Miguel Egler


m.egler@uvt.nl

I am an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Tilburg University. I have wide-ranging interests in epistemology, philosophy of mind, political philosophy and metaphilosophy. So far, most of my research has focused on debates about the epistemic norms that govern philosophical inquiry. I am currently developing elements from previous work to investigate the epistemology of democracy.

  • Special Issue on philosophical aspects of legal trials (co-editor, along with Lisa Bastian and Lewis D. Ross) - American Philosophical Quarterly


This special issue brings together contributions that explore moral and epistemological dimensions of legal trials.
  • Title Redacted (Under Review)


This paper first identifies a major flaw in current epistemic arguments for deliberative democracy. It then argues that recent work on the nature of implicit biases can help us make better informed evaluations of the purported epistemic benefits of political deliberation. Finally, it outlines a novel approach that allows for the development of a new generation of epistemic arguments for deliberative democracy.
  • Title Redacted (Under Review)


A well-known objection to epistemic arguments for democracy says that if democratic methods are truth-tracking, then people holding the minority view should defer to those of the majority. However, it seems wrong to require that people surrender their political judgements in this way. I argue that even if epistemic democrats can respond to this 'deference problem', a closer look at the motivations of this problem reveals an even more serious issue for epistemic arguments for democracy. Roughly, if democratic methods are truth-tracking, then learning you are of the minority position on one political issue requires that you suspend belief about close to every other political issue as well. I call this the 'suspension problem'.
  • Take Two on the Taking Condition (In Progress)


I argue that research on metacognition informs philosophical debates about the nature of inferential reasoning. In particular, I show how experimental and theoretical developments in meta-reasoning help to articulate and defend the Taking Condition -- i.e., the idea that inferential reasoning requires a rational appreciation of the relation of epistemic support holding between premises and conclusions.