Aurore Papegay / Sciences Po
I'm Nathaniel Butler Blondel, a fifth year PhD Candidate at Sciences Po, under the supervision of Guillaume Plantin. My research interests lie in theoretical and empirical macro-finance, with a focus on banking, prudential regulation, and monetary-fiscal interactions.
During my doctoral studies, I completed PhD internships at the International Monetary Fund (2025) and the Bank of England (2024-25). Prior to this I worked as a trainee and analyst at the European Central Bank, and an economic assistant at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR). I am currently visiting the Finance Department at HEC Paris.
I am on the 2026/27 job market.
Job Market Paper | Vitae | nathaniel.butlerblondel@sciencespo.fr
Research
JOB MARKET PAPER
Abstract. Financial institutions' reliance on public debt is usually seen as a source of fiscal discipline. I show that it can also give a government leverage over an independent central bank. Both authorities bear the output loss from sovereign default, but only the government values the tax costs it saves. At the government's margin of default, the central bank therefore accepts some inflation to secure repayment and preserve financial stability. A government can thus use the financial sector as its proxy to extract monetary accommodation. Financial repression can nonetheless preserve monetary dominance. Requiring financial institutions to hold more public debt raises the borrowing needed to make default credible, which dissuades the government from seeking accommodation. The assignment of regulatory authority can therefore determine which fiscal–monetary regime prevails.
'Either shut the Bank at once, and say it will not lend more than it commonly lends, or lend freely, boldly, and so that the public may feel you mean to go on lending.' – Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street (1873)
Abstract. Central banks increasingly backstop markets beyond the banking system. When they cannot regulate the institutions they support, how should they intervene without weakening incentives to self-insure? In a model where firms choose their balance sheets before a crisis, I compare a Bagehot rule, which lends freely at a penalty rate, with a quantity rule, which caps the central bank’s crisis balance sheet. The two are equivalent under full commitment and known crisis severity. Under limited commitment, a Bagehot rule meets underpreparation by lending more at the same rate, whereas a quantity rule must let funding rates spike or be abandoned. A quantity rule can therefore fall into a self-fulfilling expectation trap: firms choose illiquid balance sheets because they expect it to be abandoned. Lending freely, as Bagehot prescribed, rules out this trap with strictly less commitment. This advantage can outweigh the efficiency of a quantity rule when crisis severity is uncertain, but can reverse when the central bank is tempted to lend less than it promised.
with Artur Kotlicki (Bank of England)
Draft Coming Soon
Abstract. Since late 2021, UK bank credit facilities extended to non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) have expanded substantially, both in absolute terms and as a share of total bank credit facilities. This shift coincides with the onset of both conventional and unconventional monetary tightening by the Bank of England, yet it remains unclear to what extent monetary tightening has shaped this trend, and if so, whether rate hikes and balance-sheet tightening (QT) have differential effects on the composition of bank credit. We study this question using a panel of individual bank–firm credit relationships drawn from the Large Exposures regime, combined with high-frequency monetary policy surprises decomposed into interest rate and QT components from the UK Monetary Policy Event-Study Database. We find that conventional rate shocks are associated with a broad reduction in loan commitments across both NBFIs and non-financial corporates (NFCs), consistent with both the Bank Lending and Credit Line channels of monetary policy. In contrast, unconventional monetary tightening generates a marked divergence across firm types. Following QT shocks, NFC loan commitments fall while those to NBFIs increase on net – a finding that holds after accounting for bank-level supply conditions, consistent with increased NBFI demand for contingent liquidity.
Disclaimer: Any views expressed are solely those of the authors and so cannot be taken to represent those of the Bank of England or to state Bank of England policy. This paper should therefore not be reported as representing the views of the Bank of England or members of the Monetary Policy Committee, Financial Policy Committee or Prudential Regulation Committee.
Preliminary draft. Please do not quote without the permission of the author(s).
Policy Work and Data
with Yurii Sholomytskyi (International Monetary Fund) and Mumtaz Hussain (International Monetary Fund)
Abstract. This paper investigates the transmission of oil price shocks to the banking sector in oil-dependent economies, using Oman as a case study. We develop a DSGE model featuring an integrated banking block with endogenous credit rationing and a sovereign wealth fund stabilization rule, calibrated to Omani institutional targets and disciplined by Bayesian methods. Our structural approach disentangles two primary transmission channels: the solvency channel, driven by credit risk and non-performing loans (NPLs), and the liquidity channel, driven by pro-cyclical government deposit withdrawals and sovereign debt issuance. The structural variance decomposition attributes over 54% of non-oil GDP variance and 53% of credit variance to oil price shocks, while bank capital shocks account for less than 0.1%, confirming the quantitative dominance of the liquidity channel. We identify a precautionary liquidity motive—a “liquidity buffer trap”—where banks maintain excess liquidity during booms to hedge against hydrocarbon volatility, structurally suppressing credit to the productive sector. Our counterfactual regime analysis reveals the stabilizing power of credit depth: banking conservatism protects long-term physical capital formation, and the ongoing financialization of the corporate sector— including the rapid growth of Islamic banking and sukuk markets—under Vision 2040 further amplifies this structural resilience. We acknowledge identification challenges inherent in small-sample structural estimation and discuss the sensitivity of results to key modeling assumptions.