nikita Sergeevich sharply turned to me and interrupted in high temper, ‘We know what Lenin said. He didn’t have to deal with national matter in practice. He left it to us. He didn’t face such an arrogance, conceit, and ambitions of national minorities!’
I could not, or rather, I was not able to answer him, so we silently went to own rooms.
A few days later after our return to Moscow, a CC Presidium meeting took place. Nikita Sergeevich told about the trip to Albania and assessed it positively in general. The Albanian people and a major part of leaders were for us. They showed a good, brotherly attitude towards our country. They spoke with gratitude about a huge and comprehensive aid by the USSR. However, the influence of China was getting obvious there. Albanian leaders, especially high-ranking ones, did not get rid of incorrect views about the decisions of the 20th congress of the CPSU as well as our policy in general.
In conclusion Nikita Sergeevich said, ‘We had confidential conversations and a frank talk. We listened to them and now we have to define the ways for restoration of traditional friendship and cooperation, intensification and expansion of work with Albania.’
A few Presidium members spoke out their views about that information. Then the decision was made: ‘To approve the results of the trip of the delegation led by N.S. Khrushchev to Albania and the work done there.
To: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the CC department of socialist countries - to submit within two days a draft letter from the CC Presidium to the Albanian leaders, with the assessment of the trip outcomes, highlighting its positive results and expressing the gratitude for a warm reception and the confidence in further development of bilateral cooperation on parity basis.
To: Department of socialist countries - to develop and submit for approval by the CC Secretariat a complex of measures for a comprehensive development of cooperation and expansion of contacts with Albania on different levels.
To: Government Committee of Foreign Economic Relations and State Planning Committee - to follow up implementation of the mutual Soviet-Albanian obligations.
To publish in mass media a number of articles reflecting a positive assessment of the visit as well as material about the Soviet-Albanian friendship and cooperation.’
Thus, our trip was over. But then no one in the CC Presidium could imagine that soon our relations would dramatically worsen.
It happened over a year later at the third Conference of communist and labor parties in Moscow. At that time the CC CPSU and our delegation tried to be in everyday touch with a number of parties, paying particular attention to them (including Communist Party of China, Communist Party of Korea, Albanian Labor Party, and others). Joint visits to enterprises, theaters, receptions and dinners were arranged.
On November 6th M.A. Suslov gave a dinner to honor the Albanian Labor Party delegation. All the delegation members arrived; our delegation, except Khrushchev, came, too. Opening the dinner party, Mikhail Andreevich stood up and raised a glass to say a toast, ‘We have not got closer and more sincere friends than you, our Albanian friends. We are very proud of and value it. From our side we will do our best to develop and consolidate our friendship, brotherhood, and cooperation. To your health, dear comrade Enver Hoxha! To your health, dear comrade Mehmet Shehu, our dear Albanian friends!’
We all joined the toast. We had a long frank conversation during the dinner.
At those moments it did not occur to anyone that after a few days, on November 25th, right at the peak of the Conference, Albanian comrades would express a violent reaction to critical statements in Khrushchev’s report (even though neither party nor country were mentioned), emphasizing the danger of current manifestation of nationalism, separatism, and isolationism.
In his speech Enver Hoxha strongly criticized the leadership of our party and country, literally attacked them with accusations. Considering such a worsening situation, it was decided to meet separately. It was agreed with a great difficulty that the meeting would take place in a close circle. During a break between sessions, Khrushchev, Suslov, Kozlov, Hoxha, and Shehu met in the hall of the CC Presidium. A serious wrangle happened. The situation was so strained that in reply to Kozlov’s words Mehmet Shehu banged his fist on the table and stated that now they had nothing to do and to talk about any more at the Conference. They both left the room. In the same evening Hoxha and Shehu as well as most Albanian delegation members left for their homeland. At the Kievskii railway station on behalf of the CC CPSU only Kozlov saw them off. Only two members of their delegation remained at the Conference.
XXIV
A CAR WRECK: AN ACCIDENT OR REVENGE?
In mid-December 1960 we came to an agreement at the CC Presidium that the CPSU delegation members at the Conference of communist and labor parties, which finished in late November in Moscow, would travel over the country to make speeches.
I was assigned to fly to Uzbekistan. Our general department informed Tashkent of it and soon received a program of my stay made by the CC leadership of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan.
A good, interesting and full of content program quite satisfied me. But one paragraph gave rise to doubt: activities relating to ceremonial opening of the main water supply canal in the South Barren Steppe region. As far as I knew the canal construction hadn’t been completed yet. In that connection I told my assistant to phone up Tashkent to inform them as follows: ‘I agree with the program. Thank you for the interesting plan, but I have a wish - the paragraph about ceremonial opening of the canal should be excluded. At first the construction should be completed.’
In two days Kozlov (then he in fact had a role of the second CC secretary) phoned me up, ‘Look, Nuritdin, I’ve got a suggestion that you should fly to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan instead of Uzbekistan. And Suslov will fly to Tashkent.’
I answered him, ‘I’m ready for that as well and I will go there with pleasure. But I don’t understand: the trips were decided at the Presidium. What’s happened?’
He is asking, ‘Are you busy now? Can you come and see me?’
‘Sure, I can.’
I came in his study where he was striding about. He glanced at me and said, ‘It’s a boss’s order.’
‘What’s a reason for it?’ I wondered.
He explained, ‘Rashidov phoned up Nikita Sergeevich and requested for Suslov to arrive to hold an activists’ meeting.’
I didn't ask him anymore. We conversed on different topics and I went back to my office.
On December 24th in Tashkent as usual at the Theater named after Navoi, a meeting of republican party activists took place. Suslov and also representatives of party bodies, of workers and peasants of the republic made speeches.
The next day in Yangi Er (New Land), according to mainstream newspapers, was held ‘a meeting on occasion of a startup of the first stage of the South Barren Steppe regional canal.
A CC Presidium member, secretary of the CC CPSU, M. A. Suslov, made a speech at the meeting. On behalf of the CC CPSU he warmly congratulated the Uzbek people with a remarkable victory – completion of the construction of the first stage of the South Barren Steppe regional canal. Having emphasized a great significance of the job done by the conquerors of the Uzbekistan’s virgin lands, M.A. Suslov noted that it would take a short time for irrigated lands of the Barren Steppe to become the largest area for cotton growing in the Soviet Union. The first CC secretary of the Communist party of Uzbekistan, Sh.R. Rashidov, also greeted the builders.’
It was good that Mikhail Andreevich Suslov greeted the builders on behalf of the CC CPSU. Indeed, heroic deeds were being implemented there and the people’s labor was worth a deep respect. However, the newspapers' report had at least four inaccuracies the main of which was that the canal construction had not been completed yet.
Soon I flew to Turkmenistan where we together with the republic leaders held planned activities. It was a pleasure to see my Turkman friends. Then I flew to Tajikistan where also there were my good acquaintances I hadn’t seen for a long time. The meeting was held in a business-like manner, then we visited three regions and the Nurekskii Hydro Power. The only place we failed to visit was Mountain Badahshan because of a nasty weather - the trip was made in late December to early January.
On January 8th in the morning, I left Dushanbe for Moscow. At the Vnukovo airport I was met by my wife and children at about noon, then we drove home. Not far from the high-rise building of Moscow University in a broad day, a large dumper truck suddenly appeared from a side street and bumped our ‘Chaika’ (Soviet-made limousine) at a high speed. Fortunately, our car flew aside, bumped a pole, stalled and turned over.
I don’t remember how long elapsed and what was happening after the collision. At first, I just heard some sounds. I could scarcely get a point of a conversation. Having opened my eyes, I saw beside my bed at home the chief neuropathologist of the Kremlin hospital, R.A. Tkachev, professor F.P. Rabotalov, and a few doctors.
They diagnosed as follows: a bruise of the head with a brain concussion, right-sided traumatic otitis, right ear haemorrhage, low blood pressure, brain tunics irritation, left-sided Oppenheim’s syndrome. In a few days the doctors also stated the right-hand paresis.
Doctors prescribed a strict bed rest regimen till the 1st February. Later on, I was transferred to the Kremlin hospital and afterwards I was transferred to the government health resort Barviha. For the whole period of bed rest regimen, I had splitting headaches, dizziness, photophobia and abnormality of statics.
As I have already written, at the peak of the Stalingrad battle during the bombing, at first, I got a concussion and after a while the tibial bones of my left leg were broken. At that time my leg was saved in a military hospital.
In 1948, returning together with the chairman of the Namangan regional executive committee, Vali Khaidarov, from a meeting on the occasion of the commencement of the Chustskii canal, we had a car wreck. A driver, called Iskhak, apparently fell asleep and the car flipped into a ravine. In a hospital I was taken to in about an hour they diagnosed a brain concussion. Doctors Kseniya Sergeevna and Saidov performed a surgery, sutured up all injured places on my face and head. Only after two months I started work.
For four years of the war I got injuries, brain concussion, broken bones, gastritis and colitis. Isn’t it enough for a person? In addition to that I got in two car wrecks. Thousands of thanks to the doctors who saved me this time again!
When I came to my senses, the first thing I did was to inquire about my companions who were with me in the car. I was told everyone was alive and safe as the main blow had been on my side. I was told my spouse had light injuries and my children were fine. I asked about my driver Vasilii and my bodyguard Bobyshkin. They said they both hadn’t been injured. But Vasilii was being under interrogation at that moment. I immediately requested them not to disturb and release him as it wasn’t through his fault at all. In a couple of days, they did so and he was released.
One day when I was able to walk, I was sitting with a close friend of mine at the sun porch. And he said, ‘There is a suspicion that that car wreck was pre-arranged.’
I didn’t want to develop that topic and shortly answered him, ‘They will sort it out.’
Subsequently, I didn’t show interest in it, though I heard that the suspicion was in force, and in addition, one dropped hints about Serov. However, no one went deep into details of circumstances and soon the case was closed.
Who was Serov? Who were we talking about? On the eve of the USSR collapse, the former chairman of the KGB, then the CC secretary and simultaneously the chairman of the Committee of the Party and Government Control, A.N. Shelepin, published a large article with his recollections in the newspaper Trud (‘Labor’), wherein he, in particular, wrote as follows: ‘Let’s have a look at I.A. Serov – the former chairman of the KGB of the USSR. He was a deputy of Lavrentii Beria, to whom he was a very close person, and he directly took part in a complete exile of the whole peoples, including the Karachais, Chechens, Germans of Povolzhje, Crimean Tartars, Ingushs, Balkars, and others. Working in the GDR (German Democratic Republic) as a representative of the PCIA (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR), and being responsible for property evacuation, he sent a cipher message to Stalin about lieutenant-general K.F. Telegin, who was Military Council member of the troops in Germany, by which he informed that Telegin was ‘embittered on the PCIA.’ In the result, Telegin was arrested and sentenced to 25 years in prison. Serov was directly connected with the execution by shooting of 15 thousand Polish military-men in the Katyn forest and was one of the participants in an invalid attempt to establish a special prison for political prisoners. However, till late December in 1958, Serov remained the KGB chairman of the USSR, and later he was appointed the Head of the Main Intelligence Agency of the Defense Ministry of the USSR. How to explain that? I think Khrushchev, who was well informed about Serov’s crimes, realized it was a very reason for which Serov would unquestioningly, obediently implement all his orders. In particular, I am sure he might have destroyed some discreditable documents relating to Khrushchev himself… And only after a long while, he was let down to major-general rank, was punished in a party order and deprived of the awards received by him for exiling the repressed peoples.’
What might be an aim of what had happened to me if it was connected with Serov? I had never communicated with him before, and only met him when I worked in the CC CPSU. Let’s try to reflect over that. Moreover, there were persistent rumors that ‘my’ car wreck looked almost like ‘Masherov’s variant’, with the only difference that Pyotr Mironovich Masherov, unfortunately, was killed while I by accident remained alive. Thus, what was exactly connecting me with Serov?
In early 1958, the head of a state arrived in Moscow. He was accompanied by a large group of ministers, military-men and diplomats. At the airport he was met by K.E. Voroshilov, who was the head of the Soviet delegation at negotiations, and by us, a few CC Presidium members, and other executives of the Supreme Soviet, government, and MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
We were waiting for the aircraft arrival. Suddenly, Serov, the KGB chairman, approached me and said, ‘Are you courting a house maiden in your mansion?’
I didn’t understand and asked him, ‘Will you repeat what you’ve just said?’
Saying again he told her name this time (I’m not telling you her name because our family was on friendly, sincere terms with her, and she, thank goodness, is alive and has got children and grandchildren).
I asked him, ‘Why do you think so?’
‘She told about it herself.’
‘You are lying! This is a lie.’
‘Do you want me to interrogate her and record her witness?’
‘You’ve certainly done it already, and are keeping the record in your pocket, aren’t you?’
‘I just wanted to warn you.’
‘Not to warn, but to get your hands on me in this way. Remember: your teacher Beria failed to do that. He threatened to destroy me; instead, he was destroyed himself. That’s why you are revenging. Moreover, like other people, I am really aware of your dirty deeds in repressing whole peoples. As for the house maiden, it’s you who has arranged this provocation by forcing this poor woman to bear false witness. Shame on you!? I don’t want to talk to you about it anymore.’
He stepped aside. The employees, standing nearby us, were watching us, exchanging glances, and puzzled; some of them were surprised with my jarring words in a talk with such a big shot as Serov. Finally, the aircraft arrived, and we met the distinguished guest. There were flowers, smiles and greetings. Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov and the arrived state leader left together, and we departed, too.
Having entered my office, I immediately phoned up Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev and requested him to receive me. He asked, ‘Is it really urgent?’
I confirmed and, having received his consent, I went to see him.
He asked, ‘What’s happened?’
I retold him my conversation with Serov, literally word for word. He listened to me attentively, without interrupting me, and, what surprised me, quietly. Hence, I drew a conclusion that Serov had informed him beforehand about it, and Nikita Sergeevich probably told him to talk to me. So, this person didn’t find another time and place to do this except at the airport.
Having listened to me, Khrushchev said, ‘Yes, I understand the difficulties have appeared and may happen in the future. You have no idea how people of Stalin’s circle lived in mansions before us. Many employees from maintenance staff are spoiled because they have lived in luxury. We are currently replacing personnel, training them to act according to approved budget, products, and materials. That’s why they are manifesting their dissatisfaction, even sometimes losing their tempers. On top of that, you aren’t familiar with all that… Therefore, you should be more careful with them and keep your relations balanced and formal. Even I myself get sometimes afraid, but what should we do? That’s life.'
It made me by no means a favorable impression, and I said, ‘Nikita Sergeevich, can you allow me to return to Uzbekistan? Not necessarily as the First CC secretary, I agree to any other position.’
‘Why? In connection with what?’
‘If already now, literally in a few months of my stay here, they treat me in such a way, what will happen further?’
‘You’ve earned a good reputation and are giving hope, so we won’t let anyone to offend you. Do not take the conversation with Serov to heart, and take it easier. However, you should take into consideration what I’ve told you.’
So that’s how our conversation ended.
What was a destiny of the house maiden Serov had spoken about at the airport? On that morning she was at work (in our house), but in the evening when I came home, I didn’t see her. The next day we were told she had a flu. In another month she got another job allegedly because of an infectious illness. Since then we didn't see her at all. Yet, when Serov was dismissed from his job in the KGB, and we already lived in Gorkii Street, without any attending personnel, she came to see us and in tears told us what had happened.
We once had guests from our distant homeland. We received them heartily, and they were treated with delicious food. Having seen off our fellow-townsmen, I, as usual, thanked all the attending personnel, particularly her for the carefulness, politeness and hospitality which are so highly appreciated in my homeland. Apparently, one of them reported about it to ‘where it should be’. That was where my courtship manifested itself according to the report.
The ‘poor’ woman was summoned and strictly interrogated: they tried to get her acceptance that I had made compliments to her with far-reaching aims. They pressed her hard, but couldn’t get anything from her because it had never happened.
Then she still often visited us as a family friend until our very departure to Syria. When in about ten years we returned from there, our family friendly connections were restored. It was her again who saw us off when we left for Uzbekistan.
Now about the main point which makes sense. I am not going to repeat what happened between me and Beria. Serov was his ‘right-hand’ and was completely aware of all his deeds. His offence and dissatisfaction with me, if not to say more, formed back in 1956. Then twice in October and November, I made detailed reports to the CC Presidium about the necessity of the rehabilitation of the innocently victimized peoples of the Crimea, Transcaucasia and North Caucasia, who were evicted by force to the Siberia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Working at the time in the republic, I had to deal with a lot of problems of those people, and of course, I took it hard and felt sympathy for them.
Representatives of those peoples and their respected elderly men many times came to the CC and the government of Uzbekistan, told about their situation, about how, for 1944-1945, they were treated, mocked, beaten, starved to death, their kids were taken away from their parents, and they weren’t allowed to take along with them over a few kilograms of things for a long journey to unknown areas, etc.
Woken up by the decisions of the 20th CPSU congress, seeing a started rehabilitation of people who were repressed in the 1930s-1940s, representatives of the peoples evicted by force believed and hoped that the party and state leadership would grasp and comprehend their hard situation and correct injustice incurred to them, and they would be able to return to their native land, home, and their children and grandchildren would live on the land of their ancestors. So, that happened soon.
I have already written about how I was summoned to Moscow in the first days of January, 1957. We revised all draft decrees and accorded them with leaders of those peoples and their intelligentsia representatives who played an active role in all those issues. On January 7th and 9th, newspapers published them as follows: ‘About Transformation of the Kabardian ASSR into the Kabardian-Balkar ASSR’, ‘About Transformation of the Circassian Autonomous Region into the Karachai-Cicassian Autonomous Region’, ‘About Formation of the Kalmyk Autonomous Region as a Part of the RSFSR’, and ‘About Restoration of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR as a part of the RSFSR.’
When Khrushchev visited Uzbekistan in early 1957, the representatives of rehabilitated peoples heartily thanked him for the restoration of trampled justice towards them.
That was exactly that connected me to Serov. And for that reason, he apparently tried to discredit me. I’m repeating: we didn’t have unpleasant conversations anymore, except for the tiff at the airport, and before that - a discussion of destiny of evicted peoples at the CC Presidium commission.
Serov was dismissed (as well as appointed) on only Khrushchev’s initiative. One evening we were sitting in the latter’s office, and he said, ‘We need to strengthen the KGB leadership. Stalin passed away, but still there are too many Stalinists there. Beria was executed by shooting, but Beria’s methods didn’t disappear, and his close assistants are still ruling the bodies. Until we remove and get rid of all of them, there are no guarantees that destiny, even lives of many, including Presidium members, are safe. I think it’s useful to dismiss Serov from a position of the KGB chairman.’
Of course, each of us, perhaps, could say when that issue arose at the CC Presidium that it was Nikita Sergeevich who promoted Serov to the position in due time. However, keeping silent about that, everyone supported the proposal de facto.
‘Whom shall we appoint for this position?’ Khrushchev asked. Without hearing a reply suggestion, he said, ‘Maybe, Shelepin? He is young, energetic and already experienced. He actively worked in the Young Communist League and has showed his good personal qualities as the head of a CC department.’
We all were positive to the proposal. Soon at the CC Presidium Serov was dismissed and instead of him A.N. Shelepin was appointed the KGB chairman. His career seemed to be over. However, Nikita Sergeevich right away proposed to appoint Serov as the head of the Main Intelligence Agency of the Defense Ministry – the agency of a special significance, with comprehensive authorities and possibilities.
Why did Khrushchev treat Serov so favorably when he was appointed the KGB head, but in a few years, he negatively assessed his work when he was made redundant? Nevertheless, Khrushchev eventually promoted Serov to the position of similar importance in terms of politics, strategy and military affairs. There can be only one answer: fear, concerns, wish to keep an ee on him and keep him at hand. Perhaps, everyone guessed about it.
Many facts could lead to such a decision. I will mention just one of them. Shelepin fairly expressed a suspicion in his article that Serov could have destroyed the documents relating to repressions Khrushchev had taken part in.
I don’t know details, but they said that the documents were partly destroyed. However, knowing Serov, Khrushchev wasn’t sure that he didn't keep the copies anywhere in his hiding places. Moreover, as it was found out later, copies of the top secret ‘files’ with documents discrediting and compromising some Politburo members were kept in Beria’s hiding places.
Hence Khrushchev had two-faced attitude to him: he dismissed him and right away appointed him to a high position; he punished him and immediately showed him mercy.
After the car wreck I was in hospital for over a month. I didn’t feel bad. My doctors confirmed that I was healthy. Thus, I got back to work soon.
XXV
KHRUSHCHEV'S LAST CONGRESS
Having become the party leader, Nikita Sergeevich led the preparation and holding of three party congresses: 20th, 21st, and 22nd. Mass media covered the period of Khrushchev’s rule differently calling it: ‘Khrushchev’s thaw’, ‘a great decade’, ‘cadres of the 20th congress.’ Of course, these definitions might be accepted with a certain irony; however, each of them is partly true.
The 20th congress I have already told about, with all its shortcomings that brought about complications and warps in internal as well as foreign policies of the country, indisputably deserved a peculiar place in our history. Delegates of the 20th congress approved N.S. Khrushchev’s report on the personality cult and its negatives consequences.
An undoubted merit of the 20th congress was exoneration and rehabilitation (more often - posthumous) of millions of people repressed, evicted and exiled to camps, or executed by shooting, as well as the restauration of honest names of innocent slandered people. Besides, the congress turned an attention to population social problems. Government executives started thinking more about accommodation, bread and other vital consumer goods. The breakthrough into space, brave speeches for stopping the ‘cold war’, peaceful coexistence, disarmament and liquidation of the disgraceful system of colonialism - all this was the result of the 20th congress as well.
The 21st party congress was out-of-turn. It took place in January 1959, in nearly three years after the 20th congress had taken place. The party leaders were thinking it over for a long time, trying to find essential excuses, considerable matters and motives which could explain the necessity of an out-of-turn congress convocation. Finally, they were found; thus, the congress took place.
The substantiation of the congress necessity based on three main points. It was a high time to analyze a feedback reaction to the resolutions of the 20th CPSU congress, to the current work on the liquidation of personality cult consequences and launching reforms. The life showed that the 6th five-year plan for the public economy development approved by the 20th party congress was not being fulfilled. And that seriously worried Khrushchev. Finally, the third point: the 20th congress and the first Plenum of the CC elected at the congress were characterized by demonstrated ‘unanimity’ and ‘consolidation' of the Central Committee, its Presidium and Secretariat. That was a real purpose of keeping the previous leadership membership who had been approved by the 19th (still Stalin’s) congress almost untouched. But in a year or two years, the leadership membership underwent serious changes: G.K. Zhukov was dismissed and relieved from party and state positions; a considerable part of members and candidates to the CC Presidium membership was removed under the veil of defeat of ‘antiparty’ group. Essential cadre reshuffles in the republics took place. At the out-of-turn congress it was decided to get an approval of those actions and future plans.
An agenda was approved as follows: 1. Control figures of the public economy development of the country for 1959-1965; 2. About the regular 22nd CPSU congress.
86 delegates took part in the discussion of N.S. Khrushchev’s report at the 21st congress; and I also made a speech there. The adopted by the congress resolution, the control figures of the public economy development for the next seven years (instead of a five-year plan), and the approval by delegates of all cadre reshuffles and shifts and organizational measures aimed at drifting away from Stalin’s dogmata in internal and foreign policies – all this created favorable conditions for a convocation of the regular 22nd party congress in less than two years.
We may say without exaggeration that the 22nd congress was a triumph for Nikita Sergeevich. His two long speeches devoted to the CC’s report and the third Party Program were approved and optimistic decisions were sanctioned.
But it was since that congress that a negative, critical attitude to him and his actions on the part of a number of leading party and state figures, which had arisen immediately after Stalin’s death, and started strengthening when preparing and as a result of the 20th CPSU congress, though muffled then because of ‘higher political considerations’. Then the situation in the higher echelon of leadership intensified again as a result of a wrong interpretation by Khrushchev and his close advisers - Suslov, Mikoyan, and others - of the speeches made by a group of the CC Presidium members in June 1957. The opposition’s defeat was called a great victory of Khrushchev, which, unfortunately, gradually provoked and revealed his personality weaknesses. Feeling absence of control, having got rid of Stalin’s companions, many of whom were obviously much more experienced in chosen by them activities than Nikita Sergeevich, he occupied a position of Chairman of Council of Ministers of the USSR as well.
Howbeit, the CC Plenum which took place immediately after the 21st congress made a decision on a convocation of the regular 22nd CPSU congress on October 17th, 1961. The agenda included two major matters - the CC's report and the draft CPSU Program. It was decided to publish the draft Program in mass media.
Having recovered after the car wreck, I got back to work in late February. By that time the preparation of the 22nd party congress had been launched. Responsibilities were shared; were formed a few groups responsible for as follows: the Summary report, the draft Party Program, amendments and supplements to the party Charter, the five-year plan, and organizational issues.
We, in the Ideological commission, devoted more time to the preparation of the party Program, participating, of course, also in solving other issues, particularly, on the Summary report to the congress.
During the next few months, a number of extremely unpleasant events occurred inside the country and cast a shade on political activity of party bodies and Soviet institutions. In this connection, the CC Secretariat and Presidium had to face and tackle them seriously. As I have already written, on the following day after the end of the 20th party congress, at the first meeting of the CC Presidium, Voroshilov sharply denounced Khrushchev’s plans relating to cultivation of virgin lands. He spoke with anguish about a disastrous situation of the nations in the RSFSR and about a necessity of serious improvement of their social situation. Voroshilov accused him of his attempts in such an unattractive situation when Russians had to survive and live in poverty to bury peoples’ money in Kazakhstan sand. And over a year later on first pages of all newspapers of the USSR, next to a portrait of N.S. Khrushchev, there was the published Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet about awarding N.S. Khrushchev, First secretary of the CC CPSU and Hero of Socialist Labor, with a Lenin order and the second Golden medal of ‘Sickle and Hammer’. The Decree was endorsed by Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.
Two months later after that Decree, Voroshilov, as a participant in the ‘antiparty group’, was seriously accused, reminding him of his improper role in the liquidation of commanders of the Red Army. Yet, taking some circumstances into consideration, including his international fame, it was decided not to mention him in the CC resolution. However, it was obvious that the months of his tenure were numbered.
In May 1958, I with K.E. Voroshilov visited Afghanistan. When walking in King Zahir Shah’s garden, I asked him, ‘Kliment Yefremovich, I remember you making a sharp speech against Nikita Sergeevich relating to virgin lands cultivation at the CC Presidium after the 20th congress. Then I attended its meeting for the first time as a candidate to the CC Presidium membership. However, in a year, a Decree was endorsed by you to bestow him a title of Hero of Socialist Labor. Moreover, it was you who handed him an order of Lenin and a Golden medal of ‘Hammer and Sickle’. We saw you attaching the awards to his chest and firmly hugging and congratulating Nikita Sergeevich in the Kremlin. How can we put all this together?’
After keeping silent for a bit, Kliment Yefremovich smiled sadly and philosophically answered, ‘I had to do that to survive…’
Yet, I still insisted, ‘What happened later on? After handing the awards and hugging him, in a couple of months at the June Plenum, you stigmatized and accused him, insisting on his dismiss from a position of First CC secretary.’
He replied, ‘Yes, this is a serious case. They misled me. I believed them and came under Kaganovich and Malenkov’s influence when they assured me that the speech was only about the appointment of Khrushchev as minister of agriculture, peacefully and quietly, and election of Molotov as First CC secretary. I agreed on it, but afterwards, as you see, it all turned around dramatically at first at the Presidium and later at the Plenum. Of course, I didn’t expect such a turn-over.’
In a year and a half, Voroshilov, at the suggestion of Khrushchev, was dismissed from a position of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. Thus, he finally retired of politics. Indeed, he was 79 years old at that time.
Unpleasant events of that time also included a lot of things occurring in agriculture of the country. Let’s try to remember: at the September CC Plenum in 1953, Khrushchev was elected as First CC CPSU secretary. His long, detailed report on agriculture was discussed; an extensive program in all spheres was approved. However, within five years, a considerable, substantial progress wasn’t achieved, although the situation required it. Therefore, in December 1958, the Plenum relating to the agriculture was again convened. The same speaker, N.S. Khrushchev, suggested sharp and radical measures, requiring to focus to a significant extent on funds and resources channeling into the agrarian sphere. The discussion was serious. Also, a large part of that program was devoted to mass media. So, after a short while, the dramatic increase in production of meat, milk, butter, oil, grains, vegetables, fruit, and technical crops was reported. At official meetings and conferences of leaders of the republics, regions and districts, they didn’t request any more for funds and materials; instead, they raised questions about what to do with produced products as they didn’t have enough containers, boxing, storehouses, warehouses, and processing enterprises. It seemed the time of abundance was about to come true when the golden mountains would sparkle and the milk rivers would flow along kissel banks.
However, against the background, as it seemed, of the overall growth as well as the preparation for the 22nd congress, where it was supposed to approve of and adopt the communism construction program, all of a sudden, some gloomy and alarming signals about the situation in rural areas started coming. In mid-1961, from Tajikistan was received some information about doctored records of cotton processing, harvest and supply, actual crop capacity, and so on. A special CC team, sent there for verification, not only confirmed that, but also found new violation facts. It was decided to discuss that issue at the CC Secretariat, with summoning the republic leaders.
The discussion was held sharply and for a long time. It was suggested to strictly penalize and dismiss guilty persons, etc. It came to a point that it was agreed to convene soon a special CC Plenum of the Communist party of Tajikistan to discuss that issue. In a few days, F.R. Kozlov flew there. The control revision commission reported at the Plenum. After a long discussion at Kozlov’s proposal, the Plenum participants voted for removal from their positions and excluding from the party membership the following executives: Uldjabaev (First CC secretary of the Communist party of Tajikistan), Obnosov (second CC secretary), and Dodkhudoev (Chairman of the Council of Ministers). Rakhmatov (Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of Tajikistan) and a number of other managing executives were strictly penalized. A few hundred people were brought to responsibility: some of them were dismissed, the others were excluded from the party, and the rest were prosecuted. Meanwhile Khrushchev during his trips over Central Asia repeatedly held Tajiki cotton growers up as an example to all people.
Visiting regions and districts of the Russian Federation, he was in the Ryazan region as well. Upon return to Moscow, he told the CC Presidium about grandiose success of Ryazan people, and in every possible way he praised the first secretary of the regional committee, Larionov. It was decided right away, as per the year results, to title him Hero of Socialist Labor. But inspections of the received signals showed that his reports about the figures of production growth of meat, milk and eggs were twice, thrice and even five times overestimated and false. When it was found out, though they were ashamed, they had to cancel the Decree on awarding Larionov with the honored title. As a result, he committed a suicide by shooting himself.
In those days M.A. Suslov was told off, too. I have already told about the ‘solemn’ events in the Barren steppe on occasion of the commencement of the South-Barren-steppe canal the construction of which hadn’t been completed yet. So, in a few months the CC CPSU received a letter from there saying that it was a big lie. Although the figures shown in newspapers were real, there were no reasons for celebrations. Who, for example, building a five-floor house, gives a housewarming party, having built just two-three floors? On the canal there was left incomplete a considerable part of earth-digging, iron-concrete and technical-engineering work. It was not accidental that after celebrations a cofferdam was restored to dam the canal, and the construction work was continued, making more complicated, delaying the production process and in that way incurring harm to people as well as the case.
When all the CC Presidium members gathered before starting a meeting, Khrushchev said, addressing to the head of the general department, ‘Well, will you read aloud the letter from the Barren steppe?’
We listened to him and felt confused.
Khrushchev asked Suslov with indignation, ‘Mikhail Andreevich, have you dealt with this? Why did you give them an approval of this event without sorting it out? Besides, it was you who greeted them on behalf of all of us and the CC CPSU. Now how shall we face the eyes of builders and people?!’
Suslov mumbled something inarticulately. Nikita Sergeevich malignly continued, ‘Let’s summon Rashidov and the other leaders of the republic and the Syr-Darya region. We'll discuss it and penalize them strictly. If need be, we’ll dismiss them.’
All this was fully unexpected; therefore, none of us said anything or objected to it.
In a day, coming to see Khrushchev on business, I told him, ‘Nikita Sergeevich, thank you for launching in due time the cultivation program of the Barren steppe lands. Now this area literally can’t be recognized. Under these circumstances, with taking such tough measures because of the meeting, a feedback might be negative and unfavorable. The people and activists have nothing to do with this; they work in hardest conditions; so, they only should be thanked. Of course, Rashidov recklessly made a decision to welcome in this way the arrival of Mikhail Andreevich. It would be better just strictly talk to the republic leaders, warning them seriously, without incurring any administrative measures. I’m sure they will understand, correct the situation and learn a lesson, making a right conclusion.’
Khrushchev glanced at me with displeasure and replied, ‘You deal with the republics. You should have monitored lest such facts would happen. Particularly, it occurred in your native land. It was you who promoted these cadres, and now you are defending them.’
I listened silently, waiting for his next words. Khrushchev continued, ‘If in such simple matters they try to lie, what can we expect in other more serious matters?’
‘Nikita Sergeevich, I know the present cadres and believe they will make right conclusions if you talk to them strictly, without dismissing and punishing them,’ I insisted.
‘Okay… Think it over again. We’ll return to this conversation later,’ Khrushchev concluded
I have only told about a few unpleasant events, but unfortunately, there were much more. Already in the early 1960s, were revealed a number of facts of deception of the state such as humbugs, false outcome figures and overestimating records of cotton growing, animal husbandry, crop sector and water supply system. Described incidents took place not in some particular collective farms and regions, but in the three republics – the RSFSR (Russia), Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Moreover, they were the exact places visited by Nikita Sergeevich personally where he enthusiastically propagandized their success and set them up as an example. But the worst thing about it was that this dangerous occurrence was considerably spreading and increasing in scales. After publishing the mentioned above facts in mass media, we started receiving similar signals from the other republics and regions as well.
Thereby being seriously worried, the higher echelon of the country leadership started taking resolute measures to prevent similar anti-state actions. And it gradually seemed that the evil was finished off. But no such luck. A dangerous scope of false, distorted statistics, the deception of the state were revealed in the 1970s-1980s.
Thus, in such a situation of chronic lagging of the economy, particularly in agriculture, the preparation for the 22nd congress was going on. It’s difficult to say for what Khrushchev hoped, as he certainly hoped for something, preparing that congress.
The work went on in all directions in all groups and commissions. Without focusing on details, I will tell you there was an intensive exchange of views, discussions were held and information agencies actively worked. A lot of interesting proposals and wishes were expressed by local party and Soviet bodies, public communities and individual citizens. Having published a draft party Program on July 30th, they made generalized summaries of received supplements and amendments, and specified which alterations should be introduced in the Report speech.
After discussing the first draft Program version at the Presidium, Khrushchev together with CC secretary L.F. Ilichev, academician P.N. Fedoseev and chief editor of the Izvestiya (‘News’) newspaper A.I. Adjubei, flew to the Bialowieza Forest. Over there they worked on the Report speech and draft Program, combining this with hunting bisons, wild boars, deer, fishing and other entertainments. If need be, at Nikita Sergeevich demand, required by him people arrived there. Almost every day a special plane delivered him mails, inquiry papers, and so on.
Finally, they returned to Moscow. Having held a Presidium session, they found a private place in his country house again to where Suslov, Mikoyan, and Kozlov were invited, too.
And only after that the materials were given to all Presidium members. After having studied them, I expressed my reflections and suggestions to a group of the speaker or Khrushchev. I managed to talk to him thrice about those two documents. The text of the paragraphs he approved of was proofread and worked through and handed over to Ilichev or often to Adjubei.
However, you shouldn’t think that the preparation for the congress went smoothly, with full consensus.
Literally from the mid-1960s I had quite strained relationships with Suslov, Kozlov, and Mikoyan. They were the closest people to Khrushchev at that time. He discussed with them beforehand almost all matters which were then raised at the Secretariat or the CC Presidium. Perhaps nobody treated Khrushchev then with such a servile attitude and puffed him up with a delusion of grandeur like them.
Mikoyan and Khrushchev were on friendly terms even before; they were almost peers and had similar to some extent biographies. But not only this made them close. I will repeat what I have already said. After crushing the ‘antiparty group’, when the rehabilitation work on personality cult victims dramatically increased, the CC Presidium received a number of documents from Azerbaijan. Those documents had evidences witnessing a role played by Mikoyan in repressions against party and Soviet cadres in Armenia and the North Caucasia. The CC had also a number of letters from communists with requests to publish the reasons for which Stalin, at the first Plenum after the 19th congress in October 1952, sharply criticized Mikoyan, accusing him of serious mistakes in internal and foreign trade. However, having announced all the documents and accusations raised against Mikoyan, Khrushchev limited himself to this, without giving way to the further investigation.
Suslov, who was considered then as the main ideologist of the party, was also seriously accused by some CC Presidium members of distortion of the party history, dogmatism and doctrinarism. Nevertheless, no actions were taken against him either.
I suppose such a strange passiveness of Khrushchev could be explained by his desire to ‘tame’ them. Indeed, while he was standing firmly on his feet, it actually worked like that. When celebrating N.S. Khrushchev’s 70th anniversary in April 1964, Suslov made a welcoming speech. Though he didn’t call him a man of genius, he used a lot of exaggerating positive epithets to characterize him as follows: energetic, wise, farsighted, and so on. However, it’s worth recalling that exactly after six months, it was Suslov who was a speaker at the October CC CPSU Plenum when Khrushchev was made redundant. And Suslov pronounced such acute and offending words to stigmatize and accuse him! Meanwhile the rest of Khrushchev’s ‘friends’, including Mikoyan, were keeping silent. The next day by the Presidium assignment, Mikoyan arrived at Khrushchev’s mansion and shortly informed the latter that he would receive a pension; also, his country house and his mansion in Lenin Mountains area would be left at his disposal. On that they bade farewell.
Returning to disagreements with Suslov, I must say that at the CC Ideology commission sessions and other different meetings, we debated and disputed on fundamental matters. Sometimes, I felt uncomfortable as I was his deputy in that commission. At the Conference of communist and labor parties during the preparation of the 22nd CPSU congress, Suslov keynoted objectives which, from my point of view, misinterpreted the main principles of Lenin national policy, for example, the process of merging nations, their languages, unification of the Soviet people, comprehending the republics sovereignty, and so on.
His such statements were being apprehended by people all over the country as a directive, as an integral part of decisions of the future party congress. The mass media, which was a loyal servant to the party at that time, immediately picked up his thoughts. In the journal The Soviet State and Law in those years it was said that ‘The complete state and legal merging of the nations in the USSR is an event of the visible future.’ At the same time, the newspaper Groznenskii Worker said: ‘Merging of the nations is going on in our country.’ The journal Communist said: ‘In the USSR the merging of national cultures is happening more, and a single socialist nation is being formed.’ A list of such statements might be continued. At meetings of ideology employees, was set up a direct objective aimed at speeding up deep reconsideration along with other aspects of policy, ideology, as well as spheres of national and colonial policies.
All this was strongly aggravated in the process of the direct documents preparation for the 22nd CPSU congress – the Report speech and especially the new party Program. I had a chance to take part in work of the commissions established for those matters. Most discrepancies and opinion differences were detected relating to the draft CPSU Program.
Our arguments presented in disputes were discussed twice at the CC Presidium. At a session devoted to perspectives of national mutual relationships, Suslov was the first to make a speech, then I made a speech. After a comprehensive discussion his conception was rejected, and the following part of my text was included in the draft Program: ‘…wiping off national differences, particularly languages, is a significantly longer process than wiping off class verges.’ In the section relating to the party objectives, I added: ‘Party allows neither to ignore nor to exaggerate national peculiarities,’ and in another section: ‘In the sphere of national relations Party sets up the following tasks: … to fully use and improve forms of national statehood of the USSR peoples.’
However, as to the other not less principle aspects, Suslov’s formulations were approved and accepted. At last, we gathered at the Presidium again on October 14th and the next day we held the CC Plenum. Khrushchev made a short speech on the main points of the two reports. Kozlov spoke about the amendments in the party Charter, and Gorkin spoke about the report made by the Central Revision Commission. All the reports were approved practically without discussions. Concerning the election to central party bodies, it was decided to gather again additionally.
