[BEST] A Stranger In My Own Country East Pakistan Pdf Free 18

However, he points out, of all the different groups it was often East Pakistanis who were unfairly vilified. Mascarenhas lays out in simple yet gripping prose the fact that East Pakistan was continually oppressed and ignored both politically and economically to the extent that it made sense for the country to at least have provincial independence. While his imagery feels a little heavy handed at times, similar to the lens that many development workers use to depict rural poor Bangladesh today, there is an undeniable truth in the picture he paints. East Pakistanis were not living the comfortable, luxurious life that their western counterparts had been privileged to.

After his work documenting Afghanistan, Riboud continued eastwards through Pakistan to reach India, where he stayed for one year. Riboud made a visit of several months in China in 1957, the country where he was to make his well-known body of work that was to span the course of four decades.

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In the wake of (a) Goa, (b) intensified Indo-Pakistani and Pak-Afghan disputation and (c) growing Chinese Communist and Soviet capabilities to press southward our basic interest still calls for policies that will:

(1) Vigorously support the growth of viable non-Communist governments;

(2) Reduce intra-area tensions and

(3) Increase participation by both India and Pakistan in causes beneficial to the Free World.

Our political and economic policies are well-charted and reasonably successful in strengthening the domestic structures of these countries. Similarly, within the bounds of current capabilities, our general posture of defense against Soviet bloc pressures in this region are not per se an immediate cause of concern. The chief proximate threat to the success of our policies in South Asia arise from the pervasive, corrosive intra-regional disputes. In the end these troublesome controversies probably cannot be greatly ameliorated either bilaterally or mainly through the influence of the United Nations or other nations such as Britain; the United States must continue to play a major role. The problem is what additional instruments we should use to influence the governments concerned.

The policy issues we face immediately include the Afghan - Pakistan trade impasse, the Pakistani intention of raising the Kashmir dispute in the United Nations, the recent Pakistani requests and suggestions to the United States that we restrict aid to India and give additional positive reaffirmations of the U.S. - Pakistan alliance, suggestions emanating from India that American arms would be welcome to increase India's capabilities vis-a-vis the Communist Chinese, and the aftermath of the Goan invasion.

Compared with most states in Southeast and Southwest Asia, India and Pakistan enjoy a relatively high degree of political stability and sustained economic growth. India's size and strength, plus its historic role in the vanguard of Asian nationalisms, give it the political influence with other countries that can be damaging to the United States when India and the United States are at cross purposes (as in some colonial issues) or extremely helpful when we can cooperate (as in the Congo or, hopefully, in achieving peace and security in Southeast Asia). India stands sometimes on the side of the Bloc, sometimes on our side and always on its own side (Goa, Kashmir).

Pakistan, though less than a quarter as populous as India, politically and economically behind the Indian pace and less influential with other countries, ranks as another country of major importance to the United States because of its location, size and policies. Its most important policy is its alliance with the United States. From this it expects a place at the councils of the free world, military and economic strengthening beyond the usual level of aid for an unaligned nation of its size, and assured American protection against India. We expect the alliance to give us Pakistan's general support in the United Nations, a South Asian anchor position for our system of pacts around the rim of the Communist Bloc, and certain special facilities.

In general political terms India's weight in international affairs can do more to help us or harm us than can Pakistan's. To have to choose between the two countries would, however, be a failure of policy: we need both.

Afghanistan is a traditional buffer area between Russia and South Asia. While less important to the Free World than either India or Pakistan, for it to come under Communist domination would greatly aggravate the problems of defense for Iran as well as India and Pakistan. Its conflicts with Pakistan over "Pushtunistan" and related problems are the single greatest threat to its retention in the Free World.

The bitterest of the regional disputes in South Asia arises out of events in the late 1940s. In the 1960s South Asia will face new and profoundly different situations which can be met only if Afghanistan, Pakistan and India perceive the necessity of much closer cooperation than they have ever yet achieved. With economic development village economies are giving way to regional cash economies; these can ripen far more effectively when trade and exchange flow freely across the sub-continental borders. Economic cooperation will also be essential to successfully meeting the competition of the European Common Market. The advantages of close political cooperation are self-evident. In military defense, joint or coordinated policies in the face of the threat from the north will greatly strengthen each country, and therefore the Free World generally.

Moreover, it is essential to our interests that these countries find ways of compromising their bitter disputes. Hundreds of millions of dollars of our aid to India and Pakistan are in effect dissipated by their feud over Kashmir. The stability and strength that we need in South Asia as a condition of our global defenses against Communist pressures is also jeopardized. To overcome these difficulties and to settle these disputes it may be necessary for the United States to undertake further new initiatives. It is also essential to United States global security interests that we maintain in these countries an image of strength, and of determination to support their efforts to maintain independence in the face of Soviet and Communist Chinese pressures.

In our dealings with South Asian governments we must bear in mind the fact that individual leaders and oligarchies can exert tremendous influence on millions of constituents. The importance of personal diplomacy cannot be overestimated. In our discussions with South Asian leaders it is important that we keep them aware of United States interests in the area; that we impress them with our disapproval of their self-destructive squabbles; and that we constantly remind them of the grave consequences of their failure to cooperate in the face of the growing danger of Sino-Soviet expansionism.

II. Our Stake in South Asian Intra-Area Disputes

The intra-area disputes confront us, with several direct, immediate policy issues. These are discussed in the following paragraphs:

A. Pakistan - Afghanistan Disputes

1. "Pushtunistan"

The "Pushtunistan" question continues to affect directly every aspect of Afghanistan - Pakistan relations and United States relations with both countries. Pakistan flatly rejects the Afghan claim that for historical, ethnic, cultural and linguistic reasons Afghanistan has a special interest in the four to five million Pushtu-speaking peoples in Pakistan and that these people should be given the right of self-determination. In the last two years the Government of Pakistan has dealt increasingly firmly with Pushtun tribal unrest and relations between the two countries have correspondingly worsened. There is little likelihood of a solution of the "Pushtunistan" question in the foreseeable future. Pakistan has a strong legal position. Most nations, including the United States, recognize the Durand Line as the international boundary.

Policy Issue: Whether the United States should seek to establish conditions of mediation for this dispute.

We recommend that we not do so, but continue to work toward the obsolescence of this problem through resolution of the associated transit trade issue, on which we may have more leverage.

2. The Afghan Transit Trade Issue

The complex of actions and counter actions which led to the disruption of the traditional transit trade route through Pakistan into Afghanistan in September has opened the door for rapidly and sharply increased Soviet influence in Afghanistan. Because a substantial part of the transit trade consists of United States aid supplies and equipment (which we ship to Afghanistan with ample political as well as economic justification) we believe we have some leverage with Afghanistan, though very little with Pakistan except at the possible cost of a degeneration in our relations with Pakistan.

