Matthias Lassak

Welcome to my webpage!

I am an Assistant Professor of Finance at the University of Aarhus, Denmark.

My research interests are in applying information economics to questions in corporate finance, accounting, and financial markets.

I earned a Ph.D. in Economics at the Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.

News:

16/09/24: A new revised version of the paper Voluntary Disclosure, Price Informativeness, and Efficient Investment is available
13/09/24: I present "Efficiency Implications of Knowledge Generation: Private versus Public Firms" at the 21st Corporate Finance Days at KU Leuven
27/08/24: I have updated my CV.
18/08/24: Finally, the Second Aarhus Workshop on Strategic Interaction in Corporate Finance starts
20/06/24: I present Managerial Overoptimism, Discretionary Disclosure, and Certification at the Workshop on Accounting and Economics at WU Vienna
01/05/24: I start my (part-time) parental leave
14/03/24: A new revised version of the paper Clustered IPOs as a Commitment Device is available.
28/02/24: Nikolaj and I revised the paper "I (don't) care about your belief: Managerial Overoptimism and Discretionary Disclosure" - New title: Managerial Overoptimism, Discretionary Disclosure, and Certification
27/02/24: I present "Wait, What? The Consequences of Not Disclosing Feedback-Stimulating Information" at the DISS Workshop. See the recording of it here.
20/02/24: The submission deadline for the Second Aarhus Workshop on Strategic Interaction in Corporate Finance is closed.
08/02/24: Stefan received DKK 66'000 from the Carlsberg Foundation to support the Second Aarhus Workshop on Strategic Interaction in Corporate Finance.
Older News can be found in the News Archive

Working Papers:

Managerial Overoptimism, Discretionary Disclosure, and Certification - with Nikolaj Niebuhr Lambertsen

Theory: Examines the effect of managerial overoptimism on discretionary disclosure and certification choices.

Wait, What? The Consequences of Not Disclosing Feedback-Stimulating Information - with Tanja Keeve

Empirics: Firms that strategically withhold CAPEX guidance are associated with lower informed trading measures, harming real decision-making through the feedback effect.

Voluntary Disclosure, Price Informativeness, and Efficient Investment - Job Market Paper

Theory: In the feedback context, voluntary disclosure helps disclosing but harms nondisclosing firms' investment making, resulting in efficiency losses if the latter dominates.

Clustered IPOs as a Commitment Device

Theory: Timely clustering of IPOs by different underwriters generates a mutual disciplining effect, suggesting that underpricing levels might be a function of underwriter syndicate composition.