I must say that the ‘high spot’ of the congress was, of course, the party Program. The CC CPSU Plenum adopted the resolution ‘About the Results of the Discussion of the Draft CPSU Program’ where it was noted that ‘the draft Program in the discussion of which over 9 million members and candidates to the party membership, with overall over 82 million people, participated was unanimously approved. Thus, the new draft CPSU Program was fully and fierily supported by the entire party and all the Soviet people as the Program for building communism in the USSR’. The moment of approving of the third Program of All-Union Communist Party – CPSU was coming soon.
The first Program, as it is known, was adopted by the 2nd congress of the RSDLP (Russian Social Democratic Labor Party) in 1903; and it specified the overthrow of the Tsar autocracy (called Program-minimum), then of the bourgeois regime, and establishment of the proletariat dictatorship (called Program-maximum). Having adopted the second Program at the 8th congress of the RCP (Russian Communist Party) in 1919, the party set up an assignment of establishing socialist society.
In February 1917 in Russia the Tsar autocracy was overthrown, and in October the proletarian revolution won, which meant the first party Program had been implemented. The second Program was a party guide for over 40 years until it was proclaimed that ‘socialism in the Soviet Union gained a full victory once and for all.’
At the 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st party congresses, they adopted resolutions on necessity of development and approval of a new Program, with achievements and changes that occurred in the country and in the world taken into consideration. Therefore, such a Program was finally expected to be born at the 22nd party congress.
There was also some personal aspect there. If the previous Programs were usually called as V.I. Lenin’s, then at the 22nd congress and especially after it, some tried to call the third party Program as ‘Khrushchev’s’. He was naturally flattered with that.
However, not everything in the so-called ‘Khrushchev’s’ Program was smooth. Some key points, provided by the draft Program and included in the final Report to the congress, aroused some doubts and vigilance. For example, it was planned within twenty years to increase the output volume of industry products not less than by 6 times, to raise labor efficiency in industry by 4-4.5 times; the same in agriculture – to increase total output production volume - by 3.5 times, labor efficiency - by 5 times, and real income per capita – by over 3.5 times.
In conclusion it was said that within two decades, material and technical basis of communism would be established, and conditions for implementation of the communist principle ‘from everyone - according to their abilities; to everyone - according to their needs' would be provided. In that way people were promised that in the Soviet Union within 20 years basically a communist society would have been built and the ‘present generation of Soviet people would live in communism.’
Another point that should be noted, which is a topic close to me, is a national issue and Soviet policy in foreign East. I must note that for the first time in the draft CPSU Program it was said that the main result of progressive society development in contemporary age was the establishment of the world socialist system, as well as the second by its historical significance phenomenon - the liquidation of colonial system. For the first time, such an ‘equal’ wording as the ‘epoch of socialist and national liberation revolutions’ appeared. This indisputably inspiring factor was approved, though after acute disputes and discussions in our circle.
As for the national issue, the draft Program had a few positive points, although simultaneously it had a number of principle provisions it was hard to agree with. That’s why I had to stand my opinion. Indeed, I didn't always succeed in it, but still I did basically.
In particular, some farfetched, unrealistic wordings such as ‘in the USSR a process of formation of the single nation with common culture is going on’ or ‘new historical community – the Soviet people’, and in perspective 'the Soviet nation’, were rejected.
Khrushchev’s report and the Program had a paragraph where it was said: ‘The party has solved the most complicated problem that has disturbed the humanity for centuries, and in the capitalism world it has still remained acute. That is a problem of nations relationships.' Further it was said that that issue had been solved fully and finally in our country. I had to make a lot of efforts to include at least the following: ‘The tasks in the area of national relationships specified in the second Program have been implemented.’ Objecting unconvincing, unsubstantiated statements about a full and final solution of the national issue in our country, I said: ‘How can you write this in the party Program when even our Constitution doesn’t specify full sovereignty of the republics (including direct communication with foreign countries, issues of borders, and so on and so forth)?’ There were heated disputes, but I managed to convince them.
Though the mentioned above amendments and clarifications (maybe not so considerable from the present point of view) were worked out in a difficult fight, the other formulations and wordings provoking disagreements and disputes remained as Suslov saw them. For instance, the Program had the following statement: ‘The closer is communication among nations and the better is understanding of national tasks, the more successfully parochialism and national selfishness are overcome.’ I insisted on adding as follows: ‘the more successfully local issues are solved’ and ‘the displays of chauvinism are overcome.’ However, my wordings weren’t approved. Or here’s another formulation: ‘…to achieve further comprehensive prosperity of socialist cultures of the USSR peoples. A wide scope of communism building and new victories of communism ideology enrich the socialist by its content and national by its form culture of the USSR peoples.’ I spoke out giving serious arguments against artificial differentiation and even contrasting of notions of ‘form’ and ‘content’. Why can form be only national and content be only socialist? Why does this wording seem so ‘stiff and hardy’, and where is here a dialectical approach? I proposed, instead of them, to speak about the development of national cultures of all nations and nationalities of the country. I didn’t manage to convince them fully. Nevertheless, they agreed to only add that both form and content would develop. There’s another point. It was said: ‘The party will do its utmost to develop new common for all nations revolutionary traditions of communism builders.’ I had to note the narrowness of such a wording: what about many-century and thousand-year progressive traditions inherent to each nation, each people? However, my arguments weren’t included in the Program. Or here’s another provision: ‘With the communism victory in the USSR, the nations will become closer, their economic and idea commonness will grow, and common communist features and traits of their spiritual ethos will develop.’ I insisted on avoiding exaggerating and simplifying, in spite of actual reality, the convergence of nations up to leveling their spiritual ethos, avoiding pompous phrases and setting up unrealizable goals before themselves and the people. Alas, they only agreed on some of my amendments and remarks mentioned above.
From the given above examples (also, there were others), it’s obvious how complicated was the preparation of the main documents of the congress. As for the economic section, I wasn’t a member of the relevant commission. Having familiarized myself with their proposals on the tasks of the social-economic development of the country for the next 20 years, I gathered necessary material, in particular about Central Asia, and argued for a long time at the commission, but the authors of that section were mostly scientists and party employees who had been staying in Moscow for a long time and got used to obtain and cite material from books by Marxism-Leninism classics, without knowing a real life of people. They persistently upheld their standpoint, i.e., the possibility of implementation of the formulated tasks and achievement of assigned outcome figures for the next 20 years.
I raised a question, ‘Where and what material, technical and finance basis for such rates of the social and economic development is there?’
They answered me laconically, ‘So we will create this basis.’
Then at a CC Presidium meeting I spoke again about those issues. When I inquired if they had already calculated how real such growth rates were, and if they were sure of having the required basis for that, N.G. Ignatov asked me right away, ‘Why are you objecting these rates?’
I parried, ‘Nikolai Grigorievich, I respect you very much, otherwise I would consider your question as provocative.’
Nikita Sergeevich conciliatorily addressed to us, ‘Let’s discuss it in a quiet, peaceful manner, without aggravating it,’ and gave me a sign to continue.
I said, ‘With a great pleasure I would support if the project had even the doubled figures versus the given present ones. Look, listen to this attentively. For example, let’s take a look at Uzbekistan. Mainly it’s an agrarian republic. The state monopoly is active in cotton, silk and karakul production. The state procures product from peasants not on a free trade term, but at the price specified by Moscow. You all are witnesses of how hard it was to raise procurement price and how many billions of rubles the government has spent on it. So, are we really able to increase procurement prices by 5-10 times for agricultural product in the forthcoming period in Uzbekistan? There is another side. As to labor inputs of cotton growers, by 6-8 times we are lagging behind not only America, but also Egypt, Sudan, and Israel. Labor force of peasants is used to its maximum, and it’s mostly a physical force. Can the state provide, let’s say, only this sector with at least half of technologies and equipment used in the USA?’
In the same vein I spoke out about silk, karakul, and animal husbandry.
After that they piled on me, argued, objected and rejected. Eventually it ended with Nikita Sergeevich’s proposal: ‘Let’s have in principle a positive attitude to the suggested material. Meanwhile the commission will verify, rationalize and accord the given figures with the republics and union bodies concerned.’
All these were extremely serious issues. Without having received support on many issues, I felt a deep dissatisfaction.
They were just a few peripeteias of the pre-congress situation and the congress preparation I knew about and personally faced with.
The congress started on October 17th, 1961. The work bodies, including the presidium, secretariat, editorial and mandatory commissions, were elected and the agenda was approved. 4,408 delegates with a deciding vote and 405 ones with a deliberative vote were elected for the congress. Only 14 delegates were absent for valid reasons. Actually, it was the first incident in the party history when such a big number of delegates were elected. It was connected with the construction completion of the Palace of Congresses in the Kremlin.
Delegations of 80 communist and labor parties of the world arrived in Moscow. As a rule, they were headed by first leaders. The exception was only the Communist party of China (the delegation was headed by Zhou Enlai), the Communist party of Cuba (headed by Blas Roca) and a few others. Delegations of the Yugoslavian Communists Union and the Albanian Labor party didn’t attend the congress.
The delegates listened to both report speeches by N.S. Khrushchev. He spoke at four sessions for a total of about 9 hours. At some point his voice became a little bit hoarse. Nevertheless, after all he finished his speech with a great pathos. The discussion was also on the two reports simultaneously, as well as on the Central Revision Commission report. It lasted 11 days and took 16 sessions.
Undoubtedly, in all speeches made by Soviet and foreign communists, the approval of CC CPSU activities and the support to the new party Program were expressed. Nobody made essential remarks or suggested amendments, although, of course, there were some wishes which the commissions, if it was possible, added to the document texts. They also included a few my remarks and clarifications.
On the third day of the congress, after Khrushchev had already made reports, I asked his assistant to tell him that I wanted to talk to him. He received me after an evening meeting. Referring to my previous appeals, this time I persistently requested him to release me from the work in the CC CPSU and to allow me to return to Uzbekistan or to do a different job. Khrushchev asked me why I was insisting on that. I frankly told him about my serious disagreements in matters of principle with some CC Presidium members, explaining that in the following way. It was good that we established the CC Ideology commission. However, its work style did not justify its mission. Some people called that commission ‘highest party censorship’ and ‘watchman guarding the letter and spirit of Marxism-Leninism’, which excluded the appearance of any new thoughts and prevented the initiation of fresh ideas. That was due to that any judgment or assertion, deviating to some extent from the provisions stated by Marx, Engels, and Lenin a long time ago, was immediately declined by Mikhail Andreevich and was called as revisionism. The commission seldom met. And all matters were essentially settled by the chairman himself.
Further I told Khrushchev my attitude towards the special commission of control for activities of all offices relating to external trade and foreign work. And I gave him a recent example of that time. We dealt with Cuba at that time. Cuba’s economic delegation led by Ernesto Che Guevara arrived in Moscow. At the first meeting he said, ‘I’m a military-man and a politician, so my main goal is to make a revolution. I have never dealt with economy or trade, and our delegation members are not experienced enough in this sphere. We deeply respect and fully trust Soviet comrades – we will accept and sign whatever you will offer us.’
After long conversations and discussions about what Cuba requested for and what we could give to Cuba, we had a break. So, we all, without the Cubans, gathered in Mikoyan’s office, including the heads of our ministries delegations. He immediately dictated an assignment to representatives of the ministries and authorities as follows: to build in Cuba such a number of schools, hospitals, roads, industrial plants and enterprises, and so on and so forth. The only basis for such instructions was his recent trip to Cuba for a few days and the request by Cuban authority representatives.
Objecting to such methods of work, I said, ‘I don’t think it’s a proper way to establish our relationships with foreign states.’
Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan neglectfully rejected my remark, but I continued, ‘There are no estimates and plans of these projects; even primary feasibility reports haven’t been done yet.’
Mikoyan didn’t accept my arguments: ‘If there are no plans and estimates, then they will be done. No feasibility reports have been done yet? Then, before starting construction, they will carry them out.’
Having listened to his retorts, I continued, ‘Of course, your merits and wide experience are of great significance. However, you have never had a chance to work on a collective farm or in a plant where each ruble has to be earned with hard work and sweat. Life being of our people is not so well provided, so that we could squander our national property.’
To all my comments and remarks, Anastas Ivanovich answered monosyllabically, ‘You are arguing from a provincial standpoint, while mine is the overall national standpoint.’
Then addressing the attendees, he asked, ‘Well, what shall we do?’
Everybody was silent. Then he reaffirmed his assignments and instructed that each one, in accordance with their own sphere of work, should submit all necessary material and substantiations by the next morning for the final editing of the documents. On that we parted. Two days later the heads of the both delegations signed an agreement specified and formulated as per Mikoyan’s instructions.
Nikita Sergeevich was listening attentively, without interrupting, and at the end he pronounced only two words, ‘I do know.’
After that I again continued, ‘Frol Romanovich Kozlov is directly engaged in the cadre policy pursued by the Central Committee. You’ve entrusted him this field. And you, perhaps, have heard that he has made a ‘revolution’ in the cadre sphere by replacing over half of nomenclature functionaries for a couple of years. I do not mind new functionaries as I just don’t know them. But it should be taken into account that among the elected at the 20th congress and already dismissed members, candidates to the CC membership and the revision commission members, there are a lot of distinguished, skilled employees, and we don’t know where and how they are employed. Frankly speaking, we have many cases of breaching basic principles of employment and redeployment of cadres not only in the Center, but also in the republics. While decision making on important state matters, personal and subjective approach is prevailing. Correct, direct opinions and remarks are brutally ignored only because the comrades I’m speaking about consider themselves to be experienced and distinguished. All this makes for me certain difficulties in work and in life.’
Having listened to me, Nikita Sergeevich answered, ‘Ok, I see. It has already become noticeable. Let’s transfer you to the Council of Ministers. Thus, you will be deputy Chairman, i.e., my deputy. We will continue working together. You will deal with the same matters as the ones you have in the CC, with the exception, of course, of inner-party matters.’
I agreed. He immediately invited an executive secretary, then told me, ‘Your office will be next to mine. During the congress before its completion, we’ll publish the Decree of the Supreme Soviet Presidium about your appointment.’
When the executive secretary entered the room, Khrushchev told him to prepare the office for me and assign personnel.
He said, ‘Prepare the resolution of the CC Presidium and draft Decree of the Supreme Soviet Presidium about appointment of comrade Mukhitdinov as the deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Within two-three days during the congress, the Decree must be approved and published in press.'
The congress continued its work. On October 27th at the 20th session, the discussion of the CC Report and the party Program was completed. N. S. Khrushchev made a closing speech. Then the congress adopted the resolution as follows: ‘Having listened to and discussed the report ‘The Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU’ made by First secretary of CC CPSU comrade N.S. Khrushchev, the 22nd congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union decrees:
To fully and completely approve of the policies and practices of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union in the sphere of domestic and foreign policies. To approve of the conclusions and proposals given in the Report of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union.’
Then the chairman of that session V.V. Grishin made a proposal to establish a commission for the preparation of a draft Resolution of the 22nd party congress on the CC CPSU Report and on the consideration of amendments and supplements to the draft Program of the CPSU. The commission headed by N.S. Khrushchev was established, with the membership of 91 persons, including me.
On October 28th the congress listened to the report by F.R. Kozlov about alterations in the party Regulations. After the discussion of them, the commission of 53 members led by Kozlov was established. The commission gathered only once when the draft Resolution was approved, with insignificant amendments and slight clarifications.
On October 24th I made a speech at the congress as it was planned. One of the four parts of my speech was dedicated to the Soviet policy in foreign East and issues of national liberation movement in the world. This part was called ‘Collapse of Colonial System of Imperialism.’ Taking into account that it was my last speech before such a grandiose audience, I will present this part literally as per the shorthand record.
‘Dear delegates! We live in the epoch when the colonial system of imperialism has collapsed. Making speech to the 20th congress of the CPSU, comrade N.S. Khrushchev said, ‘Nowadays the agenda includes, as one of the most crucial and acute issues, the one relating to the complete liquidation of the disgraceful system of the colonialism.’ Significantly that it was from the rostrum of our party congress that a flaming challenge to put an end to the colonialism once and for all was expressed.
For the recent years, many countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America achieved political independence and embarked on the course of independent national development. Pursuing the policy of positive neutrality, they play more active role in international affairs, become an important factor of the peace and build new independent life.
However, remains and many severe consequences of the colonialism have not been liquidated yet. To fair demands for independence by the peoples of oppressed countries, colonizers reply with destructive wars, brutal terror and devastating and ruining whole regions in Africa and other parts of the world.
But the time is not far away when glorious patriots of struggling Algeria, Angola, Oman, Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Mozambique, Ruanda-Urundi, and other countries will finally achieve the national liberation and will rightfully occupy a worthy and appropriate place among free nations of the world. (Long applause came.)
The main stronghold of the modern colonialism is monopolies of the United States of America. In every way they advertise their ‘economic aid’ to under-developed countries. But who does not know what a kind of ‘aid’ it is? Essentially, their aid is nothing but economic expansion and a source of fabulous profits, and it is of undisguised militaristic and predatory nature. Not without reason one eminent scientist from Asia compared American ‘aid’ with honey which is given to lick through glass of a jar. (The audience was agitated.)
The United States implements also a wide ideological sabotage against Afro-Asian and Latin-American countries. With this aim, a special government body called ‘United States Information Agency’ has been established. The scope of subversive activities of this agency is shown, for example, by the employment of over 12 thousand employees, with 150 propagandistic centers set up in 70 young countries. This agency broadcasts radio transmissions in Asia and Africa and publishes its printed product.
In this connection remembering the past and comparing it to the present, in Africa they say, ‘When white men arrived, they had the Bible in their hands and we had the land. Now the land is in the hands of white men, and we have the Bible in our hands.’
Monopolies of the USA, England, France, the FRG (Germany), and other Western countries aspire in every way to keep young sovereign states as their agrarian raw material appendage, retain them in the world capitalist economy system and in this way, maintain and conserve their backwardness.
That’s why oppressed peoples have risen for a resolute struggle against any forms of colonialism: old and new ones as well as opened and disguised ones. Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are firm to bury the colonialism with all its attributes as soon as possible. They have turned their eyes to the socialism world.
All-round aid and support by the Soviet Union and all socialist countries are a great force which peoples may surely rely on in establishing and developing their national economy, in the struggle against imperialist aggressors for their liberation and independence.
The Soviet government has granted loans on preferential terms to these countries to facilitate construction of 380 industrial enterprises and other objects, furnished with up-to-date Soviet equipment and built with the help and according to projects of our specialists. They play an important role in the national economy development of these states.
At the governments' invitations, about five thousand Soviet specialists selflessly work in the countries which have gained independence. Our people have every reason for being proud of fulfilling their noble mission in unselfish assistance render to the peoples of friendly countries.
The Soviet Union has mutually beneficial bilateral trade relations with 35 Afro-Asian and Latin-American states; and the total volume of goods turnover with them for the past seven years has increased by eight times.
Also, our country helps young independent states in training highly skilled workers, engineers, agronomists, and other specialists. At the University of Friendship of the Peoples named after Lumumba, MSU (Moscow State University) and other Soviet universities, over four thousand students from 74 countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America study nowadays. ((Applause came.)
As it was said in the report by N.S. Khrushchev, peoples, embarking on the way of independent development, can be sure that the Soviet state has always considered and does consider the consolidation of international cooperation and mutual aid with young self-reliant countries as one of the cornerstones in its foreign policy. It will always piously observe these principles of peaceful coexistence.
Imperialists try to undermine national liberation movement and export counter-revolution using spurious flag of anticommunism. But none of anticommunist propaganda can shake the belief of millions of people in bright ideals of future. It is no coincidence that one famous political figure of Africa has recently said, ‘Like a dry and thirsty land needs moisture, Africa needs ideas of scientific socialism.’ (Applause came.)
All progressive mankind wishes patriotic and democratic forces of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America great successes and full victory in their hard but fair heroic struggle for liberty and happiness of all oppressed peoples.' (Applause came.)
One evening after a regular congress session, I was told to come to Khrushchev. When I entered his office, I saw Podgorny, Mikoyan, Suslov, Shelepin, and someone else. Nikita Sergeevich said, ‘Let’s remove Stalin's body from the Mausoleum and bury it at the Novodevichie cemetery where his wife and relatives’ remnants lie.’
Silence came. I dared to talk first, ‘Nikita Sergeevich, his body was placed in the Mausoleum as per the resolution of the CC, the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Council of Ministers.’
Kozlov interrupted me, ‘Everyone knows this, so there is no need to remind it.’
But I continued, ‘I don’t think people will encourage if we treat the remains of the deceased person in this way. In East, Muslims consider disturbing a dead person’s body as a serious sin.’
Mikoyan interrupted me, ‘Don’t impose your Muslim customs on us at the congress.’
Yet, I finished my thought, ‘It will be difficult to explain people why it’s needed to bury his body at the Novodevichie cemetery. After all, behind the Mausoleum there are his buried former companions – Dzerzhinsky, Sverdlov, Frunze, Kalinin, and many others who used to work with him. Maybe, a place will be found there for him too?’
After a spell of silence, A.N. Shelepin took the floor, ‘It’s dangerous and risky to transfer Stalin’s body to the Novodevichie cemetery. I don’t exclude that even someone can steal it. I don’t think we might prevent this. Also, a scandal might well arise. And this may happen when the congress is going on so well.’
Having reflected for a short while, Khrushchev said, ‘Okay. Let’s suggest the congress that his body be removed from the Mausoleum. It shouldn’t lie nearby Lenin’s body. Maybe we’d better bury it behind the Mausoleum along with the other famous figures?’
Everybody agreed. Nikita Sergeevich continued, ‘You, Nikolai Viktorovich (Podgorny), will make a speech and propose the draft decree. Anastas will be engaged in re-burying. Comrade Suslov will prepare the draft resolution, and comrade Kozlov will think about who will speak. It is desirable that the leaders of major republics and regions speak to support this resolution.’ On that we all went home.
The next day after the evening sitting, Kozlov phoned me up to ask if I had finished my work. I said I was about to finish.
‘Let’s go together by my car. See you at the exit,’ he suggested. When we drove off, he complained about his feeling fatigue and offered to go to his house.
‘Let’s have some drink, meanwhile my wife may cook something for us.’
I replied, ‘We’d better go to my house. We can have some drink, too, and my wife will make delicious pilau you like a lot.’
But he insisted and we went to his house. After having had a snack, Kozlov said, ‘With the participation of some comrades who are aware of Stalin matter, we've discussed and agreed to raise this issue on October 30th at the morning meeting. Shvernik will be the chairperson. It's been decided not to include it in the agenda. During the discussion of the draft party Charter, Spiridonov, the first secretary of the Leningrad regional committee, will be the first to speak. After telling about the power abuse, illegal activities, massive arrests as a result of which numerous residents of Leningrad suffered, referring to old Bolsheviks, he will make a suggestion on removal of Stalin’s body from the Lenin Mausoleum and re-burying it in a different place. We've agreed that Mjavanadze will speak on behalf of the party bodies of the Transcaucasian peoples, whereas for you it would be reasonable to speak and support the suggestion by yourself in person, telling about repressions in Central Asia and in particular, in your homeland of Uzbekistan. Demichev will speak on behalf of the Moscow party body, and then Podgorny will propose the draft decree on behalf of the Ukrainian and other republics’ delegations.’
After listening to him, I said, ‘It’s obvious you’ve thoroughly thought it over. However, there are some unclear points for me.’
‘In what way?’ He asked, strenuously continuing to treat me with the meal.
‘I mean, whether it’s reasonable for me to speak on behalf of all the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Particularly after I have spoken for about half an hour from the congress platform. In addition, I haven’t worked in Uzbekistan for a long time, being here and working along with you in Moscow. The First secretaries of the Communist parties from all the republics are present at the congress. They should gather together and agree on who will speak on behalf of the region – Kunayev, Rashidov, or someone else.’
Kozlov objected, ‘Do not breach the agreement. You are assigned to make a speech.’
‘But who has authorized me to do this? Moreover, none of the CC CPSU secretaries will speak about this matter.’
Then he noted, ‘Remember, the boss will be strongly offended. I must report him right now about our conversation on the phone.’
‘Okay, then tell him my doubts and suggestions.’
At that moment Kozlov’s wife entered the room. I thanked her for delicious food, bade farewell and went outside.
I don’t know what he told him. But when my refusal was discussed in Khrushchev’s office, without me, of course, then Suslov, Kozlov, and Mikoyan, as I found out later, expressed that it wasn’t reasonable to appoint me a deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR because of my standpoint contradicting the general strategy. Thus, the approval of the resolution of the CC CPSU Presidium and the Decree of the Supreme Soviet Presidium about my appointment was halted.
On October 30th before the morning meeting of the congress, a small incident happened. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the republic, G.D. Djavakhishvili, had to urgently prepare and make a speech instead of the First secretary of the CC Communist party of Georgia, V.P. Mjavanadze. It turned out that after a conversation with Kozlov, Mjavanadze came to the morning meeting of the congress, with his throat bandaged, and whispered that he had an inflammatory throat ache. Therefore, he had a hoarse voice and couldn’t speak at all. Thus, they chose Djavakhishvili who actually resisted and was reluctant to make a speech. However, a speech was imposed on him, and even he was intimidated. Speaking in a truly Georgian manner, he said, ‘Yes, we have to agree with the proposal of the transfer of Stalin’s body to a different place.’
No one spoke on behalf of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. Thus, to support I.V. Spiridonov’s proposal, the first secretary of the Moscow city committee of the party - P.N. Demichev and G.D. Djavakhishvili, and on behalf of the Leningrad party organization - D.A. Lazurkina, who had been a CPSU member since 1902, made speeches. In conclusion, N.V. Podgorny spoke on behalf of the Leningrad and Moscow delegations, the delegations of the Communist parties of Ukraine and Georgia, and introduced for consideration the following draft resolution of the 22nd CPSU congress:
‘1. The Mausoleum in Red Square nearby the Kremlin wall, built in the memory of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin – the immortal founder of the Communist party and the Soviet state, the leader and the teacher of all working people in the world - from now on shall be named: MAUSOLEUM OF VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN.
2. To admit that it is unreasonable to further keep in the Mausoleum the sarcophagus with the coffin of J.V. Stalin, since serious violations of Lenin’s precepts by Stalin, his abuse of power, mass repressions against honest Soviet people, and his other actions during the period of his personality cult make impossible to keep the coffin with his body in the Mausoleum of V.I. Lenin.’
Delegates approved of the draft without any remarks.
On the same day at the evening’s meeting, a discussion of candidates to the membership of the party Central Committee and the CPSU Central Revision Commission took place. Central party bodies were elected by a secret ballot. On October 31st in the morning, Demichev, the chairman of the counting commission, reported to the congress about the results of that ballot which were unanimously adopted.
As for me, in spite of serious complications arisen due to my refusal to make a speech about Stalin’s body transfer, sharp discontent by Khrushchev and the other CC Presidium members, and the cancellation of the draft resolution on my appointment as a deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, I was again elected a member of the CC CPSU.
Nikita Sergeevich congratulated the electees, then the chairman M.T. Efremov announced a break till 4 o’clock in the afternoon. Here in half an hour took place the CC Plenum where, as per rotation and at the proposal by Khrushchev, out of the previous membership a few members and candidates to the Presidium membership and secretaries, including me, weren’t elected. New people were elected, including Sh.R. Rashidov as a candidate from Uzbekistan to the Presidium membership.
All the proposals by Khrushchev were approved of smoothly, without a hitch.
At 4 o’clock in the afternoon, a final session of the congress opened, with participation of all foreign delegations, guests, journalists, and other invited persons. But I didn’t attend it…
Having come home at about 2 o’clock in the afternoon, I felt unwell. It seemed I didn’t fully recover after the past car accidence. Besides, I made a lot of efforts to arrange and hold the congress. I did my utmost to implement assignments. We started work, as a rule, at 7 o’clock in the morning and finished at about 10 o’clock at night. In addition, perhaps, my emotional experience of the recent days in connection with my request to dismiss me from the work in the CC and Khrushchev’s proposal followed by its cancellation affected my health.
I had a splitting headache, running temperature, a fast heart rate, and a low blood pressure. Doctor A.Ya. Zavarnova, who had arrived by an emergency call, did an injection, prescribed a number of drugs, and categorically prohibited me to get up. Also, she called other medical doctors. They examined my body, checked the functions of my internals and prescribed me a strict bed rest. They immediately informed the leadership, according to the rule.
Of course, the last session of the congress was considered as important and triumphal, especially for Khrushchev. Because his both reports were practically approved of with ‘a great success!’
I can’t say anything bad. Indeed, Khrushchev treated me well. At last he understood me and offered me a position in the Council of Ministers. However, his inner circle, including Suslov, Mikoyan, and Kozlov, dissuaded him. Perhaps, if I had spoken at the congress for reburying Stalin’s body, then everything would’ve been according to their plan. But I didn’t support them, which I consider right, as I have already told about in detail. After the morning CC Plenum, I became almost ‘nobody’. Besides, there was another serious reason: having sat in the first row of the congress Presidium, I would’ve had to vote for the party Program in which I strongly hesitated. Being a member of the three commissions of the congress, I made a lot of concrete proposals and amendments that might have been included in the Program, too. Nevertheless, only a few of them were accepted. So, should I vote for or against the Program? In front of the whole congress? Of course, I could’ve voted ‘for’ it, despite my conscience and beliefs. Finally, apart from my poor health and physical indisposition, I also was in deep doubts. For those reasons, I decided to be absent from the final congress session.
Three days later after the congress, I got another stab in the back this time. Suslov, Kozlov, and Rashidov raised a question to Khrushchev about my withdrawal by voting from the CC CPSU membership.
All the events that happened to me in those days, perhaps, appeared the most serious trial in my life. However, thank goodness, I managed to get the test over. The following years showed that I was right in my forebodings, doubts, worries, and concerns relating to some paragraphs of the Report speech and the Program.
N.S. Khrushchev, like everyone then, considered the 22nd CPSU congress as a triumph of his political career as the first leader of the party and the country. However, it was this congress that simultaneously became his ‘swan song’. Life confirmed those thoughts about danger of voluntarism as well as dogmatism and sectarianism. All this hit Khrushchev who worked after the 22nd congress at the post of First CC secretary for only three years.
XXVI
‘DAMOCLES SWORD’
IN SUSLOV’S HANDS
Last time I was in my office in the CC building in Old Square at 8 o’clock in the morning on October 31st, 1961, i.e., on the final day of the congress. After that neither did I go there, nor did I phone up CC secretaries and employees.
After the congress termination on the next day, I was visited at home by Yadgar Nasriddinova, who was Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan, deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, member of the CC CPSU, and her spouse Sirodj Nuriddinov, who was a CC secretary, a member of the CC Bureau of the Communist party of Uzbekistan and a delegate to the 22nd congress.
I was already lying in bed at that moment. So, they warmly greeted, hugged and kissed us. From them I found out about one circumstance. Nasriddinova told me that Khrushchev, during the congress after the conversation with me about my transfer to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, summoned her to inform as follows: ‘It has been decided to dismiss Mukhitdinov from the post of CC secretary, CC Presidium member and appoint him a deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In this job he will focus on cultural construction and social support to population. The decree will be issued these days. He has agreed on it.’ Then Nikita Sergeevich concluded, ‘I hope the Uzbeks will be positive about Mukhitdinov’s transfer from the CC to the Government of the USSR.’
Later Khamrakul Tursunkulov, who was a famous chairman of a collective farm, came to see us. He sincerely sympathized with me and wished me a soon recovery. He was very upset with the events that had happened at the end of the congress. In a long conversation, referring to his experience, he advised me to demonstrate tenacity and fortitude.
He tried to calm me down, ‘Don’t worry, things will be evened out and we will see you again occupying appropriate positions. It would be great if you could come back to Uzbekistan. I’d like to talk about it with Khrushchev. He often visited our collective farm and considers me as his friend.’
That day till late and on the next day, we had many visitors not only from Uzbekistan but also from the other republics: congress delegates, close friends and acquaintances. They expressed their regret, sympathy and wished me a soon recovery and continuation of my work activities. I received many calls as well.
On November 3rd, suddenly came to us an officer, a telecommunications specialist accompanied by a representative of the 4th General Department of the Health Ministry. As they said, doctors recommended me to have a rest. For that reason, it was found reasonable to switch off all the phones except for the internal government one and to limit visitors.
I said, ‘Do whatever you must. I don’t mind.’
One of my bodyguards was transferred to serve N.V. Podgorny. As for the other one, called Abdullaev, who had arrived with me from Tashkent, then he decided to return to Uzbekistan and retire from the KGB system at all. When he came to me to bid farewell, I requested him immediately upon arrival in Tashkent to visit my father, brothers, and relatives and tell them that everything was good with me and my family, that I was ill a little bit and kept my bed, but the doctors ensured I would recover soon, and prescribed me to have a rest. Therefore, I requested all my relatives to refrain from phoning me up and visiting me. After recovery my family and I would be glad to welcome them at my house in Moscow.
On the same day, an employee of the CC Administration who dealt with the country houses came and said, ‘Apparently, the country house you are living in will be given to one of the new CC secretaries. We’ve been instructed to prepare it quickly. For this purpose, we need to take out all your belongings.’
My spouse Mukarram went with him to our country house, had our stuff loaded in the car and gave him the keys.
By the end of the same day, an employee of the CC General Department who dealt with documents and other matters of the CC Presidium came to me. He said he was instructed to bring the keys to my office and the safe in the CC premises, as well as the documents I kept relating to the CC Presidium and Secretariat. I gave him them. He was a man of culture with good manners. Besides, I was on good terms with him. It was him who confidentially told me that day that Suslov, Kozlov, and Rashidov had prepared and submitted to Khrushchev the draft resolution about the dismissal of myself and E.A. Furtseva (by poll) from the CC CPSU membership.
I spontaneously asked, ‘Why Ekaterina Alexeevna?’
‘After the CC Plenum, when she wasn’t elected a secretary either, she came home and broached her veins. She lost a lot of blood, and the arrived doctors found her in a very poor condition, but they saved her life. She didn’t attend the final congress session either,’ he explained.
‘What kind of accusations are we charged of?’
‘The draft resolution hasn’t been discussed by the CC Presidium yet. The Three of them handed it over to Nikita Sergeevich. I don’t know what they were talking about. But in the draft, it’s said as follows: ‘For gross violation of inner-party discipline, the party Regulations, discredit of communists who had elected them as the congress delegates, as well as other mistakes, to dismiss them from the CC membership.’
Having taken the keys and documents, he drove away.
The next day I got up and went for a walk. To dispel and distract my mind from the worrying thoughts, I decided to cross a road and admire the view of the Luzhniki stadium and Moscow city from the Lenin Hills. I scarcely made a few steps, all of a sudden, a man appeared in front of me and said, ‘Comrade Mukhitdinov, according to the doctors, you shouldn’t cross the street. You’d better stay at your yard.’
I took a glance at him, then thanked him for an ‘advice’, returned to the yard and sat down on a bench.
I was pondering, ‘What’s going on? On October 31st, by a secret vote I was elected a CC member unanimously. And in a couple of days during which nothing happened, by poll they want to withdraw me out of the CC membership. If they had had serious claims, they wouldn’t have elected me at the congress. As to my absence from the final congress session, they received my doctors’ prescription and conclusion. And is it conceivable only because of this (I was absent from only one out of 26 sessions!) to take such strict measures?...
Apparently, for the last two days, some important event has happened, and a serious accusation has arisen, bringing about such a negative attitude to me from the leadership's part. But what’s it exactly? Why has it happened to me, so awkwardly and hard? I am jobless now, isolated from people, being in fact under a house custody. Of course, there is no such a decision. All this has been done because of caprice and hostility to me from the part of a few high-ranking officials.’
I was also pondering over another matter in those days. In April, 1953, as I have already written, I resolutely spoke out against provocative proposals by Beria in terms of national politics. Then in a phone conversation with me, he threatened to dismiss me from the post and ‘grind me to powder.’ The matter relating to me and my work was repeatedly discussed at the CC Bureau of the Communist party of Uzbekistan, which, by the way, objected to Beria’s demands. Then the conversation took place at the CC CPSU Presidium, as at that time Chairmen of Council of Ministers of the republics were included in the nomenclature of the CC Presidium. Besides, I was also a member of the CC CPSU and a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
When that matter was considered by the CC Presidium, three members supported Beria’s demand on my dismissal, but six were against it. The upshot was that in early May I was after all dismissed from the position of Chairman of Ministers Council, though I remained a member of the CC Bureau of the republic Communist party. In addition, they approved of my appointment the first Deputy Chairman of Ministers Council and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan. Hadn’t there been such a decision, Beria, undoubtedly, would’ve implemented his threat.
At that time, I was supported by both Moscow and Uzbekistan. I would say they stood up for me and saved me from an inevitable reprisal. However, for this time, who could say a word to stand up for me? I was absolutely ostracized and cut adrift from everyone. At home, two ‘watchmen’ were replaced; both bodyguards and drivers left us; also, two cooks, waitresses and house cleaners stopped coming. Nevertheless, it’s true we managed to cope with the household work by ourselves. Actually, it wasn’t a problem, of course. But the main problem was in a growing isolation.
On November 5th, we were visited by the head of the CC accommodation fund department who said, ‘We are preparing a new apartment for your family in a comfortable place in the city center in Gorky Street, nearby Soviet Square. Another leader will probably live in this mansion.’
‘Thanks. When must we move house?’ I asked. ‘We need two-three days to get prepared.’
‘We will help you with your moving.’
I spent the October holiday in thoughts, remaining in solitude. I remembered the deeds and fate of Fayzulla Khodzhayev - the first Chairman of the government of Uzbekistan; Akmal Ikramov - First Secretary of the CC Communist party of Uzbekistan; and Sultan Segizbaev – the acting Chairman of the Soviet People’s Committee of Uzbekistan in 1938, who was also an eminent scientist and professor. Being non-guilty, they, nevertheless, were executed by shooting.
Recalling all that, I involuntarily asked myself, ‘What will happen to me? When will the matter about me be decided and in what way or form?’ Morally and even physically, I started preparing myself for the worst-case scenario. Indirectly I warned Mukarram to prepare a minimum of vitally necessary things for me. Nonetheless, in the evening on November 7th, I gathered all my family together and did my best to prevent my children from getting worried, so that we could celebrate the October holiday joyfully.
On October 9th in the morning, the same employee of the CC General Department came to see me. It turned out that two important documents were down on my name. One of them was a protocol of a Secretariat session where I was the chairperson, but which I didn’t sign, and the other one was the Report addressed to the CC. I found and gave him them. Before leaving, he told me, ‘Nikita Sergeevich is flying to Tashkent these days.’
‘Why? What is the reason for this?’ I asked.
‘This trip hasn’t been included in his plans. In addition, here there is a great deal to do: the Presidium is to approve a package of measures for implementing the congress resolutions. The according departments have already prepared their proposals that must be immediately discussed. Also, there are other urgent matters, accumulated during the congress, to be considered by the Presidium and Secretariat. Besides, personal responsibilities of the new Presidium and Secretariat members must be specified. Finally, we expect important guests from overseas to arrive, as well as our representatives are to make trips to overseas. Surprisingly, under such circumstances, Nikita Sergeevich has decided to fly to Uzbekistan. The Program of his stay there is still unknown for us.’
We were silent for a few seconds; then he said in a low voice, ‘Immediately after the congress, especially after publishing portraits and biographies of the new CC Presidium and Secretariat members, we received a lot of letters, telegrams, and calls inquiring what had happened to you and what was the reason for that. Even they associated that with the fact that your seat had not been occupied at the final congress session. Some directly reproached Nikita Sergeevich that he ‘had appointed’ you by himself, had promoted you, and now so severely treated you. Not only did people from Uzbekistan come, but also delegates from the other republics and regions came to the apparatus, secretaries and departmental heads because of your dismissal.’
Being cut off from everyone, I thanked my interlocutor for the information. Then he asked me, ‘Do you still read foreign press?’
‘I don’t receive it at the moment.’