Policy Issues: (a) Whether we should make efforts to keep the aid pipeline open to Afghanistan if it can be done at moderate extra costs for shipments by a temporary alternative routing through Iran.

We believe this should be done and that it is desirable to add the necessary amount to the Afghan aid bill to continue the movement of selected aid goods to Afghanistan. This will indicate to the Afghans our intention of continuing a portion of our aid programs while the Pakistan route is closed. At the same time we recommend that after the Afghans and Pakistanis have had an opportunity to realize the dangerous consequences of their stubborn positions, we make a new diplomatic approach.

(b) Whether the United States should be prepared to support the development at substantial cost of a permanent alternative transit route through Iran for Afghanistan.

This issue will become acute if the trade impasse shows no significant prospects of improvement over the next one or two years. We recommend no immediate action in support of the development of a permanent alternative route for the reason that it would release Afghanistan from pressures for seeking a resolution of its issue with Pakistan.

B. India - Pakistan Disputes

1. Kashmir

If Pakistan, as it now intends, raises the Kashmir issue in the Security Council in January we can expect a deterioration in the relations between the two countries and a setback in prospects of progress toward the resolution of this overriding issue between Pakistan and India. Possibly even more important, the United Nations debate and the position the United States takes with respect to the issue in that forum probably could lead to a noticeable deterioration of United States relations with one or the other of the two countries.

Tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has risen markedly in recent weeks. India's seizure of Goa by force, and the inability of the UN to prevent this, has raised Pakistan fears that India may have in mind the eventual forceful seizure of Pakistan-occupied portions of Kashmir. The Goa action has also served to embarrass India internationally with Western nations. The initial Pakistan reaction to Goa was to advance the prospective date for presentation of Kashmir in the Security Council to mid-January. At the same time, Indian leaders, in the normal course of their election campaign, have been calling for the return to India of the portion of the state of Kashmir which Pakistan now occupies.

Meanwhile, following Ambassador Galbraith's initiative, he and Ambassador Rountree have been quietly attempting to stimulate ministerial-level talks between India and Pakistan which would hopefully lead to Nehru-Ayub talks after the Indian elections in February. (If Pakistan adopts a constitution this winter, the top-level talks would probably have to follow Pakistan elections in the spring.) At the same time we have been making representations in both Karachi and New York with the Pakistan representative in New York and giving the reasons why we believe submission to the Security Council would be of no value to Pakistan.

No progress toward a solution of the Kashmir problem is seen possible through Security Council action. Any resolution putting pressure on India would receive a Soviet veto. This the Pakistanis know, but they seem to feel that drawing UN attention again to the problem would at least draw world attention to India's intransigence and might serve as a form of pressure on India towards concessions in eventual bilateral talks.

Clearly no final political solution of the Kashmir dispute is presently possible or in view in the near future. At the same time, other aspects of the Kashmir problem--hydrological, economic, humanitarian, military--appear as possible subjects of bilateral talks in the present context when it seems impossible totally to avoid consideration of the Kashmir issue.

Policy Issue: Whether the United States should continue its active efforts to reduce Indian - Pakistan tensions over Kashmir and, if so, how far we should go. We do not believe that the size and pace of the economic assistance program should be used directly as instruments. It is possible our efforts may result in some impairment of the alliance relationship with Pakistan in view of Ayub's original expectation of full United States support in the Security Council.

We should continue intensive diplomatic efforts with the objective of leading to bilateral negotiations and of discouraging Pakistan from raising the issue in the Security Council.

We should impress upon both parties that their failure to settle traditional problems is not only diverting their attention from problems of greater importance to their future security and that of the Free World, but also jeopardizing the interests of countries outside the area desiring to assist them.

2. Recent Requests and Suggestions Made by the Pakistanis

Pakistan professes to fear that India's success in Goa will lead to aggression in Kashmir. Against this background the Pakistanis presented an aide-memoire to the Secretary on January 3, 1962 /2/ which took the following positions:

/2/Attached to Document 84; not printed.

(a) That the 1951 U.S. military sales agreement with India should be terminated and that India should not receive military equipment until it renounces "aggressive intentions and needs the equipment only to fight the Chinese";

(b) That U.S. economic aid to India should be limited to a level that would prevent India from diverting an "unduly large part of its own resources to build up its military machine";

(c) That the U.S. take action to "deter India from committing aggression against Pakistan" by a public statement to the effect that the United States would come to Pakistan's assistance if attacked--an undertaking similar to that contained in a confidential assurance given to the Pakistanis in 1959; and

(d) That the United States increase military aid to Pakistan.

Policy Issue: Whether we should restrict aid to India and give addition reaffirmations of the US - Pakistan alliance in both a material and public form.

We do not recommend acceding to the Pakistani suggestions except with respect to providing official reassurances that the United States guarantees to Pakistan are still in force. With respect to each point:

On point (a), we should observe to the Pakistanis that the President promised Ayub during his visit here that the United States had not changed its policy with regard to military assistance to India and that Ayub would be consulted prior to any contemplated change.

On point (b), we should point out that the United States provides no hard currency support to India which she could directly apply to military purchases and that all of our economic assistance is involved in specified projects or commodity purchases. In our opinion India would spend approximately the same amount of its own resources on its armed forces, in the light of its security interests as it sees them, regardless of the level of United States and other aid. The sacrifice would fall in the economic sector.

On point (c), we recommend that Ambassador Rountree be authorized to assure President Ayub that United States guarantees to Pakistan are still in force, including the undertaking contained in our note of April 15, 1959, /3/ to which the Pakistanis specifically referred. Apart from the request for this assurance contained in the Pakistani aide-memoire of January 3, President Ayub very recently separately asked Ambassador Roundtree for such an assurance, though not necessarily to be publicly given. The Department is opposed to publicly reaffirming at this time the assurances we have given to Pakistan.

/3/See Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XV, pp. 708 - 709.

On point (d), we believe the Pakistanis should be informed that the level of the United States commitment for military aid for the next five years has been settled upon between the two governments and that we intend to fulfill the commitment. The prospects of our increasing the level of military aid in the forseeable future is not favorable.

C. Country Problems

1. India

Economic Aid

In our effort to help India achieve economic and social development as a basis for a viable political structure and defense against Bloc pressures, we utilize massive economic aid programs and technical assistance.

