Melody Lo

羅珮瑜

I am an Associate Professor at National Taiwan University. My research interests include game theory, political economy and theoretical IO. Here is my CV.

Working Papers

Designing Open Source Licenses with Kim-Sau Chung

Open source licenses are noted for being self-referential. The two dominant licenses at the early stage of the open source movement were GPL and BSD. GPL says the next developer cannot go proprietary, and can only go open source with the same license, namely GPL. BSD says the next developer can go proprietary, and can also go open source with any open source license, including BSD. We construct the universal space of all self-referential licenses such as GPL and BSD. We also provide a plausible explanation of why GPL and BSD stood out from other licenses as the two most natural choices for the first-generation open source developers.

Effective Communication in Cheap Talk Games with Sidartha Gordon, Navin Kartik, Wojciech Olszewsk and Joel Sobel

This paper presents arguments based on weak dominance and learning for se- lecting informative equilibria in a model of cheap-talk communication where players must use monotonic strategies. Under a standard regularity condition, only one equilibrium that survives iterated deletion of interim dominated strategies. Un- der the same condition, we establish that best response dynamics converge to this outcome.

Decentralized Learning in Multi-Issue Two-Party Elections with limited-Attention Voters with Jimmy Chan
Why Divisive Issues Divide with Jimmy Chan and Michael Pak Hang Tam
Linkage Effect in Reserve Price Signaling with Artyom Shneyerov and Pai Xu

We study a second-price auction model with both interdependent values and affiliated signals in this paper. The value interdependence in our model gives rise to a linkage effect. Such an information channel offers the seller an incentive to price opposite to the information rent concern. Moreover, the affiliation of signals between the seller and the buyers causes the linkage effects to differ in magnitudes across sellers. We examine the conditions for existence and uniqueness of a separating equilibrium in our model. We show that the equilibrium works when the linkage effect increases with sellers’ signals at a moderate rate. This is the case when value interdependence and signal affiliation are weak. Instead, when both of them are strong, we also show a reverse ssignalingequilibrium is possible in which better sellers signal through lower reserve prices.

Publications

“On the Information Contents of Indirect Citations,” with Kim-Sau Chung and Meng-yu Liang, Canadian Journal of Economics, March 2022
“Selling to Consumers Who Cannot Detect Small Differences,” with Kim-Sau Chung and Erica Meixiazi Liu, Journal of Economic Theory, March 2021.
“Language and Coordination Games,” Economic Theory, June 2020
“Sorting: The Function of Tea Middlemen in Taiwan during the Japanese Colonial Era,” (joint with Hui-wen Koo), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Dec 2004, 607-626.

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