He explained, ‘Overseas they also are showing an interest in your fate. Different feedbacks, proposals, particularly in Eastern countries, have appeared. They are connecting your dismissal with your possibly serious mistakes in foreign policy, or even with a supposed change in a politics strategy of the USSR in foreign East after the 22nd congress. Assumptions about a big scandal in the CC Presidium have been expressed. And even one author has written as follows, ‘Mukhitdinov is a victim of the Kremlin intrigues…’ Before leaving, he added, ‘The draft resolution about you and Furtseva hasn’t been considered yet. It’s still on Nikita Sergeevich’s desk, whereas the second copy is in the possession of Suslov.’
In the afternoon, we were informed that an apartment for us was ready, so that after the weekend we could move in it. We agreed to move house on Monday or Tuesday.
In the morning on October 10th, there was a call on the Kremlin phone. I picked up the receiver and heard Kozlov’s voice, ‘How are you, Nuritdin? How are you feeling?’
‘I’m quite better. I’ve been walking since October 2nd. I’m busy with gardening now.’
He said, ‘It has been found reasonable to recommend you for a position of a deputy chairman of the Central Union of Consumer Cooperation (CUCC). What do you think of this?’
‘I agree.’
‘Then, you may have a rest for a couple of days. Today is Friday; and on Monday, if it suits you, you may start work.’
On Monday morning, having phoned up A.P. Klimov who was the chairman of the CUCC beforehand, I went to my new work. Greeting me, he said that he was informed about me, and that I could start work whenever I want to. Then he called his secretary, a young and polite woman, who was in the reception room, and told her to show me my office.
The next day, an open meeting of the CUCC Board took place. They discussed the information about the planned events for arranging reports and election in the organizations of consumer cooperation, and the preparation for the 6th congress of authorized representatives of consumer cooperation of the USSR. Then Klimov read out the draft resolution about my appointment. There were no questions, remarks, or objections. The following resolution was adopted: ‘To elect comrade Mukhitdinov, Nuritdin Akramovich as a deputy chairman of the CUCC Board. The proposal on election of comrade Mukhitdinov, N.A. as a member of the CUCC Board shall be submitted for consideration by the regular CUCC Board.’
XXVII
THREE DAYS OF ‘SILENCE’
I came to know about Khrushchev’s trip on November 9th, and on November 10th I read about his arrival in Tashkent in newspapers. At that moment in connection with his trip, various suppositions occurred to me. Of course, he could have various thoughts about the results of the 22nd congress. Perhaps, he decided to listen to both ordinary people and local administration employees. Suppose it was connected with an agriculture conference, but it seemed too early to be held. Such conferences were usually convened in January or February to discuss results of the past year and define tasks for the next year. But currently the cropping was going on in the fields … I wondered if that trip was connected only with me… It was unlikely.
At the end of the day I phoned up a permanent representative of Uzbekistan and requested him to regularly provide me with Tashkent newspapers. He promised me to send them daily to my apartment. Then he confidentially told me, ‘On November 5th or 6th, Nikita Sergeevich got in touch with Rashidov by the phone and recommended him to convene in Tashkent a conference of the leaders of the republics of Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and southern regions of Kazakhstan which were engaged in cotton growing. He suggested him to hold such a conference on November 15-16th and inform First CC secretaries of the Communist parties of these republics of his arrival in Tashkent on November 10th.’
Not only for me, but also for many other people it became a full unexpectedness. In addition to that it was the most crucial time of cotton-picking, the congress had just finished. The leaders of the republics and regions had to be available at work, do explanatory work, prepare proposals on implementing the congress decisions, hold party plenums relating to the congress results and party bodies tasks. All of a sudden, they all are summoned in Tashkent to be away from their republics for a few days.
What places did Khrushchev visit, and what did he manage to see for four days before the conference? On November 10th in the late afternoon, he arrived in Tashkent. At the airport he was met by the party and Soviet leaders of the republics of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan, as well as a few Union’s ministers and Tashkent intelligentsia. After that Khrushchev went to a government country house at Durmen. Throughout his entire drive-route in the city, he was greeted by numerous people.
On November 11th in the morning, Khrushchev arrived by train in Samarkand. Having visited local sightseeing and historical monuments of the city, he met party and Soviet employees of the region, and listened to reports made by collective and state farmers about implementation of the annual plan of cotton-picking.
Then he headed for the Djizak region where he met Soviet community farmers. In the late afternoon he held a meeting of employees of the ‘Main Construction in Barren Steppe Department’, leaders of a number of virgin lands agencies where the first results of the virgin land development were discussed. By the way, among the speakers there was the director of state farm No2, the former First CC secretary of the Communist party of Uzbekistan, the former minister of cotton growing of the USSR, Usman Usupov.
On November 12th, continuing his trip, Khrushchev left the Uzbekistan’s part for Kazakhstan’s one of a new large region of cotton growing. He visited there a famous collective farm ‘Pakhta-Aral’. In the evening Nikita Sergeevich returned to Tashkent.
On November 13th Khrushchev and the republic leaders visited a famous collective farm ‘Politotdel’, and in the Yangiyul district they met a celebrated cotton picker-woman, Tursunoi Akhunova. They exchanged their views with leaders of the Institute of mechanization and electrification of irrigated cropping and the State special design office relating to cotton-picking.
On November 14th Khrushchev visited the All-union scientific research institute of cotton growing located in the neighborhood of Tashkent.
On November 15-16th at the Navoi Theater, a regional meeting relating to agricultural matters took place. Only one matter was on the agenda: ‘About measures to increase production of cotton, meat, milk, and other agricultural products in the republics of Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and south regions of Kazakhstan.’ First CC secretaries of the Communist parties of those republics made speeches. 29 people took part in the debate. Khrushchev made a final speech.
After such an extensive media coverage of all his trips, conversations with workers and employees, and the meeting course occurring within a week, all of a sudden, mass media became silent: for three days there was no line, nor a message about his departure, nor a story about what Khrushchev was doing afterwards. Only on November 21st the newspaper Pravda Vostoka informed of his arrival in Kazakhstan on November 19th. D. A. Kunayev wrote about that in his memoirs as follows.
‘Khrushchev fixed a conference of agricultural workers and employees of the Virgin region to be held on November 21-22nd. Khrushchev summoned me to his residence house where he was staying in Tashkent and told me, ‘The conference must be held in a town of Tselinograd in a properly arranged way, without much ado and pathetic words. I will consult with foremost people in agriculture about the ways of the further development of the region. I wouldn’t like any meetings on my way to the conference. People shouldn’t be disturbed either. We are short of time to visit Alma-Ata. So, we will go straight to Tselinograd.’ Having found out his itinerary and his plan, I got a permission to invite to this conference secretaries of regional committees and chairmen of regional executive committees of western and eastern regions of the republic. Khrushchev proposed to invite people from Karaganda city as well.
We left Tashkent in the morning. We passed the Chimkent and Jambul regions. He didn’t receive leaders of those regions who went to meet him; and on his way to Tselinograd he only met me and the head of the Railroads Department. In Tselinograd he was met by leaders and residents of the region. He was staying in his sleeper wagon which was put in a dead-end siding of the railroad.
Immediately after lunch we went to an Izhevsk state fowler farm which was built improperly, with obviously overused material. It made him angry. Again, I saw Khrushchev being really furious. He was scolding everybody. He couldn’t speak quietly at the meeting with the farmers held in a club. On our way back, sitting in the car, he said, ‘Sokolov who was the regional committee secretary then must be sent back to Moscow as he isn’t able to raise the region. However, he will tell about it to Kozlov by himself.’ That evening neither did we bother him, nor did he bother us.’
And further Kunayev, telling about the conference, emphasized many times that Khrushchev had been in a bad mood, interrupted speakers. Also, his own speeches had been full of acute criticism, and he had been instructing to dismiss not only secretaries of regional committees, but also academicians.
In Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, it was noticed that Nikita Sergeevich was behaving in an unusual manner. This his fifth arrival in Uzbekistan was dramatically different from his previous arrivals. Many noticed his flaring, gloomy face and nervous behavior. How could it be explained?
According to the press coverage of Khrushchev’s arrival and stay in the region, I guessed his trip to Central Asia was not accidental. Apparently, he decided to hear directly of the feedback to the congress results by people in regional areas. He might have had something else personal to make sure or reject. Nikita Sergeevich indisputably achieved basically what he aspired to and received an appreciation and approval of his intended plans and Programs at the congress. At the same time, both he and the state leadership had a certain aftertaste of new complications with China, Yugoslavia, and Albania. The congress participants did applaud him, but that was just with hands. As to their minds, it was vague and unknown. Especially, he was worried, not without a reason, about how an unexpected to everyone resolution on reburying Stalin’s body was apprehended.
Nikita Sergeevich was a smart and sensible person. However, his main problem was that he used to think not before saying anything but afterwards having said. As a result, there was nobody to be blamed for arisen troubles. After all, it was himself who brought them about. Thus, without speaking straight, he was investigating people – from regional committees’ secretaries to ordinary farmers – to find out their feedback.
Also, Khrushchev became considerably nervous when he received a Report about Furtseva and Mukhitdinov. In case of its implementing, he would be spoken about again. He couldn’t help paying attention to that at almost all levels, people didn’t talk or talked a little bit about the congress, and kept silent regarding complications at all. After all, silence was also an assessment. For all these reasons, apparently, Nikita Sergeevich was annoyed, behaving nervously. Besides, according to eyewitnesses, he was strongly upset with two more matters.
Upon arrival in Tashkent on one of his first days at the country house in Durmen, where Khrushchev was staying, he had dinner with the CC bureau members of the Communist party of Uzbekistan and leaders of the other republics who departed after dinner. Ya.S. Nasriddinova unnoticeably left her purse somewhere. Then, having left with the rest guests, on halfway she told her driver to drive back under an excuse of having 'left' her purse. Upon return, she met Khrushchev walking in the garden alley where they had a conversation. It turned out that a few days before, she, as a CC member, had received a call from the CC CPSU, and the caller had referred to Kozlov and Suslov’s order. He informed her that it was suggested to exclude Furtseva and Mukhitdinov from the CC membership by voting way.
The caller said, ‘We are phoning you up beforehand to determine our next steps and to know your view.’
She asked, ‘What about the others?’
The caller answered, ‘Many are supporting.’
Yadgar Sadykovna Nasriddinova said, ‘I need to think it over. I will inform you of my opinion later.’
In order to make a decision, the majority of three quarters of votes was required. Bearing this in mind, the authors of ‘Damocles’ Sword’ apparently decided to figure out opinions, to probe and process the information, so that they could achieve a required number of votes.
In her conversation with Khrushchev, Nasriddinova expressed a perplexity relating to that matter. She was talking warmly about Furtseva she befriended with, argumenting that such an attitude towards an only woman in the CC Presidium membership would be apprehended in a bad way. As for me, she also said that the party organization and residents of the republic would not understand the decision on excluding me from the CC, particularly when there were no serious reasons for doing that.
Her opinion as well as the fact that behind Khrushchev’s back, the two leading Presidium members started carrying out practical activity, phoning up CC members and delegates, made a strong impact on Khrushchev. So, he didn’t express categorically his opinion in that conversation; however, he hinted he would think it over.
Reporting to Khrushchev, Suslov, Kozlov, and Rashidov, having referred to the former, claimed that Mukhitdinov’s behavior, who had not attended defiantly the last congress session, was discussed by the CC bureau members of the Communist party of Uzbekistan and republic delegates. They all unanimously condemned him, considering his behavior as making a bad publicity to the Uzbek delegation and the people prestige. Therefore, they were supporting the proposal about his exclusion from the CC membership.
But in Tashkent he found out something completely different. Indeed, the conversation had taken place. However, it had been neither with the CC bureau members nor with the delegates to the congress in particular; but it had been only with Titov, the second CC secretary of the Communist party of Uzbekistan, who actually supported the proposal about my exclusion. That’s why the CC bureau members were surprised and undignified when they found out that somebody was acting behind their backs on behalf of them. That meant that Rashidov misled and disoriented not only the co-authors of the draft decision - Suslov and Kozlov, but also Khrushchev.
Further, the Uzbekistanis are experienced, cultured, hospitable and civil people. Therefore, in official speeches, reports and public conversations, no one touched that matter. And Nikita Sergeevich also avoided it. However, during his trip in informal conversations, leaders of a number of republics, famous cotton growers, cultural workers and deputies privately told him that what had happened to Mukhitdinov was apprehended negatively; he was allegedly discredited and in the prime of life his wings were clipped.
After holding a regional meeting, Khrushchev had a three-day talk with local people of different levels – from chairmen of collective farms, leaders of districts and regions to leaders of neighboring republics, which, of course, was not covered in mass media, and nothing was flaunted at all. They said he was strongly influenced by a following fact. During the meeting, one of the participants, sitting at the presidium table, during a break in a lobby, gave an unsealed envelope to Khrushchev’s bodyguard, having shown him its content, and requested him to hand it over to Nikita Sergeevich in person. In that envelope there was a copy of the newspaper Tashkent Pravda dated on January 18th, 1957 and a handwritten letter of one third of a page. I will quote a short extract from the newspaper message.
‘COMRADE N.S. KHRUSHCHEV PRESENTED FOREMOST PEOPLE IN AGRICULTURE, PARTY, SOVIET, LABOR UNIONS, AND COMSOMOL WORKERS OF UZBEK SSR WITH GOVERNMENT AWARDS
On January 16th … In the evening in the session room of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR, gathered leaders of the party and Soviet authorities of the republic, famous cotton growers, mechanization experts, and workers of water industry who were awarded for their fruitful work in the development of Soviet cotton growing and for their labor contributed into construction of irrigational facilities, as well as for introduction in collective and state farms achievements of science and foremost experience, and for a successful implementation of the state plan of cotton picking in 1956.
… N.S. Khrushchev presented a Lenin order to the First CC secretary of Uzbekistan, N.A. Mukhitdinov. Addressing to him, comrade Khrushchev said, ‘I believe that comrade Mukhitdinov has worthily deserved an award of Lenin order from the people. The Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union highly appreciates the activity of comrade Mukhitdinov as one of the talented leaders of the Communist party of Uzbekistan which is an organizer of successes of the Uzbek people. And we are proud that comrade Mukhitdinov is the youngest among us, the members and candidates to the Presidium membership of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. (Prolonged ovation.) It proves the growth of cadres in the party and the people. I congratulate you with awarding with a Lenin order.’ (Ovation.)
Comrades Khrushchev and Mukhitdinov firmly hugged each other.
After that N.S. Khrushchev presented Lenin orders to Sh.R. Rashidov, S.K. Kamalov, R.E. Melnikov, M. Yuldashev, R. Musamukhamedov, Gafur Gulyam, and the others, as well as a large group was awarded with orders of the Labor Red Banner and of the Honor Badge.’
The letter, enclosed with the newspaper copy, said:
‘Dear Nikita Sergeevich,
Four years ago, you took N.A. Mukhitdinov away from us. You promoted him to the membership of the CC CPSU Presidium and secretaries. We were proud of that and sincerely expressed you our acknowledgement. What has happened now? Where is he? We are requesting you to send him back to us.
We are writing on behalf of ourselves, but that is what all the Uzbek people think in fact.
With deep respect to you.’ (It was signed by four people.)
Nikita Sergeevich showed that letter and the newspaper to the CC Secretaries Z.R. Rakhimbabaeva and Malik Abdurazakov (perhaps to the others, too). They confirmed that the letter was signed by two secretaries of regional committees and two chairmen of two collective farms who had been awarded with order of Socialist Labor Hero, Lenin order and Golden Star medal by Nikita Sergeevich personally in the Kremlin.
As a result, Khrushchev told Kozlov through his assistants in Moscow to halt implementing the draft resolution on exclusion of Furtseva and Mukhitdinov from the CC membership and consulting about it with anyone anymore, and to exchange their views after his return to Moscow.
Having started work in the Central Union of Consumers Cooperatives (CUCC), I found out many things later. Within the fixed time, we moved in a new apartment in building 8 in Gorky Street. There were four bedrooms, a modest dining-room, a bathroom, and a kitchen; it had a small balcony, too. It had been whitewashed and redecorated, so that we could be accommodated in it. Our neighbor was an aide-de-camp of the defense minister. That was where I lived with Mukarram and our five children for a few years.
On the third day after moving in, two employees of the CC household maintenance department visited us. They inquired about our opinion of the accommodation and then gave me a two-page document. The document contained an inventory list of the property available in that apartment and the terms of its usage as follows: ‘Dining-room furniture (1,540 rubles), seven single beds (each of 107 rubles and 40 kopecks), a kitchen suite (210 rubles), a piano (529 rubles and 64 kopecks), a TV set (280 rubles), a wall-cupboard, a desk, some chandeliers, pillows, a dinner utensils set for 12 people (54 rubles), a 4-litre stew pan (4 rubles and 70 kopecks), a teapot (3 rubles and 60 kopecks), knives, spoons, and so on. The inventory list was for a total amount of 5,549 rubles and 55 kopecks.’ And it was signed by a chief accountant Mitrofanova.
I asked, ‘What’s next? Should I pay a monthly amortization, or do I have to pay the total sum at once?’
They answered, ‘It’s up to you.’
We couldn’t afford ourselves to pay out for all the stuff at the time. Fortunately, Mukarram had 1,200 rubles to immediately pay out partly. Only after two years, having saved up, we managed to pay in full for the property and received a payment receipt signed by M. Kuvshinov, the head of the CC household maintenance department, and by N. Vladimirov, a chief accountant. (Now it’s interesting to look at those prices and compare them with today’s ones…) In that way our family became an owner of the personal property, having bought it from the CC CPSU household maintenance department.
I’m writing about it because before that a fortune had indulged me to a certain extent. After service in the army, I got a managerial position right away. That’s why in Namangan and Tashkent, as well as before those events in Moscow we used to live in state or municipal apartments and country houses furnished with all necessary for living things. Thus, for the first time, we acquired our own property.
Then we transferred our kids to a different school. Mukarram stopped her study at the medical institute because she seriously fell ill. My elder sister-in-law Salomoe arrived from Tashkent to help with our big family. Nevertheless, we were happy with having a roof over our heads and being all together. I liked my new job: at least, it was better than thinking over and worrying about different things days and nights through.
Soon I joyfully phoned up my close relatives in Tashkent to inform them of where we lived, our address, phone, and my job. Without a delay, my father and brothers arrived from Tashkent. However, we couldn’t accommodate all of them in our apartment. My brothers bedded down in a dormitory of the permanent office of Uzbekistan while my father and I were sleeping in my bedroom: he lay in my bed and I lay on the floor. As for Mukarram, she was sleeping with our children in their bedroom.
Although our life was returning to normal, I was constantly pondering over political and moral aspects of my ‘case’ which was still vague and unknown. How would further events develop? Upon return of Khrushchev from his trip, a discussion was supposed to occur at the CC Presidium. What decision would they arrive at?
I used to walk to the Central Union of Consumers Cooperatives (CUCC) and to return home on foot as Gorky and Kuybyshev Streets were almost nearby. One day I was walking, all of a sudden, a ‘Chaika’ car drew up not far from me, and an assistant of First CC secretary A.M. Alexandrov got out of it. He was one of the most sensible, modest, laborious and well-educated employees (he was fluent in a few foreign languages). He did his best at work: all important documents, especially those related to foreign policy, passed through him. However, his surname was hardly actually mentioned anywhere; only occasionally, he could be seen in official photos, always accompanying Khrushchev and then Brezhnev on their trips abroad.
He came up to me and we greeted each other. It turned out that Alexander Mikhailovich lived nearby us on the opposite side of Gorky Street. Having shortly informed me of Nikita Sergeevich’s trip to Central Asia, he smiled and said in the end, ‘Nuritdin Akramovich, everything will be alright.’
On March 4th, 1962 I received a phone call at work from the CC General Department and was informed, ‘You are expected to come tomorrow morning at nine o’clock to the CC Presidium meeting in the Kremlin.’
Of course, they didn’t say on what occasion (it wasn’t allowed to say on the phone).
The next morning, a lieutenant colonel met me at the entrance to the Sverdlov Hall, saying, ‘Comrade Mukhitdinov, let me show you where to go.’
Without asking any questions, I followed him. We used elevator and entered the reception room of the Presidium. A few men were already sitting there. An assistant on duty entered the hall and then went out to invite me, ‘Come in, please.’
I came in. All the members, candidates to the Presidium membership and secretaries gathered there, with N.S. Khrushchev being the chairman. At the end of the long table Furtseva was standing, crying and saying something. I took a seat aside in the corner. They demanded an explanation from Furtseva why she had not attended the final congress session. Being nervous and anxious, in tears she could hardly speak. Then she was offered to take a seat. Her husband, N.P. Firyubin, who was a deputy minister of foreign affairs and was elected a candidate to the CC membership at this congress, was also invited. It turned out that he had been absent from the final congress session as well.
Nikita Sergeevich was scolding him. Reminding him of his previous mistakes, he said, ‘As a party official in the past and as a husband, you had to show your will and intelligence: not only should you have attended the congress yourself, but also you should have prevented your wife from her shameful actions.’
The latter was apologizing and repentant. Nikita Sergeevich gave me a sign. I came up and stood aside the long table.
‘And you, why didn’t you come?’
In reply I said in short, ‘I fell ill.’
In complete silence, he continued, ‘We have promoted you so high, set up comfortable conditions for you, and listened to your proposals and attitudes. We have hoped and expected you to do your best. How could you behave in that way?!’
I didn’t utter a word. Obviously, my silence annoyed him, and his face even flushed. None of the attendees said a word. Nikita Sergeevich finished the discussion with the following words, ‘Let’s inform the Plenum about their behaviors.’
In that way the discussion was finished. Furtseva, Firyubin, and I went out of the room. In the reception room we were told that at ten o’clock (i.e., after a few minutes) the Plenum would start.
Nikita Sergeevich started the Plenum with an announcement that on the agenda only one matter would be raised for a discussion, which was ‘The contemporary stage of the communism building and the party objectives relating to the improvement of agriculture management.’ The Plenum participants agreed with that agenda. Further he said, ‘Before starting a discussion, I would like to inform you of the behaviors of some CC members who didn’t attend the final session of the 22nd party congress. Therefore, they didn’t accomplish their party duty as delegates and the CC members. For instance, comrade Furtseva…’ he spoke sharply, ‘She enjoyed a deep respect, being the head of the capital party body and a member of the CC Presidium and Secretariat. Also, for the past time she was the culture minister of the Soviet Union. However, after the organizational Plenum, she showed her weakness just because she had not been reelected as a Presidium member. For that reason, she injured her body. She was severely criticized at the Presidium. She admitted making mistakes and promised to draw conclusions.
Firyubin has behaved unworthily, too. In spite of his mistakes in the past, he was approved for a deputy minister of foreign affairs, and at the congress he was elected a candidate to the CC membership. You know, he is Furtseva’s spouse. He didn’t attend the congress, either, though he didn’t have any valid reasons for that. Not only was he obliged to come himself, but he was also obliged to influence his wife. I don’t know if he can assess his behavior according to the party rules and draw necessary conclusions.
Comrade Mukhitdinov didn’t come for the final session either. You know, we promoted him, invited him from Uzbekistan to work in the Center, assigned him with important, responsible missions, entrusted and supported him in all ways. There are no serious remarks or complaints towards him. However, the leaders of Uzbekistan have repeatedly informed us that he interferes in the republic activities and keynotes them, which creates difficulties in their work.
Besides, he himself has raised many times a matter about his transfer from the CC to a different work because of his disagreements with some Presidium members. In this connection, he wasn’t elected in a new membership of the CC Presidium and Secretariat. Evidently, he decided to manifest his insult by his absence from the congress session.
We discussed his behavior at the Presidium and everyone spoke out directly. We think he’s understood. He is young, well-educated, energetic and a man of principle. We hope he has learnt a lesson and drawn a conclusion for the future of what was said at the Presidium and in personal conversations. I think Mukhitdinov will learn a relevant behavior pattern as CC CPSU member.’
Then Nikita Sergeevich asked if we needed to discuss that matter further. A reply from the participants was heard: ‘No.’
‘Evidently, there is no need to make a decision?’ Khrushchev addressed to the participants.
‘No,’ was the reply again.
‘Then,’ he said, ‘let’s move on to the next point on the agenda.’
Khrushchev came up to a rostrum to deliver a long, detailed speech.
There was a particular thing about that case I remembered well. When I entered the meeting hall, I saw a few unoccupied seats. However, none suggested me to have a seat next to them, nor did they notice my appearance: after all, I was out of favor and in disgrace. So, I went towards back rows to take a seat. Nevertheless, during a break many of them came up to me to greet and congratulate me. Such was the end of my ascending to the Kremlin Olympus and overcoming a dangerous descent… Now everything was left behind, in the past.
At the beginning of my work in the CUCC, Klimov and I had certain disagreements and reticence between us. He was even suspicious of me. However, soon everything cleared up and our relationship became normal.
As a matter of fact, Klimov was the CUCC chairman and a candidate to the CC membership while I was his deputy and a CC member. Besides, there was no deputy to the Supreme Soviet in the management team; on the other hand, his new deputy (it was me) was the chairman of the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
It so happened that a few months before I joined the CUCC, the Report of the CC departments on the inspection results of the CUCC activities was discussed at the Secretariat session. Shortcomings and facts of abuse and speculations were sharply criticized. Klimov and the chairman of the Revision Committee, Matveev, were reprimanded. I also spoke and voted for a reprimand. In the resolution it was said about the necessity of the CUCC and its system consolidation with qualified cadres. And now, all of a sudden, I found myself in the CUCC. Besides, none knew the reasons for my appearance there.
Alexander Petrovich Klimov felt nervous: in lobby they whispered I allegedly came to replace him. We had serious face-to-face conversations twice. I seemed to calm him down and take unnecessary suspicions aside.
There were no other complications. All of them were friendly to me. Nobody reproached and belittled me. Specialists tried to advise me in matters I didn’t know well. In a year and a half, I was one of the CUCC employees who were awarded with ‘Order of the Badge of Honor’. By the way, it was presented to me in the Kremlin by Mikoyan who was Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR then.
XXVIII
BREZHNEV’S ADVENT TO THE POWER
I first saw L.I. Brezhnev at the 19th CPSU congress. We both then in October 1952, for the first time were elected as CC members. But I got acquainted with him later. One day I came to see S.D. Ignatjev with whom I had been on friendly terms since his work in Uzbekistan, as I have already written above. At that time, he was visited by Brezhnev. Ignatjev duly introduced us to each other. And at the end of the day, Ignatjev invited both of us to his country house. He treated us to pilau (an Uzbek dish of rice with meat) he cooked by himself and some good Moldavian cognac.
During Brezhnev’s work in Kazakhstan as the second and later as the First CC secretary, we repeatedly met each other at different meetings and conferences in Alma-Ata and Tashkent. Afterwards for some time, we both were CC secretaries and our offices were located very nearby in the same building in Old Square. Although we dealt with different matters, we often were assigned by the leadership to fulfill tasks together, holding meetings either in my office or in his one. Besides, for some time even our apartments were located on the same floor in the same building in Kutuzovskiy Avenue. Thus, we knew each other quite well. However, it never occurred to me that Brezhnev might become the party leader and the head of the state.
When in October 1964 Khrushchev was dismissed at the CC Plenum and Brezhnev was appointed as the First CC CPSU secretary, I worked at the CUCC and had no idea of lobby plots and intrigues which were later widely covered in media, and as a result of which Khrushchev so ignominiously finished his career. Nevertheless, I was aware of and faced some things. Moreover, I had my own attitude to Brezhnev, having worked with him for a long time. Although scattered, but I have my own impressions and opinions of them both and of the time they were together… and apart.
When I started work in the CUCC, I used to walk home. One day, it was not long before Khrushchev’s dismissal, I was walking in Kuybyshev street past Finance Ministry, all of a sudden a bodyguard of F.R. Kozlov ran up to me and greeting said, ‘Frol Romanovich Kozlov is inviting you. His car is over there.’ I took a look. Indeed, there was a car at about twenty meters from us with Kozlov sitting in it. The guard insisted, ‘He is waiting for you.’
Actually, I was reluctant to meet him. However, after some hesitations, I came up to the car. We greeted each other and Kozlov said, ‘Get in the car and let’s go.’
‘Where to?’
‘To my country house.’
‘No, thanks. My family is waiting for me at home.’
‘Ok, then let me see you off.’
I got in the car and we drove off. While we were exchanging our courtesies and meaningless questions, we drew up near Moscow Municipal Soviet. I asked a driver to stop the car. Kozlov said, ‘You may come and see me in my office at any time. Let’s go to my country house next Sunday. We’ll have a good time and talk.’
I thanked him for the invitation. Then he suggested to take a walk for a while. We got out of the car and took a walk near the Yuri Dolgorukiy monument. Kozlov, speaking vaguely in roundabout way, finally moved on to a concrete topic. He said, ‘Boss isn’t in a good shape lately. He’s been complaining about his health problems. We can’t exclude he might resign.’
Realizing he was waiting for my feedback, I replied, ‘I don’t think so. After all, just about two years have elapsed since the last congress. So, there’s a great deal to do to implement the adopted resolutions. Moreover, it’s not noticeable that his health is getting worse.’
‘But it is. The symptom is obvious. Who do you think will replace him? What an alignment of forces might be?’
‘I don’t think that such a question will arise at all. I am definitely sure that it’s not time for Nikita Sergeevich to resign.’
‘But still what do you think anyway?’ Frol Romanovich insisted.
‘You know, it’s not my problem now. If need be, Presidium will decide.’
‘Yet, you are CC member. A final decision will be made by Plenum.’
‘Okay, if you are insisting on, then I think Kosygin might become First secretary. And they might establish a post of second secretary for Brezhnev.’
My reply was perceived by Kozlov as a cold shower. He evidently was expecting another reply. Staring at me he said, ‘You are still holding a grudge on me, but in vain.’
‘Why should I be insulted by you? I can only thank you: my job with the CUCC is interesting, and employees are friendly. I’m exploring Russia and the other republics nowadays. I have many trips across our country as well as abroad.’
‘Yet, I see you are holding a grudge on me: neither you phone me up nor do you come to see me. In vain you are so. All that happened to you wasn’t organized by me. The resolution on your appointment as deputy Chairman of Ministers Council was cancelled without me. The Report with a proposal of excluding you from the CC membership was submitted by Suslov and Rashidov. As for me, I just endorsed it.’
‘Let bygone be bygone. It’s not worth remembering. I don’t care who submitted, signed and endorsed it.’
‘Suppose, they will nominate me?’ He returned to the beginning of the conversation.
‘If you are nominated, then I will think about how to vote: ‘for’ or ‘against’. But I don’t think they will nominate you to replace Nikita Sergeevich.’
‘Why?’
‘Because of your own fault. Look, it was due to Nikita Sergeevich that you have climbed up a career ladder so high. It was him who entrusted you the most important work – cadres. Before, the whole department was engaged in this work, but now - only you. Everyone comes to you, even CC secretaries. Now you are boasting that you have done revolution in the cadre policy, having replaced over half of high-ranking functionaries. However, many consider this as mass beating of cadres. Not only in Tajikistan do they remember this, but also in many other regions they remember and can hardly forgive you some day.’
‘And what was in Tajikistan? What are you talking about?’ he asked with bewilderment.
‘Have you forgotten what you did there? Even Tsar’s governors-general didn’t act like you towards local leaders. Remember: at your insistence at the Plenum, the First and second secretaries of the republic CC of the Communist party and Chairman of Councils Ministers were dismissed from work and excluded from the party; also, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium was strictly punished. You are not interested in history; however, you should… I warned you then not to do that. But you didn’t listen to me. In fact, you know completely nothing about a history and culture of Tajikistan, its ancient, distinctive people, who have given birth to great thinkers, prominent scientists and genius poets. People there have always worked hard and fruitfully. Of course, falsified records and fraudulence occurred there, but those deeds were done by particular persons! Even a CC commission didn’t prove that republic leaders were involved in bribes and abuse of power. Do you think you have done properly by actually beheading the republic?! At that time, I spoke to the Secretariat and to you personally in particular, and now I am repeating: you will see that all of them will be reinstated in the party and will have worthy places in republic life. Well, how will you look in their eyes eventually?’
I got agitated and couldn’t stop. At last I got a chance to speak out to Kozlov all what I thought about, ‘What you did there then looked like political distrust to the republic party body in general. Do you think that the CC of the Communist party of Tajikistan couldn’t sort that problem out and bring those persons who were really guilty to responsibility by themselves?! Sitting at a Presidium table at the Plenum in Dushanbe, you asked Obnosov, the second secretary, who was explaining to the Plenum, 'What were you sent here for? What have you been doing here? Why haven't you been reporting to us?’ By those words not only did you offend the second CC secretary, but also you left an unpleasant aftertaste in the hearts of the participants in the meeting. ‘It means,’ they thought, ‘Center sends people here to occupy high-rank managerial positions not to work but to control over, to monitor all of us, and to report to the CC CPSU, without informing elected republic authority bodies.’ How should people in national republics and regions treat those who are sent to them with CC mandate? By your actions you cast a shade on Russian people, to certain extent, in general. In the regions, Russians are respected. However, they are judged and an attitude to them by locals is determined according to their representatives.’
Kozlov became gloomy and irritated, trying to interrupt me. ‘You are insulting me!’ he boiled with rage at last, ‘You are bringing political accusation against me!’
‘No, I’m telling you the truth nobody has told you up to now. By the way, when Stalin was in power, Yezhov was responsible for the cadre policy…’
‘Why are you comparing me to him?!’ Kozlov flared up. ‘He was destroying and killing them!’
‘That’s right. You, of course, don’t kill anyone. But you are hurting cadres and turning them into ‘alive corpses’. As to me, I am grateful to you for everything: we were friends for many years, kept in touch, lived abreast, and it was you who sent me to the CUCC to work. I like my job. And it is you who has started this talk. I sincerely want you to comprehend what we’ve just talked about.’
We bade farewell coldly. He got into his car and drove away, and I entered the house I lived in. Another episode in my life due to which I was about to be sent to England to work was also connected with Kozlov.
One day, having opened a CC Presidium session, Khrushchev suddenly suggested, ‘Let’s send comrade Mukhitdinov to England as an ambassador.’
All the members watchfully kept silent; some were looking at him, the others looking at me. I didn’t utter a word either, without understanding what he meant. But one toady suddenly started flattering, ‘Yes, it’s the world’s largest and most influential power. He might bring great benefits there.’ The others still kept silent. And I didn’t know what to say.
Nikita Sergeevich waited for a while for someone else to speak, observing my feedback to it. However, seeing everyone was reluctant to speak, he said, ‘Okay. We won’t make a decision right now. Let’s return to this matter later.’
After the meeting my colleagues were asking me what’d happened. What could I say, except for ‘I don’t know’?
For the Central Committee’s apparatus, subtle ‘flair’ and ‘ear’ is a great force. Right away the number of phone calls and visitors to me dramatically decreased.
Apparently, they thought: ‘If they want to transfer him from a position of Presidium member and CC secretary to the one of ambassador, that means there must be a serious crime hidden behind the scene.’ I neither went to Khrushchev nor phoned him up.
Five days later he invited me to discuss current events. After discussion of a few issues, I was about to leave, but Khrushchev stopped me, ‘Sit down.’
After short silence, he began to speak, ‘You are young, and you are in our circle for the first time. There are some peculiarities and specificities here. As you see, we are trying to weigh all matters comprehensively. As for disagreements among Presidium members, as a rule, they are settled by them jointly. Moreover, there are persons who are responsible for tackling them. Therefore, you should be careful in these big matters.’
That’s when I finally realized what a silly thing I had done, trying to reconcile Kirichenko and Kozlov. They both, being the closest people to Nikita Sergeevich and being the CC Presidium members, were involved in fighting for the second role in the state. It was unpleasant to watch their arguments related to trifles sometimes in a rough and tactless manner. One day, Kirichenko, apparently because of that we both came from the country periphery, told me, ‘Frol (Kozlov) has gone crazy, hasn’t he? Almost every day he 'bullies' me and hostilely treats me at Presidium meetings. I don’t know what to do and how to behave.’
In response I suggested, ‘What do you think, Alexei Illarionovich (Kirichenko), if I invite you both to my country house? We might well have a frank, heart-to-heart talk.’
He agreed, ‘Ok, try it out. I will come.’
The next day I suggested the same to Kozlov, without mentioning the purpose of this invitation. He agreed, inquiring about an occasion for that. Clarifying I added I might invite Kirichenko, too. Having pondered a little, he said, ‘Why not?’
We gathered in my country house where we had a good time, dinner, and liquors. At first my both guests looked gloomy and sad. Then I told them about my thoughts and attitude: ‘We work, occupying high positions, being always in public. So, any squabbles, nervousness and tactlessness sometimes burst upon the eye. It would be useful to regulate your relationship and to restore your mutual confidence. We all have recently been elected. Thus, the more cohesive we will work, the more benefit we will bring. I’m the youngest among you, that’s why I decided to start a talk.’
The conversation didn’t go smoothly at first. Kozlov and Kirichenko argued accusing each other. But gradually the atmosphere was getting better, and it seemed to me that my good will of invitation was achieved. At the end, the three of us shook hands with each other.
And now it turned out that Nikita Sergeevich found out that I had been a mediate and tried to help them to overcome disagreements. He disliked it. Like many leaders, he’d rather his subordinates competing with each other and being on bad terms and at odds with each other. Alas, I got interfered in it. He found out about my peacemaking action directly through Kozlov’s mouth who on the following day came to see Khrushchev to tell him about everything.
Coming close to a story about Khrushchev’s dismissal from all the positions and his retirement, I’m recalling the ending of the CC Presidium session in June 1957. Then, I was among the minority to speak out against the predetermined decision on Khrushchev’s dismissal from the position of First CC secretary and, hence, election of Molotov for that position. Why? Indeed, I treated Molotov very well, considering him my first teacher in foreign affairs…
Speeches and statements at closed Presidium meetings, especially confidential conversations with Pervukhin and Kaganovich, alerted me very much. Then, I had an impression as if it was not so much about him personally as about returning to Stalin after his dismissal. As a result, prostituting Stalin's name, they intended to manage the party and the state by themselves. That was exactly my comprehension of the situation due to which I voted for Khrushchev at the Plenum.
That Plenum was evidently an essential support to Khrushchev personally, as well as the course of the 20th congress. Nikita Sergeevich was given a mandate of trust and carte blanche to continue the policies he had started.
However, life showed if it can’t have been called his full victory, yet the Plenum results were a sort of a boomerang that finally hit Khrushchev in person. Having got rid of old, experienced and authoritative figures of the party, he, being an expansive and high-tempered person, unable to think quite deeply and on a large-scale, soon started to dismiss all those who had supported him unreservedly, including Zhukov, Serov, and the others. Having undertaken a commitment of the head of the government, he launched such restructuring that eventually led him to the October CC Plenum in 1964.
On October 14th, 1964, the head of the CC General Department, Malin, phoned me up and informed me that a CC Plenum would take place in the Sverdlov Hall in the Kremlin after three hours. I inquired about the agenda. He said he didn’t know.
When everyone gathered in the conference hall, Brezhnev came out of a side room and took the seat of chairperson. The other Presidium members followed him and also took seats. Khrushchev was the last to appear and sat down on an outside chair on the right. One could immediately realize what had happened and what issue would be on the agenda…
Leonid Ilich Brezhnev announced the Plenum open and informed that the Presidium raised one proposal for consideration which would be reported about by Suslov. Then he gave the floor to Suslov who was speaking for about thirty minutes. In fact, it wasn’t a report; but it was an announcement, obviously hastily written. It consisted of events and facts accusing Khrushchev. At the end of his message, he announced that Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev had given in his resignation application from the position he had because of the health problems.
Brezhnev said that apparently there was no need in debate; the matter was clear; besides, they had an appeal by Khrushchev. Aristov and Pegov made short speeches to support Suslov. Leonid Ilich read out the draft resolution which was adopted unanimously.
Then he gave the floor to N.V. Podgorny. The latter highlighted Brezhnev’s merits, aptitude, and authority and on behalf of the Presidium proposed to elect him as First CC CPSU secretary, adding that all the attendees in the hall knew him very well and, he hoped, would support his proposal. He read out the draft resolution which was adopted unanimously. Thus, the new party leader, Leonid Brezhnev, was congratulated by applause.