Our economic aid programs serve, inter alia, to prevent India from depending on Bloc countries for a major portion of its foreign aid.

As a result of India's forcible occupation of Goa, we have postponed the signing of certain agreements pertaining to our aid program, but have proceeded with normal program planning within the United States Government.

Policy Issue: Whether to show our displeasure over Goa by cutting our future economic aid, a recommendation which may emanate from Congress.

We recommend, in view of our important security interests in South Asia, that we continue the announced policy of continuing aid at intended levels; and that at some time in the near future--taking into consideration the climate of opinion in the United States, and the behavior of the Indian Government--we resume signing agreements without undue publicity.

Military Sales

Since 1951 we have sold to India relatively small quantities of military equipment--mainly consumable or replacement items. The Indians have recently shown an interest in the purchase of aircraft, missiles and electronic devices, the sale of which would generate protests from Pakistan, and at the same time help to prevent the Indians from turning to the Bloc for similar items.

Since Goa we have informally suspended active consideration of possible sales of major military items to India. This question, of course, involves agreement among a number of Departments and agencies.

Policy Issue: Whether to sell major military items to India.

We recommend that in the near future we resume consideration of such sales on a case-by-case basis--taking into account all political and military factors such as the military situation on the Tibetan border.

2. Pakistan

In addition to far-reaching questions discussed elsewhere in this paper, the only immediate issue requiring decision is the extent of United States participation in the Pakistan Consortium for 1962 - 63. This is set out below. Because of their sensitive nature, problems relating to our special facilities and installations in Pakistan are dealt with in a separate paper.

Extent of U.S. Participation in the Pakistan Consortium

At the IBRD Consortium on Pakistan in June 1961, $320 million in aid was committed toward Pakistan's development requirements for FY 1962. Out of this total the United States committed $150 million. President Ayub has protested this result as entirely inadequate to meet Pakistan's needs. A further meeting of the Consortium is scheduled for January 24 - 26 in Washington where commitments to meet Pakistan's requirements for the two years, 1962 - 63, estimated at $945 million, will be sought.

Policy Issue: Since this is a multi-year commitment, a Presidential commitment will be required. This recommendation is being forwarded through normal channels.

We recommend that the United States offer to commit up to $500 million of this total of $945 million--the exact amount to depend on the commitments of other members of the Consortium and availability of U.S. funds.

3. Nepal

U.S. Posture

In the face of intensive Bloc efforts to detach Nepal from India's sphere of influence, the United States extends economic aid and technical assistance, and endeavors to persuade the King to reestablish a representative government, dissolved in December 1959. Recent press reports of disturbances in Nepal have not been confirmed.

Policy Issue: Whether to continue our efforts to influence the King to reach an accommodation with the Nepali Congress Party, or to support a rebellion intended to destroy the King's power and to establish a new government.

In view of the inevitable chaos which would be exploited by the Communists, and in view of the Nepali Congress' presumed inability to establish a viable government, we continue to favor efforts to bring about an accommodation between the King and the Nepali Congress.

89. Editorial Note

On January 11, 1962, Pakistan requested a meeting of the U.N. Security Council to consider further action concerning the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. In a letter to the President of the Security Council, Pakistan stated that it was forced to request the meeting because efforts to develop direct negotiations with India on the issue had failed, and recent public statements by Indian officials had exacerbated the dispute. (U.N. Document S/5058)

India responded, in a January 16 letter to the President of the Security Council, that the Council should refuse to comply with Pakistan's request. India stated that, contrary to Pakistani allegations, avenues for direct negotiations concerning Kashmir were always open. Pakistan, India argued, was trying to exploit the Council as a propaganda forum on the eve of India's general elections. (U.N. Document S/5060)

Pakistan repeated its request for a Security Council meeting in another letter to the President of the Security Council on January 29. (U.N. Document S/5068) The Security Council met in response to Pakistan's requests on February 1. After listening to divergent statements on the Kashmir issue by Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and Chandra S. Jha, India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, the Council decided to postpone further consideration of the problem until after the Indian general elections. (U.N. Document S/PV.990)

90. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, South Asia, 1961 - 963. Secret.

Washington, January 12, 1962.

McGB

South Asia Issues Decided at Meetingwith President 11 January 1962

1. Kashmir Dispute. Upon the Acting Secretary's proposal, the President agreed that we should propose to both sides a high-level mediator. It was agreed both sides looked to us on this issue. An effort will be made to get Eugene Black right away, with second choice David Lilienthal. To justify Black's use, we could say that Kashmir dispute jeopardizes IBRD stake in Indus Waters settlement.

2. With respect to Pakistani Resolution in SC, the President felt that in view of his commitment to Ayub, we would have to vote for relatively innocuous Pakistani resolution in SC, and had better tell Nehru if necessary However, we should attempt to persuade Paks against SC, arguing that it would undermine our other commitment to Ayub to get Indians to negotiate. State is to get a letter off pronto to Ayub urging him to call off SC action.

3. Upon State's recommendation, President approved going ahead and starting to release aid to India into the pipeline, after waiting a week. A small DLF loan for $5 - 6 million which had been pending for a long time would be a good thing to start with.

4. Military Sales to India. We should hold up action until after the Indian election to avoid helping Krishna Menon. In any case, even then we should hold off on big items like C - 130s. The President wanted it emphasized to both India and Pakistan that their "arms race" was ruining our economic aid program by diverting their assets from economic development.

5. Commitment to Pakistan Consortium. The President was concerned about so much aid going to India and Pakistan, in contrast to Latin America, for example. He directed a restudy to determine whether we could tighten up and increase interest rates on long term development loans. The purpose would be to make it easier to sell larger aid programs on the Hill, recognizing that we wouldn't actually get the money back anyway in many cases. However, we shouldn't worry about problems which wouldn't be upon us until ten years from now. The President did agree to go ahead on the $500 million commitment to Pak consortium, contingent upon remainder of $945 million being found elsewhere.

6. Pakistan and Transit Trade. The President was very reluctant to agree to the extra outlays ($150 a ton as opposed to $50) required to ship aid goods to Afghan over temporary Iranian route. He could not see why we should pay extra to ship what was after all aid to the Afghans. He agreed to the eight week moratorium proposal permitting US aid goods already in Pakistan to go forward by the direct route but reserved judgment on the Iran route. When Assistant Secretary Talbot pointed out that Afghans would not accept moratorium proposal unless we agreed also to go ahead with subsequent shipments via Iran route, the President's inclination was to let them stew, and tell them that Congress would not accept such a huge increase in transport costs. However, he reluctantly accepted Talbot's plea that we take a gamble for a few months, using a quarter of the estimated $2 million it would take to ship the remainder of our aid over the Iranian route during 1962.

