Welcome! I received my Ph.D. in Economics from The Ohio State University in May 2025 and will join Amazon as an Economist.
My research interests lie in Industrial Organization and Applied Microeconometrics. My current work focuses on merger analysis, enhancing the standard approach by incorporating changes in vertical contracts and product choices after mergers. My CV is available here.
Vertical Contracts and Upstream Market Structure: Insights from the Connecticut Beer Industry (Job Market Paper)
Takeaway: Shifts in upstream market structure—through mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures—can change the profitability of exclusionary vertical contracts. Overlooking changes in these contracts may understate the consumer welfare loss after a merger.
Abstract: This paper examines the motivation behind vertical contracts, focusing on their interplay with upstream market structure. Changes in upstream market structure through mergers can incentivize exclusionary vertical agreements by altering product ownership and the profit gains from excluding rivals. I analyze the Connecticut beer market, where a dominant upstream manufacturer rewarded distributors if its share of sales volume in the distributor’s portfolio exceeds a certain threshold. I build a structural model that incorporates contract terms revealed through state regulations and federal antitrust enforcement to estimate demand, marginal costs, product entry costs, and pricing distortions under the reward program. Counterfactual analysis highlights the importance of firms' endogenous choice of vertical contracts, by evaluating a merger in which the dominant manufacturer acquires a craft manufacturer. The merger motivates the dominant manufacturer to adopt more aggressive exclusionary vertical contracts, as the portfolio expansion increases the substitutability between its products and those of rivals. I find that accounting for changes in vertical contracts results in a 42 percent greater consumer welfare loss after the merger.
Mergers with Endogenous Product Choice: Evidence from the U.S. Beer Industry
Takeaway: Mergers can facilitate the market expansion of acquired firms by lowering entry barriers. Ignoring endogenous entry in merger evaluations may underestimate the merger impact, as these firms often have limited market presence beforehand.
Abstract: This paper studies mergers that facilitate the market expansion of acquired firms by lowering entry barriers. In such cases, merger evaluations that ignore endogenous entry decisions may substantially underestimate the merger's impact, as the acquired firms typically have a limited market presence before the merger. The analysis focuses on the acquisitions of craft breweries by mega-brewers in the U.S. beer industry. These craft breweries initially had a small footprint but expanded nationwide after gaining access to acquirers' resources. I develop an empirical model that accounts for endogenous product choices and estimates reductions in both fixed and marginal costs. Counterfactual analysis shows that ignoring product entry and merger-driven cost efficiencies leads to an incorrect prediction of no change in market outcomes or welfare. In contrast, when endogenous entry and cost reductions are considered, craft beer acquisitions increase consumer welfare by $60,714 per quarter in a representative market, by expanding product variety.
Mergers with Product Quality Improvements: Evidence from the U.S. Water Utility Sector (with Jose Miguel Abito)
Takeaway: Mergers and acquisitions among U.S. water utilities improve drinking water quality by reducing health-related violations, indicating that consolidation can lead to quality-related efficiencies.
Abstract: This paper investigates whether mergers and acquisitions among U.S. water utilities improve drinking water quality. Although policymakers have encouraged consolidation to enhance infrastructure investment, there is limited empirical evidence on its effects on product quality. Using data from the Environmental Protection Agency's Safe Drinking Water Information System and a difference-in-differences framework with staggered treatment timing, I find that acquisitions by investor-owned water systems lead to 0.501 fewer health-related violations per year, compared to an annual average of 0.531 violations per system. This finding suggests that consolidation can generate quality-related efficiencies, supporting policies that encourage mergers and acquisitions in the public water sector.