It seemed that everything was done according to the rule of that time. Nevertheless, such an attitude to Khrushchev in person can’t be considered normal. Indeed, he was the state leadership member for many years. What’s more, for the past decade he was the leader of the party and the state. It was a period called by his close mates, who now were speaking out against him, ‘a great decade’. Undoubtedly, Khrushchev made mistakes and had blunders in leading the party and the state and in the cadre policy. In addition, he often made hasty steps and voluntarist decisions, and so on. However, only speaking about negative points in his actions, without mentioning positive things done by the party and the people within his ruling period, can hardly be considered fair.
Moreover, since he was dismissed from any political activity and made redundant, he deserved at least a few good words about him. The worst thing about that was that they even didn’t let him say his last farewell words as he requested for.
I saw Nikita Sergeevich in different conditions and situations. He was not always self-possessed, quite often showed excessive emotions and hot, even unbridled temper. But this time, he was sitting, looking haggard, dropping his head, with a pale face and tears in his eyes. He didn’t take a glance at us for the whole time. Unfortunately, in similar situations they used to behave in that way at all levels: from very top to very bottom of the party hierarchy.
As for the election of a new party leader, Brezhnev, CC members had to face a fait accompli. On behalf of the CC Presidium, both the first and second matters were approved without any discussions and in that way, unanimously in voting.
If Podgorny’s proposal had been discussed, then participants in the Plenum could’ve introduced other candidates, since there were worthier candidates, to my mind, among the CC and Presidium members, such as Alexei Kosygin, for example, or Shelepin.
Brezhnev, by his nature, style, way of thinking, theoretical education, activity scope, habits, and other subjective characteristics and personality traits, showed himself good in secondary roles and could hardly fit in a leader role of the large and strong then days party and of the superpower as the Soviet Union was considered at that time.
When Podgorny named Brezhnev's candidacy, marshal S.K. Timoshenko, sitting next to me, asked in perplexity in a bass voice, ‘Whom? Leo? As First secretary? Gosh! Holy cow…’ And he raised his hand, requesting for being given a floor, but exactly at that moment the decision was already approved without any debates.
With the help of his minions, Brezhnev made his boss Khrushchev redundant and resign from all the positions and political arena at all, so that he could fill Khrushchev’s shoes. As expected, Brezhnev at first showed his goodwill to those who helped and supported him by promoting them up career ladder. But afterwards, he scattered all his friends, dismissing one by one from their high positions, to become independent from them.
The organizers of the October Plenum, having achieved the election of Brezhnev, were aware of not only his merits, but also his shortcomings and weaknesses. They must have expected Leonid Ilich, while promoting Brezhnev for the first role, to be obedient, so that they would be able, behind his back, to control and to manage everything. However, that calculation turned out to be miscalculation and cost pretty much not only to themselves, but to the state and the people.
Before debunking the personality cult, Brezhnev repeatedly admitted in public that he had been promoted by and had been an apprentice of Stalin. And that was true. But in fact, he owed his fast growth up career ladder, first of all, to Kaganovich and Khrushchev.
The fact of the matter is that immediately after World War II the then leaders of Ukraine and, first of all, Khrushchev noticed him and promoted him to the position of first secretary of the Zaporozhe (in August 1946) and Dnepropetrovsk (from November 1947) regional committees of the party. In 1950, a necessity arose to refresh the leadership of the Moldavian party organization. Personally, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, supported by Kaganovich, recommended Brezhnev to Stalin. Thus, he became First CC secretary of the Communist party of Moldavia.
At the first CC Plenum after the 19th party congress in October 1952, he was elected as a CC secretary and a candidate to the CC CPSU Presidium membership. However, he worked as the secretary for a little bit over four months as after Stalin’s death, Malenkov, Beria, and the others abolished the former membership of the CC Presidium and Secretariat. But he wasn’t included in the new membership. Apparently, someone remembered Brezhnev wailing at Stalin’s funeral. So, he was appointed a deputy head of the Political department of the Soviet Army.
In September 1953, Khrushchev was elected as First secretary of the CC CPSU. His advent to power opened a way again for Brezhnev – in 1956 the latter became a CC CPSU secretary. And now at the October Plenum, he became the CC First secretary. From May 1960 until his death on November 10th, 1982, Brezhnev was also Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. He was buried in Red Square among ‘eminent figures of the state’ behind the Lenin Mausoleum.
As a matter of fact, having become the party leader, Khrushchev didn’t return Brezhnev to the position of CC secretary right away. Instead, at first, he sent him to Kazakhstan. Thus, in early 1954, there were two former CC CPSU secretaries: P.K. Ponomarenko was elected First CC secretary of the Communist party of Kazakhstan while Brezhnev was the second one. Such a combination was due not to business but personal reasons. The fact of the matter was that Nikita Sergeevich disliked Panteleimon Kondratievich Ponomarenko. When they both were CC secretaries, they had conflicts. Having decided to send him away to Alma-Ata, Nikita Sergeevich most likely thought the farther he was from Moscow the better. He might have hoped that the latter would complete his political career in the Kazakhstan steppes, whereas Brezhnev, being a faithful to him person, not only would watch Ponomarenko, but also, he would focus on the virgin lands.
So, it happened that way. Ponomarenko, elected as First CC secretary of the Communist party of Kazakhstan in February 1954, was dismissed from that position in a little bit over a year. He was replaced by Brezhnev to become First CC secretary.
Having worked at the new position in Alma-Ata for just five months, at the 20th CPSU congress in February 1956, Brezhnev spoke with delight about brilliant results of the wise and farsighted policy pursued by Nikita Sergeevich regarding the cultivation of the virgin lands which had already been giving grain liberally and other products plentifully, returning the expenses spent. Also to applause, he declared that now the country would be fully provided with grain and all conditions for growth of livestock sector would be established.
So, on February 27th, 1956, the CC Plenum elected him for the second time as CC secretary and a candidate to the CC CPSU Presidium membership. The virgin lands, as you can see, brought an eminent political, state and military figure, P.K. Ponomarenko, to retirement on pension whereas Brezhnev - to the CC leadership again.
The next year at the June CC Plenum when the matter of Khrushchev’s destiny was being determined, as I’ve already told about, Brezhnev tried to speak to support Khrushchev at the first meeting of the CC Presidium. However, when Kaganovich abruptly interrupted him, he silently sat down and afterwards reported himself sick not to show up at the following meetings. But as soon as Khrushchev, with his supporters’ assistance, reversed the situation in the course of the Presidium meetings and was already negotiating over the order of Plenum convocation, he received a note in which Brezhnev apologized for being absent from the meetings, expressed his full support, congratulated Nikita Sergeevich with his victory, and suggested to strictly punish the plotters. That brief note played an important role in the fortune of Leonid Ilich Brezhnev and restored previous Khrushchev’s attitude towards him. As a result, Brezhnev was elected a member of the CC CPSU Presidium. When assigning responsibilities to CC secretaries, Brezhnev became responsible for industry and construction, including military, defense and space industries.
After the election of Brezhnev as First CC secretary, and from the 23rd CPSU congress, i.e., from 1966, as General Secretary, my meetings with him were businesslike and episodic. He took part in my fortune, promoting me to positions relevant to my experience. In the long run with his participation, I eventually turned out to be ambassador to Syria. My personal aspirations, as a rule, were met by him. As to my state and social aspirations, they weren’t always met, for it wasn’t him alone who made decisions.
It can be proved by examples at least in the eastern policy. Let’s take Arabic East. I have already written about our launched in the 1950s and continued later active cooperation in all spheres and sectors with young independent states in that region. A number of Soviet ideologists, politologists, and diplomats dogmatically divided them into a few groups. They named countries with monarchic regimes conservative, or even reactive, whereas countries with republic systems were called by them socialist-oriented, or going on the socialism building way.
As to Israel, in establishing which in due time the Soviet Union played an active role as well, being one of the first states to be recognized, found nothing better than insisting on the rupture of the diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1967.
Focusing on republic regimes, we were rendering them a comprehensive and versatile assistance in economy development and social and cultural spheres, which considerably increased the Soviet Union popularity in that region, as well as in non-aligned movement and on the whole international arena. Even given the USSR’s efforts to prevent a military conflict between the Arabs and Israel and to peacefully settle the ‘six-day war’ between them, it was completely obvious that we pursued weak policies in politics and diplomacy in the Middle East.
Prominent politicians and public figures of Syria expressed their gratitude to the Soviet Union for its disinterested and resolute support to the Arabs, including Syria. However, at the same time they regretted that the USSR broke off the relations with Israel. A paradox was that it was the Arabs who regretted about it. Those wise, deeply and prospectively thinking people realized that the great superpower could play a role of a negotiator and influence the both sides only having parity, equal relations with the conflicting countries, without pressing either party. They were confident that the Soviet Union, having direct relations with Israel, could firmly pursue its policy in negotiations as well as in contacts with Israelis, without hurting the Arabs. On the contrary, it could champion their interests.
When I told Brezhnev about the standpoints and attitudes of prominent Arabic politicians as well as my own views similar to theirs after my first trip to Syria in 1967, he literally responded as follows, ‘You know, they started accusing me of my sympathy to the Zionists and my disliking Arabs and Muslims. Ministry of Foreign Affairs has submitted the draft resolution on the rupture of the diplomatic relations with Israel which we have approved…’ That was his explanation. It must have been so.
Our weakness in that matter was adroitly used by western diplomacy. Immediately after the October war in 1973, when a lot of stuff depended on diplomatic work, the Soviet embassy employees sometimes envied Kissinger and sympathized Gromyko. Kissinger, during his famous shuttle operation, often in a day managed to visit Cairo, Tel-Aviv, Saudi Arabia, Damascus, and so on, whereas Andrei Andreevich Gromyko, having arrived by a huge aircraft, accompanied by numerous employees, spent a lot of time in a comfortable palace, meeting the president and the minister of foreign affairs. And that’s it. Having wasted a few days in that way, he flew back.
When they agreed that Kissinger and Gromyko would have a number of joint meetings in Damascus, it got to the point that when at the airport the Syrian minister of foreign affairs saw off Kissinger and then met Gromyko, or vice versa, then as a result of that agreement, Andrei Andreevich had often to adjust his own schedule to Kissinger’s arrival in Damascus who after arrival immediately rushed to see Syrian leaders, and only then talked with Gromyko, ambassadors of Arabic and western countries, different political and public figures.
At that time our embassy persistently suggested to use widely Geneva conference as a quite convenient opportunity not only to settle the Arabic-Israeli conflict, but also to establish direct contacts with the Israelis by negotiating, step by step, the restoration and development of the Soviet-Israeli relations. In Geneva Gromyko had a meeting and negotiations with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, Abba Eban, and also held a few bilateral conversations with him. It seemed that in Geneva, along with the settlement of the Arabic-Israeli conflict, a way might have been opened for the Soviet-Israeli relations and their expansion, which the Arabs could not have objected to under those circumstances. Unfortunately, the chance was missed and everything subsided. And that happened despite the meeting of the front-line Arab states with the Israeli official persons and their joint participation in the Geneva conference. Moreover, Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat even tried to establish bilateral top-level contacts between Egypt and Israel in the course of which they achieved mutual understanding and made decisions on a number of crucial issues.
In Syria I was the doyen of the diplomatic body. Interests of the Soviet Union in Israel were represented by the Finnish ambassador to Tel-Aviv who repeatedly arrived in Damascus and told me that in Israel not only communists and Arabs living on the occupied territories, but also a lot of Jews wanted the Soviet-Israeli relations to be restored. Therefore, I sent repeatedly to Moscow proposals to establish networking. However, there was no feedback from Moscow.
In those years, we had diplomatic intercourse with almost all monarchist countries (except for Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and a few others) and embassies where well-educated and experienced diplomats worked. However, the work went slowly, which was advantageous for western diplomacy and played into their hands. Our foreign policy in the East was often determined by a particular personality and leader, without expanding social and economic basis of cooperation. Of course, condemning personality cult, one mustn’t underestimate personality role, especially in the East. But it’s bad when behind this personality – whether it’s president, prime-minister, or leader of a party -ordinary people, including workers, peasants (fellahs), and intelligentsia, are ignored to a certain extent.
If policy is only oriented to and dependent on top leadership, then the state position might well become quite unsteady, irrespective of multimillion fund invested in it. And vice versa: if all society strata had been aware of the policy and practical activity of the friendly state, any replacement of its leaders, whatever it may be called - revolution, coup d’état, conspiracy, it would have never led to the rupture of the diplomatic relations with the USSR. New leaders would have pursued the same policy of cooperation, which took place, in particular, in Algeria, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen, and the other states. However, the opposite happened in Sudan and Egypt.
I remember the first President of independent Sudan, General Ibrahim Abboud, being well received in Moscow. During his visit, the both sides concluded an agreement on comprehensive cooperation. All the issues raised by him were met by the Soviet side, assisting the young state. However, when the head of the president security service, Gaafar Nimeiry, made a coup d’état in a night to become president, everything dramatically changed.
In Egypt, a great son of the Arab people and farsighted politician, Gamal Abdel Nasser, raised his people to perform the national revolution. He honestly established thorough contacts with the Soviet Union, received our comprehensive support and cooperation in all spheres.
The Soviet leaders’ efforts to consolidate relations with Egypt came to absurd when he was bestowed a title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In my conversations with the CC Presidium members, I expressed regret about that. Indeed, Gamal Abdel Nasser never wore Soviet Gold Star. Some Egyptian politicians told me in Moscow that the Soviet Union's sincere attitude to Egypt was undoubtful for the Arabs. Nevertheless, not only overseas but also in Egypt, there were many enemies and ill-wishers who tried to take advantage from awarding Gamal Abdel Nasser in order to discredit him, blaming him for being allegedly ‘sold out’ to the Soviet Union for the Gold Star.
Unfortunately, Nasser died suddenly. Anwar El Sadat took his place and for a short time drastically changed everything, driving the relations with the Soviet Union to the lowest level. It cost a lot of efforts and expenses to restore the relations in the future.
Finally, as for moral and psychological fundamentals of the Soviet eastern policy, as I have already said, the peoples of colonial countries are not as sensitive and receptive to anything else as to equality, respectful attitude, recognition of their human dignity, their ancient history, rich cultures, and spiritual world. That’s why any even insignificant attempt to disparage them in anything, even in trifles and unintentionally, and to display superiority over and to ignore their lifestyle, customs and traditions, are apprehended by them painfully. There is no need to look far for examples. There were many examples in daily communications with official and unofficial representatives of the party, the army, the YCL (Young Communist League), and science who arrived in a great number from Moscow and other Soviet cities in Damascus. Sadly, a neglectful attitude to the Syrians was manifested by the Soviet top leadership as well.
In 1974, the party-and-state delegation of Syria led by President Hafez el-Assad arrived in Moscow. The first official meeting for negotiations was assigned to be at 11 o’clock in the morning in the CC Politburo hall in the Kremlin.
In the whole world, there is a protocol rule: when two equal delegations or state leaders gather for official meeting, they enter the hall through the opposite doors simultaneously (of course, if such conditions are available in the room), then they stop at the center and greet each other by shaking hands. When we all, the Soviet delegation members, gathered at 10:50 a.m., Leonid Ilich Brezhnev stood up, went out to the next room and delayed there for a while. About twenty-five minutes elapsed, but he still didn’t show up. At that moment, an on-duty reception employee came up to us and anxiously told us that the Syrian delegation members who had arrived at 10:55 a.m. already stood up and left.
We rushed to look for Brezhnev. It turned out that after visiting a bathroom, he entered a chill-out room, took a seat there for a quiet smoking a cigarette. When he was told about what had happened, he came up to our delegation members and quizzically wondered, ‘Why have the Syrians left? How can it be explained? They might have got offended with anything?’
Podgorny responded, ‘Leonid Ilich, we were late for the meeting. Apparently, having waited for us for a while, they left.’
Immediately Kuznetsov and I were assigned to go and see the Syrians. They were in the residence house in the Kremlin where Hafez el-Assad was accommodated. When we entered the lobby, we saw them being silent and gloomy. V.V. Kuznetsov came up to the President and tactically said that some misunderstanding had happened and Leonid Brezhnev and all the Soviet delegation were waiting for them, to which Hafez el-Assad responded, ‘I am requesting you for providing us with an aircraft. We, all the delegation, will immediately leave for Damascus.’
To Kuznetsov’s question about what had happened, he emotionally but with dignity said, ‘Tell the Soviet leaders that they may not receive me or even talk to me as an ordinary person, Hafez el-Assad. But now I have arrived as President Hafez el-Assad, representing the Syrian people and the Syrian state. I have arrived with the whole party, state, and military leadership. How can they treat us in this way, keeping us waiting in the reception room?!’
I also said something, but it didn’t influence the President’s decision. Kuznetsov told me to phone up Brezhnev while himself remaining with the Syrians. I went out to the next-door room to phone up. Leonid Ilich picked up the receiver. I shortly retold him the conversation. He asked me, ‘What should we do?’
I responded, ‘It would be good if Alexei Kosygin comes here.’
He said, ‘Okay. He will instantly come to you.’
Alexei Nikolayevich Kosygin appeared. Smiling as if nothing had happened, he conversed with Hafez el-Assad, then with each one separately. After that he told a few interesting episodes from a history of diplomacy. He slightly touched our situation and said, ‘I’ve come for you. All our comrades are waiting for you. Let’s go.’
Hafez el-Assad, after a hesitation, said to the attendees, ‘Well, shall we go?’
Everyone stood up and went out together. I delayed to instantly phone up Brezhnev.
And now this time, from the opposite sides of the Politburo hall, the doors opened and the both delegations led by Leonid Brezhnev on one side and Hafez el-Assad on the other side met in the hall center at the equal distance, hugged and kissed each other, and sat down at the table. No word was uttered about the incident. The negotiations began, as a result of which some plans and agreements between the governments and the parties were signed.
There is another episode. The USA President Richard Nixon made a tour in the Middle East after settlement of the October war consequences. He visited a number of Arab countries and Israel and arrived in Damascus. He was given a lavish reception. As a token of particular attention, Richard Nixon visited Hafez el-Assad’s family and even was photographed with his spouse and children. That photo was published in all newspapers. According to mass media coverage, the successful negotiations between the two presidents resulted in launching a new stage in relationships between the USA and Syria.
After that event, the Soviet embassy in Damascus received an ‘express telegram’ from Moscow in which the ambassador was instructed to visit Syrian President to inform him that according to the invitation by General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, President of the Syrian Arab Republic, comrade Hafez el-Assad, General Secretary of the CC CPSU, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, Leonid Brezhnev, would like to visit Syria officially very soon.
I met with President to inform him of that message. He took it with joy and said that he as well as all the Syrian people was ready to receive a distinguished guest, Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, at any time.
After adjusting dates and the visit Program, an extended nation-wide preparation started. Special commissions in the government, National Front, in cities, provinces, different ministries, authority bodies, enterprises, institutions, and on the Syrian-Soviet cooperation sites were established. The Post Office and Telegraph Ministry issued a special postage stamp. A theater team prepared a concert, including Russian dances and songs. Poets wrote verses for an arrival of the highly esteemed guest. Damascus University was going to bestow Brezhnev with a title of honor. Knitted and textile manufacturers started to produce their product line of clothes decorated with his portrait and Russian design. All over the country, the headline news was arrival of the leader of the communist party and the USSR state.
A team of official employees of relevant ministries and departments arrived in Damascus from Moscow with a list of people who were supposed to accompany and serve the delegation. In this connection, we visited the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdul Halim Khaddam. Having got familiarized with our proposal, he pondered for a short while, then asked, ‘May we accommodate part of the accompanying people in the satellite towns?’
I said that all of them had to be nearby, to which he replied, ‘Even if we free up all the hotels in Damascus to accommodate the Soviet delegation, then they still won’t be enough to accommodate all of them.’
Eventually, we agreed that he would do his best to use all the facilities available at the government’s disposal. As for us, we would find opportunities to more densely accommodate the Soviet institutions employees in order to free up several rooms.
At last we discussed and sorted out all the issues related to the delegation reception. Thus, the country was ready for the arrival of the eminent guest on the fixed date. All of a sudden, we received an ‘express telegram’ saying: ‘Visit President Hafez el-Assad and inform him that due to unforeseen circumstances, L.I. Brezhnev unfortunately won’t be able to arrive in Damascus on the appointed date. His visit will have to be postponed. The next date can be negotiated via diplomatic channels.’
I won’t describe the reaction of the leadership and people of this small but ancient, distinctive and proud country as well as Soviet people staying there the quantity of whom amounted to a few thousand at that time.
Afterwards, I came to know about the reason for the ‘unforeseen circumstances’ because of which the visit had to be postponed. About two days before the flight, someone ‘whispered’ to Leonid Ilich that in Syria the reconnaissance of Israel or any other country might make an attempt on him. And that appeared to be sufficient for him to cancel the arranged visit and not to go there at all. The situation was ‘rescued’ by A. N. Kosygin who instead of Brezhnev visited Iraq at first and then Syria in 1976.
As for national politics, Leonid Ilich never dealt with it for he believed in words of his predecessors – Stalin and Khrushchev, according to whom in the USSR ‘the national issue was solved completely and finally.’ That’s why he delegated this important and very complicated matter to Mikhail Suslov who, in his turn, assumed that if nation was a class and historical category, hence, it was transient. Moreover, according to his beliefs, the ongoing rapprochement of nations was already developing into their merger in our country. He didn’t admit an idea of ‘national liberation movement’ well-grounded.
Without taking any particular interest in national politics, nevertheless, Leonid Ilich visiting regions willingly communicated with completely different people. Yet, he more sympathized with Ukraine, Moldavia, and Kazakhstan, which was clear, of course. Nonetheless, he was respected in the republics, especially in Central Asia, because in his speeches he usually warmly spoke about natives. Having become the CC secretary of the Communist party of Kazakhstan, in the very beginning of his work, Brezhnev expressed his gratitude to the Kazakh people for their hospitality and care about evacuees from Russia and Ukraine during the war years, giving an example of his family who had been evacuated to Alma-Ata and for the whole staying there always felt sincere attitude and benevolence of the Kazakhs.
On April 26th, 1966, a strong earthquake took place in Tashkent. The next morning, Brezhnev and Kosygin arrived in Tashkent. From the airport they went neither to the CC nor to the country residence house. Instead, they went to the earthquake epicenter site where they were talking with injured people and supervising rescue and care work. Then in the CC of the Communist party of Uzbekistan after a meeting of the government executives, the emergency headquarters assigned to render assistance to Tashkent were established and which were headed by Kosygin. Leonid Ilich talked on the phone to the first secretaries of the other republics, regions, and districts. As a result, the whole country was involved in restoring the Uzbekistan capital. In that way, the city got over its incurred severe damage within a short time. And its citizens were provided with accommodation and vital necessities to considerable extent. As a result, Tashkent got an honorable title of ‘City of Friendship’.
In those days Brezhnev and Kosygin visited the virgin lands and got in detail familiarized with the irrigation course and achieved results, based on which, after a while, a Plenum of the CC CPSU was convened where irrigation development problems in the country were discussed.
Such steps and actions favorably impressed natives and benevolently influenced their attitude to the leadership. However, the style and habits of Brezhnev essentially differed from Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev’s ones who used to directly communicate with collective and state farmers right in the fields, with workers of factories and plants, to go down mines and to visit pastures, etc. As for Leonid Ilich, he preferred to meet leaders of the republics and regions, or at best local leaders, without delving deeply into business and life. He was fond of magnificence, brilliance, and theatricality of his trips. Generally, he judged everything according to the information provided by the republics leaders, with being particularly sensitive to their attitude to himself in person. On that part, Dinmukhamed Kunayev, Heydar Aliyev, and Sharof Rashidov were his best friends.
During my work as the Ambassador to Syria I had to often communicate on business with Leonid Ilich. At first by his order, I was appointed the first Deputy Chairman of the Committee of Culture Relations with Foreign Countries, and later I was appointed the Ambassador to the Syrian Arab Republic.
Nine years later, I came back from Syria with a hope, as I had agreed with Rashidov and with Brezhnev’s blessing, that I would move to Tashkent. However, it didn’t happen. So, I found myself working in the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the USSR. Before and after work in Syria, I repeatedly visited Afghanistan under assignment of the CC leadership. Thus, the most crucial period in the Soviet Union relations with Afghanistan was during Brezhnev’s rule.
The decision on bringing Soviet military troops into Afghanistan was made by the CC Politburo commission consisting of four people: Leonid Brezhnev, Andrei Gromyko, Dmitriy Ustinov, and Yuri Andropov. Also, there was the working CC commission consisting of Sergey Akhromeev, Simon Tsvigun, and Sharof Rashidov.
In half a year after bringing there our troops, I was sent to Kabul. Upon return, I informed Boris N. Ponomarev who was the CC secretary supervising international affairs and his deputy, professor Rostislav Ulyanovskiy, about the current situation there.
In a couple of days, I was received by Brezhnev. I informed him in detail about the situation in Afghanistan and about my conversations with the republic leaders and Soviet employees working there. At the end, I conveyed my considerations about military matters, ‘Bringing our troops into the country where they are already being involved directly in military operations has caused a lot of false rumors. It would be helpful for us to find ways to prevent our troops from participation in internal armed conflict which is currently growing into a civil war there.’
Leonid Ilich inquired, ‘How?’
I replied, ‘We should either withdraw our troops or redeploy them by disposing them on the boarders with the neighboring countries. This would be in conformity with the official report on the reasons for our troops stay in this country.’
Brezhnev said, ‘We have considered this issue a few times beforehand. A suggestion on bringing the Soviet troops into Afghanistan has caused doubts and misgivings in some people, including me. But the new Afghan leaders have insistently requested me about that. That’s why we have assigned the defense ministry, the ministry of foreign affairs and the KGB to examine this issue in detail, weighing pros and cons, and to report their suggestions, after having advised with the Afghan comrades. We have been convinced by them that the Soviet troops will be there for a very short time, that the main point is the defense of our southern borders, that an armed conflict will be quickly halted, and the new revolutionary regime and the leadership are completely supported by the people.’
Having listened to him, I remarked that the comrades who had prepared that matter apparently didn’t know well and didn’t study deeply into peculiarities of Afghanistan, its people nature, who were well characterized and described in works by Babur, by academician Nikolai I. Vavilov, and by Marshal Sardar Shah Wali who was a commander-in-chief of the Afghan armed forces in the last war against British troops. In London were published a few interesting books about the three British military campaigns in Afghanistan which resulted in their defeat.
In the course of our conversation, I noticed Brezhnev’s facial expression getting bored, and I felt that my story about that became boring for him. Switching to a tongue twister, I soon fell silent. At the end, Brezhnev said, ‘Regarding Afghanistan, the special commission headed by Gromyko and including Ustinov, Andropov, and Rashidov has been established. You should talk to Gromyko,’ Leonid Ilich suggested me, ‘and tell him about your considerations.’
In front of me, he phoned up Gromyko and told him, ‘Look, Nuritdin is sitting in my room. He has just returned from Afghanistan and has got some considerations. Can you receive and listen to him? And then we will consult with you.’
Upon returning to the Chamber, I phoned up Andrei Andreevich Gromyko. Having said that he was really busy in those days, he asked to tell him in brief on the phone. Using the ‘government switchboard telephone’, I retold him my conversation with Brezhnev in detail. Having listened to me, he said, ‘The situation is known. Specialists are attentively keeping their eyes on these events…’
I and he, apparently, had an unpleasant aftertaste from the conversation. Sadly, nothing was done to improve the situation before it was too late.
XXIX
KOSYGIN - HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT
When Leonid I. Brezhnev became First CC CPSU secretary in 1964, Alexei N. Kosygin was appointed Chairman of Ministers Council of the USSR. He was a highly qualified specialist, experienced production manager, party figure, and statesman.
Formerly they used to say that party work is politics, science, and art. However, activity in the sphere of economics does not seem to be less complicated and responsible field requiring considerable intelligence, erudition, knowledge, talent, ability to work with people, production management experience, personal responsibility, analytical mind, and reliance on only accurate calculation.
That is how I remember Alexei Nickolaevich Kosygin. I’m not going to recount here his biography. I only would like to tell about a few traits of his character reflecting his human essence and his work style.
On November 3rd, 1951, A. N. Kosygin arrived in Tashkent because of a difficult situation in picking cotton. The then leader of Soviet aviation was aircraft ‘IL-14’. Having left Moscow in the early morning by that aircraft, he arrived in Tashkent in the late evening.
When meeting him at the airport, I noticed him being tired of the difficult and long flight in a bad weather. However, having refused from taking a rest, he suggested to go directly to the CC of the Communist party of Uzbekistan. The time difference between Moscow and Tashkent was three hours; therefore, we gathered in the office of First secretary almost at night.
Without wasting time on ‘formal ceremonies’, Alexei Nickolaevich immediately started analyzing, with a pencil in his hand, the current situation and the reasons for lagging behind the schedule; he also required that each person know thoroughly the work area he was responsible for.
We came to the country residence house at the dawn. Having a cup of tea, he right away returned to his work. It was decided to gather the CC Bureau on November 5th. Thus, I and Amin Niyazov began to phone up secretaries of regional committees to invite them together with chairmen of regional executive committees to the CC Bureau meeting.
At noon of November 4th after a light breakfast, Alexei Nickolaevich, Amin Niyazov, and I went to visit districts. We returned at midnight.
At the CC Bureau meeting, Alexei Nickolaevich showed the same businesslike efficiency and dislike for pompous phrases and transcendental heights. The secretary of the Namangan regional committee, Dzhuraev, in style of those days, began from analysis of a general situation, spoke about importance of growing cotton in general, including in his speech citations from J.V. Stalin’s statements, without forgetting to mention reigning moral and political growth in the region, and so on.
Having interrupted him, Alexei Nickolaevich began to ask him concrete questions relating to elementary and simple things, such as: the usage efficiency of bags, transport facilities, drying machines, and fuel. Also, he asked about manpower requirement, workers attendance and their labor effectiveness, about schedule of cotton store places operation, etc.
Poor thing, Khasan Dzhuraevich's face turned red and got sweating. Without receiving a satisfactory answer, Alexei Nickolaevich right away seriously rebuked and told him to sit down. It was a good lesson not only for him, but also for all the attendees. The course of the discussion instantly gained a businesslike manner.
During the meeting someone suggested that everyone go out to work in the cotton fields instead of participating in demonstration on November 7th holiday. Alexei Nickolaevich disagreed and recommended to celebrate the holiday properly. However, it was agreed that the demonstration would end by noon, so that everyone could go to collective and state farms to help in cotton up picking. Thus, Alexei Nickolaevich was standing together with the CC bureau members of the Communist party of Uzbekistan on the tribune in Lenin Square, greeting people.
After the demonstration, at his suggestion, we also drove to the cotton fields. And during the trip Alexei Nickolaevich was telling off the first secretary of the Tashkent regional committee of the party, Makhmudov, and the first secretary of the Tashkent municipal committee of the party, Khodzhaev, who were accompanying us. When we were heading to the Chinaz district, we saw people sitting off the road and imperturbably ‘celebrating’ the holiday after the demonstration, though they had announced that they were going for picking cotton up. It gave us the shivers when a big guy from the group, seeing a number of government cars and Alexei Kosygin sitting in one of them, greeted him raising a faceted glass in his hand, ‘To your health, Alexei Nickolaevich! Happy Holiday!’
In the Andizhan district, we together with the first secretary of the party regional committee, Mirza-Akhmedov, drove from the airport to the Pakhtaabad district where we were met by the first secretary of the party district committee, Nigmatshaev, and others. There, wearing rubber boots and raincoats in the pouring rain, we examined the collective farm fields. We all were hungry and in a gloomy mood. At that moment, Alimkul-aka, the chairman of the collective farm named after V. I. Lenin, invited us for a cup of tea at his house. Alexei Nickolaevich refused and after a while noticed some people putting incomprehensible bundles and something from afar looking like pots in our cars.
The chairman of the collective farm replied in an offended voice to my question, ‘We have cooked all this food for our dear, highly esteemed guest from Moscow who is visiting our collective farm for the first time. Since you are refusing to spare a few minutes for a meal with us, then you’ll have to take everything along with you.’
I told Alexei Nickolaevich about it. He right away came up to the chairman of the collective farm, thanked him for the invitation, and entered his house together with the others. With pleasure we ate shurpa (an eastern dish like broth with lamb, vegetables and spicery) and pilau (an eastern dish made of rice flavored with spices and cooked in stock, with meat, poultry, or fish added). Alexei Nickolaevich was warmly and friendly talking with people sitting at the table. Then after dinner, firmly shaking hands with each one, including a cook, a watchman, and the other collective farmers, he bade farewell.
Soon that collective farm became one of the foremost ones: it annually implemented and overfulfilled plans and commitments at all points, and achieved the most crop capacity of cotton. Due to that, under the Decree of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the USSR dated on January 11th, 1957, its chairman Alimkul-aka was among two hundred foremost people to become Socialist Labor Hero.
After that, Kosygin left for Moscow on November 10th. However, again he suddenly arrived in Tashkent on November 26th and was staying in the republic for a few days. All the population without exaggeration was engaged in picking cotton up. Permanently being nearby cotton growers, Alexei Nickolaevich embodied a moral support to them. Due to selfless labor of the population and a prompt assistance of the union government, it became possible to save the crop, pick up and deliver all cultivated cotton to the state.
Once being on my business trip to Moscow, I heard on the radio the morning news that A. N. Kosygin was appointed Minister of consumer goods industry of the USSR. It was eight o’clock in the morning. I instantly phoned him up, and his spouse Claudia Andreevna picked a receiver up. She said that he had already gone to work in the ministry. I made a call there and was put through. We greeted each other, and Alexei Nickolaevich invited me to come to his office to see him. I came at half past nine and saw his office room crowded. Alexei Nickolaevich explained that a ministry board meeting was going on and offered me to participate in its work. Besides, he didn’t fail to comment that now he would demand more cotton from us.
It’s really worth noting that he arrived at the ministry at 9 o’clock in the morning on the same day as the Decree about his appointment as minister was published. What's more, in an hour he convened a ministry board meeting he was holding as if he had been working there for many years. And that wasn’t accidental. Indeed, that was a human nature inherent to Alexei Nickolaevich Kosygin.
His being a textile engineer was manifested in everything he did. In any questions he put, one might easily reveal his deep knowledge of refinements and peculiarities of different aspects of the industry. He equally attentively listened to deputy ministers, board members, and departmental heads…For the first time participating in the ministry board, I took benefit for myself as well, because I heard and even felt their requirements to cotton quality.
In 1959, Khrushchev had a holiday in Pitsunda. A party and government delegation from Czechoslovakia arrived to visit him. We, who were having a holiday nearby at the seaside, were also invited for the dinner given in the honour of the delegation. On the same day, Alexei Nickolaevich Kosygin and I decided to go for a walk up to the Main Caucasus Mountain Ridge. Many expressed doubts and persuaded us to give up that travel, but we firmly held our ground.
By aircraft we left Pitsunda for Mineralnye Vody from where we went on foot up to the Main Caucasus Pass. The leaders of the Karachai-Cherkess autonomous region were accompanying us at the beginning of the way. After having passed a few kilometers and got over the Alimkentskyi glacier, they suggested to make a stop for a rest on the shore of Blue Lake at the altitude of about three thousand meters above the sea level.
Having come up to a tent and seeing there a box full of alcohol liquors, Alexei Nickolaevich strictly told to remove it, which was immediately done. Having cooked some meal, we decided to go swimming before dinner. We approached Blue Lake: it was very deep, cold and surrounded with snow and ice. Only three of us ventured to swim – Alexei Nickolaevich, A.P. Artamonov (my assistant), and I. When we dipped into the lake, the icy water literally burnt the body, and it became easier when we began swimming. When we got out onto the shore, we strongly shivered because the air temperature was considerably lower than the water temperature. Having quickly dressed, we returned to our tent and ate with gusto, regretting at heart about the box of liquors removed.
We kept walking farther. Finally, we reached our long-awaited destination to find ourselves standing on the highest peak of the pass. Here we were presented with alpinist medals. It was a clear and sunny day. An awesome panorama of Transcaucasia opened up before our eyes: heaven and earth merged into one, and the silhouettes of mountain ranges and their peaks merged into bizarre patterns covered with ice and snow.
After having taken a short rest and some photos, we went on. A rocky mountainous path brought us to a nearest village in the Svaneti province. A few native villagers came up to greet us, then invited us to their houses. That was a normal display of magnificent highland hospitality!
While lively conversing, I was watching those highland dwellers of Georgia – handsome, slender, courageous, cheerful, and resolute people. A young fellow suddenly left the group and ran to the village. After a few minutes, he, shouting something, came back and showed us a small photograph. Everyone instantly turned towards and stared at Alexei Nickolaevich. It turned out that the young fellow fetched a photo of Alexei Kosygin, which he apparently had cut out from a newspaper. It’s difficult to describe the excitement of the villagers, recognizing A.N. Kosygin in a man who had come on foot there, wearing an ordinary casual tracksuit, and who was the nation-wide known party figure and statesman, the CC CPSU Politburo member, first deputy Chairman of Ministers Council of the USSR. Moreover, it was a man who used to work with J. V. Stalin. (Joseph Stalin was considered to be ‘son-in-law’ of that village because his first wife was from there.)
Naturally, descending from the mountain was easier; therefore, we were walking down faster. At the border with Abkhazia, we were met by the first secretary of the party regional committee, M.T. Bghazhba, and other comrades. By the end of the day, we reached New Athos where my family was having a rest. We entered a house. Alexei Nickolaevich warmly greeted my father, Mukarram Makhkamovna (my spouse), and our children. Without delay, we went on, and in the late evening we came to Pitsunda where they were waiting for us, warmly met and congratulated us with successful hiking. Then a grand dinner was given to honor such a ‘numerous’ expedition.
The friendly relations were established between my family and Alexei Nickolaevich’s family. In this connection I would like to share my impressions of his family members.
His spouse, Claudia Andreevna, was a person of exceptional modesty, excellent nurture, assiduity, and diligence. Every time I visited them, I admired the atmosphere of mutual respect and love of all family members. Claudia Andreevna cooked meal, set the table, treated the guests, and cleaned everything by herself. At their home I always felt at ease, without feeling any constraint. A smooth and good mood always reigned there.
Their daughter, Lyudmila Alexeevna, not only outwardly but also by personality took after her mother. She helped her mother in everything, and she also didn’t find doing domestic chores shameful. Their son-in-law, called Zhermen, was a family ‘entertainment manager’: he played pretty well many musical instruments and organized many entertainments for us, such as playing dominoes, checkers, chess, and billiards. Afterwards Zhermen Mikhailovich Gvishiani became an outstanding scientist, academician, and an expert in scientific organization of management.
Once on Saturday (then Saturdays were workdays), I was sitting in my office with Chairman of Ministers Council of the UzSSR, M.Z. Mirza-Akhmedov, and permanent representative of the republic, K.R. Rakhimov. They told about the issues they were going to raise and discuss in Moscow and about the persons they were going to visit. Right at that moment, Alexei Nickolaevich phoned me up and asked me about my plans for the next day. I told him I was sitting with some Uzbeks (I told him their surnames) and inviting them to my house. He said, ‘Let’s finish our incomplete chess game tomorrow. Tell your Uzbek mates that I’m inviting them as well and together come to my house.’
Mirza-Akhmedov and Rakhimov, visiting that family for the first time, were literally subjugated by the simplicity, civility, and hospitality of the Kosygins.
Once, being in the German Democratic Republic together with other mates, I visited Dresden. This city is famous for its remarkable architecture and, in particular, its splendid art gallery established in 1722. The gallery of those days had already collected about 1,900 paintings and in the sequel, it has been collecting works of artists from all over the world.
During World War II in 1943-1944, many paintings were stolen and lost from the gallery. In addition, at night of February 13th, 1945, Anglo-American aviation made a massive bombing on Dresden, turning a lot of architectural monuments, including the famous art gallery, into ruins and ashes.
When warfare operations came close to the Elbe river, fascists hid paintings in different vaults, tunnels, and mines where they, naturally, quickly started getting worse. It was the Soviet Army, entering the city, that rescued those masterpieces of fine arts from destruction. And in 1955 the Soviet government handed 1,230 rescued masterpieces of the Dresden gallery over to the German people. Furthermore, in 1958 the USSR returned the remaining in the USSR another part of the paintings.