Bob K.

91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1 - 1262. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Weil and Naas; cleared by Talbot, McGeorge Bundy, Assistant Legal Adviser for Near East and South Asian Affairs Warren E. Hewitt, and with AID; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Karachi and Tehran. An attached handwritten note from the Secretary's Special Assist-ant Emory Swank to Rusk indicates that this telegram arose out of the previous evening's meeting with President Kennedy.

Washington, January 12, 1962, 9:47 p.m.

255. From Secretary. Department appreciates your strenuous efforts to accomplish temporary opening border but believes if Afghans are serious in desire receive aid goods they will withdraw demand that political propaganda in their note be included in joint publication. We must bear in mind following:

1) Whatever their motives, Pakistanis have consistently given assurances they continue to honor transit agreement.

2) Afghans closed border.

3) Despite offer of practical assistance in clearance processes, Afghans have refused cooperate in opening border to normal traffic and have caused USG substantial inconvenience and expenditures in importing items for official use.

4) When Afghans offered USG opportunity move its aid goods proposal was based on amount which could be moved in fixed time rather than on total amount then in Pakistan.

While not condoning GOP's arbitrary action designed retaliate against Afghan subversive activities in Pakistan territory, Department considers it damaging to US interests to associate USG with objectionable Afghan references to Pakistan in publication of exchange of notes. Receipt of King's letter /2/ re US offer good offices which omitted any reference to political aspects transit traffic problem was taken by USG as acceptance President's terms of reference--i.e., transit traffic problem would be handled separately from over-all political disputes. Department clearly recognizes joint publication notes now under consideration would inevitably associate USG with any statements appearing in Afghan note. To do so would not only constitute sign of weakness which would increase difficulties in future dealings with Afghans, but would provide GOP with legitimate basis for protest, and reduce possibility early settlement transit trade problem.

/2/See Document 49.

USG has made substantial concession to squabbling governments by indicating willingness move certain aid goods through Iran to Afghanistan while Kabul and Rawalpindi maintain adamant positions. It is hoped this concession can be justified on ground it is in our interest to give Afghans evidence of willingness to continue aid in face of Soviet exploitation of impasse. On other hand to yield to Afghan insistence on introduction propaganda into joint publication of notes might well destroy future usefulness USG good offices in dispute and provide Pakistanis with justification for withdrawing promised cooperation in moving aid goods during temporary opening of border.

Fact Afghans have insisted on inclusion propaganda despite US insistence on dealing with transit problem without bringing in political issues as such, raises question as to sincerity their intentions. Afghans should be reminded of terms of references for USG good offices. Political clauses in their note constitute built-in time bomb which seriously threatens implementation of RGA proposal.

Department suggests you talk with appropriate officials using as much of foregoing as you deem appropriate and use best efforts convince them that publication note in present form would prove counterproductive. Remind them of flexibility and friendly cooperation manifested by USG since border closed and reiterate US willingness cooperate in moving goods from Pakistan into Afghanistan on condition that RGA note, which has not been officially accepted in toto by USG, confine itself to transit traffic problem as such.

Department would accept following in place of existing third paragraph in RGA Note (Kabul tel 429) /3/

/3/Document 81.

"Taking note American Government's agreement as expressed by Ambassador Byroade, Minister Foreign Affairs reiterates expression by Foreign Minister Naim regarding RGA agreement to transportation of aid goods procured under US program and consigned Afghanistan through Karachi and held up since the break in diplomatic relations September 6, 1961."

If RGA accepts this modification in its Note you authorized agree exchange and publication.

Department recognizes possible public reactions in US if Afghans refuse alter their note, and aid goods now in Pakistan are held up indefinitely. Nevertheless Department reiterates belief that yielding to Afghan demand to publish political propaganda in these circumstances would increase difficulties of future dealings with Afghans and understand-ably affect GOP willingness cooperate in moving goods.

Rusk

92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.9OD/1 - 1262. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Talbot and Weil; cleared by Hewitt, Gaud, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Karachi and Tehran.

Washington, January 12, 1962, 10:56 p.m.

256. Eyes Only Ambassador. President, who considered transit trade impasse January 11, desires USG should continue maximum efforts to assist resolution this dispute. He is agreeable using some funds meet commitment in US draft note to Afghans re utilization Iranian route. However in view fact Afghans have capability of permitting entry aid goods via cheaper traditional route, President is opposed to use of Iranian route at added costs over extended period.

Rusk

93. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1 - 1562. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Talbot, cleared by Ball and McGeorge Bundy, and approved in S/S by Melvin L. Manfull. Repeated to Karachi.

Washington, January 15, 1962, 6:14 p.m.

2383. Deliver following to MEA soonest for Nehru.

Begin verbatim text:

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister: You know of my deep concern over relations between Pakistan and India and my firm conviction that peace and progressive development for the people of Asia require a resolution of problems as between these two countries. These problems, and particularly that of Kashmir, are difficult. But in the last fifteen years numerous and important issues between Pakistan and India have been resolved. It would surely be a tragic error of pessimism to assume that nothing can ever be accomplished on the one major problem that now remains. Above all it would be a misfortune if the search for solution by the statesmen most concerned were at any stage to be impeded by the desire of anyone else to exploit controversy for its own sake.

In recent months I have talked with the leaders of both countries. It is my sincere belief, influenced I do not doubt by my feelings of friendship for both heads of state, that a real possibility of accommodation does exist. This possibility will not be served by public debate and recrimination. It can be served by patient and continuing discussion and negotiation. In this effort the United States willingly proposes the services of a good and sympathetic friend. We have a deep and active concern for the peace and development of both countries and we cannot be without interest in the external dangers which they face in common. So I am writing to inquire whether you would be willing to request a trusted friend of both countries--I have in mind Mr. Eugene Black of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, who would be prepared to respond to such a request--to explore with each head of government the outlines and prospects for negotiations and discussions which hopefully might lead to a final resolution of this troubled and contentious matter. If you agree to this approach, I would, of course, expect that other steps which would work against, rather than for, a solution--including an appeal to the Security Council of the United Nations--would be suspended. And I would also hope that, in a spirit of reconciliation, responsible leaders on both sides might avoid work or action that would be prejudicial to the settlement we seek.

I am sending a letter in similar terms to President Ayub. /2/

Sincerely, John F. Kennedy"

Rusk

/2/Transmitted in telegram 1398 to Karachi, January 15. (Ibid., 711.11 - KE/1 - 1562)

94. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1 - 1462. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Naas, Gatch, and Talbot; cleared by Hewitt, Gaud, Ball, and Bromley Smith; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Karachi.

