Postdoctoral Researcher

at MOVE, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and Barcelona GSE

Research Interests:

Structural Microeconomics, Econometrics, and Mechanism Design

Contact Information:

Email: mrho@movebarcelona.eu
Office: B3-184Fundació Markets Organizations and Votes in Economics (MOVE) Universitat Autònoma de BarcelonaEdifici B, Campus UAB 08193Bellaterra, Spain


CV



Research

Works in Progress*:


  • Student Rank Order Choices with Large Choice Sets: An Application to the NYC High School Matching Market

Abstract: The paper studies how 8-th grader students apply to high schools by studying their submitted rank order lists of in the New York City setting. The paper first documents a student behavior of shortening their rank order list. Moreover, students with shorter lists are correlated with high socioeconomic status, high acceptance probabilities to their top choice schools, and higher rate of attrition to non-public high schools (although majority of rejected students end up at the public school system). Given such relationship between the student choices (specifically, list length) and the acceptance probabilities, I, then, develop a student decision model which rationalizes the short list length; students sequentially, or dynamically, choose schools to apply and at each slot incur a cost of filling out the slot which depends on acceptance probabilities of previous choices and outside option.


Abstract: This paper studies a multi-stage, or dynamic, Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm when a subset of the proposing side changes their rank order list over time. Inspiration for this setting comes from the largest school choice market - the New York City high school matching market. We re-define many of the static characterization associated with DA - stability, strategy-proof, and student optimality - in dynamic setting with changing preferences. With these newly defined notions, dynamic stable matching may fail to exist using DA. We show modified version of DA that is dynamically stable and strategy-proof, and the resulting matching is also Pareto dominant to any other stable matching.


*Drafts available upon request.

Teaching

Instructor

  • Regression Analysis (Undergraduate)

Teaching Assistance

  • Data Driven Business and Public Policy Decision Making (Undergraduate)
  • Econometrics II (Undergraduate)
  • Financial Accounting (Undergraduate and MBA)
  • Math Skills Workshop (MBA)
  • Intermediate Macroeconomics (Undergraduate)
  • Auctions and Markets (Undergraduate)