So, at the entrance to the gallery, the first thing we saw in the first hall was a big showcase under glass of which there was a ‘Gift Letter’ of the Soviet people to the German people, lying on velvet and signed by A.N. Kosygin.
In 1966, President of France, General Charles de Gaulle, arrived in Moscow for the second time. After successful negotiations, the important documents about bilateral friendly relations between the USSR and France and the ways of further cooperation in international arena were signed. Alexei Kosygin was entrusted to accompany the President during his trip about the country. Charles de Gaulle gladly met local people, talked to them, and made speeches in which he called the USSR as Russia, limiting in that way the state borders to the Urals.
Alexei Nickolaevich tactfully told Charles de Gaulle that the Russian SFSR was one of the fifteen union republics; and despite being a title leading nation, it was still a part of the USSR whose territory was integral and single, spreading from the Black Sea to the Pacific Ocean. After that, the French President every time called our country as ‘the Soviet Union’ and emphasized it was a great European and Asian state.
In April 1975, the civil war broke out in Lebanon. Five armed groups were operating there: the right-wing Christian military unit of the Falangists, national patriotic forces, government military units, the Palestinians, and the Kurd units. Hostilities took place essentially between the Falangists on one side and the Palestinians and national patriotic forces on the other side. The government units were small and couldn’t considerably influence the course of events. The Kurdish Leader, called Dzhambulat, kept himself apart; however, his sympathy was obviously on the side of the Palestinians and Lebanon national patriotic forces.
The armed conflicts were intensively expanding and spreading all over the country. The capital city, Beirut, turned out to be divided into two parts, occupied by Muslim and Christian units, respectively.
Under those circumstances, Syria suddenly brought its troops into Lebanon. That action appeared unexpected by many countries, including the USSR. The Syrian leadership explained its actions by desire to secure its borders and prevent the armed conflict in Lebanon from expansion.
Meanwhile the military battles didn’t stop. What’s more, Syria complicated its relations with the Palestinians, the national patriotic forces of Lebanon, and the Falangists. Also, the Lebanon government and Dzhambulat were displeased as well.
The Soviet Union position was to stop the fratricidal war in Lebanon, to save territorial integrity and unity of that country, to restore the previous favorable relations with Syria and to establish peace with the Palestinians and Lebanon patriots. The events in Lebanon were not supposed to grow into a regional conflict.
At about the same time, another problem emerged, namely, serious worsening of the Iraqi-Syrian relations.
An excuse for that was the construction of a hydropower complex on the Euphrates river in Syria where the building of the dam had already been launched, which could allow to accumulate over 11 billion cubic meters of water in the reservoir. The Iraqi leadership expressed protest and demanded that Syria immediately stop the construction, motivating its claim by the fact that keeping so much water in the reservoir could undermine irrigated cropping in Iraq and damage its energy sector.
Different-level negotiations between Iraq and Syria didn’t result in positive outcomes. Meanwhile, the construction was going on. It got to the point when the Iraqi government officially warned that Syria must halt the construction; otherwise, Iraqi’s aircrafts would bomb the dam.
The Soviet specialists led by Deputy Minister of Melioration, K.K. Shubaladze, started implementing ‘shuttle operation’ between Baghdad and Damascus. Their serious calculations proved that the construction of the dam and the reservoir in Syria would not endanger Iraq because the water accumulation could happen only in winter when there was no shortage of water at all, not at irrigation time. Unfortunately, their efforts were in vain and didn’t result in mutual understanding in the relations between the two Arabic countries where progressive patriotic regimes were pursuing anti-colonial policy.
Also, it hurt to watch that conflict because just two years before those events, Syria and Iraq side by side operated in the war against Israel. At that time, at the Syrian government's request, Iraq brought its troops into Syria to fight alongside with Syrian soldiers and officers.
The Soviet Union had close relations and comprehensive cooperation with both Iraq and Syria. Therefore, we were quite interested in settlement of the conflict between them. So, in 1976, Alexei N. Kosygin visited Iraq and Syria. He arrived in Damascus from Baghdad and immediately started negotiations. Kosygin handed over a personal message from Leonid I. Brezhnev to General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, President of Syria, Hafez el-Assad. In the message Brezhnev quite convincingly expressed his concern about the relations between Syria and Iraq and the events in Lebanon, as well as about possible negative consequences of the occurring events. Also, he made concrete suggestions to overcome those crises.
President Hafez el-Assad was noticeably impressed by such a position, supported with a long conversation with Alexei Nickolaevich. As a result of enormous efforts, the Soviet Union managed to render assistance to the leaders of Iraq, Syria, Palestinians, Lebanese patriots, Kurds, and the government of Lebanon in gradually meeting each other halfway and arriving at consensus, so that they could make mutually acceptable settlement of conflicts and restore their good relations.
Syrian Prime-Minister Abdul Rahman Khleifawi, commenting the outcomes of Kosygin’s activity in Baghdad and Damascus, said that having been in Delhi and Karachi, he had heard Hindus and Pakistanis speaking with gratitude about Kosygin’s intermediary role during the Tashkent meetings of Indian Prime-Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and Pakistani President, Muhammad Ayub Khan, where it became possible to settle a serious conflict between those countries.
‘The same disinterested, sincere aid has been rendered us by comrades Brezhnev and Kosygin,’ Khleifawi concluded.
When visiting Damascus, Alexei Nickolaevich wished to see my family members. He warmly hugged and kissed my children, and we were photographed together. My daughter Saida was working in the library of the Soviet culture center, and lest to be late for work, she wondered, ‘What time is it?’ Hearing her, Alexei Nickolaevich took his wristwatch off and gave it her. At his request, a local jeweler engraved an inscription: ‘To dear Saida as a remembrance. A. Kosygin.’ Seeing next to her my seven-year-old granddaughter Nodira, Alexei Nickolaevich regretted he hadn’t brought anything for her and promised to bring a gift for her next time. Indeed, in a few days, he really sent a set of toy cars for my grandson Bakhodir and a few beautiful dolls for Nodira.
At the airport in Damascus, all the Syrian leadership (except the President), thousands of local residents and Soviet employees cordially saw off the head of the Soviet government. As for me, it was the last meeting with Alexei Nickolaevich Kosygin. I have never seen him since then.
My daughter Saida, grandson Bakhodir, and granddaughter Nodira have been keeping the family photographs with Alexei Kosygin as an invaluable relic.
I’ve been kept on the alert for many years by a thought I shared in conversations with my friends at that time: if in October 1964, Alexei Kosygin had been elected as First secretary of CC CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev as second CC secretary (by establishing such a position), and Alexander Shelepin as Chairman of Ministers Council of the USSR, then most things might have changed for the better in the life of the country, and much could have been different in the party activities …
My sincerely respectful attitude to Alexei Nickolaevich didn’t originate due to ‘work’ since I never directly worked with him. But it was due to the fact that I was always deeply impressed by his personality, behavior manner, beliefs, as well as his diligence, assiduity, and professional competence allied with broad-mindedness and pervasive way of thinking.
It should be noted that Alexei Nickolaevich was one of a few members of the top leadership who wherever was 'thrown', or repeatedly 'pushed back', then was returned and promoted, and so on. However, with all those redeployments, both vertically and horizontally, he never changed, always being himself and focusing on the only thing – his job.
And it doesn’t matter how many groups, conflicts of interests, and obvious intrigues there were at the Kremlin Olympus; he never participated in any of them. Also, during discussions at CC Presidium or Plenum meetings of very acute issues, such as decision on destinies of Georgy Malenkov, Georgy Zhukov, Vyacheslav Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, and others, he usually expressed his personal independent opinion, without obeying to a higher opinion.
Here is the pattern of his redeployment up and down the party hierarchy ladder: in 1939 he was elected CC CPSU member, being chairman of Executive Committee of Leningrad Council; 1946-1948 – candidate to CC Politburo membership; 1948-1952 – Politburo member; 1952-1953 – candidate to CC Presidium membership; 1957-1960 – again candidate to Presidium membership; 1960-1980 – member of CC CPSU Presidium (Politburo).
Here is the record of his experience background: in 1939 he was People’s Commissar of Textile Industry of the USSR; 1940-1953 - Deputy Chairman of People’s Commissariat Council (Council of Ministers) of the USSR; at the same time in 1943-1946 he was Chairman of People’s Commissariat Council of the RSFSR (the Russian Republic), in February-December 1948 – Minister of Finance of the USSR, in 1948-1953 – Minister of Light Industry of the USSR, in March-August 1953 – Minister of Light and Food Industry of the USSR; 1953-1954 – Minister of Consumer Goods Industry of the USSR; 1953-1956 and 1957-1960 – Deputy Chairman of Ministers Council of the USSR; at the same time in 1959-1960 – Chairman of State Planning Committee of the USSR. In 1956-1957 – first Deputy Chairman of State Economic Commission of Ministers Council of the USSR – Minister of the USSR, first Deputy Chairman of State Planning Committee of the USSR – Minister of the USSR. In 1960-1964 he was first Deputy Chairman of Ministers Council of the USSR, and from 1964 to October 1980 – Chairman of Ministers Council of the USSR.
How can such a ‘motley’ picture be explained? One of the determinative reasons was the fact that when wherever there was a complicated situation, or a failure happened, or a new ministry was being established, that was the place where Alexei Nickolaevich was often sent to. For example, as a result of the currency reform in 1947, conducted successfully in general, a few flaws were elicited and revealed in the operation of the Finance Ministry of the Soviet Union. Therefore, it was necessary to adjust financial organizations functions to the new postwar conditions. Thus, Kosygin had to work as finance minister for ten months to establish a practically new ministry.
So, when sitting and conversing together in Damascus, I asked him why it had happened to him so.
He replied smiling, ‘Sometimes I was informed about my new appointment on the phone on behalf of Stalin, or at a CC Presidium meeting. The same took place regarding my redeployment in the party. Stalin promoted me, then at some stage there was someone who accordingly ‘informed’ him about my work deprecatorily. So, Stalin moved me aside, but later returned me again.’
In that conversation Alexei Nickolaevich also told his credo: every leading employee had to always and strictly follow the Party Regulations, abide state laws, and defend people’s interests. And for that, he/she had to have firm beliefs, strong will, and industriousness.
‘As to positions and posts,’ he said, ‘they used to be inherited, though in some western states they run elections. As for us, we accepted that this issue be decided by, first of all, our leadership. No wonder there is an expression about employees as ‘cogs’.’
And he continued, ‘But a human must always remain a human, be oneself, and always everywhere must do one’s best. Then, in any team, one will be helpful and useful, be able to feel satisfaction.’
I also asked him, ‘Alexei Nickolaevich, how could you explain that you’ve never participated in any faction or clique?’
Right away he asked me, ‘How about you? Have you ever participated?’
‘No, I haven’t,’ I said.
He said, ‘We, communists, at the congress back under Lenin, made a decision by ourselves about prohibition of factionalism and groupism in party bodies. Who must not only implement the decision but also set an example but us - leaders? Besides official decisions, there are also such important aspects as honesty, decency, and sincerity in mutual relations between leadership members. When three-four people secretly discuss and decide a fortune of any member of the leadership, in that way they violate not only the Party Regulations and discipline, but also normal function of Bureau, or board of colleagues, since they act behind the back of the other members. Of course, there can be disagreements, or an issue about dismissal or punishment of a member may arise; however, it must be discussed by all the members. That’s why I’m against any factionalism and groupism.'
Our conversation lasted over three hours…
And the last thing I would like to say about. Having become Chairman of Ministers Council of the USSR, Alexei Nickolaevich Kosygin instantly took up radical improving the organization and strengthening the management of industry and all economy. Being a qualified, experienced expert, he thoroughly and in detail studied the economic situation: he visited different regions of the country, invited employees and workers from republics, regions, and districts; he also involved in work scientists, enterprises’ top managers, and studied experience of developed countries.
Thus, for a few years of work as head of the Soviet government, A. N. Kosygin prepared a Program of economic reform in the country. It was mentioned a few times at CC CPSU Presidium (Politburo) and CC Plenums meetings. Even Leonid Brezhnev also spoke about it. Unfortunately, that reform was never implemented. Intriguers, libelers, and dogmatists whispered to the leading CC secretaries that decisions on such important matters had to be exclusively in competence of the Party Central Committee. However, Chairman of Ministers Council was allegedly trying to concentrate them in the government; hence, in that way humbling the party role and the CC authority.
On that ground there were conflicts and complications of which I was an eyewitness many times. All that impeded work, but most importantly, time was wasted. When the Program was ready and thoroughly developed, in October 1980 Kosygin was dispensed from his duties of CC CPSU Politburo member and Chairman of Ministers Council of the USSR. Two months later he passed away…
Let eternal memory to Alexei Nickolaevich Kosygin, who was a good, honest person and distinguished expert, who fulfilled many useful things for the country and people, be borne in our minds and hearts.
XXX
NINE YEARS IN ‘HOT SPOT’
In February 1968, A.S. Panyushkin invited me to the CC. We greeted each other; he offered me to take a seat and said, ‘A decision has been made to strengthen our embassies and representative offices in a number of major countries of the Middle East. We must learn lessons from the Israeli-Arab war. We need to thoroughly analyze the effectiveness of our activities over there, to reveal their positive and negative aspects, to develop a Program for our activities and cooperation with the countries of this region. In this connection, the CC leadership,’ he continued, ‘have assigned me to talk to you. Do you mind going to one of these countries to work as ambassador?’ After being silent for a short while, he added, ‘This suggestion proceeds from the complexity of the current situation and necessity to sort it out as well as given your experience, your previous visits there, and your knowledge of the Middle East.’
I answered, ‘Basically I can go there.’
Then he asked, ‘Where would you like to go to work?’
I immediately said, ‘To Syria.’
A.S. Panyushkin informed somebody about my consent to work in Syria as ambassador. Having put the receiver, he said, ‘The leadership has approved your choice. Perhaps within a few next days the decision will be approved by the Politburo. As for the Syrians, I’m sure they won’t protract with an agreement. Nevertheless, the procedure will take a few weeks. Before your departure, it would be useful for you to meet CC secretaries, departmental heads and employees of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Committee of Economic Relations (SCER), Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Defense, and other departments to get familiarized yourself with material, archival data relating to the region and particularly Syria. Do not hesitate to come and see me at any time. I’ll be glad to see you. Now I will inform the leadership of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and CC secretaries. Once the approval by the Politburo is issued, we’ll let you know.’
Indeed, in a few days Alexander Semenovich Panyushkin phoned me up to say, ‘The resolution on your appointment has been approved. Congratulations! Now you may start studying whatever you need to know and meet anyone you find helpful for you.’
After that I conversed in detail in the CC with R.A. Ulyanov, B. N. Ponomarev, and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – with Setenko, the departmental head of the Middle East, V.S. Semenov, the deputy minister, also with V. Kuznetsov, A.A. Gromyko, later with N.S. Patolichev, Yu.V. Andropov, A.A. Grechko, and S.A. Skachkov.
The agreement came from Syria soon, and in March I with my family left for Damascus.
Thus, I began to work at my new position. As we used to say under such circumstances, I found myself in ‘honorable exile’.
After approval by the Politburo of the resolution on my appointment, on the eve of my departure to Syria, L.I. Brezhnev asked me in our phone conversation, ‘Well, you’ve decided to go to Syria, haven’t you?’
‘Yes, I have,’ I answered.
‘You know, the East now is in the focus of particular attention and is becoming an arena for important and crucial events that great superpowers are being involved in. Everything is so complicated there… Maybe you should stay here? You may return to the CC or work in the Ministers Council.’
‘I’d rather go there,’ I said.
‘Then why did you refuse a suggestion to work as ambassador last time? Didn't we firmly decide then that you become a delegate to the 23rd party congress, remain as a Supreme Soviet deputy, and be elected again as a CC CPSU member?’
‘There were some reasons for that,’ I answered with a smile.
‘Okay then. You may go there,’ Leonid Ilich said, ‘but keep in mind it won't last long. We'll let you know when you should return to Moscow.’
Further he told me about meetings with the Syrian leaders, about party activities, its plans, and measures. Then we warmly said goodbye to each other.
Courageous people of the country where I was going to work obtained their liberation from colonists due to their unity and long-lasting coordinated actions. Last soldiers of French occupying units left the area of Syria on April 17th, 1946. Since then that ‘Evacuation Day’ has been celebrated as a national holiday of the Syrian people.
From January 1st, 1944 after the cancellation of the French mandate, all major matters of management were switched back to the Syrian government competence. On July 22nd, 1944 at the Syrian initiative, the diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were established. In February 1945 Syria declared war to Germany and Japan, taking a side of the anti-Hitler coalition. On September 24th, 1945 Syria was accepted to the United Nations.
However, after gaining political independence, in the country remained strong positions of foreign capital, mainly French, while English and American investments were expanding, which led to aggravation of contradictions, involving Syria, between the Western powers and to their attempts to interfere in domestic affairs of the country. All that negatively affected the state authority stability. Between 1949 and 1951 four coup d’états took place in there.
In December 1951, Adib Shishakli seized power in the country, became the president in July 1953, and established military dictatorship regime. He dissolved the parliament, prohibited all parties and public organizations, and suppressed any public meetings with force of guns. However, the national-democratic movement was growing on in the country, as a result of which in February 1954 Adib Shishakli’s regime was overthrown, the Constitution was restored, and parties’ activities were reestablished. Then the parliamentary elections took place in September-October in the same year.
Syria sequentially and actively spoke for liquidation of colonial system and establishment of sovereignty. It was then that the attempts of the western powers to involve Syria in the Baghdad Pact and in the sphere of the ‘Eisenhower Doctrine’ action failed. Syria took part in the 1955 Bandung conference and the Non-Alignment Movement. Besides, it resolutely supported Egypt in 1956 during the Suez crisis.
In February 1958, Syria and Egypt united in a single state – the United Arab Republic (UAR) which existed up to September 1961. For that period, the agrarian sector reformation was taking place: lands of landowners were partly handed over to landless and land-poor peasants; a number of major industrial enterprises were nationalized, and measures to strengthen and consolidate the state economic sector were taken.
In their attempt to cancel those reforms major bourgeoisie and landowners staged a coup d'état in the autumn of 1961, having brought the country back to the previous way. On March 8th, 1963, the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party (ASBP) came to power. One of the party leaders, called Salah ad-Din al-Bitar, became the head of the government.
‘Ba’ath’ in Arabic means ‘spirit of the pan-Arab renaissance’. The party included representatives of revolutionary intelligentsia, military men, peasants, craftspeople, small traders, and workers. It was established in 1947 and had the following main slogans:
UNITY – single Arabic state;
LIBERTY – liberation of all Arabic states from imperialism domination and of people consciousness - from the epoch of colonial oppression remnants;
SOCIALISM – establishing a ‘single Arabic democratic socialist society’.
For almost three years inside the ‘Ba’ath’ party, there was a struggle between ‘left-wingers’ and ‘right-wingers’ which eventually resulted in the ‘left-wingers’ triumph. In February 1966, the ‘left wingers’, supported by the army and trade unions, banished the opposition from the party and the country. The new government declared its determination to rely on working class in the society restructuring, development of planned economy, with dominating state sector and liquidation of man-by-man exploitation.
In those years in the country different political and public organizations operated legally, including the Arabic socialist union, the Arabic socialist party, the Federation of workers and peasants trade unions and Syrian women, and the Union of democratic youth. The communist party of Syria and Lebanon (at first it was United) was established in 1924 and enjoyed authority owing to its firmness and influence on common people. Its leaders, Khalid Bakdash and Yousef Faisal, were distinguished figures in the international communist movement.
Syria actively participated in the League of Arab States which was a regional organization established in March 1945 by representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, and was assigned to strengthen cooperation of Arab countries, to protect their sovereignty and independence, and to develop relationships in economy and culture. By early 1968 the League had included also Libya, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Kuwait, and Algeria; and three years later Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates joined it, too.
Finally, Syria was a comparatively small country which accepted, sheltered and established all possible conditions to facilitate life and work for most Palestinian Arabs who were exiled from their native land. Here were located headquarters and leadership of a number of major Palestinian liberation organizations and armed forces. It was here that Kurds, Druzes, and representatives of other ethnic groups and tribes, scattered over different countries and fighting for their liberty and independence, found their shelter as well.
Since old times the Syrians have shown their good attitude to the Soviet Union. The Arabs, including the Syrians, have highly appreciated the Soviet Union’s crucial role in crushing defeat of Hitler’s Germany and militarist Japan. The USSR received a high assessment from their side for its support to oppressed peoples in their struggle for liberty and independence, for its resolute position in protection of Egypt, providing a secured collapse of the English-French-Israeli aggression in the Suez Canal area, for the Soviet initiative in the UN relating to the matter of the shameful colonialism system liquidation in the world, and for the widespread bilateral cooperation and assistance to the peoples of Asia and Africa.
By the time of my arrival in Syria as an ambassador, I had already had a sufficient idea of that country, its freedom-loving people, its history, customs and traditions. Besides, as a result of my meetings with numerous Syrian leaders, I formed my own opinion of our policy and practical activities in that region.
One of the most important issues for Arab states which was always included in the agenda was permanently complicated relations with Israel, particularly after its aggression in June 1967. It seemed that along with our indisputable success and achievements, our high prestige, there were also serious blunders, miscounts, and even mistakes. That’s them that I spoke about to Brezhnev in our phone conversation before my departure to Syria.
I reminded him how acted in connection with Israel’s aggression against the Arab countries the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries except for China, North Korea, Vietnam, Romania, and Albania, and how in general those events were developing. On June 9th, a Conference of the party and governments leaders of the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia took place in Moscow; on June 19th, A.N. Kosygin delivered a speech in the UN about the situation in the Middle East; the leaders of a number of other socialist states sharply spoke there as well; in a day after that a CC CPSU Plenum took place in Moscow, where Leonid Brezhnev made a report about the CPSU policy relating to the Middle East situation.
I believe all those measures aroused sympathy of the Arabs towards us and our policy of comprehensive support to emancipated colonial countries. However, I spoke to Brezhnev as follows: ‘We can hardly consider all our actions farsighted - from dynamic to political and purely propagandistic - if they are based on only anti-Israel position. On June 9th on the conference day, the Soviet government declared: ‘If Israel does not leave the occupied Arabian territories, then the USSR will revise its relationships with it.’ And literally on the next day, the Memorandum on the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel was published. So, what is the essence of that declaration then? How can such issues be solved in a day?’
Brezhnev didn’t react to it and I continued, ‘In the report at the Plenum and also at the Conference, it was said that the relevant Soviet bodies would appropriately treat appeals of its citizens who had a desire to go as volunteers to fight on the Arabs side. Such statements are too serious and important when pronounced by the CC General Secretary and Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, we need to recall about tens of thousands of Chinese volunteers who during the Chinese war, having arrived in Korea and led by the defense minister, the CPC (Communist Party of China) Politburo member, participated in the battles and played quite an important role in achieving armistice.'
Leonid Ilich responded to my comments, ‘Speaking about possible Soviet volunteers, we just wanted to put pressure on Israel.’
I saw many miscounts and blunders in our policy and diplomacy. By the way, in contrast to us, a number of Arab states, having severed their relations with the USA and England, soon at the initiative of all three parties restored them and established necessary connections without which it was impossible to solve the conflict by political methods. Meanwhile the Soviet Union leadership was taking its ‘principled stand’ for many years up to lately, which inevitably gave hard time for its peacemaking efforts.
What was the result of that?
Two great superpowers - the USSR and the USA - were approved by the Security Council Resolution as co-chairmen of the commission for the settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict. However, in order to be a middleman, one must have an independent standpoint and unbiased relations with both conflicting sides, in other words, be steady on the both legs. That was that Americans and other concerned countries were doing, whereas the Soviet Union representatives were behaving as and looked like defenders of the interests of only one side at practical meetings and negotiations as well as in the eyes of the whole world.
The 1967 war didn’t solve any of the approximately ten existing issues of the Middle Eastern crisis. In some ways the critical situation even worsened, and the achieved ‘armistice’ was actually just a six-seven-year armistice after which another war between the Arab countries and Israel broke out, whose scale, intensity, and negative effects weren’t less than in the previous one.
Later in the period of my work in Syria, at a few Arabic figures’ advice, I raised a few times an issue about reestablishment of relations of the USSR with Israel not to the detriment of the Arabs, but, namely, to expand the front of actions towards the conflict settlement. However, under various excuses the issue was not being solved by Moscow. Moreover, that was occurring while Arab leaders themselves were trying to hold direct negotiations and meetings with Israel on a bilateral basis.
Upon arrival in Damascus on the next morning according to the rule, I made the first visit to the doyen of the diplomatic body – Kuwait’s ambassador. The ambassador told me about himself, the diplomatic body in Damascus, in particular about the ambassadors, the Syrian leadership, and existing protocol rules and traditions, including the order of handling credentials.
On the same day in the evening we phoned from the embassy up the Deputy Prime-Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mahus, to inform him that the new ambassador was ready to visit him at any convenient for him time. He made an appointment on the next morning.
Having entered his office, we warmly hugged each other and talked like old friends. Mahus invited his deputies, introduced me to them and then said that the President was ready to receive me on the following day if it was convenient for us.
At the fixed time I arrived together with our advisers at President Nureddin al-Atassi’s residence house. The meeting with him was also warm and friendly. When an official ceremony of the credentials presentation was over, we were alone together with him, talking about different topics for a long time, recalling my last visit and his visit to Moscow.
During the first months of my work everyday I had to visit a few public figures and statesmen as well as ambassadors. They, in their turn, also visited us. A general meeting of the embassy employees took place, and then I interviewed each one individually.
Soon we started the preparation of concrete proposals on the issues spoken about and agreed on in Moscow during the recent official Syrian delegations’ visits, including the last one led by President Nureddin al-Atassi. When the considerations of the embassy were ready in general outline, I requested Moscow to send to Damascus responsible representatives of ministries and departments concerned, so that they could participate in preparing required documents.
Perhaps, a new point about it was that before starting determining concrete parameters of cooperation in a sector, we thoroughly, self-critically and objectively analyzed what had been done before, the extent of its effectiveness for us and Syria. The employees from the State Planning Committee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Trade, and State Committee of Economic Relations visited us. Having studied and agreed on all issues, they left for Moscow with thoroughly prepared proposals.
In the course of reiterated conversations with high-ranking officials of Syria, who were also involved in summarizing the war outcomes, calculating losses and searching for ways to recover the situation, they expressed a desire, referring to the Moscow agreements, that a Syrian top-level delegation visit the USSR. We informed the Center and received a response that the delegation of Syria headed by Nureddin al-Atassi was officially invited.
In a year after the beginning of my work as the Ambassador to Syria, for the first time in my life, having travelled a lot of countries with different missions, I flew back to my Homeland together with the state delegation of Syria by their aircraft.
We were met at the airport warmly and affably. A benevolent and friendly atmosphere was established right away. The negotiations were held from the very beginning on a parity basis. During the negotiations we agreed on everything and solved all the issues. Then, while ministers and specialists were preparing the documents to be signed, the delegation embarked on a tour around the country. We visited Leningrad and Tashkent.
Upon arrival in Tashkent and having been accommodated in a special given residence house, Nureddin al-Atassi with his two deputies expressed a desire to visit my sick father. Our meeting at our apartment was sincerely cordial. My father could read and speak Arabic quite well, so we almost didn’t turn to our interpreter for help, which made the atmosphere much warmer and more relaxed.
Upon return to Moscow, we signed agreements and protocols. After that the delegation and I together with them returned to Damascus on the same aircraft. The Syrians were satisfied with the results. On the flight we were exchanging our impressions briskly, and it was hard to imagine that less than in a year most members of the delegation, including Nureddin al-Atassi, would be in prison…
After the war the domestic situation in the Syrian Arab Republic (the SAR) was very difficult in both economic and political spheres. High prices, production recession, and acute shortage of goods worsened, because in the top circles they were giving different assessments of the passed military operations, including military officers and state leadership’s actions. All that was almost daily discussed in the superior party bodies, in the government, the military headquarters, army units, which very often resulted in sharp disagreements.
They were talking more about a possibility of transforming those disagreements into a conflict within the top leadership; sometimes they threw stones towards the Soviet Union as well. Contradictions inside the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party were deepening; however, nobody suggested real ways out of the crisis.
In November 1970, a congress of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party (ASBP) took place. Mahus, Yusuf Zuayyin, Nureddin al-Atassi, and others informed us: during the breaks after each sitting some of them shared their impressions with us. It seemed that the atmosphere was heating up gradually from meeting to meeting.
Two groups were formed: one, consisting of the then leaders of the country led by the General Secretary Nureddin al-Atassi and the second Secretary Salah Jadid, and the other one led by Hafez Assad, the Defense Minister, the ASBP leadership member. The delicacy of our position was that each group, considering themselves the only right one, aspired to obtain the support by the Soviet leadership. There were rumors going on about not only the party split but even a possibility of breaking out a civil war.
Naturally, I was constantly informing Moscow about the current events. However, in the very beginning I received telegraph directives not to interfere into internal affairs of the country, nor to act as an official mediator, nor to advertise any contacts with either side. Should there be an opportunity, then I was supposed to privately express our opinion of crucial importance of preventing the country from bloodshed and civil war, and to remind them of necessity to reconcile any disputes by inner-party method, being guided by the superior interests of the state as well as the Syrian people.
One day, Salah Jadid said that the situation at the congress dramatically worsened, and there was an information that supporters of the defense ministry were carrying out activities among party members and the people, aimed at undermining the leadership authority and splitting the party. I expressed my opinion in accordance with the guides and directives received from the Center.
In the afternoon I received a call from the Syrian Defense Ministry: ‘Minister would like to meet the Soviet Ambassador if it is possible for him.’
In the late evening I went to the Defense Ministry. Hafez Assad told me how hard the morning meeting was; the party was obviously about to be split up. He was doing his utmost to take measures to save the unity, but he wasn’t sure if it would work out.
On the next evening Hafez Assad called me and I met him again. He informed me that in the morning he had been excluded from the party leadership, and right at the congress they had suggested his removal from the position of Defense Minister.
‘Right now,’ he added, ‘the congress sitting is going on. But I haven't gone there.’
In a day Mahus expressed his desire to meet me at any convenient for me place. I drew up to him to find him with two top leadership members standing in front of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building. They were excited, smiling and obviously glad with something.
We shook our hands and together entered the building. He told me there that in the previous evening the party top bodies had been formed, from which a few members led by Hafez Assad had been excluded. Also, they adopted the congress resolution, made a statement to the people, and approved of the measures Program on organization and politics matters. With those outcomes, the congress was closed.
Upon return to the embassy, I found out that they had received two phone calls from the General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, the head of the state Nureddin al-Atassi who had requested to tell me, since he had caught a cold, he would like to see me at his apartment. I had such a chance only in the evening.
I and my interpreter drove up to his residence house. The guards showed us where we should park the car; then we walked. The President told me the same I had already heard of in general from Mahus. I asked, ‘Was it not possible to prevent the party split? The war has just stopped; there are a lot of things to do, which need the unity and coherence of actions to be implemented.’
He explained in detail why it became impossible to do.
We returned to the embassy. On the next morning our advisor phoned up Mahus with some urgent matter, but he got an answer that Mahus wasn’t available at the moment and wouldn’t be there for the whole day. In the afternoon Salah Jadid invited me to see him in his office in the building of the Arabic Socialist Ba’ath Party. As usual he briefly, laconically informed me saying that all the events occurred might not be the end but rather the beginning of new complications.
We were talking, sipping coffee. I was sitting with my back to the door and heard during our conversation the door was opened and immediately closed twice. The conversation lasted about two hours after which we drove to the embassy.
In the evening one of the military officers closest to the Defense Minister phoned me up and apologized, ‘My officers allowed themselves a carelessness during your conversation with Salah Jadid. Therefore, I’m apologizing again.’
I answered, ‘I don’t understand. What are you talking about?’
Then he referred to that it wasn’t convenient for him to talk about that on the phone. So, he’d better drive up to me to tell everything.
‘When you were heartily conversing with Salah Jadid,’ he told me, ‘two officers got an order to arrest him. Having opened the door to his office, they found out he wasn’t alone there. That’s why they reported that there were three people in his office. Then they got an instruction to arrest all of them together. However, when they came and opened the door again, you turned your head to look back. Having recognized you and your interpreter sitting face to them, our officers moved away immediately. After that they were commanded, ‘Do not disturb anyone, do not interrupt the conversation. Only when the Soviet Ambassador leaves and arrives at his embassy, you must arrest Salah Jadid.’
Without suspecting anything then, Salah Jadid cordially saw us off. We approached the parking lot, got into the car and drove off. Another car was imperceptibly following us and left us only when we arrived at our embassy. After a while Salah Jadid was arrested. The reason for receiving me by Nureddin al-Atassi in his apartment on the previous day could be explained by not only his sickness. It turned out that his office was already under control at that time.
Of course, none of the Soviet employees working in Syria attended the Arabic Socialist Ba’ath Party congress and heard discussions and squabbles, nor did they read shorthand reports afterwards (I am not sure if any shorthand reports were made at all). However, within two-three days all Hafez Assad’s ardent opponents were arrested. Meanwhile, Mahus with his two colleagues escaped, as it became known later, fleeing to Algeria. At the new congress sitting all the party leaders were released from their positions and were arrested later. Nureddin al-Atassi was released from his responsibilities of party General Secretary and was placed under house arrest. As a result, new leadership was formed.
In spite of the forecasts of the confronting groupings, no armed conflicts, unrests, and disorders happened in Damascus or in the whole country. Moreover, soon, as usual, demonstrations began to support the new leadership of the party and the state. Also, familiar speeches with the expression of hope and even confidence in the further development were being delivered at different forums.
Literally on the next day it was announced that Hafez Assad became the head of the government, being the Defense Minister at the same time. The Ministers Council formed by him was called ‘government of the national unity’. It included representatives of leading parties, taking progressive and patriotic positions, including the communist party: two CC Politburo members took the posts of State Minister and Minister of Post and Telegraph, respectively.
On March 12th, 1971 at the general elections Hafez Assad was elected the President and was immediately released from the positions of Prime-Minister and Defense Minister. Abdul Rahman Kleifawi was elected the Prime-Minister; Abdul Halim Khaddam became the Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Mustafa Tlass, who was previously under H. Assad the head of the General Headquarters, became the Defense Minister.
In August of the same year at the enlarged plenum meeting of the Arabic Socialist Ba’ath Party, Hafez Assad was elected the CC General Secretary. In 1972 the establishment of the National Progressive Front (NPF) which united a number of political parties and public organizations was completed. At the NPF conference Hafez Assad was elected as its chairman.
On March 12th, 1973 at the national referendum the new Constitution was approved according to which the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR) was announced as a socialist people’s democratic state. Changes happened in the structures, goals and tasks, as well as in leadership membership of public organizations relating to the youth, women, trade unions, workers, students, and peasants.
A few governors in some provinces and ambassadors to a number of countries were replaced. The elections to a new parliament membership took place.
In the foreign policy they confirmed the loyalty to the Arab States League, full support to the national liberation struggle of the Palestinian Arab people, active participation in the non-alignment movement, cooperation consolidation with the Soviet Union, other socialist and democratic states, strengthening the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and Zionism.
Economic reforms were launched. Also, the new leadership confirmed a necessity for creation of conditions for the normal development of private and state sectors and attraction of foreign capital and aid.
But everyone still kept in mind and they were eyewitnesses of serious effects of the 1967 war, pendency of many unsolved problems, ambiguity of prospects, particularly territorial and others. At the same time, all the blame was put on the previous leaders, and a hope was expressed that the new leaders would be more active and effective in their actions. It was obvious that another war was about to break out.
Despite the drastic changes in the Syrian Arabic Republic leadership, the Soviet-Syrian relations didn’t change practically. Moreover, the bilateral cooperation was developing more extensive and faster.
Syria and its new leadership indisputably needed in continued strengthened military aid in different forms. By the way, it was confirmed by the previous agreements and contracts which were still in force, though needed some correcting.
More often were heard words about the usefulness of participation of volunteers from the USSR and other socialist countries in a new war with Israel, if any. Besides, they referred to the participation of a number of military units of the neighboring Arab states, as it had happened to Chinese volunteers in the Korean war. Were given examples from western countries’ experience which sent their military units to world’s hot spots.
Such opinions received support from some military leaders both in Syria and Moscow.
Having studied materials and conversed with our military advisers and attaché, I came to the conclusion that it shouldn’t be done. Such actions could not only be really expensive for us, but also they were unacceptable for us according to our principles. That might have looked as if the Soviet Union, which had actively participated in the establishment of Israel, was now involved in the war against it.
I raised repeatedly an issue before Moscow about necessity of arrival in Syria of leaders of the USSR Defense Ministry. In order to launch an official process, in one of my conversations with Hafez Assad I expressed an opinion of expediency of establishment of direct contacts between the Soviet and Syrian military leaderships. The President was positive about it. Soon the Syrian Defense Minister, Mustafa Tlass, sent an invitation to Andrei A. Grechko, the USSR Defense Minister, to visit the country as a Syrian guest being at the head of the military delegation. Via my channel I informed the Center that at that stage of practical elaboration it would be advisable for a deputy minister, i.e., for an official military executive of a lower position, to be the first to arrive, accompanied by specialists from relevant central directorates of the Defense Ministry.
After a while the Syrian military leaders received a response from Moscow informing that the invitation was accepted with gratitude by the Soviet Defense Minister who was pleased and interested in visiting Syria, but would be able to arrive a little bit later. Meanwhile, they were ready to send the first Deputy Minister, Army General Sergey A. Sokolov together with a few executive officers from the Headquarters. The Syrians agreed to receive them at any suitable for them time.
The Soviet military delegation visited front line zones and met the military staff and the Soviet specialists working in Syria. We discussed the major issue – the status of the Soviet military men in Syria.
Without false modesty, I must say that in the main issue – the status of the Soviet military men in Syria – my standpoint was supported and in that way, we arrived at consensus with the Syrian leaders. As for the other aspects of military aid, including weapons, ammunition, spare parts, uniforms, and so on, we signed relevant agreements.
The settlement of that main issue evoking disagreements between the both sides was a joint achievement. Looking ahead, I can say that according to this status during the 1973 war our military advisors, officers, tank-men, anti-aircraft gunners were never involved directly in the military operations; instead, they trained Syrian military men sharing their knowledge and experience with them, i.e., were actually military advisors. None of our officers was killed in that war in frontline battles, nor did we receive any reproaches or accusations from the West. Only three our officers together with a few Syrian military men were killed as a result of direct bombing the Headquarters premises where they were working at that moment.
Before their departure the military delegation led by Army General Sergey Sokolov signed with the Syrian side a number of agreements relating to the armament, ammunition, spare parts, and uniforms.
In late 1972 – early 1973 the events wheel in the Middle East was speeding up and everybody realized that a war was coming soon. Some in the West then and even now are trying to some extent to blame the USSR for launching the war between the Arabs and Israel in the 1973 autumn. I was right in the center of those events then. Therefore, I can assure there were no grounds for that. On the contrary, the Soviet Union did its utmost to prevent a military conflict.
In the very early 1973 our embassy was informed of President Hafez Assad’s wish to meet the Soviet Ambassador. In the afternoon I arrived at his office with my interpreter. In the conversation he expressed a desire to visit Moscow together with other representatives of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, government executives, and National Progressive Front members and to meet Leonid I. Brezhnev, Alexei N. Kosygin, and the other Soviet leaders. Naturally, we immediately informed the Center about it and received a positive answer. Both sides started preparation for the visit and in early April we arrived in Moscow.
The negotiations started on April 11th. Immediately at the first meeting with the Soviet leaders in the Kremlin Hafez Assad informed that according to the military intelligence and other sources available at the disposal of Syria and Egypt, Israel was concentrating its troops on the boarder, intensively preparing an attack. Therefore, the war was about to break out in those days.
Brezhnev and Kosygin insistently recommended that Syria prevent a new military conflict and do its best to avoid any actions to give Israel a reason for its attack. Moreover, they emphasized that the Soviet Union was against the Arab-Israel war on principle. Finally, the mutual understanding was achieved. Thus, the Syrian delegation departed from Moscow directly to Cairo, passing Damascus, where Hafez Assad met face-to-face Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to talk in detail. It was quite possible that the Soviet leaders drew the US President’s attention to that issue, so that he could influence Israel.
