Miguel Egler

I am a Philosophy PhD student with wide-ranging interests in epistemology and metaphilosophy. In recent work, I explore how research in cognitive psychology contributes to debates about the epistemic norms that govern philosophical inquiry.

  • Title Redacted (Under Review)

Argues that even if philosophical intuitions are found to vary cross-culturally, this does not threaten philosophical views that rely on those intuitions. To develop this claim, I show that experimentally-motivated methodological concerns about use of intuitions in philosophy rest on controversial assumptions.
  • Title Redacted (Under Review)

I argue for contrastivism about interrogative understanding -- i.e., the idea that whether one understands why p depends on which alternatives to p we focus on. In support of this claim, I show how it provides the best explanation for the gradability of understanding-why.
  • Learning to Know How (In Progress)

Stanley (2011) invokes the notion of Practical Ways of Thinking (PWT) to develop Intellectualism about knowledge how. Many have argued that it's simply not very clear what PWT amount to. I argue that theoretical work on Phenomenal Concepts and experimental work in developmental psychology offer valuable resources with which to better characterise PWT.
  • Take Two on the Taking Condition (In Progress)

I argue that research on metacognition informs philosophical debates about the nature of inferential reasoning. In particular, I show how experimental and theoretical developments in meta-reasoning help to articulate, and defend the Taking Condition -- i.e., the idea that inferential reasoning requires a rational appreciation of the relation of epistemic support holding between premises and conclusions.
  • For Better and Worse: The Perceptual Analogy for Intuition (In Progress)

Phenomenalists about intuition defend the Perceptual Analogy -- the idea that intuition and perception are fundamentally similar kinds of mental states. I argue that if we take this Perceptual Analogy seriously, then the Problem of Perceptual Presence -- a familiar puzzle from the literature on perceptual experiences -- raises a challenge to Phenomenalist accounts of intuitions.