Max Thon

I am a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Zurich and the University of Cologne.

Contact:

max.thon[at]business.uzh.ch

m.thon[at]wiso.uni-koeln.de

My research focuses on personnel economics, strategy, and organizational design.

I use randomized field experiments conducted in collaboration with firms, as well as observational data, to study the causal effects of organizational practices on worker behavior and performance within and across firms.

I am also affiliated with ECONtribute. Beyond that, I was a visiting researcher at the Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto and at the AXA Gender Lab at Bocconi University.

Publications

Competition and risk-taking

European Economic Review 160 (2023), 104592, Link

O. Gürtler, L. Struth & M. Thon.

Working papers

How to attract talent? Field-experimental evidence on emphasizing flexibility and career opportunities in job advertisements

ECONtribute Discussion Paper No.332, Link

L. Fuchs, M. Heinz, P. Pinger & M. Thon.

Abstract: Job advertisements are a key instrument for companies to attract talent. We conduct a field experiment in which we randomize the content of job advertisements for STEM jobs in one of the largest European technology firms. Specifically, we study how highlighting job flexibility and career advancement in job advertisements causally affects the firm’s pool of applicants. We find large treatment effects of entry-, but not for senior-level positions in the firm: highlighting job flexibility increases the total number of female and male applicants, while emphasizing career advancement only raises applications by men. Both effects are entirely driven by applicants residing outside of the federal state in which the firm is located. In a survey experiment among STEM students, we find that the content of job advertisements shapes young professionals’ beliefs about the work environment at the firm. Most importantly, we find that students expect better career benefits, but lower work-life balance when career advancement is highlighted. Our study highlights how job advertisements affect the total number of applications as well as applicants’ quality, diversity, region of residence and beliefs.

Shaping interfirm relationships in intermediary markets: Evidence from a field experiment

ECONtribute Discussion Paper No.297, Link

M. Thon, O. Gürtler, M. Heinz, K. Schäfer & D. Sliwka.

Abstract: Prior work highlights the value of relation-specific assets and knowledge-sharing routines in interfirm relationships, but little is known about how short-term interventions can build these resources. We propose that temporary transactional benefits encourage engagement, leading to accumulated firm-specific knowledge and relational assets. In a field experiment with a travel company that distributes products via intermediaries, 253 of 757 independent agencies were randomly granted access to a service hotline, lowering transaction costs for frontline agents and facilitating knowledge transfer about the firm’s products and processes. Sales increase in response to the intervention, in particular among agencies with weaker prior ties, showing such initiatives help cultivate new relationships. The treatment effects persist beyond the period of the intervention and extend to non-targeted products, indicating durable relational resources.

Discrimination, quotas, and stereotypes

ECONtribute Discussion Paper No.188, Link

L. Struth & M. Thon.

Abstract: We analyze the effect of employment-quota policies on the development of uncertainty and stereotypes in a model of inaccurate statistical discrimination with ambiguity about worker abilities. We show that, even if group characteristics are identical, higher uncertainty about one group can result in discriminatory employment decisions. The success of a quota in correcting the beliefs then depends crucially on the firm’s learning process. In particular, we find that the more confident the firm is in its initial priors, the longer a quota needs to be implemented until beliefs are sufficiently corrected such that discriminatory behavior vanishes.

Selected work in progress

How to prevent employee theft? Field-experimental evidence

O. Gürtler, M. Heinz, D. Sliwka & M. Thon.

Status: Manuscript in preparation.

Abstract: Employee theft is a pervasive issue that imposes significant financial and cultural costs on firms and society. This study evaluates interventions aimed at reducing employee theft through a field experiment conducted in collaboration with a large restaurant chain in Germany. The interventions include the implementation of a ”Four-Eye Principle,” requiring collaboration across work areas to execute theft, and external monitoring as a benchmark. Using randomized controlled trials, the results demonstrate that the Four-Eye Principle significantly increases recorded sales, translating to a profit gain of over 1% of annual revenue. These findings suggest that strategic peer monitoring can effectively mitigate theft while minimally impacting operational workflows. The study highlights the importance of organizational design in addressing workplace misconduct and offers several managerial implications.

Targeting sales incentives in intermediary markets: Field-experimental evidence

O. Gürtler, M. Heinz, K. Schäfer, D. Sliwka & M. Thon.

Status: Draft available upon request.

Abstract: We investigate how to motivate sales agents in intermediary markets. In collaboration with a large travel company, we run a field experiment with more than 1,200 independently owned intermediaries that sell our study firm’s own products as well as products from competitors to end customers. The intermediaries employ sales agents responsible for customer interaction. We compare the impact of different forms of monetary incentives. We develop a conceptual formal model hypothesizing that incentives for intermediaries (i) generally increase sales, and are more effective when targeting (ii) sales agents rather than owners of the intermediaries, (iii) intermediaries with weaker monetary incentives prior to the intervention, and (iv) products where the firm has no competitive advantage. We find that higher commission payments to the agencies' owners has no discernible effects, while directly incentivizing sales agents through vouchers raises sales for agencies with low prior commission rates. The incentive effects are driven by products where the firm has a weaker market position, while they have no discernible effects on product sales where the firm has a strong competitive advantage. We analyze underlying mechanisms using surveys and further administrative data.

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