After some time, on October 6th in the same year in the late evening our embassy in Damascus was informed that President Hafez Assad would like to see the Soviet Ambassador, and if the latter didn’t mind, the President's personal adjutant would come for him.
At night I with advisor Sultanov, accompanied by the arrived adjutant, left the embassy by his car. I noticed we passed the President’s residency, then the house he lived in. Finally, we drove in an abandoned garden. While the adjutant was lighting up a path for us with a pocket flashlight, in the dark we went downstairs into a deep vault and found ourselves in a spacious underground lodgment.
After we walked a few meters in a corridor, suddenly President Hafez Assad, wearing a field army uniform, came out from a side room towards us. In the next-door rooms there were almost all top-level commanders. It turned out that it was the military field headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief where the work was in full swing.
We entered the room of the Commander-in-Chief. He informed that Israel began shelling and bombardment of Syrian settlements, its military aircrafts were hovering over and bombing the Syrian area, and military operations were taking place on the border already.
‘Battles are going on,’ he continued, ‘on the border with Egypt as well.’
We immediately informed the Center. Since that day was established via our embassy, so to speak, a direct connection between the Kremlin in Moscow and the bunker of Hafez Assad in Damascus. The Soviet Union faultlessly and strictly within the framework of the agreements fulfilled its commitments as per all the paragraphs and, first of all, on military equipment supply.
The Soviet engineers and specialists were working hard at the projects sites within the Syrian-Soviet cooperation, each of whom replaced their two-three Syrian colleagues who went to fight on the war frontline. Within a few days, we evacuated the Soviet women and children back to Homeland by aircrafts and motor ships. All the employees of the Soviet embassy, trade representative office, counsellor in economics, military attaché, and other personnel were accommodated in military barracks and lived together.
The Soviet government deployed big diplomatic activities to attract attention of the world public and via the UN Security Council to get cease-fire and peaceful settlement of the conflict. The battles were severely hard. Moreover, we lost a few Soviet people as a result of the direct hit with Israeli missiles of the Soviet cultural center premises, as well as, I have already written above, the Syrian Army Headquarters.
Via the diplomatic channels of the USSR and the USA we agreed in the UN Security Council on a convocation of an international conference relating to the Israel-Arab military conflict. Syrian soldiers and officers continued fighting firmly and courageously. But … all of a sudden, the President of Egypt Anwar Sadat stopped combat operations at the Sinai Peninsula, leaving his ally Syria alone, face to face with Israel. An extremely complicated and quite dangerous situation came. Military aid of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Arab countries, as well as the foreign policy efforts halted military operations at a few tens of kilometers from Damascus.
The Geneva peaceful conference with participation of Israel, Syria, Egypt, the USSR, the USA, and the UN representatives specified the terms and conditions of the cease-fire and the postwar settlement of the conflict.
I would like to describe in detail an episode from that short war. Cairo and Damascus began military actions based on the joint Egyptian-Syrian plan. Syria invariably adhered to it. However, by the order of the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, the Egyptian troops, having crossed the Suez Canal, instead of continuing the movement towards passes at the Sinai Peninsula according to the agreement, immediately started entrenching. Anwar Sadat’s order to cease a further attack contradicted all military science principles and in fact, meant a betrayal of the Syrian army. In one of his conversations Hafez Assad explained Sadat's deed as a preliminarily planned collusion of the Egyptian President with the USA and Israel.
Adhering to the jointly developed plan of attack, the SAR President hurried Anwar Sadat in vain to move forward as fast as possible. However, the Egyptian frontline froze up on the left shore of the Suez Canal, which enabled Israel to redeploy its main army troops and military aircrafts towards Syria. Israeli military aircrafts daily implemented up to a thousand combat flights to the Syrian front areas, whereas their flights over Egyptian troops were basically limited to reconnaissance.
On October 9th civilian facilities in Damascus underwent barbarian bombing by Israeli military aircrafts. The ancient land of the city was abundantly sprinkled and shed over with blood of civilian residents – children and women. Altogether over two hundred people were slain as a result of bombing Damascus. The Soviet cultural center was destroyed by a direct hit of bombs and missiles. A banner attached to tree branches, announcing ‘The Russian language course will start on October 15th,' miraculously remained just in front of the former center ruins. It was supposed to be run by a recently arrived in Damascus from Moscow new director Alexandra Kalinycheva. Unfortunately, she was slain by an air killer as a result of bombing.
In 1941 Alexandra Kalinycheva went to the war front as a volunteer. She passed all roads of World War II in safe and sound and finished her battle way in Konigsberg. When she was suggested to be evacuated together with the other members of the Soviet colony back to the Soviet Union, she resolutely refused, ‘I wasn’t afraid of Germans. Do you think I’m afraid of Israelis?’
The administrator of the Soviet cultural center, Muhammad Amin, was killed together with Alexandra Kalinycheva. That man never lived for himself, unselfishly devoting all his time and forces to surrounding people. Being a graduate from Moscow State University, having a PhD in Law, he devoted all his conscious life to consolidation and development of the Syrian-Soviet friendship. The death reached him when he was on his job site, preparing the Program of forthcoming activities of the cultural center. Muhammad Amin never doubted the outcomes of the war and was always sure that the center would resume its work. In exactly two years, took place a commencement ceremony of a new building of the Soviet cultural center constructed in the city center of Damascus. Nowadays this center is one of the most popular cultural institutions in the Syrian capital. It is daily visited by up to 600 people. Everyone, having stepped over the threshold of the building, bows down before the memorial tablet with the names of Alexandra Kalinycheva and Muhammad Amin written on and immortalized.
The Syrian-Egyptian-Arabic war touched me as well. It was about to cause my dismissal from the post of Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador and bringing me to responsibility. Let’s recall an episode. At night on October 6th in the conversation with me in his staff-bunker where I was invited together with councilor Sultanov President Hafez Assad conveyed his thoughts and intentions. At the end he added, ‘Now only you and I know about that and comrade Brezhnev will be the third one to know. I’m requesting you to inform him urgently.’
We came back to the embassy and I immediately sent an ‘urgent telegram’ informing in detail about our conversation with the President. The telegram was marked as urgent and top secret, and it was supposed to be handed over to the addressee in person.
Three days later I was invited to the bunker again. This time the President looked gloomy, greeted me chilly and said reproachfully, ‘The Soviet leaders have let us down. The thoughts I shared with you completely confidentially are already known by a number of countries. What’s more, in one of the capitals our ambassador was invited by the government to give explanations. This is not a right way to do things. Now the Syrian ambassadors from everywhere are asking us what to answer to the leaders of the host countries. As a result, I have to think up how to get out of this situation… I didn't expect it all to happen in this way.’
I was confused. Shortly, officially, and in general we exchanged our views relating to the current issues. Then I took leave of him, returned to the embassy and urgently informed Moscow about what had happened.
At night I received a telegram with an indication: ‘Urgently provide a full text of the first conversation with President Hafez Assad which he is referring to.’ I sent a short response: ‘In my telegram I expounded a full text. There is nothing else I can add to it.’
Later it was cleared up that at that time Leonid Brezhnev wasn’t available in his office because he was sick. Having received my second telegram about Hafez Assad being offended and dissatisfied, Andrei Gromyko (the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs) showed all the three telegrams to Mikhail Suslov and commented, ‘Mukhitdinov must have informed us incorrectly at first.’
Then Mikhail Suslov appended a resolution on the last ‘urgent telegram’: ‘N. A. Mukhitdinov must be brought to the state and party responsibility.’
It happened in the late evening. The next morning L.I. Brezhnev came to work and A. Gromyko informed him about what had happened, of course, having put the whole blame on me, and said he was going to summon me to Moscow to demand an explanation from me and to bring me to responsibility.
Leonid Ilich Brezhnev read all my telegrams and having thought for a while said, ‘I can’t believe it. He is an experienced, competent diplomat. He shouldn’t be summoned here. How shall we explain it to Hafez Assad if we summon our ambassador during the war? We’d better send a serious expert to sort out the problem on the site.’
On the same day I received a telegram: ‘The first Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V.V. Kuznetsov, is going to Damascus. Arrange his meeting with Hafez Assad.’
Having arrived in Damascus, Vasiliy Vasilievich Kuznetsov didn’t tell me anything about the purpose of his trip. I told him the President would receive him in two hours. He informed Moscow by telegram of his arrival and asked us where he could have a rest for a while. We saw him off to a guest room.
At the appointed time we went to see Hafez Assad. Then, in the bunker when going downstairs Vasiliy Kuznetsov told me that he would speak with the President about my last telegrams to Moscow. In the bunker after formal greetings we got down to the subject matter. V. Kuznetsov explained that he had arrived with the mission to sort out the problem relating to the mutual information that had made the President upset. Then he read out the full text of my first telegram which was translated by Assad’s interpreter. To Vasiliy Kuznetsov’s question if there were any distortions in the text, Hafez Assad replied there weren’t any and confirmed that everything was right.’
Feeling embarrassed and awkward, Vasiliy Vasilievich said, ‘If our ambassador informed precisely, that means the information leak has happened somewhere else.’
‘It sounds like that,’ the President agreed.
V. Kuznetsov assured him, ‘The Soviet side will investigate this. But you, Mr. President, should not doubt the sincerity of the USSR position which intends to fulfil its commitments and render support to Syria.’
Hafez Assad requested V. Kuznetsov to stay in Damascus until the full clarification of the circumstances by the Soviet side: he would like to hear the results personally from him.
We got out of the bunker and drove away. In the embassy V. Kuznetsov wrote a telegram confirming the preciseness of my message to Moscow and informing that the Syrian President had familiarized himself with the full text, had confirmed it and expressed a desire to know what had happened actually. After that V. Kuznetsov suggested to go to the embassy country house. After a rest for a while, he was informed that an ‘urgent telegram’ came from Moscow. Then, we returned to the embassy. The telegram said: ‘To comrades Kuznetsov and Mukhitdinov. A mistake occurred for a technical reason. This is for your personal reference only. At night the telegram was received by a quite inexperienced diplomat. Since the subject matter concerned the warfare, he made markup on it as follows: ‘To urgently inform the ambassadors to the adjacent Arab states.’ He didn’t notice the note on the telegram top. The guilty has been punished. Inform the President about it and jointly determine the further actions.’
At first, I suggested that Vasili Vasilievich Kuznetsov visit Hafez Assad on his own for giving explanations, but he insisted that we go together. He told the President that there was a misunderstanding. Leonid Brezhnev had been sick and Andrei Gromyko had been away. Then he said, ‘The diplomat who was on duty at that time has been punished and fired from work. We will fix what happened. I have been assigned to think together with you over how to jointly act further.’
Having listened, Hafez Assad noted, ‘Yes… We’ve been learning much from the Soviet Union. However, such an ‘experience’ is hardly worth learning and being borrowed. Let’s go for a dinner together and talk it over there.’
Anyway, the problem was sorted out.
I knew very well the diplomat who was told to be ‘inexperienced’ and who became a ‘scapegoat’. When I met him in Moscow, we firmly shook our hands and ‘argued’ a little bit for the reason regarding who had let whom down. Our opinions coincided since we both knew very well whose fault it was actually.
Frankly speaking, Vasili Kuznetsov left the country in not a really good mood after finishing his mission caused by a bad publicity made by that event to the Soviet leaders. However, soon he returned to Syria as the head of a group of diplomats and consultants, representing the Soviet side in negotiations with Americans, Arabs, and Israelis to settle the war outcomes.
Contacts in different spheres between the two countries were strengthened. Soon after the war and finishing his visit to Iraq, the USSR Defense Minister, Andrei A. Grechko, arrived in Damascus, accompanied by a group of marshals, commanders of different kinds of troops, and generals. On his arrival day he spoke out Leonid Brezhnev’s oral message in warm expressions addressing to President Hafez Assad when meeting. The delegation visited military troops, military training institutions and got familiarized with the results of the past war and draft projects on the Syrian military forces building. Andrei Grechko was always accompanied by the Syrian Defense Minister, Mustafa Tlass, and the top commanders of the Syrian army. The cooperation prospects for the military forces of both countries and making sure that the signed agreements be implemented were discussed over.
Also, a funny thing happened. Syrian officers jokingly told the Soviet Minister that by his appearance he seemed to embody the Soviet military power, being tall, well built, with a resolute sweeping gait, being sometimes a bit rude up to familiarities. Having met and accommodated him in a given by Syrians residence house, I left him. After meeting the President, I didn’t come to see him and only came to the residence in the evening. When I entered the house, I saw the generals openly smiling and quietly exchanging words with each other. I was embarrassed to ask them about what was going on. Seeing me wondered, the aviation Marshal touched my arm and showed me to the porch. Walking with him, I suddenly saw through the window Andrei Antonovich Grechko merrily flirting with a beautiful young woman.
I asked the Minister’s adjutant, ‘Who and where is she from?’
At first, he hesitated whether to say; however, then he explained. It turned out that during their visit to Iraq they managed to go to a folklore concert where everybody liked very much the performance of a famous young singer and dancer. Andrei Antonovich invited her. Thus, she with her teacher who always accompanied and took care of her arrived in Damascus and came to him. And he suggested them to stay.
I called our military attaché and supply administrator and told them to get two flight tickets to Baghdad by any means, then to accommodate those both women in a hotel, to present them gifts, to take them for dinner and afterwards to send them home. So, they did. Nevertheless, that episode was a reason for jokes for a while.
At the end of the stay all the delegation members received gifts, and Andrei Grechko was presented a sword made out of the famous Damascus steel. Sabers, swords, and sheaths made out of the Damascus steel were famed for many centuries. Even Alexander the Great highly valued those items made by Syrian armorers.
In April 1974, by a mutual agreement, with an official visit, the Syrian state and party delegation arrived in Moscow. This time it consisted of very important persons, including leaders of all parties, who were the National Progressive Front members, the Prime-Minister and his deputies, the parliament chairman, the Defense Minister and a few his deputies, and leaders of public organizations.
In Moscow at the airport the delegation was met by Leonid Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin, Andrei Grechko, representatives of ministries, bodies, and public. A guard of honor was set out, speeches were made, and thousands of Muscovites warmly greeted the delegation as victors on route its moving about Moscow. President Hafez Assad was accommodated in the Kremlin where Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin saw him to his lodging and where they were sitting and talking altogether for a while. The other delegation members were accommodated in the government mansions.
I have already written about one diplomatic incident during the first official meeting of the Syrian and Soviet leaders. Having made definite efforts, I succeeded in adjusting disappointing blunder and on April 11th the negotiations began. They were held successfully. Everything as per the Program of their stay in the country was implemented. As usual, while the documents were being prepared to be signed, the guests were visiting the republics including Uzbekistan. The leaders who had already visited Tashkent last time were met like old friends. The other delegation members familiarized themselves with people’s life in Uzbekistan with a great interest for the first time.
Soon upon arrival in Tashkent, President Hafez Assad asked me, ‘Last time we visited your father. He was sick. How is he now? I would like to see him again. I’ve heard you’ve got a lot of relatives here?’
The republic leaders who were present during that conversation gathered almost all my kinfolk in my father’s house. The President came there and Syrian photographers took photos of that meeting for a remembrance.
The issues considered during that arrival of the Syrian leaders, achieved and signed agreements opened a new stage of the bilateral mutual relations. Hafez Assad invited Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin to visit Syria soon. Also, a number of the Soviet Union leaders were invited.
The Syrian delegation was returning to Damascus in a good mood, being satisfied, and I was accompanying them. There were two of us, the President and I, in the President’s compartment on the plane where we were excitedly, frankly talking about the development prospects of Syria and the Middle East. We were conversing without an interpreter, because I already spoke Arabic and the President was pretty good in Russian.
It seems to me the Syrian leaders were in a good mood for the last years not only because of the contacts with the Soviet Union leaders, but also due to a direct concrete assistance rendered by them. The latest event of that nature happened in the summer, 1973.
The construction of the water-power complex with a water reservoir of 730 square kilometers on the Euphrates river was completed, which enabled to irrigate additional 640 thousand hectares of land. On July 5th in As-Saur, the river was blocked. The Soviet party and government delegation led by Politburo member, CC secretary, Andrei P. Kirilenko, arrived from Moscow to participate in the ceremonies on that occasion.
A few hundred thousand people participated in a meeting there. President Hafez Assad made a welcoming speech after a report made by the head of the construction. Andrei Kirilenko congratulated the Soviet and Syrian builders with the completion of the important national economic construction. Then the command to take a sluice away was given.
It’s difficult to describe by words the delight and enthusiasm of the participants in the meeting. People applauded, shouted, hugged, danced when vigorous vivifying water flow gushed out into the bowl of the reservoir. Bedouins sitting solemnly on their colorfully decorated camels gaily fired into the sky from their guns they never left and saluted in honor of that wonderful celebration.
Launching the water reservoir into operation, the creation of state farms on the irrigated lands, as well as the construction of the plant of nitrogen fertilizers with the USSR’s assistance in the area of Lake Homs enabled to considerably increase production of agricultural products within a few years. We rendered the big assistance to Syria in search and development of oil fields and construction of oil pipelines. One of the first oil pipelines was launched in May, 1968. By 1973, a total length of the oil pipelines was 1800 km. They linked oil fields in Iraq and Saudi Arabia with the Syrian ports. If in 1960 Syria didn’t have the oil production industry at all, in ten years its outcome was over 4 million tons and by 1974 – over six and a half million tons. The same could be said about phosphates the production of which in 1974 amounted to 650 thousand tons for the first time. The production of sodium salt by that time had increased by four times versus in 1960 and of cement - had doubled.
The Soviet specialists not only shared their knowledge and experience with their Syrian colleagues, but also helped in the Training Center of professional technical education built with the USSR’s assistance for training general and skilled workers.
It substantially favored to develop different industrial sectors. For example, the cotton yarn production from 1960 to 1973 increased by over three times, and the textile manufacture of cotton and silk fabrics they hadn't had before now amounted to approximately 28 thousand tons.
Most of domestic transportation in Syria was by vehicles. Therefore, a completion of the railway construction in due time with assistance of Soviet specialists was a big event, and for that reason a plant for iron concrete ties production was built in Aleppo. The length of the railway was about two thousand kilometers.
There were much more examples of economic cooperation of the USSR and Syria, which were an evidence of our great attention to Syria. Therefore, it wasn’t easy for our embassy as well: a few dozen thousands of Soviet skilled workers, specialists, and military men worked in Syria.
In addition to governmental and official delegations, dozens of expertise, party, youth, trade unions, and other delegations visited Syria. We did our best in our embassy, so that those delegations could bring a mutual benefit.
I call to mind an arrival of the world's first woman-astronaut Valentina Tereshkova, her trips around the country, and meetings in Palestinian refugees’ camps.
Syria was also visited by Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia Pimen at the head of the Russian Orthodox Church delegation. He was warmly received not only by Syrian co-religionists living in the country, but also by the state leadership.
In a year and a half after visiting Syria by Patriarch Pimen, Ziyauddin Ishan Babakhan - the Chief Mufti of Central Asia and Kazakhstan - had many meetings all over Syria. His visit was of a particular significance and resonance because the vast majority of the Syrian population profess, as we know, Islam. The President rewarded Patriarch and Mufti with honored medals.
Permanent planned cooperation and regular top-level contacts were established between the CPSU, the Ba’ath Party, and the Syrian communist party. The CPSU delegation led by the Politburo member, the CC first secretary of the Communist party of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev, visited Syria as guests of the Ba’ath party. The delegation had quite wide contacts with the Ba’ath party, communists, workers and peasants. Thus, the Ba’ath party leaders had a few conversations with the Soviet guests.
Annual international exhibitions with participation of many countries from all the continents were held in Damascus. The Soviet Union was always represented by two pavilions – all-union and one dedicated to one of the Soviet republics, owing to which Syrians and foreign guests had a chance every year to be familiarized with the achievements, life, culture, and traditions of different peoples of the USSR. Soviet pavilions were regularly visited by not only residents of the country and its guests, but also necessarily by government executives led by the Prime-Minister and the President.
Once I suddenly received a pleasant surprise in connection with such an exhibition: comrades from Kazakhstan provided my family with nearly half-a-year supply of meat and milk. That is how it happened.
The Kazakh participants laid a rich, exotic display in their pavilion and put next to it a nomad tent made out of large white felt mat and decorated with traditional interior. A representative delegation led by deputy Chairman of the Ministers Council of the Kazakhstan SSR, D.A. Kuznetsov, including folk singers, dancers, musicians wearing picturesque national costumes, arrived. Also, the traditional Kazakh food was widely displayed. That was why I was lucky.
Dinmukhamed M. Kunayev and I were old friends and remained friends during all dramatic turnarounds. It was then that at his suggestion a big oak barrel was brought to the exhibition. That barrel with a hermetical cover was stuffed with kazi (national sausages made of horse meat) in red-hot grease. Conserved in that way, this food product can be kept for years. Besides kazi, a hermetically plugged container had a hundred bottles of fine koumiss (traditional fermented mare's milk).
‘This is all for you,’ said the head of the Kazakhstan delegation at the exhibition, 'to treat the Syrian leaders with the Kazakh delicatessens.’
By the way, according to Sergey T. Aksakov (a Russian writer) who lived in the city of Ufa for a long time in the 19th century, koumiss, which is sometimes called ‘steppe champagne’, contains a lot of vitamins, protein, sugar, and mineral salt. ‘Life-giving koumiss has already ripened, soured in mare's tursuks (a bag made of raw leather); and everyone who can drink, from an infant to a decrepit old man, drinks this healing, healthy and strong drink to be completely drunk; and all the ailments of severe hungry winter and even senility miraculously disappear: haggard faces are getting plump, pale sunken cheeks are getting covered with a healthy blush.'
The Kazakhs presented those treats with all their heart. However, a misfire occurred because they didn’t know traditions and customs of the country and its population. Although Syrian horse breeding was well developed, a horse for an Arab is a friend, a holy animal like a cow for Indians. It’s prohibited to kill horses, and Arabs never eat horse meat and drink mare’s milk.
What's more, in our embassy the overwhelming majority were Slavs. Thus, apart from me, practically no one could appreciate this delicious, nutritious sausage and health-giving drink. That’s why I had to regale myself with those treats for a long time and to thank Dinmukhamed Akhmedovich Kunayev and our Kazakh friends.
I have already written about my attitude towards establishment of the diplomatic relations with Israel. I had to deal with that problem in Syria with the help of the Finnish Ambassador to Israel who represented the Soviet Union’s interests there. He often visited me in Damascus to tell me about the current events in Israel. From him I came to know about Israel’s growing interest towards the Soviet Union and their desire to restore our relationships, as well as about their moods under which Israel surrounded by the Arabs couldn’t and didn’t have to be guided by only the USA and Zionism.
I informed the Center about everything, adding my own considerations to the Finnish Ambassador's information. I repeatedly highlighted the necessity to establish the diplomatic relations with Israel at meetings with the state top leaders. Nevertheless, it never happened in the years of my work as the Ambassador to Syria.
On November 16th, 1976 the deputy Chairman of the Republic Ministers Council, M. T. Tursunov, made a phone call from Tashkent to Damascus. He told me that my father’s health had dramatically worsened. He was taken to hospital. Doctors were doing their utmost to save him, but they didn’t exclude the worst scenario.
‘He wants to see you very much,’ Minovar Tursunovich said, ‘He is only talking about it. You should come over as soon as possible if you can.’
I was dumbfounded with that alarming news. After all my father lived with us for year and a half in Syria, was in a good shape and travelled with me not only about the country provinces, but also visited adjoining countries. All of a sudden, such news arrived…
Three hours later the embassy received an urgent telegram from Andrei Gromyko. Having informed me of a bad condition of my father, he allowed me to fly to Tashkent. I started finding out how to do that faster. It turned out that a scheduled airliner had left on the previous day and the next one would only fly in three days. What should I do?! We started searching for other flights via Europe.
According to the rule, the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SMFA) was informed that the Soviet Ambassador was leaving the country for his Homeland for a few days for his family reasons. Soon the chancellery head of the SMFA phoned me up and asked when and how I was going to fly. I told him there wasn’t a direct flight to my Homeland. So, I was figuring out how to leave on the same day. In half an hour he phoned us back and said that soon a Syrian aircraft was about to fly to Cyprus and if the Ambassador would like to, he might fly by that plane. Syrians via their channels would immediately tell their representative in Cyprus to book a passenger seat for the further flight to Moscow.
Thus, I left Damascus by plane for Homeland. I had stopover in Cyprus and soon left for Moscow. Unfortunately, the weather was nasty. It was relatively good and tranquil over the Mediterranean Sea, whereas while we were flying over the other seas, it was really stormy and raining cats and dogs along the aircraft route. That’s why our aircraft was flying hard and had to make a stopover in Odessa. Of course, nobody met me there. However, I got lucky. Another plane was flying to Moscow in an hour. I managed to change my tickets for that flight and continue my trip.
The plane arrived in Moscow at night. I was met by the deputy permanent representative of Uzbekistan, Tikhomirov, and my daughter, Saida. Tikhomirov condoled and said, ‘We have just received a phone call from Tashkent. Your father has passed away. They are waiting for you.’
Further he informed that soon an airplane was about to leave the Domodedovo airport for Tashkent, and there was an agreement with the head of the airport about my flight by that plane. Thus, we immediately rushed directly from the Sheremetyevo airport to the Domodedovo one. Fortunately, the plane already ready to take off was on the runway. We landed in Tashkent in the early morning. Among those who met me at the airport, there was the doctor who had treated my father. He told me about my father’s last minutes, the reasons for his death, and that my father asked the doctor every time he saw him if Nuritdin had come. Feeling his life was leaving him, my father said, ‘Tell Nuritdin I’m happy with him and giving him my blessing. Being serene I’m leaving my life quietly, knowing our kin will never fade away. Tell Nuritdin to return home as soon as possible. He must replace me, become the head of our kin, so that our children, grandchildren, and all kinsfolk won’t be scattered and gone with the wind.’
My father’s body had already been transferred to my brother Ziyavutdin’s house. For that reason, we drove directly from the airport to his place where there were already a lot of people. Without shaking hands and greeting, I entered the room where my father was lying and firmly hugged him. Without hiding my tears, I was sitting next to him for a long time…
Fathers and mothers are dear to everybody’s heart. My particular deep affection towards my father, apart from the natural filial feeling, was connected with the fact that I lost my mother very early. She passed away in 1951 at the age of 53. So, I tried to take care about my father for the rest of my life.
My father was a wise man who had seen a lot in his life. When I was promoted to a higher position, he would softly convince me not to overestimate myself and be ready for any turnabouts and vicissitudes of fate. When I felt bad, he would invigorate and advised me to remain myself and not to give way to feelings.
I seldom visited my father for his last 19 years: only when I was in Tashkent on my business trips or when he visited us. After the 22nd party congress when I got into trouble, he arrived in Moscow. There was only one bed in one of the bedrooms in our new apartment, so he slept in my bed and I slept on the floor mat. Lying there, we had long heart-to-heart talks about life. My father was talking quietly, calmly trying to instill confidence in me, convincing that the truth and justice would eventually triumph and Allah (God) would show his mercy. Indeed, we were so happy when he lived with us in Syria!
Now there was his breathless body lying in front of me… He had fallen ill by accident. His old friends came to visit him. They ate pilau and had tea; then my father, wearing light clothes, went out to see them off. It was late autumn and the temperature was below zero degree by Celsius. He caught a cold, had a running temperature and got pneumonia which occurred lethal for him.
Nearby our home, there were ambulance cars, buses, and cars ready to go to the cemetery. The distance from home to the cemetery was about five kilometers. I suggested not to use cars and to carry my father on the shoulders to the burial place according to the Muslim traditions.
We moved towards the cemetery Sheikhzin-buva. It took about one hour. We came up to our hilhona – our family place where our ancestors’ remnants lie. The grave was already ready. Having put the stretcher on the ground, everybody squatted down and a mullah started reading Koran (the Holy Book for Muslims), pronouncing parting words to the deceased man and his living family people.
The mullah finished his part of the ceremony, and before lowering the body into the grave, I asked him and all the attendees for a permission to carry out a short mourning meeting. Everybody agreed, although it was a violation of a religious ritual.
Shogies - a friend of mine, the district head, was the first to speak, then the chairman of the district committee spoke. At the end after all speakers I spoke, ‘Father, forgive me, please, that I have been late for you. Having received the worrying news, I had to fly changing flights by four planes over the five seas and a few countries. Despite my efforts, I arrived a few hours late and was deprived of a chance to hear your last words. From now on I will reproach myself for that delay for the rest of my life. Thank you, my dearest dad, for all you have done for me and all your sons, daughters, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and your close people. We will always be grateful to you that you have never hurt anybody’s feelings in your life and always done your best for the sake of others. My dearest father! We have been together in this world, and I’m dreaming of being with you in another world, too. We all are guests on Earth,’ I addressed to the attendees, ‘Sooner or later for everyone the time to part with one’s life will inevitably come. When my turn comes, wherever I will pass away, I am requesting to bring my body here to be buried here next to my father Shomuhitdin, mother Sabriniso, grandfather Akramsho, grandmother Nuribuvi, great-grandfather Shoyakub, and our other ancestors. Sleep well, my dearest father! None of us will let you down and soil your sacred for us name! I swear to you that soon I will come back to our native land and do my best to make all your children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and kinfolk live together, love, respect each other and serve their homeland and people. May you rest in peace!’
My father’s body was taken off the stretcher and placed into a horizontal recess of the grave. The niche was blocked with bricks, then the grave was covered up with soil. The mullah again read Koran asking Allah to accept the soul of the deceased with peace and wished all the attendees health and well-being. On that, the sorrowful ceremony was finished.
By tradition, a funeral repast is to be held on the seventh, twentieth, fortieth days and in a year after death. Because I had to come back urgently to Damascus, I asked to hold the first funeral repast on the third day instead of the seventh one.
We held the commemorating ceremony at my youngest brother Jalal’s house in Allan street. By tradition, in the early morning at his home and in the yard the tables were set with fruit, sweets, and flatbread. The bowls of pilau and teapots with tea were served. A few mullahs were saying remembering prayers in turn. Each group of visitors spend about 20-30 minutes to honor my father’s memory, and after eating some food, gave the place to the next group.
A lot of people came to honor my father’s memory. People were moving in a nonstop flow. There were over a thousand people. Having expressed their condolences, leaving they wished us health and almost each one asked me, ‘When will you come back? Come back soon!’
Recalling those sad for me days, I feel grateful to the then Chairman of the Republic Ministers Council, Normakhonmadi Khudaiberdiev, and executive secretary of the Ministers Council, Timur Alimov, who rendered their invaluable assistance and gave a hand in the funeral.
The next day I met Sharof Rashidov. In his office there was the CC secretary, Kurbanov. So, the three of us had a conversation. Having expressed his condolences, Sharof Rashidov said that he had phoned Andrei Gromyko and asked for his permission to let me urgently arrive in Tashkent. Also, he had visited my father and taken care of his treatment. At the end he repeated what he had told me before many times, ‘You have already worked far from your home for twenty years. Isn't that enough? You ought to return to the republic. There is a great deal to do. Let’s work together.’
I clearly realized there might arise unforeseen complications. But I couldn’t help implementing my father’s will and numerous wishes of my compatriots. What’s more, I had wanted to return to my own country for a long time. At the end of our conversation I accepted Sharof Rashidov’s suggestion.
Sharof Rashidov offered me to stay in Tashkent for a few days and visit some districts, but I had to refuse. Bidding farewell, we firmly shook our hands and he said, ‘See you soon.’
On the way back to Syria I made a stop in Moscow, and on the next day Leonid Brezhnev received me. He expressed his condolences because of my father’s death. He inquired about a few Syrian issues. And for this time, I spoke about the establishment of normal relations with Israel. However, Brezhnev said, ‘We won’t hurry up with that.’
At the end of our meeting, I told him about my desire to finally and permanently return to Tashkent and about Sharof Rashidov’s attitude to that. Leonid Ilich did not immediately, but nevertheless agreed. Having left his office, I wrote a formal request to release me from responsibilities of the Ambassador.
In Damascus I was invited by Hafez Assad. Being well informed, he condoled with me and my family members. He was unexpectedly surprised with my decision to return to Uzbekistan.
The embassy employees also expressed their sorrow. I told them I was going to return to my homeland for family reasons.
On April 2nd in the evening we landed in Moscow. We were met by our children and other relatives. At home they thoroughly prepared for our arrival. A festive table was ready for us. Most our relatives and close friends met us wearing national clothes: women - in traditional silk dresses and men - in cotton robes and skullcaps. Those who met us at the airport, having crossed the home threshold, also quickly changed their clothes and made me and Mukarram do the same. And right away we felt home.
A telephone rang in an hour. My daughter picked up a phone receiver and having said that Pegov wanted to talk to me, she passed me a receiver. I had known Nikolai Mikhailovich Pegov before. He was a secretary of a number of large party committees in the Far East, worked as CC CPSU secretary, secretary of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, ambassador, and deputy minister of foreign affairs. Recently he became the head of the department of the CC staff working abroad.
We greeted each other. He asked how the flight had been and if we were fine, then he welcomed us warmly. Then he said, ‘We need to talk. When can you come to the CC?’
‘At any time,’ I replied.
Having thought for a short while, he suggested, ‘It’s late right now and tomorrow is Sunday. Have a rest with your children and on Monday we can meet.’ On that, we bade farewell.
Our whole family spent the next day outdoors in nature. Fortunately, the snow didn’t melt yet and in spite of the spring, the weather was still quite wintry. We were walking till the noon in the pine forest where we had lunch enjoying homemade food. In the afternoon, we grilled shish kebab in a birch grove. We enjoyed walking in the nature setting very much. I’ve been to many countries in different seasons, but Moscow suburban vicinities and forests are incomparable with anything else.
In the afternoon during our walks and in the evening at home we animatedly discussed the date of our flight to Tashkent, where we were going to live and what we were going to do. Some of our children regretted because of their poor Uzbek, and they were going to make up a leeway. Walking in the forest and laughing, we planned to compete in the evening in perfect eating pilau using just fingers. The day passed wonderfully.
On Monday morning, as we agreed, I went to the CC to see Nikolai Pegov. Having asked about my family and the passed weekend, he said, ‘We’ve got a proposal to recommend you for a position of deputy chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the USSR.’
I didn’t expect it at all. At first, I even thought I misheard. But, as I had formed a habit for years, I gave no sign and quietly asked if he knew about my conversation with Sharof Rashidov and his proposal to me to return to the republic and after that my conversation with Leonid Brezhnev.’
Nikolai Mikhailovich answered, ‘I’ve got no idea about it. I’ve been assigned to propose you this position.’
Without asking him any more, I answered in short, ‘OK.’
He picked up the phone receiver and phoned the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, B.A. Borisov, and said that the CC recommended Nuritdin Mukhitdinov for a position of deputy chairman.
The conversation was finished. I thanked Pegov and directly from there I went to the Chamber. Fortunately, it wasn’t far from there, in Kuibisheva street.
The chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Boris Andrianovich, and his deputy Yevgeny P. Pitovranov were old acquaintances. They both were in the office. They warmly welcomed and congratulated me with my new position. Together we went upstairs and entered my new office. Yevgeny Pitovranov and I had a common reception room.
I entered my office and looked around imagining myself working here. Pitovranov came in and invited me for a lunch a bit later.
As soon as he left the room, a liaison officer arrived and handed me over a big red envelope. I opened it and saw a document in it saying the following:
‘Concerning comrade Mukhitdinov, N.A.
1. To approve of the proposal on appointment of comrade Mukhitdinov, N.A. as Deputy Chairman of the CCI (Chamber of Commerce and Industry) of the USSR.
2. To fix a personal monthly salary in the amount of 450 rubles, as an exception, for comrade Mukhitdinov, N.A. and to keep his right to use the 1st polyclinic of the 4th Main Department of the Health Ministry of the USSR, as well as the healthy food cafeteria.
April 2nd, 1977 M. Suslov’
Thus, the decision was made on the day of my arrival from Damascus, although nobody at that moment talked to me about that point. Apparently, they considered my phone conversation with Nikolai Pegov, during which we didn’t talk about my employment as we just spoke about our seeing, sufficient.
The decision document was handed me over in a few hours after I had started work, and it was signed neither by the first party leader, nor by the Ministers Council Chairman, but by acting ‘second’ CC secretary. However, indeed, they showed concern for me – treatment, nutrition, and even the salary exceeding the one of the first deputy were provided…
In the late afternoon I was summoned by the CCI Chairman. When I entered his office, I saw some people there. They were CCI employees. Boris Andrianovich Borisov introduced me to them, now we became colleagues, and announced that I had started work. In a few days the resolution by the Ministers Council about my appointment was received.
I was walking home slowly, without rushing, and was pondering over my situation. What should I tell my wife, children, and grandchildren? For all our hopes and plans were foiled. We couldn't return to Tashkent and would have to stay in Moscow. How would they apprehend that news? What would they think of that?
I told them nothing that evening because I didn’t want to spoil their good mood and make them feel frustrated. I tried to joke, smile and took part in a family merriment, though I felt a nagging anxiety at the bottom of my heart.
The next day I went to work in the Chamber, and only in the evening at home having gathered all my family, I announced that we would stay in Moscow. They all gasped with surprise, they just couldn’t believe that. I explained, ‘So it is necessary. I need to work here. You all will study and work in Moscow. You should think about what and how to do this.’
Days and weeks were elapsing. I agreed with Boris Borisov that I would deal with the union republics and foreign activities under the CCI. It was an interesting job and I didn’t notice the summer coming.
In early June one of the deputies of our chairman, D. Filippov, came to see me and said, ‘Comrade Gustov phoned from the PCC (Party Control Committee). He asked you to call him back.’
I dialed his number, but nobody answered. Having put the receiver, I thought, ‘We have known each other for a long time; and when he was the first secretary of the Novgorod regional party committee, he visited me in the CC and I sometimes visited the region and rendered assistance to him in solving some issues. Why didn’t he phone me up by himself?’
In an hour or so I finally reached him by phone. Having greeted he asked, ‘Could you come to me?’
‘When?’ I asked.
‘You can do it right now.’
We met in half an hour. He was the first to start speaking, ‘You know, I’m talking to you by an order of the PCC chairman, Arvid Ianovich Pelshe, and the CC leadership. There are some papers concerning you sent by Andrei Gromyko to the CC CPSU. They were sent to us, the PCC, for consideration and making a decision. That’s why I asked you to come.’
‘What are they about?’ It was my first question.
‘It turned out that when working in Damascus, you wrote a few Memos that negatively covered activities of a number of Soviet leaders, gathered papers describing negatively particular aspects of our policy. Also, there are some brochures, books, and other documents by foreign authors which are impregnated with anti-Soviet spirit.’
I couldn’t believe my ears and asked, ‘Where did you get this all from?’
He answered, ‘I will only tell you in confidence. You sent them by himself to the MFA (ministry of foreign affairs) by diplomatic post.’
Now it became clear to me what he was talking about and I said, ‘I see. I’m at your disposal. Do whatever you should do.’
‘Nuritdin Akramovich,’ Gustov continued, ‘do not take it as an insult, please. I’m just doing my assignment. I’m sure there can’t be any pretensions of political nature to you. But assignment must be done. I think we’ll sort it out.’
‘What should I do?’
‘We decided to do in the following way,’ he answered. ‘Now your papers are being investigated. Then a summary with a conclusion will be made, after which we’ll talk to you essentially about the subject matter. Meanwhile, you can’t leave the city as apparently we’ll have a number of meetings.’
After leaving the PCC it took me time to pull myself together. I was wondering, trying to find answers. What might have happened? What was going on? Just a few months ago Andrei Gromyko presented me with an ‘Order of Nations Friendship’ in Damascus, firmly shaking my hand, highly appreciating my merits and other good personality traits of a person and a diplomat both. Despite that he instantly, without hesitation signed a slanderous Report to the PCC about allegedly most likely crime I had committed. Mikhail Suslov familiarized himself with the Report and sent it to the PCC. Of course, he had a grudge against me and had wanted to come down hard on me for a long time. However, Suslov was quite cunning. So, he didn’t endorse that Report, but ordered orally, ‘There is a document signed by Andrei Gromyko. We need to prosecute and bring Mikhitdinov to the party and state responsibility.’ I guess Arvid Pelshe undertook implementing the assignment with great pleasure. We had been on unfriendly terms for about twenty years.