Washington, January 15, 1962, 8:09 p.m.

260. From the Secretary. Kabul's 452. /2/ I understand how difficult your official and personal position has become as result events past three weeks and I appreciate your willingness delay departure. Before getting to specifics regarding your meeting with Naim, I believe following observations may help remove any misunderstanding our position.

/2/In telegram 452 from Kabul, January 14, Byroade expressed himself as "gravely disappointed" in what he saw as a change in the Department's position as outlined in telegram 255 to Kabul (Document 91). He felt that to demand new changes in the Afghan note would be to risk the loss of an opportunity for a breakthrough in the transit impasse, and would encourage the Afghan Government to maintain a rigid position. (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1 - 1462)

In our strenuous efforts serve Afghan and American interests by keeping aid flowing to Afghanistan despite troublesome Pak - Afghan dispute, we have never been willing to let Afghanistan use these efforts for propaganda advantage against Pakistan or vice versa. We object to being associated with publication of Afghan note only because terms "illegal" and "Pakistan and Peshawar, Chaman and Quetta" carry legal meaning which we cannot accept. Afghanistan's insistence on retaining these terms has increasingly suggested to us Afghans intend use them propagandistically. Therefore we cannot now agree to joint publication notes if these terms remain.

We have no other objection to the Afghan note. We would agree publication of notes jointly if these terms deleted or we would agree to other alternative procedures specified below. Our prime immediate object remains to get border open so aid goods now in Pakistan can be moved directly into Afghanistan.

FYI. At time President authorized some funds for added costs transit reported Deptel 256 /3/ to honor our pledge to use Iran route as a temporary alternative to the traditional route through Pakistan, the subject of authorizing funds for backhauling of aid goods via Iran or India was not raised. However he takes firm position we have made all advisable concessions to Afghan's sensibilities and if these insufficient to move stalled aid goods we will reconsider aid program. End FYI.

/3/Document 92.

In view foregoing US prepared follow any one of following three courses of action in conjunction with RGA. Latter two are successive fall-back positions if first proposal not acceptable RGA.

A. The US will agree to the publication of exchange notes if para 3 RGA note revised to remove political content. We do not regard our language Deptel 255 as sacrosanct as long as political allusions mentioned para two above omitted.

B. The US will agree to confidential exchange of RGA note as presently phrased and revised US draft (Kabul tel 451) /4/ with subsequent RGA press release along lines suggested Deptel 247. /5/ US also willing, if you believe it might be helpful, agree associating itself with RGA in joint communique along same lines as press release--i.e. without reference political issues. Within these limits you authorized use your discretion in agreeing on language press release or communique.

/4/Telegram 451 from Kabul, January 12, transmitted the text of the U.S. note, as revised in accordance with instructions from Washington. The Embassy also confirmed that the Afghan note remained identical to the note initially transmitted in telegram 429 from Kabul (Document 81), except for the substitution of January 22 for January 15 as the date on which the border would be opened for the transit of U.S. aid material. (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1 - 1262)

/5/Document 86.

C. Failing obtain agreement on either above proposals, you may tell Naim US will not object to RGA publication by itself of RGA note as originally drafted. In this case either Embassy or RGA could issue press release (preferably before publication RGA note) acceptable to you stating that negotiations have been held, and that the border will be temporarily reopened. Mention of Iran route in this release also authorized if necessary Under this procedure RGA accepts our note which remains confidential and basis of agreement.

Rusk

95. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Nehru/1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, Nehru Correspondence, 1/15/62 - 3/31/62. No classification marking.

Washington, January 18, 1962.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I appreciate your writing me at length and in personal vein on the Goan matter. /2/ Your letter, incidentally, was delayed in transmittal and it reached my desk only in the last few days.

/2/See footnote 1, Document 77.

You have my sympathy on the colonial aspects of this issue. There is, I am sure, a feeling in your part of the world that this is a matter we do not quite understand. I believe we do understand. Sometimes, perhaps, we are inclined to talk a little too unctuously about the colonial origins of the United States, now nearly two centuries in the past. But, like many others, I grew up in a community where the people were barely a generation away from colonial rule. And I can claim the company of most historians in saying that the colonialism to which my immediate ancestors were subject was more sterile, oppressive, and even cruel than that of India. The legacy of Clive was on the whole more tolerable than that of Cromwell.

But I should like to say a word about the more immediate issue, that of the effect of the Goan episode on the relations between our two countries. It has not been good, but there may be useful lessons from the experience.

One difficulty was, of course, that the action followed so soon after your visit. I had naturally hoped that the candor of our exchange might have extended to all of the problems with which we were mutually concerned. I confess to a feeling that we should have discussed this problem; it is at least possible that if we had talked about it, our efforts to help prevent a solution by force could have been more helpful.

I have also been disturbed by the chain effect of this action on other parts of the world. Public opinion does not easily differentiate between the use of troops for good and bad purposes. And all countries, including of course the United States, have a great capacity for convincing themselves of the full righteousness of their particular cause. No country ever uses force for reasons it considers unjust.

Probably we should be glad of the existence of this adverse reaction, discriminating or otherwise, to the setting of armies in motion. We both want a world in which disputes are settled and oppression is ended by alternative means; it is good that on this matter opinion is with us. I fear that the episode in Goa will make it harder to hold the line for peace in other places.

But my major concern was and continues to be the effect of the action on our joint tasks, especially in terms of its impact on American opinion. Unfortunately the hard, obvious fact for our people was the resort to force--and by India. This was a shock to the majority who have admired your country's ardent advocacy of peaceful methods, and a reinforcement to those who did not enjoy what they called "irresponsible lectures." Moreover, the action occurred at a time when our joint efforts in the Congo were subject to especially harsh criticism here and it added a new dimension of criticism. Critics asked how we could claim to work with you for peace in the Congo while force was being used by you in Goa. The action brought also some setback for our efforts to develop the strength of the United Nations and confidence in its effectiveness. In the next few weeks, as we seek authorization by the Congress to purchase the bonds of the United Nations, I fear we shall hear a good deal about the failure to find a non-violent solution in Goa. Yet the finances of the UN depend upon this action in our Congress.

