My PC, running Windows 10 is taking a long time to reach the desktop screen. I have timed the various stages as best I can. It previously booted so fast that there was hardly time to hit F11 when necessary. It changed several weeks ago and as far as I can recall I had not added any hardware.

I recall many years ago being able to watch files/drivers etc being loaded on a console-type window so it was apparent which ones were taking a long time. I can't find any way to do this, the Windows boot log doesn't give any time info.


Windows XP Boot UpProcess


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20/02/23 FIXEDWindows Disk Manager showed a drive marked unallocated, I tried to initialise this drive but received an error message like 'not correct function'.Opened the case and removed cables from each drive in turn. I have 2 SSD drives and 1 HDD. Disconnecting the HDD resulted in a normal boot time. How do I mark the answer that helped?

A device running Windows 10 has several requirements for booting into the OS. After the device's firmware initializes all the hardware, the device needs to ensure that there's enough power to boot. Afterwards, the device needs to ensure that the device is booting into the appropriate OS depending on if the user wants to perform an update or a restore on the device, or if the user wants to boot the device into the main OS.

The firmware boot loaders boot the UEFI environment and hands over control to UEFI applications written by the SoC vendor, Microsoft, and OEMs. These applications can utilize UEFI drivers and services.

The SoC firmware boot loaders initialize the minimal set of hardware required for the device to run. The SoC firmware boot loaders are designed to finish as fast as possible, and nothing is drawn to the screen while they're running. After the SoC firmware boot loaders finish, the device is booted into the UEFI environment.

The SoC firmware boot loaders also contain an emergency flashing capability that allows devices to be flashed when the boot environment isn't stable and Full Flash Update (FFU) image-based flashing using the Microsoft-provided flashing tool isn't possible. Emergency flashing requires tools specific to the SoC. For more information, contact the SoC vendor.

Windows 10 utilizes the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to support the handoff of system control from the SoC firmware boot loader to the OS. The UEFI environment is a minimal boot OS upon which devices are booted and the Windows 10 OS runs. For more information, see UEFI in Windows.

The Windows Boot Manager is a Microsoft-provided UEFI application that sets up the boot environment. Inside the boot environment, individual boot applications started by the Boot Manager provide functionality for all customer-facing scenarios before the device boots.

After the UEFI environment launches the Boot Manager, the Boot Manager initializes boot libraries, reads the boot configuration database to determine which boot applications to run and in which order to run them. The Boot Manager launches boot applications sequentially, and each application exits back to the Boot Manager after finishing.

Boot libraries are libraries of functions that extend upon existing UEFI functionality, and are designed to be used within the boot environment. Only boot applications, which are launched by the Boot Manager, have access to the boot libraries.

In non-retail OS images, the Boot Manager next runs an offline crash dump boot application that allows the device to capture a snapshot of physical memory from the previous OS session. When the device resets abnormally, the previous OS session's memory is preserved across the reset. When this happens, the offline crash dump application saves that memory and turn it into an offline crash dump file, which can be transferred off the device and analyzed. If the device didn't reset abnormally in the previous OS session, the offline crash dump application exits immediately.

In all OS images, the Boot Manager next runs mobilestartup.efi. This application runs several boot libraries, some of which are only run on first boot (for example, to provision the secure boot policy) or only in non-retail images (for example, to enter USB mass storage mode). The following libraries are always run:

First, mobilestartup.efi runs the library that implements UEFI battery charging. This library allows the user to charge their device while the device is in the boot environment (or is perceived as being turned off). This library is run first to ensure that the device has enough power to fully boot. For more information about scenarios involving the battery charging application, see Battery charging in the boot environment.

Next, mobilestartup.efi runs the libraries that implement flashing, device reset, and updates. These libraries determine whether the device should boot to flashing or device reset mode, or if the device should continue to the Update OS or Main OS.