In 1958, being the CC secretary and the CC CPSU Presidium member, I was the head of the control commission for monitoring and sorting out a number of complications arising inside the Latvian Communist party. The commission worked for about a couple of weeks or so. We thoroughly looked into disagreements occurring in the top party echelon and the behavior of top party leaders and statesmen. We met representatives of different population strata – from leaders of many trade unions and economic divisions to intelligentsia and secret service agencies.
The study of the issue and a thorough look into the methods of Latvian party bodies revealed essential shortcomings in their work and first of all in political-educational aspect. But at the closed meeting of the CC bureau of the Latvian Communist party, the second CC secretary, Arvid I. Pelshe, assigned all the blame to the first CC secretary, Ian E. Kalnberzin, who had held that position since 1940. Being received in Moscow by the top Soviet leaders, he made a proposal to oust Ian Kaliberzin from his job.
Arvid Pelshe reported to those who wanted to promote him for a position of First CC secretary of the Communist party of the republic. During preliminary consideration of that issue I and two more members of the commission spoke against it; thus, his promotion was foiled. It was frankly said about Arvid Pelshe’s personal mistakes in the ideological and manpower work and his improper attitude to leading representatives of Latvian intelligentsia. Therefore, he didn’t get the position of the republic leader at that time, but he became the leader later in 1959. Seven years later at the proposal by Mikhail Suslov he was appointed the chairman of the Party Control Committee of the CC CPSU and became a member of the party CC Politburo.
Also, I knew him relating to the USSR Supreme Soviet when he was a member and I was the chairman of the Commission of foreign affairs of the Soviet of Nationalities. I often had to correct him even there. So now he was at power. And it was him who would decide on my fate now.
Everything started from a noble idea, which by the way was warmly supported by Andrei Gromyko as well. At that time, he was in Damascus, and I told him twice that I was gathering materials and was going to write about our policy in the East.
During the years of my life and work in Syria I stored up a considerable number of books, brochures, and my personal notes on different topics. I decided not to take them along with me on the airplane. Instead, I mailed them by diplomatic post to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In fact, it was a total of two middle-sized diplomatic post bags. They were packed, sewed up and sealed as per the rules by special service officers in the embassy. Diplomatic couriers picked up those bags and delivered them with the official post to the MFA, handed them over in the special department, having informed the head of the Middle East department, Setenko, to whom I had addressed them.
In Damascus I used any chance to visit the Arab Academy, the National Library, different scientific centers, committees on Palestinian issue, Islam religion, and so on. Habitually, I always wanted to read more and study as much as possible interesting for me matters. At my request embassy employees used to bring me materials to read from which I copied out something and then returned them. For instance, in the diplomatic post bag there was a book ‘My Life’ by Leon Trotsky published in Arabic. Having read it, I took a few notes for myself; or for instance, the BAATH newspaper published a large article about Leon Trotsky on occasion of his 90th anniversary. It had some information much of which I hadn’t known before. Indeed, our press didn’t write anything except scolding him. We all had been brain washed with an idea of him being our foe number one, anti-Soviet, anti-Leninist, and so on. Thus, that article was found in my personal archive. I also had a lot of interesting books by a number of western authors which in detail covered a history and policies of the USSR, including republics in particular. Of course, they were written from a specific point of view and included many negative statements towards the CPSU. Sometimes I encountered books by emigrants and those who during the war had been captured and now lived in the West. Besides, there were a lot of personal papers in those two bags. Of course, I didn’t do any copies of telegrams relating to my job because it was prohibited. Nor did I make any daily notes. However, I used to note down some my thoughts, considerations, and conclusions, including those concerning some issues about which I reported to the leaders in the Center. For example, I wrote my remarks regarding Andrei Gromyko in connection with his meetings with Henry Kissinger and his stay in Damascus, about some weak points in our foreign policy. I also wrote about Syrians' disappointment and frustration caused by Leonid Brezhnev’s refusal to visit Syria and about successful visit to the country by Alexei Kosygin, Andrei Kirilenko, and Valentina Tereshkova.
Since I was born to a Muslim family, I have always been interested in a history of this religion, a history of the Koran writing, the Sharia, Hadith, and Prophet’s biography: I visited places related to Islam not only in Damascus but also in adjoining countries. Gradually I gathered a lot of materials, although all of them by our comprehension of those days were considered as opium for people.
At my disposal I had extensive data relating to Israel and the Arab-Israel relations established literally since the ancient times. In fact, these two nations are of the same origin, i.e., the Semites. It was interesting and helpful, as I thought, to trace their development by documents and researches to find out who and how managed to split them up, to oppose them to each other and make them sworn enemies. Even so, naturally, I also analyzed our positions, meaning the MFA (ministry of foreign affairs) leadership.
We could surely pack all those papers in our suitcases and boxes to bring them home. There were no technical problems with that; moreover, ambassadors' luggage was never subjected to customs clearance inspection. However, I decided to sent them by formal post. After all I didn’t send them to America or France. They were sent to Moscow, the USSR, with two senior officers – diplomatic couriers. It never occurred to me it might have been considered as a crime.
Upon arrival at home, I once came to see Setenko and asked him, ‘Have you received my materials?’
‘Yes, we have,’ he answered. ‘Your bags are in the special department.’
The next time I inquired about them and they said the bags had been torn up and the contents had dropped out and got mixed up. Now they were being gathered and put in order.
‘We’ll let you know once they are piled in order so that you can take them.’
Now the contents of those bags, as they say, led to the trail. Gustov recently told me that all my papers had been paginated, their contents had been looked into, and the report had been written. But for some reason, they didn’t let me read the report, although I had to give explanations about each paper.
Neither Arvid Pelshe nor Andrei Gromyko talked to me. When I came to a session of the Party Control Committee, there were a few people in the reception room who were waiting for consideration of their personal cases. We were invited in turn. Some left the room with tears, having held the heart, the others were indignant.
In the boardroom Arvid Pelshe was sitting at the head of an oblong table, next to him there were sitting Nikolai Pegov – on his right and Gustov - on his left. Further were seated employees of the PCC and the CC departments. I knew the vast majority of the attendees. Having entered, I said, ‘How do you do?’ and wanted to take a seat somewhere aside. But Arvid Ianovich Pelshe, having replied to my greeting, said to me, ‘Nuritdin Akramovich, come up to us closer so that you can see us and we can see you, too.’
Then he claimed that the PCC had a report concerning my improper actions taken during my work in Syria. All the facts had been investigated, and Gustov would inform of the results.
Gustov stood up from his massive armchair and began speaking. I listened to him and couldn’t believe his words. He emphasized some trifle details of political nature, used acute scathing wordings, blamed me, and at the end summarized, ‘He deserves a punishment.’ When he finished, it occurred to me, ‘Thank goodness, it’s not the 1937 year now.’
After Gustov’s speech, Arvid Pelshe gave me the floor. I spoke in short, focusing on that I had been gathering materials and taking notes for a further analysis and writing summary reports to the CC or for an article. Moreover, I had sent all the papers not to enemies but to the USSR MFA. Then we had a short conversation, ‘You’ve done wrong,’ Arvid Ianovich said.
‘What exactly was I wrong in?’ I asked.
‘Why did you write critically about esteemed and prominent figures of our country?’
‘I did write those papers but not to be read by anybody else. I intended to analyze their steps and deeds, promises, weaknesses, and miscalculations with only one purpose – to warn for the future. Besides, I informed the leadership of the MFA and the CC long time ago. There is nothing new in my papers.’
Pelshe asked, ‘Does anybody have any questions?’
Everybody was silent. Pegov asked me, ‘When gathering materials, did you advise with the minister - comrade Gromyko?’
I kept silent.
He repeated his question. I kept on silent. Then Nikolai Mikhailovich, raising his voice a bit, asked me for the third time, ‘I’m asking you if you advised with your minister.’
Nevertheless, I didn’t answer again. Pegov settled back in his armchair with dissatisfied look. There were no more questions. Then Arvid Ianovich proposed to give me a reprimand with putting it down in my personal record card. No other options were proposed, everyone silently agreed with Arvid Pelshe, and he read out the resolution: ‘For violation of the established order of service.’ He asked me if I had any questions. I answered, ‘No, I don't.’
When I left the room, a reception secretary, an old acquaintance of mine whom I had known at my previous job, compassionately told me, ‘Don’t worry, Nuritdin Akramovich. It will pass soon. What decision has been made? Are they going to exclude you?’
‘No,’ I answered, ‘I’ve got a reprimand with putting it down in my personal record card.’
‘Then, there’s nothing to worry about. Hundreds of such decisions are made here. Keep yourself in hand and everything will be good.’ She gave me a pill of a painkiller and a glass of water. I mechanically drank it, thanked her for her sympathy and left.
Of course, it could turn out to be completely different. If I had answered positively to Pegov’s question, the outcome of the denunciation could have been completely different. Why didn’t I answer to Pegov’s question then? The answer is simple. I decided to show moral rectitude in return to Gromyko’s dishonesty and duplicity. However, it’s true that Nikolai Mikhailovich Pegov found himself in an uncomfortable situation because of that. I found out later that he preliminarily before the PCC session had been summoned by the CC leaders to agree on the resolution wording as follows: ‘To take it into consideration.’
Neither at home nor at work I talked about what had happened. Boris Borisov and Yevgeny Pitovranov were obviously informed by the party committee of the Ministry of Foreign Trade where we all were registered. Approximately two days later N. S. Patolichev, the minister of foreign trade of the USSR, phoned me up. We greeted each other, and he cheered me up, ‘Don't lose heart, hold on, everything will be good. We should see each other.’
The next day I received another call from the party committee of the MFT. I was invited to get familiarized with ‘a document’. I got into a car and went there. I read the resolution about me and signed it. The party committee secretary said, ‘Minister is waiting for you.’
I went upstairs to see Nikolai Semenovich Patolichev. We had a long conversation, talking about different topics, but I was also interested in my ‘issue’. Patolichev and Pegov were close friends, thus Nikolai Semenovich Patolichev found out the details of my case from Nikolai Mikhailovich Pegov. He told me, ‘When the leader of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted his Report and Mikhail Suslov assigned the Party Control Committee to hold you accountable, Pegov, as per the department rule, also decided to examine this case, particularly because it’s his department through which an ambassador is included in the Politburo nomenclature. Of course, he previously agreed this with the CC leaders. All your papers were thoroughly studied in the department,’ Nikolai Semenovich Patolichev continued, ‘particularly your notes and extractions. They exchanged their views within the department at first, then reported to the leadership that there were no grounds for a serious punishment and recommended your case should be only discussed. With this opinion Nikolai Mikhailovich deliberately went to the Party Control Committee session. But you didn’t seem to answer to his direct question repeated by him three times, being silent and putting him in this way in an embarrassing situation. Nevertheless, the department will soon raise this resolution to be revised.’
I’ve been punished twice for 60 years of my conscious life. In December 1951, as the reader knows, Joseph Stalin admonished me ‘For failure to implement the plan of cotton provision’ and in 1977 by the Party Control Committee ‘For violation of the established order of service.’
Joseph Stalin’s reprimand literally shocked me. At the age of 33 years old I became Chairman of the Republic Ministers Council. Having worked for just seven months, I suddenly received a reprimand from Joseph Stalin personally which I could hardly get over. However, I remembered it for the rest of my life. It helped me in my further work and taught me how to treat my work, take decisions, fulfill tasks, organize work and be able to mobilize people. Although two months later in February 1952 after the conversation with me and my report about the situation in the republic, Joseph Stalin cancelled the punishment himself, dropped a remark to Lavrentiy Beria who had made a suggestion about the reprimand, and seriously reproached Usman Yusupov who was the minister of cotton growing of the USSR. Despite all these, I learnt and remembered that lesson forever.
However, the punishment exerted by the Party Control Committee, taking the motives and its reasons into consideration, didn’t make an affect on me that the authors expected.
After a while the reprimand was withdrawn from me. At that time, I was on my business trip to Ashgabat and by the end of the day I found myself at home of academician Nina Nechaeva on occasion of her jubilee. People called her ‘The Queen of the Karakum Desert.’ After graduating from the Russian Agriculture Institute, she arrived in Turkmenistan to work. Having fallen in love with that region, she was involved in fruitful scientific work. She got married. In the 1947 earthquake her husband and two children perished. By that time, she had already become an academician, an outstanding expert in steppe zones. She was offered to work in Moscow; they promised her to provide a good job, an apartment, and so on. However, she refused and fully dedicated herself to studying flora and fauna of the Karakum Desert. She did dozens of scientific studies; her students did MD and PhD in science in the Central Asian republics. I had known her before. From the bottom of our hearts we congratulated the heroine of the day and wished her health, well-being, and new successes in the science. Thus, we were sipping tea and conversing about an interesting topic when all of a sudden, a phone rang: I was urgently invited to the CC secretary of the Communist party of Turkmenistan.
He told me, ‘Comrade Pelshe has phoned up from Moscow. He’s looking for you.’
I contacted the PCC, and Arvid Ianovich warmly greeted me, ‘How are you, Nuritdin Akramovich? We have withdrawn the reprimand from you. Congratulations!’
In reply to his greeting I just said, ‘Thanks.’
Inwardly, of course, I expressed a bit tougher.
In that way a final full stop was put after my nine-year job as an ambassador to Syria.
XXXI
LOCHIN – THREE GENERATIONS OF MY HORSE
It happened that I didn’t learn how to play football that most people in my time took a great interest in. My favorite sports are horse riding, swimming, and mountaineering. I had all opportunities to play tennis which was considered for many long years a bourgeois sport, but my foot injury didn’t allow me to do that sport. However, I was keen on volleyball.
Inexpressible feelings of flight smoothness and speed of soaring over the land are caused by riding a horse. I seldom took part in horse races, but I always watched horse riding races, and when I had a small opportunity, I visited them. I’ve been keen on horses from my childhood. Some people like dogs, cats, but I like horses.
Dogs, horses, and cats became domestic animals in different time. However, it was horse that considerably influenced the mankind development. To me, horse means more than just a domestic animal.
Mankind on the planet of Earth comprises a few thousand nations, nationalities, tribes, and ethnic groups. They approximately speak eight thousand languages and dialects; and religious people practice religious cults the number of which amounts to about two and a half thousand nowadays. At the same time, almost none of them in their history have ever lived without horses a track of which has been traced up to now.
Can we imagine a Spanish toreador, American cowboy, or Argentinian herder without a horse? In Austria tourists are offered an entertainment that includes horse riding in the famous Vienna forest glorified by Johan Strauss. In Hungary the most popular entertainment on the lake shores of Balaton is horse riding around it or in carriages.
In Jordan there is an ancient town-fortress Al-Batra. It occupies nearly three square kilometers of an area. There are more than thousand burial-vaults, temples, dwelling houses, social facilities, including a theater for three thousand seats, three markets, and a lot of other things. All of these structures (besides the theater and the markets) were cut out inside sheer rocks (hence an origin of the town name: in Greek ‘Petros’ means ‘rock’), i.e., the structure was made without usage of wood, nails, bricks, metals, and other building materials.
Hundreds of thousands of tourist-pilgrims yearly visit Al-Batra. You can only drive up to a certain place, but further you have to cover the rest of the way only riding a horse. Thousands of tourists wait for their turn to hire a horse. A lucky visitor mounts a horse led with a bridle by its Arab-owner. Thus, a horse enables humans to witness and marvel a miraculous creation of ancient people, and at the same time it’s the only way for Arab-owners to earn money to keep their extended families.
Horse-riding has already become an international classic sport for a long time and has gained different forms and taken one of the leading places in sport competitions at various levels – from national to international.
Isn’t it amazing when a young jockey, whether it’s a young man or a girl wearing a smart uniform, makes his/her horse jump over quite serious obstacles, show complicated tricks, movements, and dances, evoking admiration? It’s breathtaking when you are riding a famous Russian troika (three horses harnessed abreast). Both children and adults have deep unforgettable impressions caused by horse shows in the circus.
Corrida means so much for Spanish people. Anyone from any part of the world, having seen it once, will never forget it for the rest of one's life.
One of the main wide green rich streets of Madrid is called Toreadors Avenue. On the both sides of the avenue there are endless rows of stores, restaurants, cafés, cafeterias, movie theaters, and at the end of the avenue in the downtown there is a square of ‘Brawl of Bulls’. This is the arena where fights between a toreador and a bull take place.
Spanish people say that anything can be late in their country. Political party congresses, parliament sessions, government meetings, an airliner departure or a train arrival can delay or be late. But the only one thing that starts at the fixed time sharp – six o’clock in the evening – is corrida.
The arena is not a stadium but a circled fundamental majestic construction in the middle of which there is a solid area covered with sand. It is surrounded by an amphitheater with six thousand seats. There are two barriers between the amphitheater and the fight area.
When we entered the amphitheater, it had already been full of spectators. There were thousands of people in the corridors, on the roofs, and outside. A stranger might well be impressed, first of all, by Spanish spectators: all of them were dressed up festively. Men were wearing necessarily white shirts, women were in fancy smart dresses, with beautifully decorated bonnets, many of whom had carnations in their hands. And men had brought wineskins filled with wine.
The brawl hadn't start yet, but all people were already really excited. It’s known that Spaniards speak very fast as if they are in a hurry. But here they were far more excited: they were arguing, joking, speaking so loud that one could hardly understand whether they were abusing each other or just talking.
Toreador!... Toreador!... I used to think that only young professionally skilled people can be them. But it seems wrong. Their age ranges between 25 and 40 years and even older. Most of them are former peasants who know these animals well, their behavior, temper, nature, and habits. They get trained in small specialized schools. But the most important thing for them is coaching, individual training by an experienced master.
On the fight day the toreador, having received a specified payment, gets some rest, then gets dressed in a special changing room. His outfit, decorations weigh up to 18 kilograms. He looks handsome, smart, artistic and strong. Then he walks into a nearby small chapel to say a prayer, putting his hands on his chest and bowing his head before the Christ Crucifixion.
The performance lasts three or three and a half hours, with participation of three toreadors and six bulls. At six o’clock sharp in the evening to the blare of horns the toreadors, their assistants, and spearmen are coming out on the arena at the ceremonial parade. They are introduced to the public and the judge, then they leave. The spectators, having chosen a toreador, with sinking heart in an absolute silence are waiting for appearance on the arena of a man and a bull face to face one of whom will inevitably die within nearest 30 minutes.
The toreador with his four assistants and spearmen comes out of a passage. He looks joyful and energetic. He greets the spectators with a bow. The viewers become ecstatic. Some are exclaiming in exultation, the others are discussing strengths and weaknesses of the animal, interrupting each other, at the same time betting on either the toreador or the bull. The information board shows the bull body mass index normally ranging between 500 and 600 kilograms. The fight lasts about 25-30 minutes or so and consists of four acts: mutual learning each other, the fight, the toreador thrusts up to six epees into the bull back, and finally the death of one of them at the end of the performance, followed by either spectators' rejoicing and jubilation or overall sadness and tragedy full of tears, sobbing, indignation, and mourning.
By swinging his cloak, the toreador is irritating, exasperating the bull which is dashing upon him while he is adroitly and artistically letting the bull pass next to him. It lasts a few minutes. While the fight is gradually becoming more severe, the toreador is changing his cloaks: at first, he’s got a cloak in pink, then another one in blue, further the one in reddish, and at the end - in bright red. When the animal reaches a peak of frenzy and outrage, the fighter approaches it closer and masterly thrusts two small swords into its back next to its upper backbone. Suffering from acute pain, the bull dashes upon its enemy who manages to run up to the barrier while his assistants are distracting the bull with their cloaks. In a minute a new mutual attack starts. The toreador has to thrust two more small swords into it. When the bull has become physically and emotionally broken, the last and decisive attack starts: the toreador thrusts the fifth and sixth small swords into it, after which he and his four assistants are slowly coming up to the bull from all sides, luring it to one or another side. The animal, having desperately fought, loses an orientation, flinging about, trying not to give up, but eventually falls over the ground and perishes.
The happy toreador, highly raising his cloak and holding a small sword in the other hand, is greeting all the spectators who are selflessly, enthusiastically rejoicing and congratulating him with his triumph. A piece of white cloth is a prize, an assessment of the toreador. When his acting is assessed as satisfactory, the judge waves with the cloth once and the winner solemnly gets the bull’s ear; when the assessment is good, the judge waves twice and the toreador gets the bull’s both ears; when the assessment is excellent, the judge waves with the cloth three times and the toreador gets the ears and a tail of the bull he has just killed.
After a short pause another pair of a bull and the toreador comes out onto the arena. In that way it repeats six times. In one performance each toreador has to fight twice and to kill two bulls.
Corrida is held not only in Madrid. Valencia, Seville, Bilbao, and other large cities have got arenas as well. Performances take place on each arena on Sundays just a few times a year. But the whole nation watches them.
Once on my trip from Toledo to Madrid I saw a crowd of people in a café in a remote god-forsaken village. Having heard a noise and shouts, we halted. A small hall was overcrowded with visitors some of whom were standing, the others were sitting, but all with their eyes glued to a small TV-set screen. Each movement of the toreador and the bull aroused stormy reactions: delight or abuse.
Perhaps, not many people know that this exciting and dangerous contest originally started with a fight between a horse-rider and a bull. Since the ancient time up to middle of the 20th century, a toreador riding a horse used to fight against a bull. Hence, a victory or a death of the toreador depended on strength, agility, quick wit, will, and perseverance of not only the man but also of the horse.
However, a horse plays a certain role in corrida even today. A bull with its raised head first dashes upon the toreador. To make it lower its head, a spearman rides a horse out onto the arena and hits the bull’s back with his long spear with peculiar sharp metal blades that invade into the bull's flesh a few centimeters deep. After that the animal attacks with its head lowered to the ground because of the acute pain. When the bull shows inertia and passiveness for some reason, the spearman again shows up riding a horse and deeply hits the bull with his spear to provoke and annoy it. Finally, when the bull gives up and dies, its body is taken away from the battle arena by three harnessed horses.
Here it’s worth mentioning two ancient stories relating to horse. Greek mythology tells in detail a legend of the Pegasus horse. Because of the blow of its hoof a spring whose water was magical formed on Helicon Mount. They used to say that poets drinking its water got inspired. Hence, there is the expression 'to saddle the Pegasus.'
Once the King of Macedonia, Philippe, was offered to buy a horse called Bucephalus because of its head similarity to Bucephalus bull’s head. The King with his son Alexander went to have a look at the horse which was wild, willful, reared, kicked and tried to bite. Nobody dared to approach it. The King Philippe wanted to refuse to buy it, but seventeen-year-old Alexander who liked the horse accused his father of cowardice and inability to ride the horse. The King got angry and suggested that his son try to tame Bucephalus by himself.
Alexander fearlessly came up to the horse, grabbed the bridle, patted the horse for a short while and ran abreast enabling it to get used to him. Then he dropped his cape and resolutely mounted its back. The horse darted forward trying to throw the rider off. Alexander let it ride a full gallop, and after a long frantic race the horse gave up to its burden and began to obey. That’s how Bucephalus horse was tamed and became a faithful mate for the famous Macedonian conqueror in all his campaigns.
In 326 BC Bucephalus died from overstrain after the battle against Indians on the Hydaspes river. Alexander of Macedon established a town and named it after Bucephalus at the place of its death. Perhaps, it was the only town in the world named after the horse.
Here is an interesting fact from our modern times. In the 1960s a famous American billionaire, Armand Hammer, bought a horse named Pesnyar from the Terskii stud-farm for a million dollars at the auction in Pyatigorsk. In addition to it he bought another horse and twelve mares and paid half a million dollars for them.
Many wonderful pages have been dedicated to horse in world’s literature. It’s sufficient to remember a famous story ‘Kholstomer’ by Tolstoy, or a story ‘The Enchanted Wanderer’ by Nikolai Leskov where he wrote impressive lines about the horse: ‘Didona was young and golden-bay for an officer’s saddle. It was a marvelous beauty. Its head was pretty-looking, its eyes were comely, its nostrils were slender and opened so that it breathed as it wanted, its mane was light, its chest between the shoulders was adroit like a boat, and its loin was flexible, its legs were light in white stockings, and it tossed them as if playing…
In one word, a person who was a hunter and understood beauty might enjoy watching that animal and be absorbed in pondering. As to me, I liked it so much that I couldn’t leave it in the stable even for a moment and cherished it joyfully.
I would clean and rub it off with a white handkerchief so that its hair didn’t have any dust, and I would even kiss it.’
I fell in love with horses in my childhood. When I underwent a male circumcision ceremony at the age of eight years old, my grandfather presented me a foal of eight months old. I can’t even put in words how much I was happy. I was seated on top of the foal. I was very proud and happy. We were growing up together. It was named Lochin. At that time my life consisted of going to school and taking care about my horse. I spent all my leisure time with it.
Lochin naturally grew up faster than me, and already at the age of three years old it took part in contests. When it was time for me to go to Moscow for study, I hesitated for a long time: to go or not to go? Should I go to Moscow or stay in Tashkent? How about Lochin? Who will look after it? Soon my father and grandfather persuaded me ensuring they would look after Lochin, so that I could go without worrying about it.
When I returned home after long and terrible military years, my Lochin, of course, wasn’t alive already. But soon my father’s friends one of whom was a major cattleman brought us a beautiful young horse. I rushed to it, having forgotten about my injured, wounded leg, to hug and pat it. It was a copy of my Lochin.
I was really happy to find out it was my Lochin’s foal offspring. Again, when I had free time, which I was short of now, of course, I fully devoted it to my pet. I took part with it in a flat race and in a horse race we got a medal having won the second place.
I was sent to work in the Namangan regional party committee. It was difficult and inconvenient for me to take Lochin along with me. That’s why I left it at the hippodrome whose director and employees promised me to look after and keep it for me. When I was elected the first secretary of the regional committee, Namangan people brought me Lochin without letting me know about it. It was a surprise for me to see my pet. Again, with a great joy and pleasure I took part in different contests, spent a lot of leisure time with my horse enjoying its looks and admiring it whenever I had a chance.
Then I was sent to work in Tashkent: in the regional committee, the Council of Ministers, the CC of the party. After some time Lochin joined me again. Having a rest in a state country house, I regularly did morning exercises by riding my horse.
Time elapsed. In 1957 I left Tashkent for Moscow. Again, I had to leave my Lochin at the Tashkent hippodrome. I worked in Moscow, then Syria and again in Moscow for 29 years… Under such circumstances I couldn’t afford myself to have my pet. Moreover, I knew that its horse age had already been over long time ago. Upon return to Tashkent in 1986, of course, I didn’t even inquire about my Lochin. I just didn’t want to become upset. Soon on my trips by car over regions in June of the same year, I with academician M. Mukhamedjanov drove to Namangan. At the mountainous pass Kamchi we were met by the first secretary of the party regional committee, Nazir Radjabov, and the chairman of the regional executive committee, Batyrali Khakimov. We visited districts and villages. Everywhere I noticed certain changes. Good cotton and other cultivations crops on fields were expected. For a period of about thirty years that I was absent from Namangan, a lot of new roads, irrigation sprinklers, many settlements, new schools, and hospitals had been built. Above all, I was really delighted with my dear Namangan people who were still industrious, hospitable and cheerful.
During that travel we also visited a collective farm named after Telman. A secretary of the district committee, a chairman of the district executive committee of the collective farm, and a respected Hero of Socialist Labor, Salibaev, were waiting for us there. We had a rest in a grove enjoying the wonderful local nature and had some tea. After that we went to familiarize with the farm and local people. We couldn’t miss a local stud-farm. While we were viewing the horses, I couldn’t avert my eyes from them for a long time. Suddenly I noticed the hosts looking at me with enigmatic smiles. What was the matter? All of a sudden, I stood stunned and couldn’t believe my eyes: in the third row of the tied horses there was a slender extremely familiar to me stallion – reddish with a white star on its forehead. That was my Lochin! It can’t be true!
The chairman of the collective farm came up to me and happily asked me, ‘Do you recognize it? This foal is a grand-offspring of your Lochin. We found and bought it.’
I couldn’t avert my eyes glued to my revived Lochin which was even named after its ancestors.
‘Let’s remember our old times… when we were young and we used to gallop…,’ the local Namangan people suggested and brought four more horses. All of us mounted them. Radjabov and I were in the first pair. He was riding a black horse while I was riding Lochin. We started racing on the paths between the cotton fields. The distance was about a kilometer. When we were about to jump over a water ditch, we suddenly heard a noise, people shouting and horses neighing. What was going on? We rode our horses back and approaching the ‘start line’ we saw an incomprehensible, unimaginable picture. In the center of a crowd academician Mukhamedjanov was sitting on a grey horse, wearing a hat and a tie, turning pale and furious, seizing the saddle with his both hands and trying with all his might to stay in the saddle when the horses of the other riders rushed to his horse, not obeying the bridle. Our stallions also rushed into that crowd to the horse of the poor academician.
Finally, with great difficulty they managed to calm the horses down. The academician dismounted and being exhausted sat down on the grass. He was given some tea. Then he was offered to ride another horse, but he categorically refused to take part in the horse race.
Later we found out that Namangan wags mounted all of us on stallions, whereas a mare was palmed off to the scientist. In that way our ‘male admirers’ were desperate to court the ‘lady’ instead of racing. What’s more, the mare rider was intentionally placed in the group center.
Nevertheless, the horse race took place, though without the academician. While riding over the water ditch, I even forgot about my recently operated on leg. We had enough topics for fun and jokes for the whole day.
The collective farm managers and the district committee head suggested that we take Lochin with us to Tashkent.
‘We will deliver it to you by ourselves,’ the chairman of the collective farm, Mamadjanov, was persuading me.
Thanking him I could hardly check myself from excitement, but I refused to accept such a precious to me present. Two years later Lochin had a foal – the forth generation offspring of my dearest since my childhood stallion.
XXXII
THE RETURN TO UZBEKISTAN
On July 1st, 1985 I made a written request to Mikhail S. Gorbachev, as it turned out the last General Secretary of the party, I was a member of which for about 50 years and worked in its superior bodies for over 30 years, and which stopped existing not without Gorbachev’s assistance in 1991. In my resignation letter I requested the highest official in the party hierarchy for my dismissal and granting me a pension due to my decision to move to Tashkent for a permanent residence. I asked him not to prevent my retiring but on the contrary to foster my moving to my homeland.
I was invited to the CC twice where I had to explain in detail the motives for my request, my further plans and wishes relating to it. I can say nothing except their positive attitude towards my request. The decision was taken by the CC on July 26th, and on July 30th the Ministers Council of the USSR approved of granting me with a personal pension.
I had tried to leave Moscow for Tashkent several times. However, it was that time, as it turned out the last and lucky, that everything started with a conversation with Yu. V. Andropov, E.K. Ligachev, Sh. R. Rashidov. and I.B. Usmankhodjaev who replaced Sharof Rashidov at the post of CC First secretary of the Communist party of Uzbekistan.
Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov told me during our conversation about worrying information received from ‘my homeland’, as he said, regarding exaggerated upward figures of cotton crop, its quality deterioration, numerous briberies, corruptions, and other large-scope abuses by local authorities. Upon his order I was given a thick folder of received from the republic letters, petitions, and appeals signed by individual citizens and whole groups. Those letters made a sad impression on me. In addition, in those days the Soviet Union mass media were daily covering cases of numerous abuses by the party local authorities in Uzbekistan. Such terms and collocations as ‘Uzbek case’, ‘cotton case’, and ‘Uzbek mafia’ were introduced in daily press coverage. Reading all that I was getting upset and deeply worried.
I told Yuri Andropov then, ‘You shouldn’t hurry up. First of all, you should thoroughly investigate the situation. Whatever has happened in the republic, whatever facts may be revealed, you must not blacken without any grounds the whole nation with its thousand-year history, its original culture, customs and traditions, the people famous for their diligence and honesty for all times. There’s certainly a black sheep in every flock; therefore, any violations must undoubtedly be stopped and need serious measures to be taken to prevent them. However, I doubt such violations are of mass and organized nature, occurring only in one republic in particular!?’
At the end of our conversation Andropov proposed me, ‘Let’s work together.’
To which I replied, ‘I’m currently working for the Chamber whose employees are good and friendly to me. Besides, I’ve already got used to this job.’
Then he said, ‘OK, I’ll tell Ligachev to think together with his colleagues over how to use you more effectively. Nowadays it’s high time that we pay a close attention to the national policy and personnel. These are the fields where you’ve got a great experience and knowledge.’
To be frank, I refused Andropov’s proposal, first of all, because I wanted to return to Uzbekistan as soon as possible to join my people at the hard time for the republic.
Strangely, a conversation about my return home, my homeland, arose twice for the past two years, and the both times it was related to my trip to Afghanistan. Besides the matters directly relating to my job for the Commerce and Industry Chamber, the CC leaders sending me to Kabul assigned me to take a close look into and thoroughly study a number of issues related to the deployment of the Soviet military troops in Afghanistan. Simultaneously I was assigned to sort out on the site numerous complaints by Kabul about low quality cotton supplied from Central Asia.
Being in Afghanistan in May, 1983 I had conversations with many leaders of this country, the Soviet ambassador, military commanders, and other employees. During that visit we signed a number of documents with the Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
Upon my return, the CC and the USSR government made a decision on holding an All-union conference on cotton production in Tashkent in late May, with participation of leaders of all cotton-growing republics.
The representatives list of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, State Committee of Foreign Economic Relations, CC and government departments, State Planning Committee, Ministries of Agriculture, Finance, Light and Food Industries, who were assigned to give a thorough analysis of situation in the relevant fields, was approved to participate in the conference. I was assigned to make a speech at that conference.
After my report the first deputy chairman of the State Planning Committee of the Uzbekistan SSR, Sh. Mirsaidov, made a report about the situation in the republic. He explained the reasons for cotton fiber quality deterioration and told about the urgent measures for the situation correction. Representatives of union and all republic agencies were given the floor. A number of short term and middle term measures and actions were elaborated in accordance with the conference outcomes.
On the following day, I together with the chairman of the Commerce and Industry Chamber of Uzbekistan, D. Ilhamova, met Sh. Rashidov. After her report about the conference, he said, ‘I’ve read all the speeches and find the accusations addressed to Uzbekistan tendentious and groundless. We produce good cotton here; therefore, nobody has a right to present claims to us.’
After Ilkhamova had left, Rashidov and I were left alone. That was the time he candidly shared his experiences, admitted he was worried, being under the pressure from all sides: union mass media regularly published critical materials about Uzbekistan; the current situation in the republic was quite unfavorable; people stopped feeling responsibility; and he felt lonely.
I asked him whether the materials published in media were true, noticing that all the materials actually came from Uzbekistan. He responded, ‘Yes, but not to such extent and in such forms. There are certainly some figures upward distortions, and there is cotton quality deterioration, as well as bribery cases have been revealed. I’m saying again all is not to such extent as published in mainstream media.’
‘What are you going to do?’ I asked him.
‘To be honest, I don’t know,’ said Sharof Rashidov. ‘I would like, my dear friend, to consult with you. I admit confidentially the CC leaders in Moscow have recently conversed with me. The conversation was sharp. They told me it was time that I should resign. I said I would send them my written request for my resignation from Tashkent.’
‘Having returned from Moscow,’ he continued, ‘I visited regions. It looks like we will have good crop and the cotton production plan will definitely be fulfilled. Therefore, I intend to make a written request at the end of the year.’
In response I said, ‘Everything published and told about concerning scandalous, blatant facts occurring in Uzbekistan seriously worries many people. I think you’d better personally initiate a convocation of a meeting or a session of the Supreme Soviet or CC Plenum where according to the party rules, you might report self-critically and candidly to CC members, leaders of the republic, regions and districts about the current situation to make a joint decision on how to put an end to these violations with well-thought out actions, to look into concrete facts, strictly acting according to the law, and, the most important, to work out and implement the preventive measures.’
Rashidov was keeping silence for a long while, staring at something with a blank look, then said, ‘I’d rather think it over.’ Suddenly he added, ‘Come back, Nuritdin Akramovich. Let’s work together.’
I replied, ‘Dear Sharof Rashidovich, last time you already insisted on this. I agreed and was eager to return to my homeland and to work with you. I told Brezhnev about my desire. He supported me. At my request I was relieved from an ambassador position. However, our agreements have not been implemented.’
‘Dear friend,’ Sharof Rashidovich noticed, ‘there are people in Tashkent as well as in Moscow who don’t want us to work together…’
‘But it isn’t them who must pursue policies,’ I objected. ‘As for my return, I’d gladly do this. However, right now you’d better convince the people to correct the economic situation and improve political work in the republic.’
‘Could you come to participate in a Plenum session or a meeting of the republic leaders If we convocated it?’
‘I don’t think so. My participation in it may be interpreted wrong. But after the session I’m ready to arrive and work with you.’
Finishing our conversation, Sharof Rashidovich asked me, ‘Have you had a holiday this year? Would you like to come to the Namangan ‘Chartak’? You did contribute in its construction, didn't you? When could you arrive there?’
‘I will almost certainly do this in August.’
Then we bade farewell to each other.
Indeed, the next time we met in August. Having bought four vacation tickets in the ACSTU (All-Union Center of Soviet Trade Unions) to have a rest and take medical treatment in the Chartak sanatorium, I with my spouse, grandson, and granddaughter arrived in Tashkent. This time Rashidov looked worse than in May. He said all the measures were being taken by the republic to fulfill its obligations in all industries, particularly in cotton production.
In my presence he phoned up the first secretary of the Namangan regional party to inform him of my arrival with my family and our going to the Chartak sanatorium, and asked him to take care of us. Then Rashidov told the CC administrator, Tursun Umarov, to provide us with a good car from the CC garage and to phone up the first secretary of the Chartak regional party committee and the chief doctor in the sanatorium to inform of our soon arrival.
Saying goodbye, he added, ‘I’ll definitely come to Chartak in a few days. We need to talk face to face about serious matters.’
We had a good time; however, Rashidov never visited us in Chartak. On August 27th we all returned to Tashkent. I phoned up the CC. The receiver was picked up by Maya Spiridonovna, Rashidov’s assistant. She said Sharof Rashidovich was visiting Syrdariya at the moment and she would immediately let him know about our return. The following day Maya Spiridonovna phoned us up to inform that after visiting Syrdariya, Sharof Rashidovich was going to Djizak, then to Samarkand. For that reason, he would be away from Tashkent for another four or five days.
Thus, our meeting never occurred again. On August 29th we left Tashkent for Moscow. I never managed to find out what Rashidov was going to tell me confidentially…
On November 1st, 1983 I was in Geneva. Our Swiss colleagues, Mr. Vook and Mr. Veran, who had invited a delegation of the Commerce and Industry Chamber of the USSR, arranged our walking up in the Alps that day. Having gone down the mountain that evening, we were sitting in a restaurant on the lakeshore. We were having a good time, exchanging our bright impressions of the seen and the heard. We had just drunk a glass of wonderful wine, all of a sudden, an employee of the Soviet consulate-general came up to me and whispered that Rashidov had passed away. I couldn’t believe and asked him to say again. He confirmed and said that he had personally heard of that news on the radio. My companions felt that something had happened and I told them the sad news. I told them about Rashidov, his indisputable merits and Uzbekistan. Soon I heard of Rashidov’s death on the radio by myself and sent a condolence telegram to the leaders of Uzbekistan and his family members on occasion of his soon death.
The 16th Plenum of the CC of the Communist party of Uzbekistan took place in Tashkent in June the next year. I.B. Usmankhodjaev was the first to speak. E.K. Ligachev, who was the Politburo member and the CC CPSU secretary, and the other speakers spoke openly and sharply about the facts of gross violation of the socialist legality in the republic, distortions in personnel policy, malpractice, statistics upward distortions, scams and deceit, and briberies. The facts and figures given in the speeches made an oppressive impression on me…
In January 1985 I was sent again to Afghanistan. On my way back, I made a stopover in Tashkent where I first met a new leader of communists of Uzbekistan, Usmankhodjaev.
In May that year it was my turn to host my former brother-soldiers, so I shared my plans with Usmankhodjaev, ‘I can certainly invite all of them to Moscow, although my real home is here in Tashkent, and everyone is eager to visit me at my home in Tashkent.’