There is also the problem of aid appropriations. This, I should make clear, is not a question of strings; nothing could be farther from my thought than to make our assistance to India Contingent on her acceptance of our particular wishes in foreign or domestic policy We seek to help develop independence, and independence exists to be used. Still we must both weigh the effects of action by one country on public opinion and political action in the other. We both lead countries that are not easily governed. You are justified in asking that American action be considerate of the problems of Indian democracy. I should not willingly do anything to make your problems more difficult--shall hope, when something bears on Indian public opinion, to consider this closely, and to be informed if I am ever indifferent. Similarly I think it is reasonable that American public opinion should be a subject of concern to you. Each year our appropriations to help, not India alone, but also the other developing countries of the world, involve our most difficult political battle. This aid is of prime importance--to help countries to independence, to show compassion for the less fortunate, to ease the strains and passions that arise from poverty. I hope that you will agree that we have a common concern in maintaining the political atmosphere and the public attitudes that are sympathetic to this effort. If India had large-scale aid programs to other countries, would you not face a similar problem if one of those countries should adopt a course of armed action? And what is worse is that these difficulties spread out and affect not just one country, but the whole principle of disinterested aid.

You and I stand for cooperation and understanding, but not all our countrymen agree with us--and some of them would like nothing better than to see our hopes disappointed. It is not an accident that the men who are taking most advantage of the Goa matter here are the same men who are already attacking our aid programs and our support of the UN. They are also the men who would noisily advocate certain armed adventures by the United States. I hate to see our common purposes impeded in this way.

I feel, Mr. Prime Minister, that you would wish me to write you candidly of matters as I see them. I do so in no mood of self-righteousness, and with no feeling that our own policy is above reproach. Indeed, I trust that you will continue to make clear in equal candor your views on matters of common concern. Meanwhile, you can count on me to do all that I can to ensure that any damage to our common interests is temporary. Good and fruitful relations with India have been a matter of great concern to me for many years, and I have taken satisfaction in the progress we were making together before this episode. I believe we can and must get back on this high road, and I shall work steadily toward this end. /3/

Sincerely,

JFK/4/

/3/Nehru responded on January 30 with a letter in which he reiterated his position with respect to Goa. He wrote that his government had weighed many of the considerations put forward in Kennedy's letter of January 18 and had taken a necessary action which was "the lesser of two evils." Nehru's letter was delivered to the White House on February 6, under the cover of a note from the Indian Ambassador. (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, India, Security 1962)

/4/Kennedy's initials appear in an unidentified hand, indicating Kennedy signed the original.

96. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1 - 1862. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Karachi and Tehran.

Kabul, January 18, 1962,5 p.m.

459. For the Secretary. Your helpful message (Deptel 260) /2/ encoded Washington Monday night arrived at this post on Thursday morning. Hannah and I saw Naim and Etemadi at noon today.

/2/Document 94.

Certainly agree that first alternative proposed by Department preferable solution and ordinarily would have been prepared stick at this as negotiating tactic in first meeting. However, in view of several local factors, including deplorable state situation as regards our contractors, decided to seek complete agreement today if at all possible. Following Naim's negative reaction successively to proposals contained in paragraphs A and B of Deptel 260, I therefore proceeded to that of paragraph C. Based on broad authority given me by your telegram, I have reached agreement with RGA along following lines: RGA note will be published and our reply will remain confidential. In finally agreeing to this alternative, I insisted upon change in last substantive paragraph of RGA note, as felt we should not accept phrase "on receipt of confirmative reply to this note" as this would imply that confirmation reply to entire contents had been made on behalf USG, whether privately or publicly. Naim agreed to following substitution: "on receipt of confirmation of the above mentioned statements made by Ambassador Byroade, the Royal Ministry, etc." It seems to me that this is acceptable from our point of view as it in effect excludes our association from objectionable phrases RGA note and does not even indicate our reply given in write up. Of far less importance, the words "the traditional route of" were inserted between the words "through" and "Pakistan" in second paragraph Afghan note. The commencement date in numbered paragraph three was changed to January 29.

The text of our note remains in substance the same except for slight modification first sentence paragraph 2 which now reads as follows:

"The Embassy notes that the RGA agrees to make arrangements for the entry of the above mentioned goods, and to cooperate fully in this effort."

No other changes made except minor ones without substance for grammatical reasons or for assistance in translation. Order that exact text be available, Embassy will cable complete text to addressees this message. Both Afghan and Embassy notes will be dated January 18. Publication date for Afghan note was set for evening January 21, Kabul time.

Naim and I had rather confusing discussion on subject separate press release by US. This, of course, would merely be placed in USIS bulletin here and would not have normal significance in view absence International Press. It might, of course, be carried locally and picked up by Pakistanis. I agreed to wording given below for such possible statement. RGA does not care whether we use it or not. Will therefore leave decision up to Department, with comment that I would prefer to drop press release idea rather than try to renegotiate [garble]. It would not be published here until next Monday and would appreciate early guidance to post as to whether to use or not. Text follows:

"In recent discussions between the Royal Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Byroade, the American Ambassador reaffirmed the desire of the US to continue its aid programs in Afghanistan. The US has also stated that it is willing to utilize the transit route running through Iran while continuing to hope for resumption of transit via the traditional route through Pakistan.

"The Royal Afghan Government has decided to admit all US aid goods under the title of the USG or American or other foreign contractors, which are destined for the different aid projects in Afghanistan and which have been consigned through the port of Karachi but have been held up since September 6,1961. The USG has indicated its willingness to utilize its offices and its facilities to move these goods. The RGA has indicated its willingness to allow 8 weeks, beginning January 29, 1962, for the movement of these goods."

I depart Kabul tomorrow morning /3/ convinced it was in our overall interest make this particular agreement, and greatly appreciate under-standing and help of Department to make agreement possible. I am sorry my clients seem so difficult to get along with. One can, perhaps, understand them a little more easily if he lives here but not much.

Byroade

/3/Byroade was replaced as Ambassador by John M. Steeves, who was appointed on February 7 and presented his credentials on March 20.

97. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1 - 1862. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only; Limit Distribution. Repeated to New Delhi and USUN.

Karachi, January 18, 1962, 9 p.m.

1221. Foreign Secretary Dehlavi called me to Foreign Office 6 p.m. today and handed me following message dated January 18 from President Ayub now in Sibi to President Kennedy. Comments contained immediately following message:

Begin Verbatim Text:

"Dear Mister President,

Please accept my sincere thanks for your message of January 15, /2/ on the Kashmir issue.

/2/See footnote 1, Document 93.

I would also like to express to you my gratitude for the deep concern and interest that you have shown over the relations between Pakistan and India and the efforts that you have been personally making to bring about negotiations between the two countries to relieve the dispute, which is, as you have truly said, the one major problem that now remains between the two countries.