PreBoot: The PC's firmware initiates a power-on self test (POST) and loads firmware settings. This pre-boot process ends when a valid system disk is detected. Firmware reads the master boot record (MBR), and then starts Windows Boot Manager.

Here's a summary of the boot sequence, what will be seen on the display, and typical boot problems at that point in the sequence. Before you start troubleshooting, you have to understand the outline of the boot process and display status to ensure that the issue is properly identified at the beginning of the engagement. Select the thumbnail to view it larger.

On the Advanced Boot Options screen, try to start the computer in Safe Mode or Safe Mode with Networking. If either of these options works, use Event Viewer to help identify and diagnose the cause of the boot problem. To view events that are recorded in the event logs, follow these steps:

To troubleshoot problems that affect services, do a clean boot by using System Configuration (msconfig).Select Selective startup to test the services one at a time to determine which one is causing the problem. If you can't find the cause, try including system services. However, in most cases, the problematic service is third-party.

If the computer starts in Disable Driver Signature mode, start the computer in Disable Driver Signature Enforcement mode, and then follow the steps that are documented in the following article to determine which drivers or files require driver signature enforcement:Troubleshooting boot problem caused by missing driver signature (x64)

If the Stop error occurs late in the startup process, or if the Stop error is still being generated, you can capture a memory dump. A good memory dump can help determine the root cause of the Stop error. For more information, see Generate a kernel or complete crash dump.

Windows has many features to help protect you from malware, and it does an amazingly good job. Except for apps that businesses develop and use internally, all Microsoft Store apps must meet a series of requirements to be certified and included in the Microsoft Store. This certification process examines several criteria, including security, and is an effective means of preventing malware from entering the Microsoft Store. Even if a malicious app does get through, Windows includes a series of security features that can mitigate the effect. For instance, Microsoft Store apps are sandboxed and lack the privileges necessary to access user data or change system settings.

Those components are just some of the ways that Windows protects you from malware. However, those security features protect you only after Windows starts. Modern malware, and bootkits specifically, are capable of starting before Windows, completely bypassing OS security, and remaining hidden.

When a PC starts, it first finds the OS bootloader. PCs without Secure Boot run whatever bootloader is on the PC's hard drive. There's no way for the PC to tell whether it's a trusted OS or a rootkit.

When a PC equipped with UEFI starts, the PC first verifies that the firmware is digitally signed, reducing the risk of firmware rootkits. If Secure Boot is enabled, the firmware examines the bootloader's digital signature to verify that it hasn't been modified. If the bootloader is intact, the firmware starts the bootloader only if one of the following conditions is true:

To prevent malware from abusing these options, the user must manually configure the UEFI firmware to trust a non-certified bootloader or to turn off Secure Boot. Software can't change the Secure Boot settings.

The default state of Secure Boot has a wide circle of trust, which can result in customers trusting boot components they may not need. Since the Microsoft 3rd Party UEFI CA certificate signs the bootloaders for all Linux distributions, trusting the Microsoft 3rd Party UEFI CA signature in the UEFI database increase s the attack surface of systems. A customer who intended to only trust and boot a single Linux distribution will trust all distributions - much more than their desired configuration. A vulnerability in any of the bootloaders exposes the system and places the customer at risk of exploit for a bootloader they never intended to use, as seen in recent vulnerabilities, for example with the GRUB bootloader or firmware-level rootkit affecting boot components. Secured-core PCs require Secure Boot to be enabled and configured to distrust the Microsoft 3rd Party UEFI CA signature, by default, to provide customers with the most secure configuration of their PCs possible.

To trust and boot operating systems, like Linux, and components signed by the UEFI signature, Secured-core PCs can be configured in the BIOS menu to add the signature in the UEFI database by following these steps:

Like most mobile devices, Arm-based devices, such as the Microsoft Surface RT device, are designed to run only Windows 8.1. Therefore, Secure Boot can't be turned off, and you can't load a different OS. Fortunately, there's a large market of ARM processor devices designed to run other operating systems. 589ccfa754

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