Inamjon Buzrukovich Usmankhodjaev said without delay, ‘You must necessarily invite all of them to Tashkent.’
The meeting of my former brother-soldiers was held perfectly. 65 friends – veterans with their families and 13 widows of the dead brother-soldiers arrived here. That meeting was actively supported and arranged by employees of the CC, the republic government and military registration and enlistment office, and the Commerce and Industry Chamber.
Having seen off our guests, Usmankhodjaev and I met again and had a long conversation. He told me, ‘Nuritdin Akramovich, let’s finally decide a matter about your return to the republic. I’d like to talk about it in Moscow with the CC leaders.’
I agreed with him. Thus, upon return to Moscow, in about two months I wrote a request to Mikhail Gorbachev (the first Soviet President). A pension matter was settled within a month. However, I was only released from a job in the CI Chamber in January, 1986. The CC CPSU Secretariat took a decision to establish me a personal pension in the amount of 350 rubles per month, to keep the right to use the First (informally called 'Kremlin') policlinic of the Forth Main Department of the Health Ministry of the USSR and to use the specialized government healthy food shop. We spent February through preparing for our departure. Before a leave-taking my spouse and I were given a fortnight prophylactic checkup and medical treatment in the Kremlin hospital.
From the middle of March our farewell meetings with friends began. Surprisingly, we had a lot of friends and workmates. We invited them to our home and visited them as well. Together with our children and grandchildren, we visited Lenin Hill, the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum, the Kremlin Wall, the Novodevichie Cemetery; we also laid flowers on the Unknown Warrior’s grave; and finally, on March 21st we left for Tashkent by a Moscow-Tashkent train. We were accompanied by my brother-in-law (Mukarram’s brother), called Azim, who helped us with moving. Being a disabled war veteran, he was a wonderful, cheerful man, superb at cooking national meals. His only shortcoming was smoking. Nobody smoked cigarettes in our family, so we prohibited him smoking during our trip. That’s why he, a poor fellow, had to go out onto a platform to smoke a cigarette at every train stop.
It took us three days to arrive in Tashkent in the afternoon on March 24th. At the railway station we were met by our relatives, friends, acquaintances; however, of those who had seen us off back in 1957 there were only a few people: some had died, the others were in prison or had moved to other cities and regions.
There were hot hugs, kisses, handshakes, and happy exclamations. It was a really exciting welcome! After that I with my family and my brothers drove directly to the cemetery instead of going home. There of course, nobody was waiting for us. There was only a watchman in the cemetery. In our ancestral graveyard I kneeled down before the graves of my grandparents and my parents. We laid flowers on their graves and prayed.
At home hundreds of people were already waiting for us. In the yard a big lamb was tied to a tree. By tradition I blessed the ‘sacrifice’. Having cut the lamb, the cooks started cooking various dishes and grilling shish kebab.
The merriment lasted till midnight. Anvar Kasymov, my truly faithful friend, was sitting next to me. It was him who persistently persuaded me to return home.
We both were residents of different districts of Tashkent city. We first met doing training course ‘Osoaviakhim’ where schoolboys - future military recruits were trained for elementary military service rules: how to use guns and safeguard techniques. After finishing the course, each of us went on his own way, though we were still on friendly terms. He and I participated in the war from the first to the last day. He finished the war in Prague, celebrating the Victory holiday there, after which he was redeployed to the Far East where he took part in the battles against Kvantun troops. From there he returned to Tashkent, having been awarded with numerous war decorations and stripes for courage and bravery.
After the war we found each other, restored our relations and swore to each other to be on the friendly and fraternal terms for ever. Every time he visited Moscow he stayed with us at our home. Every holiday he congratulated us, brought or sent us fresh strawberries, fruit, traditional drinks or dishes so that we could feel home and didn’t feel homesick. In my turn, I always did my best to be good and sincere to him.
We wrote together my request to Mikhail Gorbachev. That’s why I phoned up Anvar after submitting it. He immediately arrived to see me and waited till the resolution was issued. Thus, we both rejoiced and even celebrated that event. Soon he left for Tashkent with that news. My resignation was delayed. When that matter was solved, he arrived again and stayed with us in Moscow. Having made sure that on March 21st we were leaving for Tashkent by train, he flew to Tashkent, and on March 24th he with my friends and relatives met us at the Tashkent railway station. When we got home from the cemetery, he met us at the house threshold and solemnly put an oriental national robe, belbag (a waist scarf) and skullcap on me which I was wearing for the whole evening, welcoming our guests.
Anvar-aka’s children are already adults like mine. Our grandchildren and great grandchildren are growing up. Our sons, daughters, sons-in-law, daughters-in-law work for state, public and private institutions. Anvar Kasymov and I were peers not only by years, but also by the number of awards and wounds. After the guests had left, it was time to go to bed. I requested to prepare two folding beds for us to sleep in the open terrace. We were lying and talking till the early morning, remembering how long and difficult the dream of returning home came true.
Finally, my faithful friend fell asleep, but I was still lying, staring at the sky and pondering, ‘That is my homeland… My ancestors were buried in its soil. My children, grandchildren, and great grandchildren live here. The people who raised and brought me up live here as well...’ Bright stars were glowing and the moon was shining over me. The air was pervaded with the fragrance of awaken spring verdure. In a small orchard there were cherry trees, apple-trees, peach-trees, persimmon, apricot trees, and quince-trees. A small garden was lavished with colorful flowers, fragrant basil, delicious strawberries, and something else. The water in a ditch was quietly murmuring and silvering in the moonlight reflections. I experienced an indescribable feeling of excitement and serenity at the same time. All these are my Homeland...
POSTSCRIPT
(Instead of Afterward)
The tenth year has been going on since we returned home to Tashkent after my 29-year climbing up the power hierarchy. Feeling home is indescribable. Even though there isn’t a town I was born in any longer and there are no recognizable buildings and things from my childhood and adolescence any more, it is still the place where my ancestors, grandparents and parents’ remnants lie. It is still the place where the spirit of my kinsfolk and my homeland is still alive. It is here that being a teenager, I first touched the holy book of Koran, trying to absorb its spirit and grasp its essence, even though afterwards my spiritual cup filled with it was gradually getting exhausted under the pressure of different circumstances.
Living here, in the early age I joined the comsomol (communist union of youth), then the communist party and very soon became at first a comsomol and later party activist. Approaching Tashkent on the train, I was unintentionally recalling my youth, my life, my work, and most importantly, the years of my belief in the party and in all what we were doing then.
It is well-known that any religion is the spirit of a nation, its culture, and its history; and it is the holy support to the national social consciousness. Islam like other religions has its peculiarities not always comprehensible by people of other confessions and religions. Vladimir Lenin, it seems, comprehended that as well.
Having come to power in December 1917, on behalf of the Council of People’s Commissars he addressed to all Muslims and assured that their religion, traditions, customs, life principles, mosques, and madrasahs be protected by the Soviet power. However, Lenin had no successors and followers in that matter. Moreover, neither Joseph Stalin nor Nikita Khrushchev, nor Leonid Brezhnev ever lived in the East. Therefore, they had no idea of the eastern religion, lifestyle, national peculiarities, customs, traditions, history, and culture.
In Moscow during my preparation to move homeland, I was often asked the same question: ‘Why are you leaving? Don’t you like living here?’
‘I do like Moscow very much,‘ I answered. ‘I can live here quite happily, but I’m worried about the events occurring in my homeland. Mainstream central and local media publish almost daily negative articles, sometimes of slanderous and false character, about briberies, extortions and different fraudulence schemes occurring in the republic. Authors of these publications call these events as ‘Uzbek case’, ‘cotton case’, ‘Uzbek mafia’, and so on. Repressions, unprecedented by character and scale in the past, are taking place in the republic nowadays. All this is worrying and making me anxious. I am talking about the people, society, and the republic to which I owe so much.’
On the other hand, such anti-state activities now can be seen not only in Uzbekistan, but also in some other republics, regions, and districts. Besides, doers of these actions are concrete people, concrete individuals. That’s them who must be in charge of and brought to responsibility according to the law. Hence, is it really reasonable and necessary to manifest distrust to the whole republic, the whole people of Uzbekistan with its ancient history and culture?
Upon arrival in Tashkent I was offered a few high positions. But I refused them and started working as an adviser to the government, and later I was appointed the chairman of the Society of Monuments Protection. I was really glad and happy to get that job. It gives an opportunity to visit regions and districts, enabling me to see, find out, study and understand whatever has happened and is happening on the land of my ancestors and contemporaries. In one word, I have returned to my people who have done so much for me. That’s why I felt it was my duty to be with them.
We left Moscow in the very beginning of the ‘Perestroika’ (the transition period in the Soviet Union before its collapse). For all these years, having observed and studied the reform course at first in the USSR and later in the independent state of Uzbekistan, I tried to comprehend and conceive these reforms. The contemporary phase of the Russian history as well as the history of Uzbekistan, Armenia, Kirgizstan, Ukraine… and all the other republics included in the USSR, already nowadays can be considered as one of the most crucial transition epoch of special significance for all the former Soviet republics.
I think in the country that doesn’t exist any more, its leadership disliked its own history very much, bringing one generation after another, who were coming to replace those who had seized the power in October, 1917, to a deadlock. Yet, what was before the year of 1917? Soviet schoolchildren used to be given a simple answer to this question: ‘When you grow up, you will find out!’ University students sometimes had to account before communist youth union committee members for their awkward, unsuitable question when they assumed that in Tsar Russia there had been something else that might be useful even nowadays besides ‘Tsarism oppression’.
Uzbekistan was a part of Russia for sixty years and a part of the USSR for seventy years. It wasn't a short period. For all those long years, Russia established certain relations with Turkestan, later Uzbekistan and the other central Asian republics, which actually were metropolitan-provincial relations. Russia rendered a substantial assistance in the railway construction, connecting directly Moscow with Bukhara and Tashkent. Russian scientists and engineers helped to restore in the republic fundamental sciences, education, and culture. They also helped to develop many industries, including machine-building, metallurgical, fuel and energy, chemical and light ones. Russia imported cotton from Uzbekistan for its established major textile industry which became one of the core economic sectors in Russia for many years. Russia also imported other raw material and food. For the last decades of the USSR, Uzbekistan became the main base of cotton growing of the country, having dramatically reduced production of other agricultural products, as it is obvious now, to the detriment of its own people. In 1984, for example, 5.3 million tons of cotton was produced. I’m not going to analyze economic, cultural and purely scientific relations of Uzbekistan and Russia. They are so broad and fundamental that it would take many pages to describe them. For many decades of living together, our peoples have simply become related. Let’s remember at least the war and people migration, especially to Tashkent and other large cities of the republic: hundreds of thousands of families from Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia were hospitably welcomed and received in Central Asia. What about the earthquake in Tashkent in 1966? It was Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus that were the first to render invaluable assistance in the restoration and construction of a new Tashkent city. Speaking about all that, I would like just to remind you of the strong, versatile, fundamental relations between Uzbekistan and Russia. Therefore, if anyone of either side makes an attempt to break them up, they will make a serious mistake. We’ve got too much in common, especially in industry and economy, to give up 130-year relations and living together with Russia. These relations should be developed further but completely on a new basis of sovereignty, independence, equality of rights, and mutual benefits for both sides. I’m a person of advanced age, and it seems, I’ve seen and experienced a lot of things that may happen not only to one but also to a few generations. So, I can firmly say that whoever is hampering the development, to be more precise, versatile and all-round consolidation of the Uzbek-Russian relations, is in fact incurring damage to not only the current but also the future generations. Those people who don’t foster and contribute to development of these relations are doing no good. In international affairs people’s diplomacy can play a major role, particularly with the government support. My compatriots, Uzbeks, and Russian speaking population should be engaged in it. If I were asked what my advice to the young generation would be, I’d say, ‘Befriend with Russia!’ That's what I’m going to write about in detail in my third book.
About ten years have elapsed since we moved to Tashkent. I have come to know, seen and studied a lot for this period. A year later after my return home, I wrote an extensive letter to Mikhail S. Gorbachev. I was shocked by social and life conditions of the population of Uzbekistan. That’s why I couldn’t help writing that letter. Of course, in it I noted, first of all, noticeable progress and positive changes in the republic. However, I also wrote in detail about everything that needed urgent attention and decision. Besides, I emphasized a dramatic deterioration of the social and material welfare of the population, and underlined the economy malfunction and deformation as well as legislation distortions. I gave as many examples and obvious facts as possible. Here are these evidences relating to the year 1987.
37 billion rubles has been invested in the agriculture of Uzbekistan for the past 15 years, which is 3 times more than that for the previous 50 years. The production funds have increased by 3.9 times; the tractor fleet power is up by 2.4 times, the electricity consumption – by 8.2 times, and the mineral fertilizer use has increased by twice. Irrigated lands have expanded by 44%. Nevertheless, the food production and its quality have not substantially improved. For instance, in the 11th five-year plan in comparison with the 10th five-year plan, the labor efficiency in the whole Soviet Union increased by 8% while in Uzbekistan in particular it decreased by 7%, with the man power expenditure per one ton of cotton in the republic by 10 times more than that in the USA. It is also worth noting that an average monthly wage of villagers in Uzbekistan in 1985 amounted to 59.4 rubles, whereas in the whole country it averaged to 91.5 rubles. Meanwhile, the minimum wage officially amounted to 75 rubles.
In Uzbekistan the sales per capita is 1.5 times less than that in the Soviet Union as a whole; and among 15 Soviet republics it occupies the following places in public services: telecommunication (post, telegraph, phone) – 15th, culture and entertainment – 14th, accommodation and public transport – 13th. As for the food product consumption per capita, livestock products (meat, milk, butter, eggs), fruit, and vegetables are consumed by the republic population twice as little as by the Soviet Union population on average. The soil condition, usage of land, and water consumption, as well as the overall ecological environment condition are unsatisfactory.
One of the major reasons for these is the decrease of production of agricultural products, including plant cultivation and livestock. Besides, social and material care of welfare of cotton growers, cattlemen, and other peasants obviously is not enough.
In Central Asia in agriculture there are two dangerous tendencies: autarky and monoculture. Nowadays, it’s really important to prevent them from expanding. Therefore, the opinion of leaders and scientists that agriculture be developed comprehensively should be fully supported. For that, it is necessary to reduce cotton fields, using the released lands for production of other agricultural products.
The crucial condition for solving these issues can be a considerable increase of purchase prices for cotton, grapes, fruit, and livestock products. In my letter to Gorbachev I also in particular brought into notice the Aral Sea fate.
Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev paid serious attention to the raised issues and established a commission led by V.P. Nikonov, the Politburo member, the CC CPSU secretary. It was assigned to study and prepare necessary resolutions. The CC employees together with representatives of relevant bodies and experts from Uzbekistan thoroughly studied and came to an agreement on prepared draft resolutions and instructions to be submitted to the CC for consideration.
However, it was at that time that Nikonov was dismissed from his job in the CC CPSU. A fundamental replacement of departmental employees in the CC, Council of Ministers, and their agencies took place. As a result, many similar documents on important cases, including those related to Uzbekistan, were left in the safes of the CC and its departments.
Obviously, it was the last and unfortunately unrealized hope to help Uzbekistan on the part of the Center. In December 1991, President Mikhail Gorbachev resigned from his presidency; there wasn’t any more the country that could have solved vital issues for the republic. Since then they had to sort them out by themselves: for on August 31st, 1991 Uzbekistan became an independent, sovereign state.
Islam Abduganievich Karimov was the tenth First secretary of the CC of the Communist party of Uzbekistan. The people assigned him a historical mission by electing him as the first president of the new country. I.A. Karimov suggested the parliament to proclaim Uzbekistan a sovereign republic, hoisted its flag and led the preparation and adoption of the new Constitution. An intensive process of search for and implementation of optimal ways, means, and methods of establishing its domestic and foreign policies is going on. At the same time at different levels, sometimes shortcomings, blunders and mistakes are taking place, and are corrected on the go. This is, of course, natural.
Independent Uzbekistan is approaching step by step its ultimate goal – the establishment of a stable, serried, flourishing, constitutional, democratic state, keeping a proper place in the world community. Certain successes have already been achieved in this process.
I am glad to see youth who are well-educated, energetic and determined people, joining the state management in most cases. Of course, we, veterans, have got heads, covered with grey hair, and wrinkled faces; the posture and gait are no longer the same as in youth; and the strength is getting dried up. Nevertheless, with accumulated experience and knowledge, our priority duty is to fully give everything we have to the people and our homeland, to rejoice in their successes and to live in their hopes for a happy future.
Dear readers! I have intended to write my memoires in three stages and to set them forth in three books. The first of them, ‘The Years Spent in the Kremlin’, has recently been published in Tashkent in both Uzbek and Russian.
The second is the one you are reading now. It was published in Moscow in 1995. It focuses considerably on the foreign policy pursued by the USSR in the foreign East. It also comprises some brief extracts from the chapters of the first book.
The third book I’m working on at the moment consists of two parts: ‘The Triumph and Tragedy of the National Policy of the CPSU’ and ‘Sovereign Uzbekistan: from a History and Life of the People’.
Telling about my life experience I have undergone through, recalling different periods in the life of my homeland, I hope to tell people about the great Uzbek people with their history going back centuries.
Tashkent
July, 1995
PHOTOS
At school, 9th grade
photo taken at the frontline on May 9, 1943
During the war, the best servicemen in combat and political training of the separate pontoon regiment
Presentation of the order to Uzbekistan. From left to right: N. Mukhitdinov, U. Yusupov, L. Kaganovich, A. Niyazov, R. Melnikov, S. Kamalov, M. Abdurazakov, A. Alimov
Tashkent. One of N. Khrushchev's visits to the republic. From left to right: L. Brezhnev, A. Niyazov, N. Khrushchev, S. Rashidov, N. Mukhitdinov
N. A. Bulganin and N. S. Khrushchev made a stopover in Tashkent, returning from India. Next to them: A. Niyazov and N. Mukhitdinov, 1955
Mukhitdinov with his grandson Bakhodir
Government reception party after the presentation of awards to the Heroes of Socialist Labor from Uzbekistan. Kremlin, 1957
V.M. Molotov and N.A. Mukhitdinov in Kremlin, 1958
Returning from Afghanistan, the USSR delegation headed by K.E. Voroshilov made a stopover in Tashkent. Hunting at Chatkal
Gala dinner at the Lenin collective farm, Yangiyul district, 1958
N.S. Khrushchev with his spouse Nina Petrovna and daughter Yulia is visiting the Mukhitdinovs in Moscow
A.N. Kosygin and N.A. Mukhitdinov are on the pass of the Main Caucasian ridge
A.I. Mikoyan is presenting the order to Mukhitdinov in Kremlin, 1962
Visiting the Prime Minister of Burma Ne Vin
Gala reception dinner on the occasion of the stay of the President of Indonesia Sukarno in Uzbekistan
Arrival of the Prime Minister of India J. Nehru in Tashkent
G.A. Naser, President of the United Arab Republic (the second from the right), during his visit to the USSR on the Kutuzov cruiser
Kho Shi Min with the CC CPSU delegation
At the Vietnam frontline. On the left of N. Mukhitdinov: Le Zuan, first secretary of the CC of the Vietnam workers’ party, and Fam Van Dong, chairman of the Ministers Council of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
In Tokyo, N. Mukhitdinov is speaking at the exhibition opening ceremony dedicated to the 50th October anniversary
A.N. Kosygin, chairman of the Ministers Council of the USSR, visiting the Mukhitdinovs in Damascus, Syria
N.A. Mukhitdinov with Miss Africa
H. Asad and other Syrian VIPs with A. Kirilenko and N. Mukhitdinov (foreground) are watching the damming of the Euphrates river bed nearby As-Sauru
During the conversation with Syrian prime-minister Zuayen
Syrian President Hafez Asad visited Mukhitdinov’s father’s home (at Shomukhitdin's)
In Kremlin, 1973. Negotiations between the delegations of the USSR and Syria
January 5, 1985 before the departure from Moscow to Tashkent.
N.A. Mukhitdinov’s family going for a walk
March, 1986. Returning home
N.A. Mukhitdinov’s relatives and friends
The first months in Tashkent after return from Moscow
NAME INDEX
1. Avloniy, Abdulla
(June 12, 1878 — August 25, 1934)
Abdulla Avloniy
Famous Uzbek writer who wrote for children, playwright, and educator, who did a lot for the development of Uzbek schools of the modern type.
2. Akhunbabaev, Yuldash
(July13, 1885 — February 28, 1943)
Yuldash Akhunbabaevich Akhunbabaev
Soviet statesman, member of the Communist Party since May, 1921.
3. Antropov, P.Ya.
(October 30, 1905 – June 23, 1979)
Pyotr Yakovlevich Antropov
Soviet geologist. In recognition of his work, Mr. Antropov was appointed Geology Minister In 1953.
4. Bedil Mirzo Abdukadir
(1644 - December 5, 1721)
Mawlānā Abul-Ma'ānī Mīrzā Abdul-Qādir Bēdil, also known as Bīdel Dehlavī
Sufi saint and remarkable poet from the Indian subcontinent.
5. Brezhnev, L.I.
(December 19, 1906 -November 10, 1982)
Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev
Soviet politician. The fifth leader of the Soviet Union, he served as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1964 until his death in 1982.
6. Bukharin, N.I.
(October 9, 1888 – March 15, 1938)
Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin
Bolshevik revolutionary, Soviet Union politician and prolific author on revolutionary theory.
7. Bobokhan, Ishan
The Muslim Spiritual Board for Central Asia and Kazakhstan was formally established in 1943, with Mufti Ishan Bobokhan as its head in Tashkent.
8. Budyonny, S.M.
(April 25, 1883 – October 26, 1973)
Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny
Russian cavalryman, military commander during the Russian Civil War, Polish-Soviet War and World War II, and a close political ally of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.
9. Beria, L.P.
(March 29, 1899 – December 23, 1953)
Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria
Soviet politician, Marshal of the Soviet Union and state security administrator, chief of the Soviet security and secret police apparatus under Joseph Stalin during World War II, and promoted to deputy premier under Stalin from 1941. Born in Georgia and died in Moscow, Russia.
10. Bulganin, N.A.
(June 11, 1895 - February 24, 1975)
Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin
Soviet politician who served as Minister of Defense (1953–1955) and Premier of the Soviet Union (1955–1958) under Nikita Khrushchev, following service in the Red Army and as Defense Minister under Joseph Stalin.
11. Bolesław Bierut
(April 18, 1892 - March 12, 1956)
Bolesław Bierut
Activist in the Communist Party of Poland. He was the prime minister (1952-1954) and president (1945-1952) of Poland, founder of Polish United Workers’ Party. Born in Poland and died in Moscow, Russia.
12. Baghirov, Jafar
(September 17, 1895 – May 26, 1956)
Mir Jafar Baghirov Abbas oglu
Soviet and Azerbaijani party figure and statesman; the leader of the Azerbaijani communist party.
13. Chervenkov, Vâlko V.
(September 6, 1900 -October 21, 1980)
Vâlko Velyov Chervenkov
Bulgarian communist politician, leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party in 1949-1954, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria in 1950-1956 and Deputy Prime Minister 1956-1961, army General.
14. Derzhavin, Gavriil
(July14, 1743 – July 20, 1816)
Gavriil Romanovich Derzhavin
One of the most highly esteemed Russian poets before Alexander Pushkin, as well as a statesman.
15. Duclos, Jacques
(October 2, 1896 - April 25, 1975)
Jacques Duclos
French politician, leader of the French Communist Party, associate and de facto successor of Maurice Thorez.
16. Engels, Friedrich
(November 28, 1820 - August 5, 1895)
Friedrich Engels
German philosopher, communist, social scientist, journalist, and businessman. Born in Barmen, Germany and died in London, England.
17. Fadeev, Alexander
(December 24, 1901 - May 13, 1956)
Alexander Alexandrovich Fadeev
Soviet writer, one of the co-founders of the Union of Soviet Writers and its chairman from 1946 to 1954.
18. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej
(November 8, 1901 - March 19, 1965)
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej
Romanian communist politician who served as the first Communist leader of Romania from 1947 to 1965.
19. Grotewohl, Otto
(March 1, 1894 - September 21, 1964)
Otto Grotewohl
German politician, member of the SPD, since 1946 — SED. In 1949-1964 he served as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR.
20. Gottwald, Klement
(November 23, 1896 - March 14, 1953)
Klement Gottwald
Czechoslovak revolutionary, statesman, political and party leader. Head of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Prime Minister and President of Czechoslovakia.
21. Gandhi, Indira P.
(November 19, 1917 - October 31, 1984)
Indira Priyadarshini Gandhi
Indian politician and central figure of the Indian National Congress. She was the 3rd prime minister of India and was also the first and, to date, only female prime minister of India.
22. Ikramov, Akmal I.
(September 1898 – March 13, 1938)
Akmal Ikramovich Ikramov
Uzbek politician active in Uzbek SSR politics and served as the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan from 1929 to 1937. Born in Uzbekistan and died in Moscow, Russia.
23. Ignatiev, S.D.
(September 14, 1904 - November 27, 1983)
Semyon Denisovich Ignatiev
Soviet politician. Born in Ukraine and died in Moscow, Russia.
24. Ibárruri, Dolores
(December 9, 1895 - November 12, 1989)
Isidora Dolores Ibárruri Gómez, known as La Pasionaria
Spanish Republican fighter, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Spain (1942-1960).
25. Khrushchev, N.S.
(April 15, 1894 -September 11, 1971)
Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev
Soviet statesman who led the Soviet Union during the Cold War-era as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1964, and as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, or Premier, from 1958 to 1964.
26. Khrushchev, S.N.
(July 2, 1935 – June 18, 2020)
Sergei Nikitich Khrushchev
The son of former Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev.
27. Komsomol
(Established in 1918 – Dissolved on September 28, 1991)
The All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, usually known as Komsomol, was a political youth organization in the Soviet Union.
28. Kambaraka
Chairman of a collective farm.
29. Khodzhayev, Fayzulla U.
(1896 — March15, 1938)
Fayzulla Ubaydullayevich Khodzhayev
Bukharan politician that served as the first head of the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic, which would later form part of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. Born in Uzbekistan and died in Moscow, Russia.
30. Krestinsky, N.N.
(October 13, 1883— March 15, 1938)
Nikolay Nikolayevich Krestinsky
Russian Bolshevik revolutionary and Soviet politician.
31. Kaganovich, L.M.
(November 22, 1893 – July 25, 1991)
Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich
Stalinist Soviet politician and administrator and one of the main associates of Joseph Stalin. Born in the Kiev district, Ukraine and died in Moscow, Russia.
32. Konev, I.S.
(December 28, 1897 - May 21, 1973)
Ivan Stepanovich Konev
Soviet military commander, Soviet general and Marshal of the Soviet Union.
33. Kosygin, A.N.
(February 21, 1904 - December 18, 1980)
Alexei Nikolayevich Kosygin
Soviet statesman and party leader, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1964-1980). Twice Hero of Socialist Labor (1964, 1974). Born in Saint Petersburg and died in Moscow.
34. Kekkonen, Urho K.
(September 3, 1900 - August 31, 1986)
Urho Kaleva Kekkonen
Finnish politician who served as the eighth and longest-serving president of Finland from 1956 until 1982.
35. Kamalov, Sabyr K.
(May 2, 1910 – June 6 июня, 1990)
Sabyr Kamalovich Kamalov
Soviet and Uzbek statesman and party leader, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan.
36. Lenin, V.I.
(April 22, 1870 – January 21, 1924)
Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, better known by his alias as Lenin
Russian revolutionary, politician, and political theorist.
37. Levitan, Yuri B.
(September 19, 1914 – August 4, 1983)
Yuri Borisovich Levitan
Primary Soviet radio announcer during and after World War II.
38. Mukhitdinov, N.A.
(November 19, 1917 - August 27, 2008)
Nuritdin Akramovich Mukhitdinov
Soviet statesman and party leader, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1957-1961). Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR to Syria (1968-1977).
39. Mikoyan, A.I.
(November 25, 1895 - October 21, 1978)
Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan
Soviet revolutionary, Old Bolshevik and statesman during the mandates of Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev.
40. Marx, Karl Heinrich
(May 5, 1818 – March 14 марта, 1883)
Karl Marx
German philosopher, economist, historian, sociologist, political theorist, journalist, and socialist revolutionary. Born in Trier, Germany and died in London, England.
41. Mayakovsky, V.V.
(July 19, 1893 -April 14, 1930)
Vladimir Vladimirovich Mayakovsky
Soviet poet, playwright, artist, and actor. Born in Georgia and died in Moscow, Russia.
42. Mulla Tuychi Hafiz
(1868 - 1943)
Tashmukhamedov, Mulla Tuychi
Famous Uzbek singer, connoisseur of folk music, representative of the vocal performing arts of Ferghana and Tashkent.
43. Malenkov, G.M.
(December 6, 1901 - January 14, 1988)
Georgy Maximilianovich Malenkov
Soviet politician who briefly succeeded Joseph Stalin as the leader of the Soviet Union.
44. Zhdanov, A.A.
(February 26, 1896 - August 31, 1948)
Andrei Alexandrovich Zhdanov
Soviet Communist Party leader and cultural ideologist.
45. Malyshev, V.A.
(December 16, 1902 -February 20, 1957)
Viacheslav Aleksandrovich Malyshev
One of the leading figures of Soviet industry during the 1940s and 1950s.
46. Molotov, V.M.
(March 9, 1890 - November 8, 1986)
Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov
Stalinist Soviet politician and diplomat, Old Bolshevik, and leading figure in the Soviet government from the 1920s.
47. Moskalenko, K.S.
(May 1, 1902 - June 17, 1985)
Kirill Semyonovich Moskalenko
Soviet military commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union.
48. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
(Born on October 26, 1919, Tehrān, Iran—died on July 27, 1980, Cairo, Egypt)
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
The thirty-fifth and last Shahinshah of Iran, ruled from 1941 to 1979. The Iranian Shahinshah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi compared himself to the founder of the Achaemenid kingdom, King Cyrus II the Great, and dreamed of restoring the former glory of his country.
49. Mao Zedong
(December 26, 1893 – September 9, 1976)
Mao Zedong,
also known as Chairman Mao, was a Chinese communist revolutionary who was the founder of the People's Republic of China (PRC), which he ruled as the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party from the establishment of the PRC in 1949 until his death in 1976. Ideologically a Marxist–Leninist, his theories, military strategies, and political policies are collectively known as Maoism.
50. Niyazov, A.I.
(November 7, 1903 – December 26, 1973)
Amin Irmatovich Niyazov
Uzbek-Soviet politician. Born in Fergana and died in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
51. Nenni, Pietro Sandro
(February 9, 1891 - January 1, 1980)
Pietro Sandro Nenni
National secretary of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) and lifetime Senator since 1970.
52. Nasriddinova, Yodgor S.
(December 26, 1920 - April 7, 2006)
Yodgor Sodiqovna Nasriddinova
Uzbek-Soviet engineer, communist party operative and high-ranking member of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. Born in Kokand, Uzbekistan and died in Moscow, Russia.
53. Nehru, Jawaharlal
(November 14, 1889 - May 27, 1964)
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
Leading Indian independence activist, and subsequently, the first Prime Minister of Independent India.
54. Ordzhonikidze, Sergo K.
(October 24, 1886 - February 18, 1937)
Sergo Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze
Georgian Bolshevik and Soviet politician. Born in Ghoresha, Georgia and died in Moscow, Russia.
55. Poskrebyshev, A.N.
(August 7, 1891 - January 3, 1965)
Alexander Nikolaevich Poskrebyshev
Soviet politician and state and Communist Party functionary.
56. Pervukhin, M.G.
(October 14, 1904 - July 22, 1978)
Mikhail Georgievich Pervukhin
Soviet statesman, political and military figure. First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Lieutenant General of Engineering and Technical Service, Hero of Socialist Labor.
57. Qodiriy, Abdulla
(April 10, 1894 — October 4, 1938)
Abdulla Qodiriy
Uzbek and Soviet playwright, poet, writer, and literary translator. Qodiriy was one of the most influential Uzbek writers of the 20th century.
58. Rykov, A.I.
(February13, 1881 - March15, 1938)
Alexei Ivanovich Rykov
Russian Bolshevik revolutionary and Soviet politician most prominent as Premier of Russia and the Soviet Union from 1924 to 1929 and 1924 to 1930 respectively.
59. Rákosi, Mátyás
(March 9, 1892 - February 5, 1971)
Mátyás Rákosi
Hungarian communist politician who was the de facto leader of Hungary from 1947 to 1956. Born in Serbia and died in Russia.
60. Ribbentrop, J.
(April 30, 1893 - October 16, 1946)
Ulrich Friedrich Wilhelm Joachim von Ribbentrop, better known as simply Joachim von Ribbentrop
German politician, Foreign Minister of Nazi Germany.
61. Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli
(September 5, 1888 – April 17, 1975)
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan
Indian philosopher and statesman who served as the second president of India from 1962 to 1967. He was also the first vice-president of India from 1952 to 1962.
62. Rokossovsky, K.K.
(December 21, 1896 - August 3, 1968)
Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky
Soviet and Polish military commander, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. Knight of the Order of Victory. The only marshal of two countries in the history of the USSR: Marshal of the Soviet Union and Marshal of Poland. He commanded the Victory Day Parade on June 24, 1945 on Red Square in Moscow.
63. Stalin, J.V.
(December 6, 1878 - March 5, 1953)
Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin
Georgian revolutionary and Soviet politician who led the Soviet Union from the mid–1920s until 1953 as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Premier of the Soviet Union. Born in Georgia and died in Moscow, Russia.
64. Suslov, Mikhail A.
(November 21, 1902 - January 25, 1982)
Mikhail Andreievich Suslov
Soviet statesman during the Cold War-era. He served as Second Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1965, and as unofficial Chief Ideologue of the Party until his death in 1982.
65. Semyonov-Tyan-Shansky, P.P.
(January 14, 1827 – March 11, 1914)
Pyotr Petrovich Semyonov-Tyan-Shansky
Russian geographer and statistician who managed the Russian Geographical Society for more than 40 years. Born and died in Saint Petersburg, Russia
66. Shatalin, N.N.
(December 16, 1904 -June 3, 1984)
Nikolai Nikolayevich Shatalin
Soviet party figure and statesman.
67. Saburov, M.Z.
(February 19, 1900 - March 24, 1977)
Maksim Zakharovich Saburov
Soviet engineer, economist and politician, three-time Chairman of Gosplan and later First Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union. Born in Ukraine and died in Moscow, Russia.
68. Shcherbakov, P.A.
(February 16, 1916 – May 2, 1994)
Pavel Andreevich Shcherbakov
Soviet economic, state and political figure.
69. Sverdlov, Ya.M.
(June 3, 1885 - March 16, 1919)
Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov
Bolshevik party administrator and chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.
70. Serov, I.A.
(August 13, 1905 – July 1, 1990)
Ivan Alexandrovich Serov
Head of the Soviet secret services, Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff in 1958-1963, first Chairman of the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR in 1954-1958, Army General.
71. Sukarno
(June 6, 1901 - June 21, 1970)
Sukarno
Indonesian statesman, politician, nationalist and revolutionary who was the first president of Indonesia, serving from 1945 to 1967.
72. Sulaimanova, Khadicha S.
(June 3, 1913 - November 26, 1965)
Khadicha Sulaimanovna Sulaimanova
Doctor of Law, Professor, Academician. She was also Minister of Justice of the UzSSR, Chairman of the Supreme Court of the UzSSR.
73. Tolstoy, L.N.
(September 9, 1828 – November 20, 1910)
Count Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy, usually referred to in English as Leo Tolstoy
Russian writer who is regarded as one of the greatest authors of all time.
74. 12. Chekhov, A.P.
(January 29, 1860 – July 15, 1904)
Anton Pavlovich Chekhov
Russian playwright and short-story writer who is considered to be among the greatest writers of short fiction in history.
75. Turgenev, I.S.
(November 9, 1818 – August 22, 1883)
Ivan Sergeevich Turgenev
Russian novelist, short story writer, poet, playwright, translator, and popularizer of Russian literature in the West. Born in Russia and died in France.
76. Trotsky, L.D.
(November 7, 1879 - August 21, 1940)
Lev D. Trotsky (Lev Davidovich Bronstein)
Soviet revolutionary, Marxist theorist, and politician whose particular strain of Marxist thought is known as Trotskyism. Born in Ukraine and killed in Mexico.
77. Turdyev, Khalil
(1909 – 1971)
Khalil Turdiev
First secretary of the provincial committee of the party and later he became a party figure.
78. Thorez, Maurice
(April 28, 1900 -July 11, 1964)
Maurice Thorez
French politician and longtime leader of the French Communist Party from 1930 until his death. Born in France and died in the Black Sea.
79. Togliatti, Palmiro
(March 26, 1893 - August 21, 1964)
Palmiro Michele Nicola Togliatti
Italian politician and leader of the Italian Communist Party from 1927 until his death. Born in Italy and died in Crimea, Russia.
80. Tevosian, I.F.
(January 4, 1902 -March 30, 1958)
Ivan Fyodorovich Tevosian
Soviet state and party figure. Born in Armenia and died in Moscow, Russia.
81. Turgunbaeva, Mukarram
(May 13, 1913 - November 26, 1978)
Mukarram Turgunbaeva
Uzbek, Soviet ballet dancer, choreographer, teacher, folklorist. People's Artist of the USSR. Winner of two Stalin and State Prizes of the USSR.
82. Ulrikh, V.V.
(July13, 1889 -May 7, 1951)
Vasiliy Vasilievich Ulrikh
Senior judge of the Soviet Union during most of the regime of Joseph Stalin. In this capacity, Ulrikh served as the presiding judge at many of the major show trials of the Great Purges in the Soviet Union. Born in Riga, Latvia and died in Moscow, Russia.
83. Ulyanov, N.F.
Nikolai Fedorovich Ulyanov
Famous Russian architect and process engineer. Arrived in Tashkent in 1869. Died in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
84. Ulbricht, Walter E.P.
(June 30, 1893 - August 1, 1973)
Walter Ernst Paul Ulbricht
German communist politician, head of the state (1960-1973), German Democratic Republic Reichstag (1928-1933), Germany; leader of Communist Party of Socialist Unity Party of Germany.
85. U Nu
(May 25, 1907 - February 14, 1995)
U Nu
First prime minister of independent Burma (now called Myanmar) after freedom was obtained in 1948 from British colonial rule.
86. Vyshinsky, A.Y.
(December 10, 1883 -November 22, 1954)
Andrei Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky
Soviet politician, jurist, and diplomat. Born in Odessa, Ukraine and died in New-York, USA.
87. Voroshilov, K.Ye.
(February 4, 1881 - December 2, 1969)
Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov, popularly known as Klim Voroshilov
Prominent Soviet military officer and politician during the Stalin era. Born in Ukraine and died in Moscow, Russia.
88. Yusupov, Usman
(March1, 1900 -May 7, 1966)
Usman Yusupov
First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in office 27 September 1937 – 7 April 1953.
89. Yenukidze, A.S.
(May 19, 1877 - October 30, 1937)
Avel Safronovich Yenukidze
Prominent ‘Old Bolshevik’. He was a Soviet statesman and party leader, and Stalin's closest friend since his youth.
90. Yagoda, G.G.
(November 7, 1891 - March 15, 1938)
Genrikh Grigoryevich Yagoda
Russian revolutionary, Soviet statesman and politician, one of the main leaders of the Soviet state security agencies, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the first ever ‘General Commissar of State Security’.
91. Yezhov, N.I.
(May 1, 1895 - February 4, 1940)
Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov
Soviet secret police official under Joseph Stalin, who was head of the NKVD from 1936 to 1938, during the height of the Great Purge.
92. Zhou Enlai
(March 5, 1898 - January 8, 1976)
Zhou Enlai, also known as Zhou Xiangyu
First Premier of the People's Republic of China in 1949 until his death; descendant in the 33rd generation of the founder of neo-Confucianism Zhou Dongyi. A prominent diplomat, he promoted peaceful coexistence with the West, while at the same time trying not to break off relations with the Soviet Union.
93. Zhukov, G.K.
(December 1, 1896 -June 18, 1974)
Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov
Soviet commander and statesman, Soviet general and Marshal of the Soviet Union.