I entirely agree with you that it would be a tragic error to assume that this problem cannot be settled. I do not think I should tire you by setting forth the efforts that I have been making during the last three years to persuade Prime Minister Nehru to enter into direct negotiations with me, to find an equitable and realistic solution of the Kashmir dispute. At no time, however, have I had any assurance that the Indian leader was ready to enter into discussions with me except on his own terms.

You have inquired whether I would be willing to request a trusted friend of both India and Pakistan--Mister Eugene Black--to explore with Mister Nehru and myself, the prospects for negotiations and discussions which might lead to a final solution of the problem. I am deeply grateful to you for this constructive initiative and I welcome it as yet another manifestation of the deep concern of the United States and yourself personally for the peaceful existence and well-being of the peoples of the sub-continent.

I know Mister Black to be a man of high stature in international life and as a statesman who has given proof of his talents for mediation and conciliation.

While my final answer to your inquiry must necessarily be formulated after taking into consideration Prime Minister Nehru's reactions, I consider your offer to assist in negotiations between Pakistan and India by making available the good offices of a trusted statesman of international prestige as one that I could readily accept.

You have said that if I agree with the approach to the Kashmir problem suggested by you, you would expect that the appeal of Pakistan to the Security Council would be suspended. I must, of course, attach the utmost weight and importance to any suggestion that you feel it necessary to make. At the same time, may I assure you that the decision of my government to make the appeal has been prompted solely with a view to ending the intolerable impasse in which the question of self-determination of the people of Kashmir has become embedded for the past 13 years.

There is another consideration of a basic nature which is at the back of our appeal to the Security Council. The political independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan, and indeed its very existence, have never been free from threat by India. Confident of its growing strength and encouraged by the failure of the world to thwart its successful recourse to force in the past, our colossal neighbor has become more emboldened than ever to proclaim its aggressive intentions towards Pakistan. Since the danger of an armed attack by India is real and ever present to us, Pakistan is under the obligation and has indeed the right to invoke the political and moral protection of the United Nations. in the attempt to safeguard its security. It would be neither wise nor statesmanlike, for comparatively small countries like Pakistan, to discard the instrumentality of the United Nations whenever they feel themselves threatened by more powerful neighbors. Therefore, our motivation in appealing to the Security Council flows from our deep concern for the future of our country, and from our anxiety to guard against a mounting threat to its very existence. That this threat has become more grave and imminent is manifest not only from the recent statements of the Indian Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, Mister Krishna Menon, and the President of the Ruling Congress Party, Mister Sanjiva Reddy, but also from the fact that 85 percent of the Indian Armed Forces, including their armoured formations, are now concentrated within striking distance of our borders. This situation is causing grave concern in Pakistan.

I hope you appreciate that in the circumstances suspending our proposed action in the Security Council at this stage would shock public opinion in Pakistan and provoke severe criticism as [of] the value of our present alignments. This is scarcely desirable, particularly at this time when we are about to introduce our constitution.

The Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations is an eminent statesman and I have no doubt that insofar as his interventions in the Security Council are concerned, they will rise above the level of mere controversy and recrimination.

Yours sincerely

Mohammed Ayub Khan."

End Verbatim Text.

Rountree

98. National Security Action Memorandum No. 125/1/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 125. No classification marking. Copies were sent to the Secretary of State, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the President of the Export - Import Bank.

Washington, January 22, 1962.

The Honorable Fowler Hamilton

Administrator

Agency for International Development

SUBJECT

Pakistan Consortium

I have made the determination requested by you in your memorandum of January 18, 1962 /2/ with respect to the Pakistan Second Five-Year Plan. In it you are authorized to make a pledge at the forthcoming Pakistan Consortium meeting which would bring our contribution up to $500 million out of the $945 million needed by Pakistan, subject to a number of conditions. One of these conditions is that pledges from other Consortium members must be sufficient to assure that the target will be substantially met. /3/

/2/Not found.

/3/The conditions established by President Kennedy were met when the Pakistan consortium reconvened in Washington on January 24, under the auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The consortium, which had initiated consideration of Pakistan's development plan in June 1961, endorsed Pakistan's request for $945 million in aid for the years 1961/1962 and 1962/1963. Of the $945 million, the United States committed to provide $500 million. (Telegram 1496 to Karachi, January 26; Department of State, Central Files, 890D.00/1 - 2662)

I am concerned at the prospect that the total amount of the pledges as indicated so far may be insufficient to meet the agreed upon target, since a failure to provide what competent analysts have determined to be Pakistan's needs would seriously weaken the image of the United States and the West as determined to advance the development of our staunchest partners. In the event that a shortfall threatens, therefore, I would like you to consult with me immediately in order to determine what steps may best be taken.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original.

99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1 - 2662. Confidential. Drafted by Talbot, cleared by Kaysen, and approved by Talbot. Also sent to New Delhi.

Washington, January 26, 1962, 2:46 p.m.

1495. Following based on uncleared memcon:

During call on President Jan 24 Amb Ahmed expressed Pakistan's heightened fears of India's aggressive intentions against Pakistan-held portions Kashmir and Pakistan itself. Citing recent statements by Jha, Menon, Reddy, Nehru and in GOI booklet "Kashmir and United Nations," Amb argued GOI believes that prospective Soviet veto would protect it against adverse Security Council action and that Allies would be fearful of coming to Pakistan's aid if latter attacked lest general nuclear war result. Emphasized that Pakistan has always felt India to be aggressive. President, questioning validity of these views, pointed out that for India Pakistan is very different matter from Goa. Goa action over in 24 hours; no one thinks India could deal with Pakistan that way.

Speaking along lines of aide-memoire presented Dept January 3 (Deptel 1294 to Karachi), /2/ Amb said Pakistan asking USG to consider how GOI can be deterred from aggressiveness.

/2/See footnote 1, Document 87.

Pak had suggested (1) US terminate 1951 military sales agreement with India, since India violated agreement by Goa aggression; (2) US review quantum of aid to India, which at present levels (along with aid from other Western countries) frees India's entire foreign exchange earnings for military purchases and other domestic needs outside development program; (3) public restatement of past assurances that US would come to Pakistan's aid if it attacked; and (4) stepped up military assistance to strengthen Pakistan against Indian threat. Amplifying these requests, Amb said Pak would not oppose future US military aid to India if USG convinced India sincerely proposing oppose ChiComs but Paks doubt India seriously intend take on ChiComs. He urged importance of deterrent actions because any new fighting over Kashmir would not be localized. To contrary, it would become total war between India and Pakistan involving not only armed forces but massacres of Muslim minority in India and doubtless reprisals against Hindu minority in Pakistan. Ambassador said Pak recognizes subcontinent will stand or fall as whole since neither India nor Pakistan can withstand Sino-Soviet Bloc pressures alone. Pak does not regard itself as unduly pessimistic in appraising apparent Indian intentions since it is going by what Indian leaders themselves say.

