Miguel Egler


I am an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Tilburg University. I have wide-ranging interests in epistemology, philosophy of mind, political philosophy and metaphilosophy. So far, most of my research has focused on debates about the epistemic norms that govern philosophical inquiry. I am currently developing elements from previous work to investigate the epistemology of deliberative democracy.

(drafts available upon request)

  • Title redacted (R&R)

Argues that even if philosophical intuitions are found to vary cross-culturally, this does not threaten philosophical views that rely on them. To develop this claim, I show that experimentally-motivated methodological concerns about use of intuitions in philosophy rely on controversial assumptions.
  • Title Redacted (R&R)

Contrastivism about interrogative understanding is the view that ascriptions of the form 'S understands why p' posit a three-place epistemic relation between a subject S, a fact p, and some alternative to p, q. The major upshot of this view is a subject S cannot understand why p simpliciter. I argue that contrastivism provides the best explanation for three notable patterns of interrogative understanding attributions.
  • Title Redacted (Under Review)

Phenomenalists about intuition defend the Perceptual Analogy -- the idea that intuition and perception are fundamentally similar kinds of mental states. I argue that if we take this Perceptual Analogy seriously in the way that some have defended, then a version of the Problem of Perceptual Presence -- a familiar puzzle from the literature on perceptual experiences -- arises for theories of intuitions.
  • The Myth of the Collective Expertise in Deliberative Democracy (In Progress)

Some epistemic arguments for deliberative democracy claim that democracies would foster better political decision-making if they encouraged citizens to deliberate before casting their votes. In effect, this proposal amounts to the idea that political deliberation gives rise to a kind of collective expertise, in the sense that groups of citizens would be more suited to solve their collective problems than citizens voting in isolation. I argue that work on the cognitive processes underlying political biases casts doubts on the potential of political deliberation to engender such collective expertise.
  • Learning to Know How (In Progress)

Stanley (2011) invokes the notion of Practical Ways of Thinking (PWT) to develop Intellectualism about knowledge how. Many have argued that it's simply not very clear what PWT amount to. I argue that theoretical work on Phenomenal Concepts and experimental work in developmental psychology offer valuable resources with which to better characterise PWT.
  • Take Two on the Taking Condition (In Progress)

I argue that research on metacognition informs philosophical debates about the nature of inferential reasoning. In particular, I show how experimental and theoretical developments in meta-reasoning help to articulate and defend the Taking Condition -- i.e., the idea that inferential reasoning requires a rational appreciation of the relation of epistemic support holding between premises and conclusions.