President replied he not persuaded that likelihood of an attack by India was demonstrated by Goa action or by statements cited by Amb, even though we all know Krishna Menon and what he is like. Our concern with Indo - Pak dispute has led us, however, to suggest that Eugene Black might make helpful contribution. If both countries accept him, we hopeful of results though unlikely Black could do much till after Indian elections. Amb responded that Pakistan welcomes this suggestion though not very optimistic about its success because of India's apparent lack of desire to settle Kashmir issue.

Amb told President Pakistan public has noticed that USG has repeatedly given public assurance to India of American support if Pakistan should attack India but has given no comparable public assurances to Pakistan. Talbot intervened to explain assurances to India based on condition that if US aid to Pakistan is misused and directed against another country in aggression US would take appropriate action to thwart such aggression. Amb agreed this initial official USG statement but said some US spokesman in years past had omitted that condition and given India full assurances. He added Pakistan knows USG acting from highest motives and that Pakistan and US desires are the same, but believed public assurances to Pakistan now would have helpfully deterrent effect on Indian leadership.

President expressed our deep concern that full effects US aid siphoned off into disputes between two countries. Said we feel our aid goes down drain; that is why we suggested Black mission. Added we have no evidence that Indo-Pak situation now likely to degenerate into war.

President referred Pakistan consortium meeting. Said he had received Ayub's letter /3/ and answered it. /4/ USG bringing maximum effort to bear on other contributors to consortium as he hoped Pakistan aware; but USG would not make up any deficiency in their contributions. Other donors have their problems, so does USG. Amb acknowledged that Pakistan aware of and grateful for USG efforts in this consortium.

/3/In a message delivered to Kennedy on January 16 through the Pakistani Embassy, Ayub referred to his discussions with Kennedy concerning economic assistance during his visit to Washington in July 1961. He recalled the understanding reached at the January 1962 meeting of the Pakistan consortium that the U.S. contribution would be a minimum of $500 million. Ayub noted that Pakistan had used what influence it had with the other members of the consortium to try to ensure that they would collectively provide the remaining $445 million, which he considered essential to Pakistan's economic development plans for fiscal years 1962 - 1963. If those contributions fell short of that amount, Ayub requested U.S. assistance in bringing the combined contributions to a total of $945 million. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, Subjects, Ayub Correspondence, 1/30/61 - 1/16/62)

/4/On January 20, the Embassy in Karachi was instructed to inform Ayub, in response to his January 16 message, that Kennedy had instructed U.S. officials to make every effort to assure a successful consortium meeting, but the United States could not make up any shortfall in contributions from other members of the consortium. (Telegram 1440 to Karachi, January 20; Department of State, Central Files, 711.11 - KE/1 - 1662)

President commented further on dimensions our aid programs in India and Pakistan, which larger than whole Alliance for Progress this year. This true even though whole development assistance effort this hemisphere falls on US: no European nations contribute as they do to aid programs in subcontinent. Thus extremely important our aid be well used. US extremely disappointed at Indo - Pak troubles. We know how Krishna Menon, for example, exploits them, but from the point of view of the world as well as the two countries a last great effort should be made to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Otherwise, we could see that the fighting that might occur in the subcontinent would be except for a nuclear war the worst kind of war involving millions of people.

Ambassador expressed concern at reports that USG "would not take sides" on Kashmir issue. Said Pakistan not asking USG to take sides but only to support right of self-determination of peoples and let that right be exercised in Kashmir. Pakistan fully aware of the need to settle disputes with India and anxious to do so. Pakistani people uneasy, how-ever, because impression been given that US reaction to Goa was a directive to New Delhi saying that because India vital to US there will be no change in US policy toward India. Pak public also worried by reports US pressing Pakistan not go to Security Council. President said he is not aware of any special directive but of course we wish to continue friendly relationship with India as well as with Pakistan. As for Security Coun- cil hearing of the Kashmir case the Pakistan Govt knows our attitude full well.

On self-determination of peoples President commented that we don't have power to enforce UN resolutions unilaterally nor would Pakistan expect us to. On Goa, he said, US opinion is clear and will have an effect on our relationship with India for a long time. He thought Goa action could affect our entire aid program. Ambassador commented that consequences of Goa not merely economic, though that could be important Graver situation is fact that bulk of both India and Pakistan's armies are concentrated against each other and consequently immobilized against greater threat from north.

President noted that Ambassador had been somewhat critical of USG policies, at least by implication, but he sure Ambassador recognizes we are not always able to persuade others to do the things we wish, as for example our difficulty in persuading Pakistan of the rightness of our views on such matters as Red China, Afghanistan and Security Council action. Amb answered that on Chinese representation Pakistan had virtually eaten its words, despite promises to support Chinese Communist admission this year. Ayub had instructed Pakistan delegation at our request to vote for Chinese representation as "important issue." President said he was thinking specifically of over-all issue of Chinese representation, but in generally merely wanted to point out that even its friends do not always see eye to eye with US, though US and Pakistan do pretty well together. Expressed his pleasure that Amb had come to see him and said he would consider Amb's comments though he thought Amb now pretty well understood his feelings.

Ball

100. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11 - KE/1 - 2662. Secret; Niact; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Gatch; cleared by Hewitt, McGhee (in substance), and Bromley Smith; and approved by Talbot.

Washington, January 26, 1962, 6:36 p.m.

1500. You authorized transmit following letter from President to Ayub:

"Dear Mr. President:

I have given close and sympathetic consideration to your several recent messages on developments in South Asia. Ambassador Rountree has Is reported fully to me on your conversation with him on 7 January, 1962. /2/ In turn, I have just personally discussed the many issues mutually confronting us with Ambassador Aziz Ahmed.

/2/Rountree returned to Washington on January 7 and presumably reported directly to Kennedy on his conversation with Ayub. No record of Rountree's meeting with Kennedy has been found.

As a firm ally, Pakistan is entitled to the reaffirmation you have requested of the prior assurances given by the United States to Pakistan on the subject of aggression against Pakistan. My Government certainly stands by these assurances. I trust that you will agree, however, that a public statement to this effect would not be fruitful at this juncture.

In closing, let me reiterate my confidence in the ability of our two nations, working closely together, to achieve our common goals.

With warm personal regards, John F. Kennedy"

Inform Dept transmittal date.

Ball

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